City of College Park v. Jenkins

JAMES R. EYLER, Judge. Alvin F. Jenkins, appellee, filed two separate actions to quiet title in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, claiming that he had acquired title to certain property by adverse possession. Appellee filed affidavits stating that no other persons claimed a right to the property, that all persons who appeared of record to have an interest in the property were named as defendants, and that their whereabouts were unknown. Consequently, pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-122, process was served by publication.

After the time for responding to the complaints had expired, the court entered judgments by default. More than 30 days after each judgment was entered, the City of College Park, appellant, filed motions to intervene, pursuant to Rule 2-214, and motions to vacate the judgments, pursuant to Rule 2-535(b). Appellant alleged that it had an interest in the property and that the judgments should be vacated because of extrinsic fraud, based on appellee’s knowledge of appellant’s interest and failure to include appellant as a party. According to appellant, the property in question lies ²⁵⁹ within a right of way (“the railway right of way”), formerly used for transportation purposes, and acquired by appellant for the purpose of constructing a hiker/biker trail.

The circuit court denied the motions. We shall vacate the circuit court’s opinion and order dated December 13, 2001, and remand for further proceedings. Factual Background On July 3, 1997, appellee filed a complaint to quiet title in circuit court. Appellee named as defendants the successors and assigns of Filmore Beall and James C. Rogers, trustees; the heirs, successors, personal representatives, devisees, and assigns of Francis Shanabrooke; and any and all persons claiming an interest in certain property.

The property was identified as 0.1145 acres, “being part of the railroad bed adjacent to lot 1, Central Heights Subdivision as recorded in JB No. 10 at folio 276 and re-recorded in Plat Book ‘A’ at folio 55 among the Land Records of Prince George’s County,” and was described by metes and bounds in an attached exhibit. The exhibit was prepared by William L. Machen, a registered land surveyor. Appellee alleged that, according to the land records, legal title to the property was conveyed to Filmore Beall and James C. Rogers from City and Suburban Railway and Alan L. McDermott, receiver, by deed dated October 22, 1903, and recorded in liber 17, folio 44 (“October 1903 deed”). Beall and Rogers were appointed trustees of the estate of Francis Shanabrooke in June 1903, by decree of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, in Long v. Long, Equity no. 2959.

By affidavit, appellee asserted that no other persons claimed a right to the property and that the whereabouts of the defendants were unknown. After service of process by publication, no response having been filed, appellee sought and obtained an order of default, entered on November 1, 1997, and a judgment by default, entered on December 10,1997. On April 17, 1998, appellee filed a second complaint to quiet title in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County with ²⁶⁰ respect to another parcel contiguous to the first parcel. This parcel, described by metes and bounds, contained 0.0455 acres of land.

The allegations and the named defendants were the same as in the first action. After service by publication, and in the absence of a response to the Complaint, the court, on March 8, 1998, entered an order of default, and on May 13, 1999, judgment by default. The parcels described in the two actions were contiguous to property previously acquired by appellee by deed. In both actions, appellee alleged that the named defendants were identified based on the last interest of record pertaining to the property in question.

According to appellee, this showed title ' in the trustees of the estate of Francis Shanabrooke by virtue of the October 1903 deed. According to appellant, the properties described in the actions to quiet title lie within the railway right of way, but the property described in the October 1903 deed does not lie within the railway right of way. In other words, appellant asserts that the complaints filed by appellee described parcels of property that are different from the property conveyed by the October 1903 deed. On April 8,1997, appellant acquired the railway right of way by quitclaim deed from The Bank of New York as successor trustee of the Riders’ Fund Trust.

The deed was recorded on April 21, 1997. Appellant asserts that- the conveyancer was a successor in interest to City and Suburban Railway. Appellant further asserts that the property in question was owned by City and Suburban Railway, but was retained, and as previously mentioned, was not conveyed as part of the October 1903 deed. 1 ²⁶¹ On June 15, 2001, appellant filed a motion to intervene and to vacate judgment in both of appellee’s quiet title actions. The motion to intervene was filed pursuant to Rule 2-214, and the motion to vacate judgment was filed pursuant to Rule 2-535(b).

At or about the same time, appellant filed a complaint to quiet title with respect to the property in question, naming appellee as a defendant. The quiet title action initiated by appellant is not before us. Appellant requested that it be permitted to intervene in appellee’s actions, that all three actions be consolidated, and that after the completion of discovery, its motion to vacate be heard along with its action to quiet title. The circuit court consolidated appellant’s motions regarding the actions instituted by appellee, but denied the request to consolidate those actions with appellant’s quiet title action.

The circuit court conducted an evidentiary proceeding with respect to appellant’s motions. In an opinion dated December 13, 2001, the court held that appellant had to satisfy Rule 2-535(b) before it could intervene, and that it failed to satisfy that rule. In pertinent part, the court stated: The City contends that Jenkins’ failure to name the City as a party or an interested party constitutes fraud.... This allegation does not constitute an act of extrinsic fraud within the context of Rule 2-535.

The City offered no evidence as to Jenkins’ chain of title. For the City to prevail, it would have to show that Jenkins’ chain of title revealed an ownership interest in the City and that Jenkins made false representations to the Court despite his knowledge of the City’s ownership. The City had several opportunities to challenge Jenkins’ action to quiet title and assert its interest in either or both parcels of land. This is evident by several publications associated with the filing of the action to quiet title. ²⁶² Following the court’s denial of appellant’s motions, this appeal was timely filed.

Questions Presented and Parties’ Contentions The following questions, as phrased by appellant, were presented for our review. 1. Did the trial court err in requiring the appellant to satisfy the requirements of Rule 2-535, requiring a showing of fraud, mistake, or irregularity, before allowing appellant to intervene? 2. Was the filing of a deed sufficient notice to the appellee to support a finding of fraud under Rule 2-535? Appellant contends that the court erred (1) in not permitting it to intervene prior to requiring a showing under Rule 2-535(b), and (2) assuming that it was required to make such a showing, in holding that it failed to establish fraud.

In support of the latter contention, appellant asserts that its evidence proved that the property in question is within the railway right of way, was not part of the property conveyed by the October 1903 deed, and that the railway property was conveyed to appellant by deed, which was recorded prior to the initiation of appellee’s actions. Appellee contends that appellant was not entitled to intervene because it was charged with notice of appellee’s pending actions, by virtue of publication, and because appellant had actual notice of the pending actions. Consequently, the motion to intervene was not timely. In addition, appellee contends that appellant did not show that it had an interest in the property in question because it failed to prove that the property in question was not part of the property conveyed by the October 1903 deed.

Finally, appellee argues that appellant failed to show fraud. Discussion Appellant challenges the circuit court’s denial of its motions to intervene and its motion to vacate the judgments in appel ²⁶³ lee’s quiet title actions. Rule 2-214, which outlines the requirements for intervention, provides in pertinent part: (a) Of right. Upon timely motion, a person shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when the person has an unconditional right to intervene as a matter of law; or (2) when the person claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and the person is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the ability to protect that interest unless it is adequately represented by existing parties.

Md. Rule 2-214 (2003). Rule 2-535, which explains the revisory power of a court over a judgment, provides, in pertinent part: (a) Generally. On motion of any party filed within 30 days after entry of judgment, the court may exercise revisory power and control over the judgment and, if the action was tried before the court, may take any action that it could have taken under Rule 2-534. (b) Fraud, mistake, irregularity.

On motion of any party filed at any time, the court may exercise revisory power and control over the judgment in case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity. Md. Rule 2-535 (2003). Both of these rules have been the subject of much case law. Those cases will be discussed below.

In denying appellant’s motions, the circuit court decided the Rule 2-535 question but treated the ability to intervene as being dependent upon the ability to vacate the judgment. While the court held that appellant had not proved extrinsic fraud, because there were no express findings of fact, we cannot discern whether that conclusion was based on implied findings of fact determined adversely to appellant, or whether the court accepted appellant’s evidence and assertions as accurate, but determined that the facts did not amount to extrinsic fraud as a matter of law. ²⁶⁴ This Court cannot resolve the factual questions that underlie appellant’s motions, and consequently, we shall remand the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. We offer the following comments as guidance on remand. Intervention Generally, a motion to intervene coupled with a substantive motion should be treated as a two-step process, with the first step being determination of the threshold issue of whether the petitioner has the right to intervene.

See Office of People’s Counsel v. Advance Mobilehome Corp., 75 Md.App. 39 , 42 n. 2, 540 A.2d 151 (1988) (explaining that the motion to alter or amend the judgment was not officially filed until the court granted the motion to intervene). If the motion to intervene is granted, the court then addresses-the substantive motion. Id. As explained below, for practical reasons, the general two-step process may not be an efficient way for the court to proceed in this case after remand.

However, we will address the intervention issue before we discuss the law pertaining to the motions to vacate. As previously mentioned, Rule 2-214 governs the right to intervene in Maryland. In reviewing the denial of a motion to intervene, this Court must determine whether the lower court committed error. Chapman v. Kamara, 118 Md.App. 418, 427 , 702 A.2d 977 (1997).

In the present case, we cannot determine whether the lower court committed error because the relevant factors relating to intervention were not addressed. Instead, the court treated the right to intervene as being dependent upon satisfying Rule 2-535(b). Because the issue of intervention will have to be addressed on remand, we shall comment on the relevant factors. In Chapman v. Kamara, 118 Md.App. 418 , 702 A.2d 977 (1997), we outlined the four requirements for intervention as of right: (1) the application for intervention must be timely; (2) the applicant must have an interest in the subject matter of the action; (3) the disposition of the action would at least potentially impair the applicant’s ability to protect its interest; ²⁶⁵ and (4) the applicant’s interest must be inadequately represented by existing parties.

Id. at 427 , 702 A.2d 977 (citing Pharmaceia ENI Diagnostics, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 85 Md.App. 555, 566 , 584 A.2d 714 (1991), and Hartford Ins. Co. v. Birdsong, 69 Md.App. 615, 622 , 519 A.2d 219 (1987)). Before we address the timeliness issue, we consider the other three factors and, based on the pleadings, it appears that appellant has fulfilled all three. In First Penn-Pacific Life Ins.

Co. v. Evans, 200 F.R.D. 532 (D.Md.2001), the United States District Court for the District of Maryland explained that the would-be intervenor bears the burden of demonstrating that intervention is appropriate, but also pointed out that the issue of cognizable interest should be decided on the pleadings, and not on whether the movant is likely to prevail on the merits. Id. at 536 . 2 First, appellant’s claim that appellee’s quiet title actions adjudicated the ownership rights of land to which appellant claims title clearly satisfies the element requiring that appellant have an interest in the subject matter. See Chapman, 118 Md.App. at 428 , 702 A.2d 977 (explaining that “[o]ur precedents on the sufficiency of an interest have tended to ask the question of whether the claimed interest ‘is essential to protect and ... is not otherwise protected’ ”) (citing Citizens Coordinating Comm. on Friendship Heights, Inc. v. TKU Assocs., 276 Md. 705, 712 , 351 A.2d 133 (1976), Shenk v. Maryland Dist. Sav. & Loan Co., 235 Md. 326, 326 , 201 A.2d 498 (1964); and Hartford Ins.

Co. v. Birdsong, 69 Md.App. at 626 , 519 A.2d 219 ). Second, appellant has also successfully demonstrated that the disposition of the quiet title actions impaired its ability to protect its ownership interest in the land. Chapman, 118 Md.App. at 428 , 702 A.2d 977 (requiring only that applicant establish that the disposition may impair ²⁶⁶ its ability to protect its interest) (emphasis added). Next, using the “interest-analysis” test set forth in Maryland Radiological, it is'clear that appellant demonstrated that its interests were not adequately represented by the existing parties, given that its interests are directly adverse to appellee’s position in seeking to quiet title.

See Maryland Radiological, 285 Md. at 390-92, 402 A.2d 907 (requiring a comparison of the interest of the would-be intervenor with that of the existing parties). Finally, the timeliness of a motion to intervene depends on the individual circumstances of each case, which usually involve consideration of four factors: (1) the purpose for which intervention is sought; (2) the probability of prejudice to the parties already in the case; (3) the extent to which the proceedings have progressed when the movant applies to intervene; and (4) the reason or reasons for the delay in seeking intervention. Id. at 388-89, 402 A.2d 907 . With respect to the timeliness of appellant’s motion, appellee asserts that appellant had actual knowledge of appellee’s claim of ownership of the land in question because of information given to one of its councilmen, its planning director, and its attorney approximately two years prior to the time appellant filed its motions. 3 Appellant denies that it had actual knowledge, thus creating a factual issue.

Because the circuit court did not make any factual findings pertinent to this issue, we can not determine, as a matter of law, whether appellant’s motions were timely. As alluded to earlier and as will become clearer later, this factual issue, relevant to the question of timeliness for purposes of intervention, is also relevant to the question of whether the motions to vacate should be granted. In the interest of judicial efficiency, the circuit court may decide to conduct one evidentiary ²⁶⁷ proceeding in order to decide all factual issues relevant to all motions. In addition, based on overlapping factual and legal issues, the court may also wish to consider whether proceedings to resolve the motions in these actions should be consolidated with proceedings in appellant’s action to quiet, title.

Nevertheless, after determining the facts, the court must resolve the question of timeliness, and thus intervention, as an independent, threshold issue. Motions to Vacate In the event that the court determines that appellant’s motion to intervene was timely, we shall comment on appellant’s Rule 2-585 motions, and specifically, whether appellant’s allegations, if proved, support a finding of extrinsic fraud. Rule 2 — 535(b) provides that, after thirty days, a judgment may be revised only upon a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, of fraud, mistake, or irregularity. See Tandra S. v. Tyrone W., 336 Md. 303, 313-14 , 648 A.2d 439 (1994).

The rationale underlying the rule’s strict application is that, given the highly litigious nature of today’s society, there must be a point in time when a judgment becomes final. Id. at 314 , 648 A.2d 439 . In addition, the court may only set aside a judgment when the moving party has acted with ordinary diligence and in good faith, and has a meritorious defense or cause