Clark v. O'MALLEY

KENNEY, J. Appellant, Kevin P. Clark (“Clark”), appeals the decision of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City granting summary judgment in favor of Mayor Martin O’Malley and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (“the Mayor”). Clark presents one question, which we have rewritten as follows: 1 Did the circuit court err in granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment? ⁴¹² For the following reasons, we shall reverse the circuit court’s judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In February 2003, the City of Baltimore and Clark entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) “to employ the sendees of Clark as the Police Commissioner of Baltimore City.” The City Council confirmed Clark’s appointment on March 3, 2003. Relevant provisions of the MOU include the following: SECTION 1.

EMPLOYMENT The City hereby engages the services of Clark to act as the Police Commissioner of the Baltimore City Police Department to serve the remaining term of the last Commissioner until June 30, 2008 (“Initial Term”). During the Initial Term Clark shall receive a salary of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000) per annum to be paid biweekly. SECTION 2. ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION/SEVERANCE PAY.

A. The Commissioner recognizes that he may be terminated by the City pursuant to the removal provisions by the Mayor in Baltimore City Code of Public Local Laws (§ 16-5[e]) [2] and nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights of the Mayor in that respect. However, except as stated in Section 3 [3] and for just cause as defined below, ⁴¹³ Clark shall be entitled to receive the additional compensation/severance pay as provided in section 2.B. of this Agreement regardless of the reasons for the termination of employment by the Mayor or City. Just cause for the purpose of this section shall be defined as: (1) Gross dereliction of duty; as to any one incident or series of conduct. (2) Illegal use of intoxicants or drugs; or (3) Indictment of a felony or any other crime involving moral turpitude or theft.

B. If Clark is willing and able to perform employment duties under this Agreement and the employment of Clark is (1) terminated in the Initial Term by City for any reason other than for just cause as defined in Paragraph 2.A.; or (2) in the event Clark is forced to resign following a formal or informal suggestion by the Mayor that he resign; or (3) that Clark’s salary is reduced below his present annual salary without Clark’s written consent; or (4) in the event, for any reason whatsoever other than for just cause as above defined the Mayor does not reappoint and the Council confirm the reappointment of Clark to a full six-year term immediately following the Initial Term, City agrees to pay Clark a lump sum payment, as and for additional compensation/severance, equal to six (6) months aggregate salary, including retirement benefits calculated as the employer’s share of retirement benefits at the time of termination or non-reappointment as defined herein. Clark shall also be fully compensated for any accrued sick leave, vacation, compensatory time and any other accrued benefits at the time of termination or failure of reappointment. Should Clark not be reappointed or terminated without just cause, Clark agrees that the additional compensation/severanee lump sum payment set out above shall satisfy all obligations ⁴¹⁴ City has to Clark as a result of the termination/non-reappointment. * * * SECTION 12 RIGHT TO TERMINATE WITHOUT CAUSE Either party may terminate this contract at any time, by giving forty-five (45) days prior written notice to the other. Notwithstanding the above sentence the provisions of Section 2B remain in force.

SECTION 13 NOTICES Notices pursuant hereto shall be effective when hand-delivered or when mailed by certified mail. All notices to the City shall be addressed to the City at the Office of Law— All notices from the City to Clark shall be addressed to an address to be named by Clark not more than 10 days after the execution of this contract and updated from time to time when his address changes. On November 10, 2004, the City Solicitor delivered a letter to Clark giving him forty-five days’ notice of his termination as Police Commissioner, and relieving him of his duties: This notice is sent on behalf of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (the “City”) pursuant to Sections 12 and 13 of the Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) between you and the City dated February 19, 2003. This notice shall serve as the City’s 45-day notice of termination of your employment.

Thus, your employment shall terminate 45 days from today. However, as the Mayor announced this morning, you have been relieved of all official duties as of 8:30 a.m., November 10, 2004, and therefore, your further access, if any, to Police Department facilities, equipment, or documents will be subject to the specific, prior authorization of Acting or Interim Police Commissioner Hamm. The City will begin immediately to do a calculation of the salary and benefits to which you may be due under the ⁴¹⁵ February 19 MOU and will advise you of the details once appropriate calculations are made. On November 16, 2004, Clark filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, money damages, and reinstatement to his former position as Police Commissioner.

On December 13, 2004, the Mayor moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The court held a hearing on January 31, 2005, after which it denied summary judgment, finding a genuine dispute of material facts related to the Mayor’s issuance of notice of termination to Clark. Clark filed an amended complaint on December 28, 2004. The Mayor again moved for summary judgment on February 10, 2005, asserting that admissible evidence clearly established that there was no genuine dispute of material fact with respect to notice.

The court held a hearing on April 4, 2005. After argument by counsel, the court found that the MOU is a valid and unambiguous contract, and that Clark had been properly terminated after proper notice was given pursuant to sections 12 and 13 of the MOU. The court thereby granted the Mayor’s motion for summary judgment. The Court issued a declaratory judgment on April 4, 2005, stating that the Mayor had properly terminated Clark without cause, and with proper notice.

Clark noted this appeal on April 5, 2005. Additional facts will be provided as necessary to our discussion of the issues. STANDARD OF REVIEW The circuit court may grant a motion for summary judgment “if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Maryland Rule 2-501(f). “This Court reviews the same material from the record and decides the same legal issues as the circuit court.” Lopata v. Miller, 122 Md.App. 76, 83 , 712 A.2d 24 (1998). Accordingly, “[w]hen reviewing a ⁴¹⁶ grant of summary judgment, we first determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists.” Mitchell v. Baltimore Sun Co., 164 Md.App. 497, 507 , 883 A.2d 1008 (2005). “If the record reveals that a material fact is in dispute, summary judgment is not appropriate.” Serio v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 373, 388 , 863 A.2d 952 (2004). “If we determine that no genuine issue of material fact is present, then we must decide ‘whether the [trial] court reached the correct legal result.’ ” Crews v. Hollenbach, 126 Md.App. 609, 625 , 730 A.2d 742 (1999) (quoting Chicago Title Ins.

Co. v. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co., 120 Md.App. 538, 547 , 707 A.2d 913 (1998)). “In making our analysis, we do not accord deference to the trial court’s legal conclusions.” Lopata, 122 Md.App. at 83 , 712 A.2d 24 . DISCUSSION I. Is there a Final Judgment ?

At oral argument, Clark asserted that the court’s grant of summary judgment applied to only count 10 of his amended complaint, which alleged “Breach of Contract—Termination Without Cause/Contract.” To the contrary, we conclude that the court’s judgment pertained to all of Clark’s claims. Clark’s amended complaint included ten counts. In count 1, Clark argued that the Mayor’s removal of him was illegal because it violated section 16-5(e) of the Code of Public Local Laws of Baltimore City (2005) (“PLL”), and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. In counts 2, 3, 4, and 5, Clark sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, a writ of quo warranto, and a writ of mandamus based on the Mayor’s alleged violation of PLL § 16-5(e).

Clark also based his count 5 request for a writ of mandamus on the argument that his termination violated his due process rights under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. In count 6, Clark sought a writ of certiorari based on the Mayor’s alleged violations of PLL § 16-5(e) and Article 24. In count 7, Clark asked for declaratory and injunctive relief based on the alleged violation of his rights under Article 24. In counts 8 and ⁴¹⁷ 9, Clark averred that the Mayor breached the terms of the MOU by terminating him without cause.

In count 10, Clark asserted that his termination without cause violated the terms of the MOU because he was not given proper notice. After the hearing on April 4, 2005, the court announced its judgment at follows: Counsel, the court has had an opportunity to review the papers. The court’s had an opportunity to review the contract, the notice that was provided on November 10th, 2004, the statutory references that were made in the plaintiffs papers to the public local law and the city charter as well as to the Maryland Declaration of Rights and consider all of the arguments that were presented this morning and I’m prepared to rule. On the basis of the record the court has before it, for purposes of this summary judgement [sic] motion, this court does not see that there are material facts in dispute at this point nor does the court find either conflict in the contract provisions or ambiguity in the contract provisions.

And the court is prepared to enter declaratory judgment holding that the contract between the Police Commissioner Clark and the Mayor and City Council dated February 2003 ____is a valid contract^] that pursuant to Seetion[s] 11 and 12 of that contract appropriate notice was given to the Police Commissioner on November 10, 2004, that he was lawfully terminated without cause[,] and that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment. The circuit court’s declaratory judgment, issued April 4, 2005, stated in relevant part: 2. The Memorandum of Understanding between Clark and the City is a valid and binding contract. 3. Section 12 of the Memorandum of Understanding unambiguously provides both parties with a right to terminate without cause upon giving forty-five days prior written notice to the other. 4.

Section 12 is a valid and binding provision of the Memorandum of Understanding. ⁴¹⁸ 5. On November 10, 2004, the defendants sent a notice to Clark, through counsel, that Clark’s employment as Police Commissioner would be terminated without cause in forty-five days pursuant to Section 12 of the Memorandum of Understanding. 6. Clark received the forty-five days prior notice of termination to which he was entitled. 7. The City properly exercised its right to terminate Clark’s employment without cause pursuant to Section 12 of the Memorandum of Understanding.

It is a long-standing rule that “the right to seek appellate review of a trial court’s ruling ordinarily must await the entry of a final judgment that disposes of all claims against all parties.” Maryland State Bd. of Educ. v. Bradford, 387 Md. 353, 382 , 875 A.2d 703 (2005). Maryland Rule 2-602(a) states: Except as provided in section (b) of this Rule/ [4] an order or other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all of the claims in an action (whether raised by original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim), or that adjudicates less than an entire claim, or that adjudicates the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties to the action: (1) is not a final judgment____ Indeed, “[tjhere can be no final judgment until every claim is resolved.” Tierco Maryland, Inc. v. Williams, 381 Md. 378, 393 , 849 A.2d 504 (2004). Here, the court found that the Mayor had a valid contractual right to terminate Clark without cause because the MOU “is a valid and binding contract.” Thus, the court’s grant of ⁴¹⁹ summary judgment and subsequent declaratory judgment clearly resolved all of Clark’s claims that were based on arguments that his termination violated PLL § 16-5(e) or the terms of the MOU. Specifically, the court’s judgment disposed of counts 1-4 and 8-10 in their entirety, and counts 5 and 6 to the extent they were based on the Mayor’s alleged violation of PLL § 16-5(e).

Counts 5 and 6 were based in part, and count 7 was based in its entirety, on Clark’s assertion that his termination violated his due process rights under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 5 Article 24 protects, among other things, an individual’s interest in procedural due process. Samuels v. Tschechtelin, 135 Md.App. 483, 523 , 763 A.2d 209 (2000). “To be successful in an action alleging denial of procedural due process in violation of a property interest, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he had a protected property interest, that he was deprived of that interest, and that he was afforded less process than was due.” Id. A colorable property interest in a position of employment requires “ ‘a legitimate claim of entitlement’ ” to continued employment. Id. at 524 , 763 A.2d 209 (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)).

That claim must be grounded on a source apart from Article 24 itself, “ ‘such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits,’ ” or “[a] public employment contract.” Samuels, 135 Md.App. at 524, 527 , 763 A.2d 209 (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 ). The circuit court’s finding that the City “exercised its right to terminate Clark’s employment without cause pursuant to Section 12 of the Memorandum of Understanding,” constituted an implicit finding that Clark did not have a legitimate ⁴²⁰ property interest in continued employment and, thus, that he had received any process due to him under the circumstances. The court’s judgment resolved all of Clark’s claims that were based on an alleged violation of his due process rights and was an appealable final judgment.

II

Was there a Genuine Dispute of Material Fact? Clark contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in granting summary judgment prior to the completion of discovery. In addition, he argues that certain material facts are genuinely disputed. A Grant of Summary Judgment Prior to Completion of Discovery Clark argues that the court’s grant of summary judgment prior to the completion of discovery “effectively terminated the Scheduling Order without a full factual record having been developed,” and that “[discovery would have established a full evidentiary record that the Court should have had before ruling on a dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment.” To be sure, the circuit court may “deny a motion for summary judgment so that a more complete factual record can be developed.” AJ.

Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 333 Md. 245 , 262-63 634 A.2d 1330 (1994). Maryland Rule 2-501(d) provides as follows: If the court is satisfied from the affidavit of a party opposing a motion for summary judgment that the facts essential to justify the opposition cannot be set forth for reasons stated in the affidavit, the court may deny the motion or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be conducted or may enter any other order that justice requires. “ ‘The timing of a summary judgment ruling, i.e., whether it is to be postponed pending completion of discovery or denied in favor of submission to the fact-finder, falls within the trial court’s discretion and will be reviewed only for abuse of ⁴²¹ discretion.’ ” Chaires v. Chevy Chase Bank, 131 Md.App. 64, 88 , 748 A.2d 34 (2000) (quoting Paul V. Niemeyer & Linda M. Schuett, Maryland Rules Commentary 95 (2d ed.1992, Supp. 1998)). Clark did not submit an affidavit pursuant to Rule 2-501(d).

In his brief, he focuses primarily on the court’s scheduling order, and argues that he was “substantially prejudiced” by the grant of summary judgment prior to the completion of discovery in accordance with the order. The status of the scheduling order, in and of itself, has no direct bearing on whether the court’s grant of summary judgment prior to the completion of discovery was an abuse of discretion. Maryland Rule 2-501 (a) provides that “[a]ny party may make a motion for summary judgment on all or part of an action on the ground that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The court could consider the status of discovery under a scheduling order in its decision to grant or deny summary judgment, but the rule is not limited by such an order. Given Clark’s failure to support his allegations that there were disputes of material fact with “an affidavit or other written statement under oath,” Md. Rule 2-501 (b), or an affidavit “that the facts essential to justify the opposition cannot be set forth for reasons stated in the affidavit,” Md. Rule 2-501(d), we are not persuaded that the circuit court erred or abused its discretion in considering the motion for summary judgment prior to completion of discovery under the scheduling order.

B. Clark’s Assertion of Genuinely Disputed Material Facts In the memorandum in support of his motion for summary judgment, and at the motion hearing, the Mayor asserted that the material facts surrounding Clark’s termination were not in dispute: that the City entered into the MOU with Clark, the terms of which included a right on the part of either party to terminate Clark’s employment without cause upon forty-five ⁴²² days’ written notice; that Clark was given notice of termination required by section 12 of the MOU on November 10, 2004; and that Clark was sent a check that would have satisfied the terms of the MOU in the event of termination. In support of his motion, the Mayor submitted the affidavit of the City Solicitor, who stated that he wrote and delivered the notice letter to Clark on November 10, 2004. The Mayor also submitted the affidavit of Lieutenant Robert Haukdal, the Acting Director of the Fiscal Section of the Baltimore Police Department. Haukdal stated in his affidavit that, after Clark’s termination, the City continued to pay his biweekly salary of $5,769.24 through December 25, 2004.

He also stated that the City sent Clark a check in the amount of $8,513.22 for “unused vacation time and comp time,” and “a check for $49,318.76, reflecting Mr. Clark’s aggregate salary for six months ($75,000), minus deductions.” The relevant payroll records and photocopies of the checks that were sent to Clark were included. In his response, Clark argued that, because the Mayor’s answer to the amended complaint was in the form of general denials, “Defendants by their own pleading have put at issue every material fact concerning every claim alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint.” Clark asserted that there were disputes of material fact surrounding the notice of termination, arguing in his response memorandum that the notice was “inefficient and defective” because it was issued by the City Solicitor, rather than the Mayor, and because the Board of Estimates took no part in his termination. He asserted that whether the notice satisfied the contractual requirement of forty-five days was also in dispute. 6 Clark further contended in his memorandum that, with regard to his claim of deprivation of due process, “[i]t is disputed whether Plaintiff received ... notice and was given an opportunity to be heard before his removal and termination.” ⁴²³ Clark submitted no affidavits or other documents demonstrating the alleged factual disputes. At the hearing, counsel noted that “[w]e did submit a[ ] verified] complaint.” Maryland Rule 2-501(a) provides: Any party may make a motion for summary judgment on all or part of an action on the ground that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The motion shall be supported by affidavit if it is (1) filed before the day on which the adverse party’s initial pleading or motion is filed or (2) based on facts not contained in the record. The party moving for summary judgment shoulders the burden of proof that no genuine dispute of material fact exists. Carter v. Aramark Sports & Entm’t Servs., 153 Md.App. 210, 224 , 835 A.2d 262 (2003). The movant may satisfy that burden by “identify[ing] portions of the record that demonstrate absence of a genuine issue of material fact,” Nerenberg v. RICA of S. Maryland, 131 Md.App. 646, 660 , 750 A.2d 655 (2000), or “by placing before the court facts that would be admissible in evidence or otherwise detailing the absence of evidence in the record to support a cause of action.” Bond v. Nibco, Inc., 96 Md.App. 127, 134 , 623 A.2d 731 (1993).

The response to a motion for summary judgment is governed by Maryland Rule 2-501 (b): A response to a written motion for summary judgment shall be in writing and shall (1) identify with particularity each material fact as to which it is contended that there is a genuine dispute and (2) as to each such fact, identify and attach the relevant portion of the specific document, discovery response, transcript of testimony (by page and line), or other statement under oath that demonstrates the dispute. A response asserting the existence of a material fact or controverting any fact contained in the record shall be supported by an affidavit or other written statement under oath. “In order for there to be disputed facts sufficient to render summary judgment inappropriate ‘there must be evi ⁴²⁴ dence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.’ ” Danielewicz v. Arnold, 137 Md.App. 601, 612-13 , 769 A.2d 274 (2001) (quoting Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Richard F. Kline, Inc., 91 Md.App. 236, 244 , 603 A.2d 1357 (1992)). “Once the movant makes his showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to ‘identify with particularity the material facts that are disputed.’ ” Nerenberg, 131 Md.App. at 660 , 750 A.2d 655 (quoting Md. Rule 2-501(b)). As stated in Niemeyer & Schuett, supra, at 357 (3d ed.2003): A response that simply denies or argues that the facts are in dispute without inclusion of an affidavit or other admissible evidence is insufficient.

The court cannot treat bald allegations in a response as creating a disputed fact, any more than it can assume that contentions made in an opening statement or closing argument dispute evidence introduced at trial. The Mayor’s motion for summary judgment alleged specific facts that were not in dispute. He submitted affidavits and other evidence in support of his motion. In his response, Clark merely propounded a number of arguments alleging factual disputes.

With respect to each of his arguments, however, Clark either failed to identify with particularity the disputed facts, failed to demonstrate that the facts were in dispute, or failed to support the alleged dispute with affidavits or other documentation. Clark’s contention that the Mayor’s general denial of most of the averments in the second amended complaint places all of the facts alleged in the complaint in dispute patently does not “identify with particularity” the supposed factual disputes. Md. Rule 2-501(b). Similarly, his argument in his brief to this Court that “[a]ll of the facts as alleged underlying [his due process] claims are disputed” does not demonstrate any error by the circuit court in its application of Maryland Rule 2-501(b).

The Mayor does not dispute that the City Solicitor, rather than the Mayor, delivered to Clark the notice of termination. Likewise, it is undisputed that the Board of Estimates did not ⁴²⁵ participate in Clark’s termination. Thus, Clark has not raised a genuine dispute as to those facts. It is the legal implications, and thus the materiality, of those facts that is in dispute.

See O’Connor v. Baltimore County, 382 Md. 102, 111-12 , 854 A.2d 1191 (2004) (stating that a dispute over whether employment regulations enacted by the County violated the County charter is not a factual dispute). Clark likewise failed to raise a factual dispute as to whether he received proper notice. The Mayor contends that Clark was terminated without cause upon forty-five days’ notice in accordance with the MOU. It is unclear whether Clark continues to assert that there is a dispute regarding whether the notice itself satisfied the terms of the MOU.

It appears that he argues that notice was insufficient due to the timing of the delivery of that notice based on the fact that the Mayor had announced his termination several hours before the notice was delivered, a fact that is not disputed. In his brief to this Court, he states that “[tjhose material facts were disputed by Defendants in their Answer, but then essentially admitted in their Motion for Summary Judgment.” Thus, Clark seems to recognize that the facts surrounding the timing of the delivery of the notice are not in dispute. Despite his argument that the timing of the notice was disputed, he failed to “identify and attach the relevant portion of the specific document, discovery response, transcript of testimony (by page and line), or other statement under oath that demonstrates the dispute.” Md. Rule 2-501(b). Moreover, the effectiveness of the notice under the terms of the MOU is not a factual dispute, but, rather, the basis for Clark’s legal argument that the Mayor breached the terms of the MOU.

See O’Connor, 382 Md. at 111-12 , 854 A.2d 1191 . We perceive no error in the circuit court’s finding that there is no genuine dispute of material fact. We turn now to whether the Mayor was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ⁴²⁶ III. Is the Mayor Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law?

A. The Mayor’s Power to Remove the Police Commissioner Clark presents four somewhat related arguments with regard to the Mayor’s authority to remove the Police Commissioner and name a new Police Commissioner. First, Clark claims that, because he took an oath of office upon his appointment as Police Commissioner, he is a public officer who could not be removed by the Mayor at will. Second, he asserts that the Police Commissioner is independent from the “interference and control” of the Mayor. Third, he argues that the Mayor may remove a police commissioner only in accordance with the PLL, which provides for removal of the Commissioner only for cause.

Finally, he contends that, because he was not legitimately removed from his position, the Mayor had no authority to appoint a new Police Commissioner. The Mayor, in response, contends that he has the power to enter into a contract with a police commissioner that provides for removal without cause. He also argues that the matters of appointing and removing the Police Commissioner are “peculiarly local in character,” and that a decision limiting his power to do so would improperly impinge on the City’s authority over its Police Commissioner. Article XI-A of the Constitution of Maryland provides for limited self-government by the various counties and Baltimore City.

Ratified by the voters in 1915, Art. XI-A, popularly known as the Home Rule Amendment, provides for the distribution of powers between the State Legislature and the political subdivisions of the State; the underlying purpose of the Article is to share with the counties and Baltimore City, within well-defined limits, powers formerly reserved to the General Assembly so as to afford the subdivisions certain powers of self-government. ⁴²⁷ Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., 287 Md. 595, 597 , 415 A.2d 255 (1980). Section 1 of Article XI-A provides for “the election of a charter board” in any county or the City, to “prepare ... a charter or form of government” for that entity. Md. Const, art. XI-A, § 1. “ ‘(A) charter ... ’ which the voters of Baltimore City or any county may adopt under Art. XI-A, s 1 is, in effect, a local constitution which forms the framework for the organization of the local government....” Cheeks, 287 Md. at 606 , 415 A.2d 255 .

Accord Maryland State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws v. Talbot County, 816 Md. 332 , 341, 558 A.2d 724 (1988); Ritchmount P’ship v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections for Anne Arundel County, 283 Md. 48, 58 , 388 A.2d 523 (1978). After the City or a county adopts a charter by popular election, it “shall become the law of said City or County, subject only to the Constitution and Public General Laws of this State, and any public local laws inconsistent with the provisions of said charter and any former charter of the City of Baltimore or County shall be thereby repealed.” Md. Const, art. XI-A, § 1.

Baltimore City adopted a charter (“the Charter”), pursuant to Article XI-A, in 1918. Cheeks, 287 Md. at 599 , 415 A.2d 255 . The Charter provides that the Mayor has the power to appoint municipal officers: “Except as otherwise provided in the Charter, the Mayor shall have the sole power of appointment of all municipal officers, subject to confirmation by the City Council by a majority vote of its members....” Charter, art. IV, § 6(a).

The Charter further provides that the Mayor may remove municipal officers: The Mayor shall have the power to remove at pleasure all municipal officers, except members of boards and commissions established by Charter or other law, appointed by the Mayor in the manner prescribed in this section and confirmed by the City Council; provided, however, that appointees holding office pursuant to