Clark v. Strasburg

BLACKWELL, Judge. Under Maryland Code (1974, 1987 Cum.Supp.), Estates and Trusts Article, § 2-102(c), an “interested person may petition the [orphans’] court to resolve any question concerning an estate or its administration.” An “interested person” is: “(1) A person named as executor in a will; (2) A person serving as personal representative after judicial or administrative probate; ⁷¹² (3) A legatee in being, not fully paid, whether his interest is vested or contingent; (4) An heir even if the decedent dies testate, except that an heir of a testate decedent ceases to be an ‘interested person’ when the register has given notice pursuant to §§ 2-210 or 5-403(a).” Id. at § l-101(g). We granted certiorari to determine whether a pretermitted spouse who elects to take a statutory share is an interested person within the meaning of Code, Estates and Trusts, § l-lOl(g). 1 I Margaret H.S. Clark, a domiciliary of Montgomery County, Maryland, died testate on May 19, 1986. On June 24, 1986, the will of Margaret Clark was admitted to probate and her daughter, Anne H. Strasburg, was appointed personal representative of the estate.

On August 27, 1986, W. Edward Clark, the surviving spouse of Margaret Clark, who was not a beneficiary under the terms of the will, renounced the will and elected to take his statutory share under § 3-203. 2 On the same day, Mr. Clark moved to have his name added to the List of Interested Persons. On September 19, 1986, the Orphans’ Court for Montgomery County (Sanders, J.) ordered that the List of Interested Persons be amended to include Mr. Clark. On June 10, 1987, Mr. Clark contested the accuracy of the appraisal and inventory of the estate pursuant to § 7-204. 3 ⁷¹³ On June 15, 1987, the Orphans’ Court (Miller, J.) denied Mr. Clark’s petition concluding that Mr. Clark was not an interested person under § l-101(g) and therefore had no standing to challenge the inventory and appraisal. Mr. Clark appealed the order to the Court of Special Appeals.

We issued a writ of certiorari to that court on our own motion and we now reverse. 4 II Under § l-101(g), an ‘interested person’ includes: “An heir even if the decedent dies testate, except that an heir of a testate decedent ceases to be an ‘interested person’ when the register has given notice pursuant to §§ 2-210 or 5-403(a).” Id. at § l-101(g)(4). The personal representative insists that Mr. Clark is the heir of a testate decedent and therefore ceases to be an interested person after notice is given pursuant to §§ 2-210 or 5-403. Mr. Clark counters that “[t]he legislature could not possibly have meant to create the right to elect a statutory share and then deny the means to protect [that] right.” (Appellant’s brief at 12). He argues, among other things, that an electing spouse, as one who takes an intestate share of the estate, should be treated as an heir of an intestate decedent.

We begin by noting that an heir is defined as “a person entitled to property of an intestate decedent pursuant to §§ 3-101 through 3-110,” § l-101(f), and that a ⁷¹⁴ surviving spouse is an heir as a person entitled to property of a intestate decedent pursuant to § 3-102. The transfer of property from a