Clautice v. Murphy

Collins, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases are the result of a collision at the intersection of Water and Commerce Streets, ■ in Baltimore ⁵⁶⁰ City, between a taxicab and a truck, the plaintiff being a passenger in the taxicab, which had the right of way at the intersection. The defendant, F. Albert Clautice, individually and trading as Hanover Transfer Company, the owner of the truck, appeals from the judgment awarded the appellee, Mary Murphy, and from the judgment entered in favor of Russell R. Vane, individually and trading as Diamond Cab Company, the owner of the taxicab, and both appeals are considered in this opinion. At the point of the accident, Commerce Street is about forty feet wide and Water Street, a one-way street for eastbound traffic, is about thirty feet in width.

An unused single car track is laid along the center of-Commerce Street. At about 4.10 P. M. on November 28, 1940, the street being dry and traffic congested, the plaintiff, Mary Murphy, was riding in a taxicab, owned by Vane, in an easterly direction on Water Street. The truck of the appellant, Clautice, was proceeding south on Commerce Street. The appellee, Mary Murphy, testified that when she was coming- down Water Street in the taxicab she saw a green car at the corner of Water and Commerce Streets, hereinafter referred to as the green car, waiting to let the cab go by.

The green car was standing still and not making any sort of turn and the driver of the green car let the cab go by, the cab being to the right of that car. The cab driver was going rather fast down Water Street, that she does not drive a car and doesn’t know anything about miles per hour nor about speed. As the cab driver started to cross Commerce Street he was almost across the street when the truck came and hit the taxicab. When the truck hit the cab she was thrown up in the air, and when she came down she struck her face against the front seat of the cab and then her body rocked back and forth between the two seats.

She landed on the floor in the middle of the cab. She told the driver that she thought her hips were hurt and he came around and picked her up and put her on the seat. ⁵⁶¹ The driver of the taxicab stated that he was going east on Water Street with Miss Murphy as a passenger and slowed down to from five to seven miles an hour in second gear and when he saw the green car stop to let him go by, he continued across the intersection in second gear at a rate of from ten to twelve miles per hour. The green car coming south on Commerce Street stopped to let him go by and that naturally when he stopped to let him go by he went ahead still in second gear. The truck went around the green car, which was stopped, and hit his left rear fender.

He didn’t see the truck pass around the green car as he wasn’t expecting that. He just got a glimpse of the truck before his cab was hit. He was past the car tracks, which ran down the center of Commerce Street, when the accident happened and the front of his cab has reached the east curb line before the cab was hit. He was three-quarters of the way across Commerce Street, almost completely over.

He further said that when the truck hit his cab it jarred the rear and shook the passenger, the appellee, out of her seat. When he looked back, Miss Murphy was off the seat and he helped her back and took her to Mercy Hospital, where he waited about an hour or two when appellee was examined and he then took her home. The truck driver stated that he was driving south on Commerce Street and in front of him was the green car trying to find a parking space. As this could not be found, the green car started to turn up Water Street and after it was found that this was a one-way street, the green car stopped.

He then pulled around the green car. When he made the left turn around the green car he was partly on the wrong side of the street. He pulled right out on the left-hand side, partly on the car track, and then hit the taxi on the left rear fender, the taxi being on the track. He further stated that he did not see the cab until he hit it.

The green car had stopped when he pulled around it. ⁵⁶² Six exceptions were taken by the appellant, the sixth being abandoned on appeal. The defendant, Vane, at the end of the case, offered the following prayer: “The court instructs the jury that there is no evidence in this case legally sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover against the defendant, Russell R. Vane, and therefore their verdict must be for the defendant, Russell R. Vane.” Under Rule Four of Part Three, III, General Rules of Practice and Procedure, adopted by this court pursuant to Chapter 719 of the Acts of 1939, the trial judge reserved his ruling on this prayer and allowed the case to go to the jury. After a verdict was brought in for the plaintiff, the following day the defendant, Vane, under Rule Eight, moved for a judgment N. O. V. and in the alternative moved for a new trial. After a hearing on this motion, the trial judge granted defendant Vane’s-prayer for a directed verdict and entered a judgment N. O. V. in favor of the defendant, Vane, for costs and refused the motion for a new trial.

The action of the trial judge in granting this judgment N. O. V. in favor of Vane for costs constitutes the fifth exception of the appellant and will be first considered by us here. The first question that arises is whether this prayer is sufficient under Rule Four, supra, providing that a motion or prayer for a directed verdict shall state the grounds therefor. In the instant case, there being but one issue of fact to which it could apply, the prayer is sufficient. Under the provision of the Code, 1939, Art. 56, Sec. 235, as to vehicles approaching an intersection from right to-left, Vane’s driver of the cab was the favored, Clautice’s driver of the truck the unfavored, driver.

There is no evidence that the traffic at the intersection was governed by signal lights or any other governing device. The general rule applicable therefore under ordinary circumstances was that all vehicles shall have the right of way over other vehicles approaching at intersection public roads from the left. Article 56, Section 235, supra; Billotti v. Saval, 165 Md. 563 , 168 A. 890 ; ⁵⁶³ Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351 , 189 A. 260 . It appears without doubt that the two drivers came to the intersection in such proximity of time as to require the accommodation of one to the other.

Under such circumstances the driver of the taxicab had the right of way over the driver of the truck. Billotti v. Saval, supra; Jersey Ice Cream Co. v. Bach, 161 Md. 285, 292 , 157 A. 277 ; Minch v. Hilkowitz, 162 Md. 649, 656 , 161 A. 164 ; Paolini v. Western Mill & Lumber Corp., 165 Md. 45, 52 , 166 A. 609 ; Warner v. Markoe, supra. Clautice’s driver, coming from the left, was required to yield to avoid apparent chances of collision. The driver of the taxicab coming from the right could rightly expect such a yielding.

On the other hand, the driver of the truck from the left could rightly expect traffic from the right to be under control and that it would take care to avoid traffic from its own right. If the taxicab came at such a speed in disregard of other traffic, negligence in driving from the left would not constitute an intervening cause superseding such excessive speed. The driver of the taxicab was, of course, under the duty to recognize that drivers from the left will often cross negligently, miscalculating the chances of collision. United Railways & Electric Co. v. State, 163 Md. 313, 325 , 163 A. 90 ; United Railways & Electric Co. v. Crain, 123 Md. 332 , 91 A. 405 ; Lange v. Affleck, 160 Md. 695 , 155 A. 150 , 79 A. L. R. 1274; Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. Wilkinson, 107 Md. 574, 581 , 69 A. 412 , 16 L. R. A.

(N. S.) 200; 72 Univ. of Pa. Law Review, 211, 343; Torts, Restatement, Sec. 449; Warner v. Markoe, supra. The rule is well stated in the case of Chiswell v. Nichols, 137 Md. 291, 306 , 112 A. 363, 368 , where it is said: “The first and chief thought and care of the driver of a vehicle approaching an intersecting road should be given to those vehicles that might be approaching him from the right, and, for the safety of those using the public roads, too much stress cannot be laid upon the importance of so doing. At the same time the traveler is not, because of the statute, looking to the general safety ⁵⁶⁴ and welfare of others as well as himself, altogether relieved of the necessity of observing the condition of the road to his left with a view of ascertaining whether or not the road is clear and free of persons and vehicles approaching from that direction.” Warner v. Markoe, supra; Askin v. Long, 176 Md. 545, 547, 548 , 6 A. 2d 246 .

The question, although governed by statute, usually is one of fact. Askin v. Long, supra. In the instant case the green car had stopped at the intersection almost in the middle of Commerce Street, near the intersection, there being another car parked between- it and the curb. The driver of the taxicab seeing the green car stopped was under no duty to assume that the truck would pull around this green car on the left-hand side of Commerce Street practically at the intersection and cross the intersection at that point.

This is exactly what the truck driver did, as brought out by all of the testimony. He admits that he did not see the taxicab