Clayton v. Clayton

Henderson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal challenges the authority of the divorce court to award alimony to a wife incident to a decree of divorce on the ground that her husband had another wife living at the time of the marriage. It was alleged, and proved, that the parties were married by a religious ceremony on September 6, 1933, and that there are four children of the marriage. She alleged that she discovered that the appellant had been married on January 24, 1926, to one Adelaide Magruder, although Adelaide obtained a divorce on February 15, 1945.

The appellee filed her bill on May 24, 1961. The Chancellor awarded her alimony and support for a minor child. It is conceded that the effect of the decree was to legitimate the children under Code (1957), Art. 16, Sec. 27 and the award of support for the minor child is not challenged. ⁷⁶ One of the grounds for a divorce a vinculo, set out in Code (1962 Supp.). Art. 16, Sec. 24, is “secondly, for any cause which by the laws of this State, render a marriage null and void ab initio”.

The purpose and application of this clause are not free from doubt. See the discussion by Strahorn in 2 Md. L. Rev. 211 and 13 Md. L. Rev. 128 . But we think it clearly covers the case of bigamy and establishes another prevenient ground of divorce, as distinguished from annulment under Code (1962 Supp.) Art. 16, Sec. 22 (cf. Fisher, Admrx. v. Demarr, 226 Md. 509 ), and formerly available under Code (1957), Art. 62, Sec. 16, repealed by Ch. 36, Acts of 1962, (cf. Ridgely v. Ridgely, 79 Md. 298, 304 ), and now under Rule S76, following a conviction of bigamy under Code (1957) Art. 27, Sec. 18. Whether there could be a bigamy prosecution in the instant case is a question we need not consider.

Code (1957), Art. 16, Sec. 3 provides: “In cases where a divorce is decreed, alimony may be awarded”. The appellant argues that under Code (1957), Art. 16, Sec. 2, alimony can only be granted for causes cognizable in the ecclesiastical courts. This section reads: “The courts of equity of this State shall and may hear and determine all causes for alimony, in as full and ample manner as such causes could be heard and determined by the laws of England in the ecclesiastical courts there”. The ecclesiastical courts only granted alimony where there was a divorce a mensa and the marital status subsisted.

Sec. 3 (first adopted by Ch. 262, Acts of 1841) was specifically designed to enlarge the jurisdiction of the equity courts beyond what was conferred by Sec. 2, and to authorize the award of support beyond the scope of historical alimony. The same argument here pressed was made unsuccessfully in Foote v. Foote, 190 Md. 171 . It was there held that alimony could be allowed (by reading sections 3 and 24 together) incident to a grant of divorce on the ground of voluntary separation, a ground entirely unknown to the ecclesiastical