Cleckley v. State

⁸¹ Mason, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Sam Cleckley, appellant, was convicted by a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore on five counts of robbery. On appeal appellant contends: (1) That the trial court erred in admitting evidence seized from three pocketbooks during a warrantless search; (2) that he was denied a speedy trial; (3) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. On the afternoon of January 10, 1976, at 1:40 p.m., a man, accompanied by a woman, entered Mondie’s Beauty Shop in Baltimore City.

After producing a pistol, the man robbed Sarah Mondie, owner of the shop, and four other females of money and jewelry valued at several thousand dollars. Later the same day around 6:30 p.m., a red Buick with Maryland license tags, operated by appellant, was illegally parked on 8th Avenue and 126th Street in New York City. As Officer Vincent Guzzo and his partner, Officer Peter Cotroneo, approached the vehicle to give the operator a summons, the vehicle pulled off from the curb without lights, While the vehicle was stopped at a red light, Officer Guzzo approached the car from the driver’s side and asked appellant for his driver’s license and registration card. Whereupon appellant gave the officer his license and a rental receipt for the vehicle he was driving.

Officer Cotroneo, who had approached the car from the passenger side, observed Raymond Cleckley, appellant’s nephew, in the back seat acting a little “fidgety”, i.e., moving his hands and shifting his feet. When Officer Cotroneo directed the beam of his flashlight to the floor in the rear of the car, he observed the end of an automatic revolver with the hammer cocked. At this point, he drew his service revolver and ordered Raymond Cleckley not to move. Officer Guzzo in the meantime called for assistance.

On arrival of other officers, appellant was removed from the car and frisked. A .22 caliber pistol was recovered from his pocket. Appellant, Raymond Cleckley, and a male passenger who was in the front seat of the vehicle, were all arrested and transported to the police station. Officer Guzzo took custody of appellant’s vehicle and while driving it to the station house noticed three ladies’ purses on the front seat.

After parking the vehicle, he opened them and ⁸² observed their contents. The officer then removed the handbags from the car and took them into the station house. After advising appellant of his Miranda rights he opened one of the purses which contained the identification of one Jacqueline Gardner. Appellant, when asked who she was, said she was his “old lady.” After booking appellant on the handgun charge, the officer telephoned Jacqueline Gardner regarding her purse.

She told him she had been a victim of a robbery earlier that day, and referred him to a Detective Cole of the Baltimore City Police Department who was handling the case. Soon thereafter the officer inventoried the contents of the three purses. At trial, the .22 caliber revolver, which had been removed from appellant’s pocket, as well as the three purses and their contents were introduced into evidence against appellant. The victims of the robberies identified the purses and the items contained therein.

The .22 caliber revolver was identified by Sarah Mondie as belonging to her. In addition, there was testimony that at approximately 1:45 p.m., on the day of the robbery, a red Buick with its motor running and with a man at the wheel, was observed parked near Mondie’s Beauty Shop. The State also introduced evidence showing appellant had leased the red Buick he was driving in New York from Avis Car Rental in Baltimore. Further, Sarah Mondie testified that Raymond Cleckley was the man who had robbed her beauty shop.

Appellant argues that the purses and the property contained therein should not have been admitted into evidence because they were obtained as the result of an illegal search. On the other hand, the State argues that these items were properly admitted into evidence because the actions of Officer Guzzo did not constitute a Fourth Amendment intrusion, but amounted to no more than a bonafide taking of an inventory. I. In determining whether the search of the pocketbooks was an impermissible intrusion of Fourth Amendment values or the bonafide taking of an inventory, we are guided by the case ⁸³ of South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976) where the Supreme Court stated: “When vehicles are impounded, local police departments generally follow a routine practice of securing and inventorying the automobiles' contents. These procedures developed in response to three distinct needs: the protection of the owner’s property while it remains in police custody; the protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property; and the protection of the police from potential danger.” (Emphasis supplied) (Citations omitted).

In Duncan and Smith v. State, 281 Md. 247, 259 (1977) the court of appeals held: “[P]olice may, without regard to probable cause, and, thus, absent a warrant, constitutionally enter an automobile and unlocked compartments therein, and inventory and seize articles found, provided the vehicle had been otherwise legally taken into police custody and the inventorying was pursuant to a standard police procedure.” (Emphasis supplied) The principle exposited by these cases is that inventory searches must be conducted in a non-investigative manner, as part of a standard, routine procedure and not conducted to discover evidence of crimes. See Boone v. State, 39 Md. App. 20, 30 (1978), affirmed with modification, State v. Boone, 284 Md. 1 (1978). See also Waine v. State, 37 Md. App. 22 (1977). We think the following testimony of Officer Guzzo on cross-examination, at the suppression hearing, clearly shows the purpose for which the search was conducted: “Q Can you explain to the Court why you did not place the purses that you found on the front seat of the car in the trunk and lock the trunk?

A Well, we were trying to find someone who knew to verify who the ownership of it was. ⁸⁴ Q Why? A It appeared to be a few rings of considerable cost. Q These purses were closed when you first observed them on the front seat? A Yes.

Q And after you found them you opened them? A Yes. Q You did this before they were inventoried? A I opened them before I removed them from the car.

Q You had your inventory sheet out at the time you were opening the purses? A No. Q For what purpose did you open the purses before you removed them from the car? A I opened the purses to see what their contents were. Q Why did you do that?

A I was interested to know. Q Why? A Because my suspicions were aroused. The Defendant was found to be in possession of a gun and the purses on the front seat.

Q You were looking for incriminating evidence? A No, sir. Q What do you mean when you say your suspicions were aroused? Suspicions of what?

A Suspicions of what the women’s purses were doing there at that time on the front seat of the car. Q What specifically were you suspicious about? A I was suspicious whether the items belonged to the occupants of the car. Q When you saw the purses the first time in the car?

A Yes. ⁸⁵ Q You thought that it was the result of a robbery or stick up or purse snatching? A Yes. Q There is no typical inventory of a person’s property when you routinely impound a car? A No. Q It was the result of an exploratory act on your part which led you to the conclusion that the Defendant might be in possession of incriminating evidence.

MR. KATZ: Objection. THE COURT: Overruled. THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.” Based on our independent examination of the evidence in the record, as we are required to do, Walker v. State, 12 Md. App. 684 (1971), we think it clear that the challenged search in this case was not conducted pursuant to a standard