Cloud v. State

Moylan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant, Leevonn Cloud, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Harford County by a jury, presided over by Judge Harry E. Dyer, Jr., of both rape and perverted practices. He raises here the unusual claim that the trial judge, by his action in revoking bail in mid-trial, revealed his own strong belief in the appellant’s guilt and thereby prejudicially disposed the jury in that direction. No question is raised as to the legal sufficiency of the evidence or as to the conduct of the trial proper.

The relevant facts bearing on this novel contention are all collateral to the trial itself. Prior to trial, the appellant had been free on bail, a property bond posted by his mother and father. He had been on such bail for approximately eight months when the trial commenced on Wednesday, November 4, 1970. The trial continued through Thursday, November 5, and Friday, November 6.

The appellant remained on bail throughout those first two and one-half days of trial. At 11:15 a.m. on Friday, the State closed its case in chief, reserving only the right to reopen the case on the following Monday to present the testimony of one F.B.I. agent, who would not be available until that time. At that point, the jury was excused from the room and the trial judge made the following announcement: ⁴²⁶ “Now, in view of the fact that we are at the point of closing the State’s case, the Court feels that it can no longer permit the Defendant to remain free on a bond that expired when he first came into the court on Wednesday, or whenever it was that we started this trial. Actually, of course, the Court didn’t realize it at first, but the bond stops when the Defendant appears in Court for trial.

He has been free on his own recognizance. The Court does not feel that that can continue at this stage of the case. So that I will have to direct the Sheriff to take charge of the Defendant at this time. I understand that the Defendant will be returned to Towson for the weekend and will be brought to this Court on Monday.

I direct the Police of Baltimore County — and I don’t know to whom I should speak, because I don’t know who the Senior Officer is that might be present — but whoever it might be and I think they can all hear me, I do not want the jury to be made aware of any change in the status of this Defendant on Monday or at any time during the progress of this trial, which means that I want the Defendant brought into the Sheriff’s Office on Monday morning well before ten o’clock, — or well before 9:30, or 9:00 even, and I want the Sheriff then to be responsible for him, bringing the Defendant to this Courtroom. And I do not want handcuffs on the Defendant in the Courtroom at all when he comes in. Whatever precautions you Police think are necessary outside is up to you all. I am not going to interfere with Police practice, but I do not want that to be displayed in here.

And I want the Defendant in the Courtroom before the Jury gets here, which means that I would suggest that you have the Defendant in ⁴²⁷ the Courtroom no later than 9:45 and preferably around 9:30.” This unexpected turn of events precipitated an extended colloquy between the court and appellant’s counsel. Over the repeated protests of the appellant and under strenuous probing by the appellant for the reasons for the action, the trial court explicitly and repeatedly insisted that the only reason for taking the action was that the bail which had earlier been posted had expired with the appearance of the appellant at the commencement of the trial on Wednesday morning. Since there was no indication that the State ever sought a change in the appellant’s status or that the court, sua sponte, felt such a change to be in order on the ground that the appellant was not a good bail risk, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether a trial court, in the absence of any new circumstance, may review and override an earlier decision that a defendant shall be free upon bail. See Md. Rule 777.

We look only at the court’s action in terms of the reasons given by the court for that action. We feel that the trial court was in error in its conclusion that the liability of the surety terminated with the commencement of the trial. The Property Bail Application and Recognizance, signed, sealed and posted by the mother and father of the appellant, pledged their property at 4113 Boarman Avenue, assessed at $8,800, as security “for the appearance of the above defendant in court when required.” It recited further, “Failure to appear to answer said charge and all other charges which may be preferred, shall constitute a forfeiture of the bail.” Although this precise problem does not