Coale v. Merryman

Brent, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case has been argued only on the part of the appellants, no oral or written argument having been submitted by the appellees. The bill was filed by Hester Coale, and her three daughters, Sarah B., Martha E. and Jemima O. Coale to correct certain alleged mistakes in a deed from Plester Coale to Lewis Merryman, dated the 10th of February, 1865, conveying to him in trust certain leasehold property, and bank stock of the Howard Bank, in Baltimore city. The power of Courts of Equity, to reform upon parol evidence mistakes in deeds, is so well settled, that it may be assumed as a concession in this case.

The only difficulty is in questions of this character, the certainty and extent of the proof required to establish the mistake. While there is to be found much conflict in the cases upon this point outside of ³⁸³ our own State, the rule here is, that only such full and strict evidence is required as will be sufficient to satisfy the mind of the Court. This rule is established in 6 Md., 485 , and affirmed in Schaeffer and Wife vs. Burk, an unreported case decided at April Term, 1871. The inquiry therefore in the present case is, does the evidence fully establish a mistake'?

The deed is a voluntary settlement of property, the legal title to which was in Hester Coale, but in which the three daughters had an equitable interest as their means had contributed to purchase it. It conveys this property to a trustee upon certain limitations, uses and restrictions, which Mrs. Coale and two of her daughters, who were examined as witnesses, concur in stating were not designed and intended. These constitute the mistake complained of. The conveyancer, on the other hand, who prepared the deed, thinks it conforms to the instructions which he received from Mrs. Coale, but while she cannot possibly be mistaken, without the imputation of false swearing, when she testifies what she did purpose and intend at the time she directed the deed to be prepared, he may have misunderstood, and no doubt did misunderstand and mistake her wishes and intention.

Her testimony is explicit as to the character of the conveyance she designed to make, and the time when the mistake in the deed, she had executed, was discovered. It is coroborated by the testimony of her daughters, and we can perceive no reason to doubt it. The deed, as before said, is not one of bargain and sale, but is a voluntary settlement, and all the parties interested in it, who are sui juris, are willing that it should be reformed and corrected. Hot to allow it to be done under such