Coates v. State

DAVIS, Judge. Bobby Dean Coates, appellant, was charged with three counts of manslaughter by automobile, three counts of homicide by motor vehicle while intoxicated, and lesser related offenses. On August 8,1990, appellant was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County (Melbourne, J.) of three counts of homicide by motor vehicle while intoxicated and the lesser related offenses. He was acquitted on the manslaughter counts.

On September 24, 1990, the court merged the convictions upon the lesser offenses into the homicide convictions and imposed a sentence of three consecutive five year terms of incarceration with all but nine years suspended. His appeal, timely noted, presents the following questions: I. Did the trial judge impermissibly restrict the defense cross-examination of prosecution witnesses?

II

Did the trial judge err in ruling that evidence of intoxication or drug use of the victims was relevant only to credibility and not to the substance of appellant’s guilt or innocence?

III

Did the trial judge err in permitting prosecution witnesses to remain in the courtroom after their testimony and in refusing to permit them to be reserved as rebuttal witnesses? Because we hold that the trial court, by its instruction, foreclosed the jury from considering evidence relevant on the question of who caused the accident, we reverse and ¹⁰⁹ explain. We nonetheless address the remaining issues for guidance of the lower court when the case is retried. A motor vehicle accident which occurred on October 14, 1989, at approximately 1:15 a.m. on Bealle Hill Road, a dual lane road in Prince George’s County, provides the factual backdrop in this case.

The lanes of the road are each 10 feet wide and are separated by a double yellow line. Appellant was driving north on Bealle Hill Road in his Ford Thunderbird automobile. He had consumed about four beers in the preceding five hours. Eleven members of a motorcycle club were proceeding south along the same road, riding six motorcycles, traveling two abreast.

The motorcyclists had spent the evening at a bar and then at a party. As appellant and the motorcyclists passed each other, a collision occurred. Appellant’s automobile collided with two of the motorcycles, on which John Becker and Brian Minor were riding. Apparently, other motorcycles collided with each other.

As a result, Brian Minor, Donald Blaylock, and his passenger, Helen Doane, were killed. Appellant and several of the surviving motorcyclists were injured. At trial, several of the motorcyclists testified that appellant crossed the double yellow line, entered their lane, and caused the accident. Appellant testified that he drove in his own lane and that at least one motorcycle crossed the line, struck his car, and caused the accident.

Accident reconstructionists, qualified as experts, were called by both parties and testified. Corporal Patrick Burley of the Prince George’s County Police Department testified for the State that, in his opinion, appellant’s automobile crossed the line and collided with the motorcycles in the southbound lane. According to Corporal Burley, appellant’s automobile pushed Becker’s motorcycle into Blaylock’s motorcycle and then crashed head-on into Minor’s motorcycle. Appellant’s expert, Harry Kriemelmeyer, testified that the evidence did not support the conclusion that appellant crossed the line.

He further opined that, when appellant ¹¹⁰ collided with Minor, the impact occurred on appellant’s side of the road. The witness claimed Minor, not appellant, was operating his vehicle on the wrong side of the road. Each expert contested the other’s opinion in regard to the correct interpretation of the various road marks and items of physical evidence. At the conclusion of the evidence, the lower court instructed the jury, in part: You have heard evidence that the drivers of some of the motorcycles involved in this accident may have consumed alcohol and/or a controlled dangerous substance prior to the accident.

It is not a defense to the charges in this case that some or all of the drivers of the motorcycles may have been intoxicated and/or under the influence of these substances or were guilty of contributory negligence. You are instructed that you are not to consider this evidence unless you find that the accident was caused by any of the drivers of the motorcycles. You have also heard evidence in this case that some or all of the passengers of the motorcycles involved in this accident may have been consuming alcohol prior to the accident. It is not a defense to these charges that the victim Helen Doane may have been consuming alcohol prior to her death.

It is also not a defense to these charges that the passengers who testified may have consumed alcohol prior to the accident. This evidence is only to be considered by you in so far as it affects the witness’s credibility, that is, their ability to perceive the incident and their memory. It is not relevant otherwise. I tried to make that clear in the beginning of this trial.

I hope you all understand the Court’s ruling. Their consumption at that party immediately before this accident is relevant to whoever is on the witness stand does it affect the ability to hear, see what they are testifying to. I'm talking about the passengers now. So whoever testified who was a passenger it does go to the credibility, are ¹¹¹ you going to believe them, but it is not a defense to the charges in this case. [Emphasis supplied.] I RESTRICTION ON DEFENSE’S CROSS-EXAMINATION Appellant claims that the trial judge impermissibly restricted the defense’s cross-examination of prosecution witnesses John Becker, Robert Greininger, and Corporal Burley.

During the cross-examination of John Becker, defense counsel asked Becker if he was pursuing a civil suit in this matter. The prosecution’s objection to this question was sustained by the court. Appellant claims he intended to impeach the witness and show motive. Defense counsel apparently based his question on a statement Becker made to police, but counsel failed to lay the proper foundation for his question.

When the trial judge explained her reason for sustaining the objection, counsel did not attempt to lay the proper foundation and then restate the question. Md. Rule 4-323. Thus, appellant forfeited the opportunity to pursue this line of questioning. Subsequently, on cross-examination of Robert Greininger, defense counsel attempted to question him about an alleged physical attack that counsel suggested Greininger made upon appellant after the accident occurred.

The State’s objection was sustained, and the trial court stated, “You are introducing evidence in your case. You are not cross-examining.” Cross-examination is generally limited to matters raised on direct examination. Small-wood v. State, 320 Md. 300, 307 , 577 A.2d 356 (1990). The scope of the cross-examination inquiry is subject to the trial judge’s sound discretion.

Robinson v. State, 298 Md. 193, 201 , 468 A.2d 328 (1983). We are not persuaded that the trial judge abused her discretion in this case. Questioning the witness concerning an attack on appellant was outside the scope of the direct examination and properly could have ¹¹² been raised if appellant had called Greininger as his witness. Finally, appellant complains of the court’s restrictions on his cross-examination of Corporal Burley, who was called as the State’s expert on accident reconstruction.

Appellant enumerates several instances: whether Corporal Burley had testified in previous motorcycle cases and how many; whether Corporal Burley inquired about the blood alcohol levels of Becker, Blaylock, and Sharon Storke, a motorcycle passenger; whether Corporal Burley inquired about Becker’s cocaine use; and when Corporal Burley informed appellant that he was being charged. In each instance, the prosecution’s objection was sustained. Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. The trial judge properly sustained the prosecutor’s objection regarding the number of motorcycle cases in which Corporal Burley had testified previously because defense counsel had asked the question and it had been answered on two prior occasions during the voir dire of Corporal Burley as to his qualifications.

Defense counsel questioned Corporal Burley regarding whether he inquired into the blood alcohol levels of Becker, Blaylock, and a passenger. The trial judge properly sustained the prosecution’s objection, as this issue was not within the scope of Corporal Burley’s testimony as an expert in accident reconstruction. Moreover, this subject was not raised on direct examination; the questioning, therefore, was improper. At a later point, counsel asked Corporal Burley about his inquiry into Becker’s cocaine use.

This inquiry was outside the scope of the direct examination. Becker himself had previously testified that he did in fact ingest cocaine prior to the accident. The trial court did not err in sustaining the prosecution’s objection to the question as to when Corporal Burley had informed appellant that he was being charged in connection with the accident. The trial court’s ruling was correct that ¹¹³ defense counsel’s question was outside the scope of redirect examination.

II EVIDENCE OF INTOXICATION OR DRUG USE BY VICTIMS Appellant posits that THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT EVIDENCE OF INTOXICATION OR DRUG USAGE BY THE ALLEGED VICTIMS WAS RELEVANT ONLY TO CREDIBILITY AND NOT TO THE SUBSTANCE OF APPELLANT’S GUILT OR INNOCENCE. Appellant contends that the court’s instruction and “the numerous related rulings applying to evidence and argument ... completely skewed the trial of this case.” He asserts that the central issue was who caused the accident, and whether one of the motorcyclists crossed the yellow line and struck his vehicle was relevant to the question of causation. Citing the trial judge’s rulings excluding evidence of intoxication contained in the medical records of the victims, the trial judge’s instructions on whether the jury should consider evidence of intoxication as to who caused the accident, and what appellant perceives to be restrictions on the closing argument by defense counsel, appellant claims the jury was denied the right to consider relevant evidence in arriving at its verdict. We agree.

Manslaughter by automobile requires proof of gross negligence, which can be defined as wanton or reckless disregard for human life. State v. Kramer, 318 Md. 576, 590 , 569 A.2d 674 (1990). No proof of intoxication is required. Because of the difficulty in proving “gross negligence” (that is, wanton and willful conduct), the offense of homicide by motor vehicle while intoxicated was established.

Webber v. State, 320 Md. 238 , 577 A.2d 58 (1990). The Legislature’s purpose in enacting this crime was to ¹¹⁴ create a lesser offense than manslaughter which would require “proof of a lesser degree of negligence than gross negligence.” Id. at 247 , 577 A.2d 58 . Therefore, the crime of homicide by motor vehicle while intoxicated requires only that the State prove that appellant was intoxicated 1 when he drove the motor vehicle that struck and killed the victim and that his negligent