Cobourn v. Moore

Oeetjtt, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an action of libel brought by Frederick Lee Cobourn, the appellant, against Leo M. Moore and George T. Pennington, the appellees, in the Circuit Court for Harford County. It grew out of a newspaper controversy concerning the issues and candidates involved in the mayoralty election of the City of Havre de Grace held in 1929. In his amended declaration, the appellant, after stating that he was an attormey at law in good standing, practicing his profession in the state and federal courts, that for a “'number of years” he had been the city attorney for the ³⁶⁰ City of Havre de Grace, and had resigned that office in April, 1929, and that he enjoyed an unblemished reputation in the community where he resided and practiced his profession as an upright, respectable, law abiding and moral citizen of professional integrity and honesty in the practice of the law, alleged that the appellees falsely and maliciously composed, printed and published in the Democratic Ledger, a weekly newspaper published and circulated throughout the City of Havre de Grace and Harford County of and concerning him, the following “false, untrue, malicious, wicked, defamatory and wanton libel,” to wit: “To the Citizens of Havre de Grace— “Recently a number of letters addressed to me and signed by Mr. Robert R. Lawder have appeared in a local paper.

These letters were signed by Mr. Lawder, but they were actually prepared and written by Mr. Frederick L. Cobourn. Mr. Oobourn is simply using Mr. Lawder as his mouthpiece. The questions raised in these letters are too ridiculous and so evidently purely political bunk that they do not deserve an answer, but I have answered them as will be shown in the statement given below;. Mr. Oobourn, who wrote Mr. Lawder’s letters, was until recently City Attorney.

If during my term any act of mine was wrong it was Mr. Oobourn’s duty to advise me and the City Council about it. He always assured us we were within our rights. “Here are some facts, not idle conjectures, which Mr. Oobourn’s Lawder has not brought to the people’s attention: “1st. Mr. Cobourn’s Lawder while a member of the legislature introduced the Lawder amendment to the City Charter raising the tax limit from $1.15 on the hundred dollars to $1.50 on the hundred dollars. Was Mr. Ooboum’s Lawder then looking ahead to the time when he would be Mayor and when he would raise the tax rate to $1.50.

Mr. Lawder thought a higher tax rate needed when he introduced his bill and if he is Mayor he will probably stick to his views. ³⁶¹ “2nd. Mr. Oobourn’s Lawder did not call to the attention of the voters the fees which Mr. Oobourn has charged and been paid by the city which are as follows according to the city books: Year 1924. Jan. 8 — R. L. Cobourn.......... $550.00 Jan. 23 — R. L. Oobourn.......... 46.50 Dee. 1 — R. L. Cobourn.......... 520.00 June 2 — R. L. Cobourn.......... 2,350.00 Year 1925. Jan. 19 — R. L. Cobourn.......... 25.00 June 1 — R. L. Oobourn.......... 500.00 July 20 — R. L. Cobourn.......... 53.00 Oct. 19 — R. L. Cobourn.......... 500.00 Oct. 5 — R. L. Cobourn.......... 1,000.00 Year 1926.

Jan. 4 — R. L. Cobourn.......... 900.00 July 19 — R. L. Coboum.......... 2,500.00 Sept. 6 — R. L. Oobourn.......... 417.00 Year 1927. March 7 — R. L. Cobourn.......... 150.00 June 6 — R. L. Coboum.......... 750.00 Sept. 19 — R. L. Oobourn.......... 250.00 Total paid Cobourn in four years, $11,011.50 Average paid Cobourn per year.. 2,752.87 “This is approximately one-third of the total income of the City of Havre de Grace in a single year from taxes, and is nearly sufficient to pay in full the total floating debt of the City which would have been done, except for Mr. Lawder’s Cobourn’s high fees charged to the tax-payers. It is my intention because of these charges to secure a new City Attorney in the event I am re-elected. Mr. Cobourn evidently knew this when he brought out Mr. Lawder for Mayor against me.

If Mr. Lawder is elected he will, no doubt, appoint Mr. Cobourn his main backer, as City Attorney, and Mr. Lawder may have need for his $1.50 tax rate to keep the City from going in debt. I shall under no circumstances appoint Mr. Cobourn City Attorney if I am elected. * * *” ³⁶² He further alleged that these words were in fact understood by the readers of said newspaper to mean, and were-intended by the appellees to be understood as meaning: “That the fees charged by the plaintiff to the City of Havre de Grace were unreasonably high and caused the City of Havre de Grace to have a floating indebtedness which would have been paid were it not for said alleged high charges made by the plaintiff, and meaning and intending to mean thereby,, that the plaintiff, speaking of him individually and as an attorney at law, was a man unfit by reason of said alleged high charges to act as city attorney and thereby intending to bring the plaintiff into public scorn, contumely and disrespect among his neighbors, clients and acquaintances.” To -that declaration the appellants demurred generally, and specially on the grounds: (1) that the words charged were not actionable per se and that no special damage was alleged,, and (2) that the colloquium did not support the innuendo. The court sustained that demurrer, and the plaintiff declining to further amend, judgment for costs in favor of the defendants was entered, and from that judgment the plaintiff appealed. The effect of the demurrer was to concede such matters of fact stated in the declaration as were “issuable and well pleaded” (1 Poe, PI. & Pr., sec. 705), and it is apparent from an examination of the declaration that no special damages were alleged, so that the only question presented by the appeal is whether in the absence of such an allegation the facts alleged in the declaration are sufficient to charge an actionable libel.

Newbold v. Bradstreet, 57 Md. 38, 53 ; Flaks v. Clark, 143 Md. 381 . The decision of that question depends upon whether there is anything in the alleged libelous-matter to support the construction which the appellant placed upon the words “high fees” and “high charges,” which is that they were intended by appellees to mean and were understood as meaning that appellant’s fees and charges were “unreasonably high,” and that he as an attorney at law was by reason of such “alleged high charges” a man unfit “to act as city attorney.” The publication itself is apparently of a recrim ³⁶³ inatory nature and purports to be a reply to some article which the author attributed to Mr. Cobourn, and its essential averments of fact are that Mr. Oobourn was for four years city attorney for the Oity of Havre de Grace, that during that period he collected fees aggregating $11,011.50, an -average of $2,752.87 per annum> that such charges were “high,” that the author of the article if elected mayor would not appoint Mr. Oobourn “city attorney” but that his opponent Lawder, if elected, “'no doubt would.” Assuming that these allegations were all false in fact and maliciously made, the only one of them which could possibly had been regarded ás libelous was that Oobourn had charged the municipality “high fees” for his services as city attorney. The allegations that he was city attorney and that he was paid for his services as such were certainly not libelous, nor, in view of the relations existing between Oobourn and the author of the article, as indicated in the publication, did his statement that because of these high charges he would appoint a new city attorney reflect adversely upon Oobourn. There is no apparent reason why such charges, even if false, should have degraded, humiliated, or injured the appellant, or have reflected upon his personal or professional integrity, or have brought him into public ridicule, hatred, scorn, contumely, or disrespect.

Nor are there in the narr. any colloquia which could give to the word “high” as used in the alleged libelous publication a meaning different from that ordinarily attached to it. So that the final question is whether it is libelous per se to falsely and maliciously publish of and concerning a lawyer that he made and collected high charges for his professional services. “High” as applied to fees, charges, or prices, is