Colao v. County Council of Prince George's County

DAVIS, Judge. This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County affirming decisions of the County Council for Prince George’s County, sitting as the District Council (Council), that, in separately enacted ordinances, approved two rezoning applications—A-9900 and A-9901. Six questions are presented on this appeal, the first of which is a threshold jurisdictional question. We restate (and rearrange the order of) these questions as follows: I. Did the circuit court err in entertaining the appeal of the Council’s approval of rezoning application A-9900?

II

Did the circuit court err in determining that the Council sufficiently articulated its findings of fact and conclusions of law?

III

Did the circuit court err in determining that the Council’s approvals of the rezoning applications were supported by substantial evidence?

IV

Did the circuit court err in denying appellants’ motion to supplement the record with a transcript of the oral argument before the Council? V. Did the circuit court err in determining that the Council was not required to remand the case for failure of the administrative file to contain certain documents?

VI

Did the circuit court err in determining that the Council was not required to remand the case upon the amendment of rezoning application A-9900? FACTS This case involves two separate rezoning applications, which the Council ultimately approved through enactment of separate zoning ordinances. In October 199B, appellee North- ⁴³⁷ peak-Racetrack Limited Partnership (Northpeak) filed two applications to rezone certain parcels of land situated northwest of Bowie, Maryland in Prince George’s County, in furtherance of its plan to build a townhouse development and retail center in the area. By the first rezoning application (A-9900), Northpeak requested that two parcels of land be rezoned from R-R (Rural-Residential) and R-A (Rural-Agricultural) zoning to R-S (Residential-Suburban) zoning.

These two parcels—the northern parcel and the southern parcel— are separated by Route 197 and total approximately 95.84 acres. By the second rezoning application (A-9901), appellee Northpeak requested that four acres of land located adjacent to the southern parcel be rezoned from R-R zoning to L-A-C (Local Activity Center) zoning for a retail center. The subject property is located within the approved Bowie-Collington-Mitchellville and Vicinity Master Plan (master plan). Appellants oppose each of Northpeak’s rezoning applications.

Appellants are Charles F. Colao, Alexander Senecal, Nancy Engelman, and the Berwyn Rod & Gun Club, Inc. Northpeak asserts that its rezoning requests are in conformity with the recommendations of the master plan. The applications recite that the master plan recommends that R-A zoning be retained for the northern parcel and that the southern parcel be rezoned to R-S zoning for development at a density of 1.6 to 2.6 dwelling units per acre. Northpeak desired to rezone the northern parcel to the R-S zone, and then—rather than develop the northern parcel—transfer the dwelling unit per-acre density from the northern parcel to the southern parcel, thereby increasing the maximum number of units in the southern parcel as set forth in the master plan. In exchange for this density transfer, Northpeak offered the undeveloped and newly rezoned R-S northern parcel for use as a park.

According to Northpeak, this parkland dedication is consistent with the master plan’s suggestion that a thirty-acre park be located in the vicinity of the northern parcel, and that the density transfer is consistent with the master plan’s goal for increasing housing opportunities in the area. ⁴³⁸ Northpeak also proposed a convenience center for the four-acre parcel that would span 15,000 to 25,000 square feet of gross floor area. This, according to Northpeak, is consistent with the recommendations of the master plan (which suggests that a developer could submit a rezoning application to construct a convenience center occupying a maximum of 15,000 square feet of gross floor area). Northpeak’s market study purportedly justifies the floor area increase. Under the Prince George’s County Code, the R-S zone and the L-A-C zone are “Comprehensive Design Zones.” See Prince George’s County Code §§ 27-179 to 27-198 (1991).

Accordingly, Northpeak’s rezoning applications are considered comprehensive design zone applications. As a result, many different public offices in Prince George’s County held hearings, reviewed each rezoning application, and issued recommendations thereon. 1 The Bowie City Council, after a series of public hearings, issued a letter dated March 1,1994 to John W. Rhoads, the chairman of the Prince George’s County Planning Board, reflecting the Bowie City Council’s recommendations. 2 The letter stated that the Bowie City Council voted to recommend that A-9900 be denied because the northern parcel was included in the R-S rezoning request. ⁴³⁹ According to the letter, however, the Bowie City Council voted to approve A-9900 for R-S rezoning of the southern tract at a density of 1.6 to 2.6 units per acre, subject to five conditions, provided that the northern parcel was excluded from the R-S rezoning request. With respect to A-9901, the Bowie City Council recommended that the L-A-C rezoning be granted subject to a 15,000 square foot limitation, with residential density permitted as set forth in the master plan. The Technical Staff of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission (MNCPPC) issued a report dated February 1, 1994 to the Prince George’s County Planning Board of the MNCPPC and to the Council, recommending approval of the rezoning and of the dwelling unit density transfer from the northern to the southern parcel for a maximum 200 dwelling units.

The Technical Staffs approval of A-9900 was subject to eleven conditions dealing with such matters as traffic and environmental issues. The Technical Staff also recommended approval of A-9901 for 15,000 square feet of retail use on two acres and residential use on the remaining two acres with a maximum of twenty dwelling units. In addition, the Prince George’s County Planning Board of the MNCPPC conducted a hearing on March 10, 1994 and issued two resolutions (one for A-9900 and one for A-9901) four days later, recommending to the Council approval of the applications based on the Technical Staffs analysis. The Zoning Hearing Examiner (ZHE) of Prince George’s County conducted hearings on March 2, 17, and 21, 1994.

On March 29, 1994, the ZHE issued a written decision regarding applications A-9900 and A-9901. Therein, with respect to A-9900, the ZHE recommended to the Council denial of the northern parcel rezoning request and approval of R-S rezoning for the southern parcel (with a dwelling unit density of 1.6 to 2.6 per acre), without a dwelling unit density transfer. With respect to A-9901, the ZHE recommended approval of L-A-C rezoning for the four-acre parcel with 15,000 square feet of commercial floor space and with sixteen to twenty-four units of residential use. Other facts pertaining to the ZHE hearing and decision will be explained more fully below. ⁴⁴⁰ The Council conducted oral argument on May 18, 1994.

On June 22, 1994, the Council issued notices that it had enacted a series of zoning ordinances disposing of Northpeak’s rezoning applications. In the ordinances pertaining to A-9900, the Council adopted the recommendations of the ZHE, subject to various conditions and considerations regarding issues of traffic, environment, and topography. Similarly, in separately enacted ordinances pertaining to A-9901, the Council adopted the ZHE’s recommendations, subject to certain conditions concerning, among other things, safety and transportation. In response to the Council’s approvals, appellants filed a Petition for Review on July 22, 1994 with the circuit court.

Below the caption, in the text of the petition, the petition requests judicial review of the Council’s approval of application A-9901. Appellants’ petition, however, does not state that appellants are also appealing from the Council’s rezoning approval of A-9900, nor does it refer to that rezoning approval. Appellants assert that they intended to appeal from the approval of A-9901 and A-9900 but, because of a clerical error, they inadvertently failed to refer to A-9900. On August 1, 1994, in response to appellants’ petition for judicial review, the Council issued a “Notice of Filing of Petition for Judicial Review” to all parties to the proceeding pursuant to Maryland Rule 7—202(d).

This notice announced ■ that appellants had filed a petition for judicial review of the Council’s approval of application A-9901, and that any party wishing to oppose the petition must file a response within thirty days after the date of the mailing of the notice. No mention is made of A-9900. On October 18, 1994, nearly ninety days after the filing of the petition for judicial review, appellants filed with the circuit court a “Motion to Correct Petition and Record” (motion to correct) to amend the petition to reflect that appellants were also appealing from the approval of A-9900. Therein, appellants argued that the failure to refer to A-9900 was a clerical error, that they fully intended to appeal from the approval of ⁴⁴¹ A-9900, and that appellees suffered no prejudice from appellants’ clerical error.

Also on October 18, 1994, appellants filed a “Motion to Include Transcript in the Record and Petition to Show Cause” (transcript motion). Therein, appellants argued that, during the May 18, 1994 oral argument, the Council committed procedural errors and the Chairman of the Council exhibited personal bias against appellants’ counsel (discussed below), which resulted in an unfair hearing in violation of due process. Appellants, therefore, requested that the circuit court order the transcript from the May 18, 1994 oral argument included in the record so that the circuit court could fully consider the issues regarding the Council’s alleged improper actions. In the alternative, appellants requested a show cause order to have the appeals remanded to the Council for inclusion of the transcripts in the record. 3 On December 23,1994, the circuit court conducted a hearing on these motions.

The circuit court, from the bench, granted the motion to correct, but denied the transcript motion. With respect to the motion to correct, commenting that it was a “very close issue,” the circuit court determined that the failure to refer to A-9900 resulted from a clerical mistake, that there was substantial compliance with the rules, and that no prejudice to appellees resulted. With respect to the transcript motion, the circuit court ruled that its task was to review the evidence before the Council—not to review the transcript of the oral argument. Thus, the circuit court concluded that the alleged bias and prejudice against appellants were collateral to the substantive issue of the propriety of the Council’s rezoning approvals.

On April 12, 1995, the circuit court heard oral argument on appellants’ petition for review. Following argument, the circuit court issued its ruling from the bench, affirming the ⁴⁴² decisions of the Council. In so doing, the circuit court ruled that there was substantial evidence to support each rezoning decision. Thereafter, appellants filed a timely appeal with this Court challenging the judgment of the circuit court.

DISCUSSION I As a threshold matter, appellees contend that the circuit court was without authority to review the Council’s approval of A-9900 because of appellants’ alleged failure to file a timely petition for review of A-9900 in compliance with Maryland Rule 7-203(a). In order to determine whether appellees are correct, we must examine the Maryland rules governing circuit court review of administrative decisions. 4 A “The rules in this Chapter [Maryland Rule 7-201 to 7-210 (1996) ] govern actions for judicial review of an order or action of an administrative agency, where judicial review is authorized by statute.” 5 Maryland Rule 7-201(a) (1996) (emphasis added). An “administrative agency” includes a “unit of ... a ⁴⁴³ political subdivision of the State.” Id. at 7-201(b). Rule 7-203 governs the time for which a petition for judicial review of an agency decision must be filed in circuit court.

That rule provides: Except as otherwise provided in this Rule or by statute, a petition for judicial review shall be filed within 30 days after the latest of: (1) the date of the order or action of which review is sought; (2) the date the administrative agency sent notice of the order or action to the petitioner, if notice was required by law to be sent to the petitioner; or (3) the date the petitioner received notice of the agency’s order or action, if notice was required by law to be received by the petitioner. This rule is derived from former Rule B4. See notes following Md.Rule 7-203 (1996). See also One Hundred Twenty-Second Report of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Vol. 19, Issue 26 of Md.Reg. 2278 (Dec. 23, 1992).

Former Rule B4.a. provided that “[a]n order for appeal shall be filed within thirty days from the date of the action appealed from____” Md.Rule B4.a. (1993). In addition, subsections b through e of that rule contained provisions for extending or reducing the time for filing an appeal from an administrative decision. Id. at B4.b.-e.

Significantly, former Rule B5 provided: If the appellant shall fail to file his order for appeal within the time prescribed by Rule B4 (Time for Filing) or any order issued pursuant thereto ... the court shall dismiss the appeal unless cause to the contrary he shown. (Emphasis added). On March 30, 1993, Rules B1 to B13 were rescinded effective July 1, 1993. Md.Rule B1 to B13 (1994).

Rule 7-203, as presently codified, first appeared in the 1994 version of the Maryland Rules. Neither the “cause” aspect of Rule B5, nor the provisions for extending or shortening time, survived the 1993 rules change, and are noticeably absent from the present ⁴⁴⁴ rules. Because the time for initiating an action for review is viewed as a statute of limitations, the good cause exception was omitted from the present codification. See Committee notes following Md.Rule 7-203 (1996). 6 It is clear, therefore, that discretion has been removed from the circuit court with respect to untimely filed petitions for judicial review of agency decisions.

Accordingly, the petition must be filed within the thirty-day filing period in order for the circuit court to have authority to hear the appeal. 7 In this regard, Md.Rule 7-203- operates in a similar manner as Md.Rule 8-202(a), with respect to appeals to this Court. See Houghton v. County Comm’rs of Kent County, 305 Md. 407, 413 , 504 A.2d 1145 (1986) (“if the requirement is not met, the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction and the appeal must be dismissed.”); Maxwell v. Ingerman, 107 Md.App. 677, 678 , 670 A.2d 959 (1996); Blackstone v. State, 6 Md.App. 404, 406 , 251 A.2d 255 (1969) (The Maryland Rules do not contain a provision authorizing an extension of the thirty-day notice of appeal period from the circuit court to this Court). ⁴⁴⁵ The principle that the thirty-day period under Rule 7-203 is now considered in the nature of a statute of limitations, the extension of which is no longer possible for good cause, must not be confused with another important principle: mere technical defects respecting the petition for review will not cause an appeal from an administrative agency to be dismissed if the petitioner has otherwise substantially complied with the procedural rules and there is no prejudice to the respondent. This principle was explained in Town of Somerset v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 245 Md. 52, 60 , 225 A.2d 294 (1966), where a timely-filed petition of appeal from the agency decision did not expressly allege that petitioners were persons aggrieved by the agency’s order. See Md.Rule 7-202(c) (1996) (The petition for judicial review shall “state whether the petitioner was a party to the agency proceeding.”).

The Court of Appeals recognized that “[wjhere there is compliance with the substance of the requirements of statutes or rules and the other parties have not been prejudiced, technical irregularities cannot be made the basis for depriving persons of the opportunity to assert their legal rights.” Town of Somerset, 245 Md. at 61 , 225 A.2d 294 . The Court, therefore, held that the petitioners’ failure to allege expressly in their petition that they were aggrieved parties merely was a technical irregularity. Id. A similar result was reached in Border v. Grooms, 267 Md. 100, 103-05 , 297 A.2d 81 (1972).

In that case, petitioners had technically violated Md.Rule B2.e; instead of serving a copy of the petition “on the agency,” as required by the rule, petitioners had served the copy of the petition on counsel for the agency. Before determining whether the circuit court properly entertained the appeal, the Court comprehensively discussed Maryland case law on the subject: In Volk v. Pugatch, 262 Md. 80 , 277 A.2d 17 (1971), we approved the granting of a motion to dismiss where the appellant completely failed to file the petition of appeal required by Rule B2.e and also failed to transmit the record and testimony, as required by Rule B7.a. In Salisbury Board of Zoning Appeals v. Bounds, 240 Md. 547 , 214 A.2d ⁴⁴⁶ 810 (1965), we reversed the lower court’s ruling refusing to dismiss an appeal where the appellants failed to file a petition of appeal setting forth the error committed by the agency until thirty days beyond the time prescribed for such filing by Rule B2.e. Both Volk and Bounds involved failure to file a petition of appeal complying with the requirements of Rule B2.e; in each case, we noted that the Rule did not require a showing of prejudice to the adverse party as a prerequisite to dismissal of the appeal.

In Town of Somerset v. Montgomery County Board of Appeals, 245 Md. 52 , 225 A.2d 294 (1966), the petition was timely filed but failed to expressly allege that appellants were persons aggrieved by the Board’s order. We there held, in refusing to approve a dismissal of the appeal, that “[w]here there is compliance with the substance of the requirements of statutes or rules and the other parties have not been prejudiced, technical irregularities cannot be made the basis for depriving persons of the opportunity to assert their legal rights.” 245 Md. at 61 , 225 A.2d at 299-300 . In Board of County Commissioners v. Kines, 239 Md. 119 , 210 A.2d 367 (1965), it was claimed that the appeal was subject to dismissal because a copy of the order of appeal had not been served on the agency prior to its filing with the Clerk of the lower court, as required by Rule B2.c. After noting that the agency received a copy of the petition of appeal before the expiration of the time for appeal, and therefore had “full and timely notice” that its action was sought to be overturned, we ruled that there was “substantial compliance with the appeal procedures.” 239 Md. at 125 , 210 A.2d at 371 .

Id. at 105-06. Following this discussion, the Court of Appeals held that petitioners did not fail to file a timely petition, but rather only committed a technical error akin to the error in Town of Somerset , and that, in light of the fact that they otherwise substantially complied with the rule and no prejudice resulted to the respondents, the appeal was properly entertained. Id. at 106-07 , 297 A.2d 81 . ⁴⁴⁷ It is important to note that Town of Somerset and Grooms (and the cases discussed in Grooms) dealt with technical deviations from former Rule B2, the predecessor to current Rule 7-202. Former Rule B2 and current Rule 7-202 dictate the method for securing judicial review of an agency order, and set forth technical procedural requirements related to the petition for review, such as, service of copies of the petition on the agency and the contents of the petition.

Although Rule 7-202 is very similar to Rule B2, it nonetheless underwent some significant changes. For example, the new rule specifically sets forth a caption that shall be used in a petition for review. Md.Rule 7-202(b). Additionally, the old rule’s requirement of filing an initial “order for appeal” followed by a separate “petition” of appeal, Md.Rule B2.e (1993), is replaced with the requirement that only a single “petition for judicial review” need be filed to secure an appeal.

Md.Rule 7-202(a) (1996). In light of these changes, it could be argued that the aforementioned cases decided under former Rule B2 may no longer be strictly binding authority today. Because of the similarity between the old and the new rales, however, we view these cases as highly persuasive—if not binding—authority with respect to departures from present Rule 7-202. Understanding the fundamental difference between (1) the nature of Rule 7-203’s thirty-day filing period, which may be likened to a statute of limitations, on the one hand, and (2) the principle relating to Rule 7-202 that mere technical irregularities with respect to a petition for review will be excused when the petitioner has otherwise substantially complied with the procedural rules and there is no prejudice to the respondent, on the other hand, is necessary for a firm understanding of the parties’ arguments with respect to whether the circuit court properly entertained a review of the Council's approval of A-9900.

In the instant case, there is no question that appellants filed a timely petition for review from the Council’s approval of A-9901. The critical issue, however, is whether that petition was sufficient to entitle appellants to appeal from the Council’s approval of A-9900 also. The parties, of course, hold two very ⁴⁴⁸ different views regarding the effect and nature of the petition that appellants timely filed. Under appellants’ view, “a timely appeal had been filed [from the Council’s approval of A-9900], but ... it contained a clerical error which did not prejudice Appellee Northpeak.” Thus, appellants assert that they cannot be deprived of their opportunity to seek judicial review of A-9900 as a result of a technical irregularity, because they otherwise substantially complied with the rules and appellees allegedly were not prejudiced by the technical defect.

In support of this contention, appellants rely primarily on the Town of Somerset line of cases. On the other hand, under appellees’ view, a petition for review from the Council’s approval of A-9900 was never filed—the petition that appellants actually filed being a facially non-defective and complete petition effectively preserving an appeal only from the approval of A-9901. Asserting that a petition from A-9901 was never filed, appellees cite Francois v. Alberti Van & Storage Co., 285 Md. 663 , 404 A.2d 1058 (1979), as supportive of their position that the circuit court erred in reviewing the approval of A-9900. In Francois , the petitioner violated Rule B2.e. by filing its petition for review more than ten days after the date of filing the order for appeal.

Id. at 666 , 404 A.2d 1058 (Rule B2.e. provided that “[t]he appellant shall join with his order for appeal, or shall file with the clerk of the court, within ten days after filing the order, a petition setting forth the action appealed from.... ”). The Court, citing Town of Somerset and Grooms , stated that it had “allowed an appeal to proceed on the ground that there had been substantial, if not literal, compliance with Rule B2.e on two occasions, where there were minor technical irregularities in the petition or the manner of its filing.” Id. at 667, 404 A.2d 1058 . The Court distinguished those cases from the facts in Francois , however, stating that “ ‘substantial compliance,’ given its most liberal construction, denotes at least the timely filing of the document particularly required by Rule B2.e.” Id. at 668 , 404 A.2d 1058 . Thus, the Court held that, since the petitioner did not file a petition within the time ⁴⁴⁹ required by Rule B2.e, the petitioner failed to preserve its appeal.

Id. In so doing, the Court stated: We cannot countenance a party’s substituting methods of his choice for established rules for perfecting appeals. Accordingly, we hold that [petitioner] failed to comply with the requirements of Rule B2.e. Id. 8 Appellees argue that if their interpretation of the situation is correct, the circuit court lacked authority to review the A-9900 approval, despite the fact that appellants’ failure to refer to A-9900 resulted from an honest clerical error and caused no prejudice to appellees, because there are no exceptions to the thirty-day limitations period provided in the current rule.

This is indeed the result, under the foregoing legal principles, if appellees are correct. We now turn to the resolution of this issue. B We agree with appellees that the appeal from the Council’s approval of A-9900 was not preserved. We are of the opinion that a petition for review was not timely filed with respect to that appeal.

Stated differently, the failure to file a separate petition for A-9900 (or, alternatively, to at least reference A-9900 in the timely-filed petition) was not a mere “technical” irregularity under the Town of Somerset line of cases, even ⁴⁵⁰ though it may have resulted from a clerical error. We explain. We hold that appellants were required to file a separate petition for A-9900 or were at least required to state in their timely-filed petition that they were also seeking review of the approval of A-9900, because the Council’s approval of A-9900 and its approval of A-9901 cannot be considered one appealable “order or action of an administrative agency,” Maryland Rule 7-201(a) (1996), from which judicial review may be sought. Rather, the Council’s decision to approve A-9900 was a distinct “order or action of an administrative agency,” apart from its decision to approve A-9901.

The record unquestionably bears this out. A-9900 and A-9901 were two separate rezoning applications. To be sure, rezoning applications A-9900 and A-9901 procedurally travelled together and were contemporaneously examined by the various public bodies as companion applications. This would be expected, since both applications were a part of Northpeak’s overall development plan for the area.

Indeed, throughout this case, appellees sought approval of, and appellants opposed, both applications simultaneously. This, however, does not change the fact that the Council’s action approving A-9900 was “an order or action of an administrative agency” that was administratively distinct from its action approving A-9901. Appellant must not lose sight of the fact that application A-9900 and application A-9901 were two separate rezoning applications, for different (albeit proximate) parcels of land, and for very different zoning and development purposes. A-9900 dealt with rezoning for a housing development and A-9901 primarily dealt with rezoning for a commercial center.

Although the various governmental offices may have handled both applications contemporaneously, the written reports and recommendations from these offices clearly demonstrate that A-9900 was considered as a separate rezoning request from A-9901. Indeed, the record contains a single red-well file ⁴⁵¹ folder for materials pertaining to A-9901, and two red-well file folders for materials pertaining to A-9900. Most important, the Council enacted two sets of zoning ordinances—one covering A-9900 and one covering A-9901. In other words, the Council did not approve both applications in the same zoning ordinance, but treated each application as independent, requiring separate legislative action.

Moreover, A-9900 and A-9901 were never formally consolidated into one matter. We recognize that the ZHE proceeded “as though [both applications] were joint cases,” and that many of the evidentiary exhibits and much of the testimony were applicable to both applications. (Emphasis supplied). The conduct of the ZHE in handling the applications, however, cannot erase or trump the Council’s separate administrative treatment of each application.

After all, it is the Council, and not the ZHE, that is the final agency decision maker, and, in this case, the Council took separate administrative action for each application. That both may have been dealt with as companion applications was clearly for purposes of administrative convenience, and not because they were viewed as a single rezoning application necessitating only one enactment. All of this stated, we have no doubt that appellees intended to appeal from both decisions of the Council. Unintentional clerical mistakes do, of course, happen, and we empathize with appellants in this regard.

In this case, however, the innocent clerical mistake led to a real substantive flaw, as opposed to a mere technical irregularity. Stated differently, this clerical mistake did not cause the filed petition to become technically irregular. Indeed, the filed petition, on its face, is technically sufficient under Rule 7-202—with one minor exception that we shall discuss below. In this regard, the filed petition states that appellants “were parties to the proceedings before the District Council on this matter,” in compliance with Rule 7-202(c) (the petition shall “state whether the petitioner was a party to the agency proceeding.”).

Additionally, the filed petition states that appellants are “requesting judicial review,” also in compliance ⁴⁵² with Rule 7-202(c) (the “petition shall request judicial review”). Furthermore, the filed petition identifies the decision of the Council in the case of A-9901. See Md.Rule 7-202(e) (“The petition shall ... identify the order or action of which review is sought....”). Somewhat ironically, the caption of the filed petition contains a defect that, if relied upon by appellees as a basis for dismissal of the A-9901 appeal, we would deem to be a mere technical irregularity under the Town of Somerset line of cases.

As previously noted, Rule 7-202(b) sets forth a caption to be employed in the petition for review, which requires the petitioner to reference the “agency case number.” The caption of appellants’ filed petition for review, however, fails to indicate the “agency case number.” In our opinion, in the circumstances of this case where omission caused no problem to the agency or prejudice to anyone, a mere technical irregularity in the petition should be excused because appellants substantially complied in every other respect with the rules. Thus, apart from a minor violation of the caption provision in Rule 7-202(b), appellants’ petition for review is flawless. Because it is not defective in any material way, we do not consider it to be a technically irregular petition for review. Rather, it is a complete and effective petition for review of the approval of A-9901.

This, coupled with our holding that the Council’s approval of A-9900 was a separate appealable “order or action of an administrative agency,” leads us to conclude that the circuit court was without authority to provide a remedy because no petition for review from that decision was filed. Based on the foregoing, therefore, we reverse the circuit court’s determination that it had authority to review the Council’s approval of A-9900. As a result, the remainder of our opinion only deals with issues relating to A-9901. II Because they are related, we shall address together the second and third questions presented by appellant.

Those ⁴⁵³ questions require us to decide whether the circuit court erred in determining that the Council sufficiently articulated its findings of fact and conclusions of law in approving A-9901, and in determining that the approval of A-9901 was supported by substantial evidence. In disposing of these questions, we shall first present a few principles of law applicable to the issues. A In resolving the second question, we must keep in mind the requirements related to the sufficiency of an agency’s factual findings and legal conclusions. As we stated in our factual recitation, the Council adopted the ZHE’s recommendation to approve A-9901.

Despite strong commentary from the Court of Appeals in Montgomery v. Board of County Comm’rs, 256 Md. 597, 603 , 261 A.2d 447 (1970), disapproving of the Council’s practice of adopting and incorporating as its own the findings and conclusions of others, the Council has evidently continued to do so. As long as the Council wishes to continue this practice, as we have previously held in a Prince George’s County floating zone case, “it must at least make certain that the findings it proposes to adopt comply with the statutory requirements of specificity.” Rodriguez, 79 Md.App. at 549, 558 A.2d 742 (citing Md.Ann.Code art. 28, § 8-124 and Prince George’s County Code §§ 27-195(b) & 27-499). This means that the adopted findings must be specific and the conclusions clearly articulated. Id. at 551, 558 A.2d 742 . “It is not permissible for the Council, or any administrative body, simply to parrot general statutory requirements or rest on broad conclusory statements.” Id. at 550, 558 A.2d 742 .

Courts require specific findings and well-articulated conclusions because “ ‘citizens are entitled to something more than [a] boiler-plate resolution.’” Id. (quoting Turner v. Hammond, 270 Md. 41, 56 , 310 A.2d 543 (1973)). See Harford County v. Preston, 322 Md. 493, 505 , 588 A.2d 772 (1991) (this requirement recognizes that a party to an administrative ⁴⁵⁴ proceeding is entitled to be apprised of the facts relied upon by the agency and permits meaningful judicial review of those findings). As the Court of Appeals recognized in a prior Montgomery County “floating zone” case, [i]t is vitally important that the District Council make appropriate express findings based on adequate evidence that the purposes set forth in the Ordinance for the R-H zone exist and that the project is compatible with the existing uses in the general neighborhood.

We held in Bujno v. Montgomery County Council, 243 Md. 110 , 220 A.2d 126 (1966), however, that in a proper case—arising before our decision in Beall [v. Montgomery County Council, 240 Md. 77 [ 212 A.2d 751 ] (1965) ]—we could infer that the necessary findings had been made by the District Council. In Bujno , the opinion of the District Council indicated the unique location of the site, the amount of lot coverage permitted in the R-H zone and most importantly that “there was expert testimony submitted by the applicant that the R-H zone is most suitable for this tract.” Aubinoe v. Lewis, 250 Md. 645, 653-54 , 244 A.2d 879 (1968). Indeed, so important are well-reasoned and articulated administrative findings that a reviewing court may not uphold an agency’s decision without them. Mortimer v. Howard Research & Dev.

Corp., 83 Md.App. 432, 441 , 575 A.2d 750 (1990). This is because in the absence of reasoned administrative analysis a reviewing court is unable to determine the basis of the agency’s action. Id. Thus, the agency’s decision must be precise and clear enough to allow for meaningful appellate review.

If the agency fails to meet this basic requirement, the decision is considered arbitrary and the case must be remanded for the purpose of correcting the deficiency. Id. at 441-42 . In the instant case, under Prince George’s County Code § 27-195(b) (1991), before the Council may approve a rezoning application, the applicant must demonstrate to the Council’s satisfaction that the entire development meets certain statutory criteria, which we restate and summarize as follows: ⁴⁵⁵ 1. The proposed Basic Plan shall conform either to the specific recommendation of a master plan map; or to the principles and guidelines contained in the master plan with respect to land use, number of dwelling units, etc; 2. the economic analysis submitted for a proposed retail commercial area must adequately justify an area of the size and scope shown on the Basic Plan; 3. transportation facilities (e.g., streets and public transit) will be adequate to support anticipated traffic, and the uses proposed will not generate traffic that will lower the level of service anticipated; 4. other facilities, such as schools, recreation areas, water and sewerage systems, libraries, and fire stations, will be adequate to support the proposed uses; 5. the proposed use will be compatible with the environment so as to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the present and future inhabitants of the Regional District; 6. where construction is anticipated to last for more than six years, public facilities must be adequate to serve the proposed development within the first six years; the Council must also find that adequate facilities probably will be provided for the remainder of the project; and 7. in the case of an L-A-C zone, the applicant, must show that any proposed commercial development is consistent with the master plan; or not larger than needed to serve existing and proposed residential development within the community or neighborhood.

Id. at § 27-195(b). While both parties to the instant dispute acknowledge that § 27-195(b) must be satisfied before the rezoning application may be approved, the parties disagree as to whether the Council must also determine that the purposes of the proposed zone will be met under the County Code. Section § 27-494(a) of the Code states that the purposes of the L-A-C Zone are to: (1) Establish (in the public interest) a plan implementation Zone, in which (among other things): ⁴⁵⁶ (A) Permissible residential density and building intern sity are dependent on providing public benefit features and related density/intensity increment factors; and (B) The location of the zone must be in accordance with the adopted and approved General Plan, Master Plan, or public urban renewal plan; (2) Establish regulations through which adopted and approved public plans and policies (such as the General Plan, Master Plan, and public urban renewal plan for Community, Village, and Neighborhood Centers) can serve as the criteria for judging individual physical development proposals; (3) Assure the compatibility of proposed land uses with existing and proposed surrounding land uses, and existing and proposed public facilities and services, so as to promote the health, safety and welfare of the present and future inhabitants of the Regional District; (4) Encourage and stimulate balanced land development; (5) Group uses serving public, quasi-public, and commercial needs together for the convenience of the populations they serve; and (6) Encourage dwellings integrated with activity centers in a manner which retains the amenities of the residential environment and provides the convenience of proximity to an activity center. Id. at § 27-494(a).

Appellants argue that the Council was required to make an express determination based on specific findings of fact and articulated legal conclusions, whether § 27-494(a) was satisfied before approving A-9901. In support of this contention, appellants cite Aubinoe, 250 Md. at 653-54 , 244 A.2d 879 , wherein the Court of Appeals determined that the Montgomery County District Council was required to make appropriate express findings that the purposes of a Montgomery County zoning ordinance (which, in a similar manner, set forth the purposes of the “R-H Zone”) were met by the rezoning application. ⁴⁵⁷ Appellees, on the other hand, argue that the Council was not required to make an express determination that § 27-494(a) was satisfied. First, appellees point out that Aubinoe was a Montgomery County case based on the R-H zone. Second, appellees assert that § 27-494(a) is necessarily satisfied by the determination that § 27-195(b) is satisfied.

We agree with appellants. In addition to making the required express determination that § 27-195(b) is satisfied, the Council must also make an express determination that approving the application would satisfy the purposes of the LA-C zone as set forth in § 27-494(a). Aubinoe is highly supportive of our view. Although that case was a Montgomery County zoning case, the principle, we are confident, is applicable here.

Most significantly, in Rodriguez—a Prince George’s County rezoning application case—we specifically held that the Council was required to make express findings under both § 27-195(b) and § 27-499, the latter of which sets forth the purposes of the E-I-A Zone. Rodriguez, 79 Md.App. at 540 , 558 A.2d 742 (“Section 27-499 sets out a number of standards or conditions which a Basic Plan must meet to qualify the property for E-I-A zoning. They are supplemented by other standards or conditions specified in § 27-195.... ”), & at 549-50. To be sure, both provisions share some common elements, e.g., master plan compatibility.

We are of the opinion, however, that the ordinances supplement one another so as to require the Council to make separate express determinations under each provision. Of course, the Council may use the same evidence to support its conclusions under either statute. Our first task, therefore, will be to determine whether, in approving A-9901, the Council made an express determination, based on sufficiently specific findings and well-reasoned conclusions, that Northpeak’s application A-9901 satisfied