COLEMAN-FULLER v. State

DAVIS, J. On May 8, 2006, a Baltimore County grand jury indicted Lee Andrew Coleman-Fuller, appellant, for the first-degree murder of Travis Taylor. Md.Code (2002 Vol., 2008 Supp.), Crim. Law. § 2-201. On September 5 and 6, 2007, and again on November 6, 2007, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County heard appellant’s motion to suppress two statements that he made to police, on April 12 and April 19, 2006, and the evidence derived from his first statement.

The court granted the motion to suppress the April 12th statement, but denied the motion to suppress the April 19th statement and the evidence derived from appellant’s April 12th statement. On April 14, 2008, the court heard appellant’s motion in limine regarding the State’s attempt to introduce cell phone records and cell phone tracking evidence through a detective instead of an expert witness. The court ruled that such evidence did not require expert testimony and denied the motion. Thereafter, on May 5 through May 15, 2008, a jury trial was held.

On May 15, 2008, the jury convicted Lee Andrew Coleman-Fuller, appellant, of the first-degree murder of Travis Taylor. On ⁵⁸¹ September 10, 2008, the court sentenced appellant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Appellant filed a timely appeal and raises six questions for our review, which we quote: I. Did the trial court err in refusing to instruct the jury on the law relating to accomplice testimony?

II

Did the trial court err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress the second of his two statements to [the] police?

III

Did the trial court err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress the fruits of his first statement to [the] police?

IV

Did the trial court err in permitting a lay witness to present expert testimony concerning cell phone records and cell phone technology? V. Did the trial court erroneously restrict defense cross-examination of Shamar Harris?

VI

Did the trial court err in permitting improper prosecutorial closing argument? For the reasons that follow, we answer appellant’s first and third questions in the negative, decline to address his sixth question, and answer his remaining questions in the affirmative. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of conviction for first-degree murder and remand the case to the Circuit Court of Baltimore County for a new trial. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 1 The charges against appellant stem from a murder that took place at 2878 Scarborough Circle in Woodlawn, Maryland on April 11, 2006.

On the evening of April 11th, the victim, Travis Taylor, was stabbed to death at the home of April ⁵⁸² Goggans. At the time, both appellant and Taylor were staying with Goggans. After two interrogations, one on April 12, 2006 and another April 19, 2006, the police arrested appellant for the murder. As noted, appellant’s trial before a jury transpired from May 5 to May 15, 2008.

Goggans testified that she and her daughter lived on Scarborough Circle during the Spring of 2006. She was a self-professed alcoholic who drank “... every night. All day every day on the weekends.” She also admitted that she was fairly promiscuous. One night in February 2006, she met appellant, whom she knew as “Javier,” and his friend, Kenneth “Bean” Hill.

The first night that they met, she had sexual relations with both Hill and appellant. Shortly thereafter, Goggans continued to carry on a sexual relationship with Hill. A few weeks later, appellant began to stay at Goggans’s house. He slept on her couch and used her car to earn money as a “hack,” a slang term for an unlicensed cab driver.

Goggans admitted that, during this time, she carried on a sexual relationship with appellant. The events ultimately ending in Taylor’s murder began during the first week of April 2006. Goggans met Taylor while he was attending a party at her house at the invitation of Hill. Goggans and Taylor talked most of the night and, in her words, “kind of hit it off.” She and Taylor discussed her drinking problem and the number of people in her house.

She related part of the conversation she had with Taylor in which he told her “ ‘you just got to stop, you got to stop drinking, you got to get these people out of your house ... you got to stop letting people beat on you.’ ” She further recollected that, the next day, “it was obvious that we connected in that way” and that she and Taylor were starting a relationship. She recounted that, when she met Taylor, appellant was continually spending nights sleeping on her couch and she would “wake up and he was there in the morning.” On the morning after she met Taylor, she had intended to use her car, but appellant had rendered it unfit to drive and she did not have the money to fix it. Despite this, she said that ⁵⁸³ everything remained “fine up until about the second day [Taylor] was there.” On the morning of the second day that Taylor was at her house, Goggans noticed that appellant was putting more of his belongings in her closets, as if he were moving in. Out of patience with appellant and exacerbated by the fact that he had disabled her car, Goggans, along with Taylor, confronted appellant later that afternoon.

Goggans told him that, while he was permitted to stay at her house occasionally, he could not live there. She stated that appellant was upset and said, “ ‘I’ve been staying here. Everything’s been fine till Travis got here.’ ” When she responded that he could not live there, he stated “ ‘Man, you make me so mad, you make me want to kill you.’ ” Thereafter, appellant walked into the kitchen and Goggans “heard a silverware drawer being messed around in.” 2 When appellant reentered the room, Taylor told him that he had to leave and, according to Goggans, Taylor and appellant “stared at each other but it wasn’t an altercation.” Goggans and Taylor had a conversation later that night in which he agreed to help her “fix the situation,” meaning that he would help her to evict the people in her house and he would help her to stop drinking. Taylor stayed with Goggans throughout that night as she suffered symptoms of alcohol withdrawal.

The next day, April 11th, Taylor, Hill, Goggans and her daughter were at her house and the day was “kind of slow.” Taylor helped Goggans clean her house and told anyone who came to the house that they could not come inside. Eventually, Goggans asked Hill to call someone so that they could take her daughter to get some food. At approximately 10:45 p.m., one of Hill’s friends arrived to take Hill, Goggans and her daughter to buy food. As she was preparing to leave, Hill was on the phone with appellant.

Goggans spoke to appellant and told him that he ⁵⁸⁴ needed to retrieve his belongings. She testified that appellant was upset when she said this: He told me, just told me, you know, there was nothing else to say. I told him, I say, [“]You need to come get your stuff.[”] He’s like, [“]Man, you know, this shit is making me mad.[”] And I’m like, [“JWell, you need to come get your stuff.[”] And he was like, [“]Are you saying that I have to get my stuff?[”] I said, [“jThere’s nothing else to say, okay[”]. She then proceeded to get her daughter ready to leave.

She stated that the person that Hill had called to provide transportation arrived and she, Hill and her daughter exited the front door. Taylor declined to accompany them. Goggans recounted that she did not close the door all the way when she left because she knew appellant was coming to pick up his belongings. While Goggans, Hill and her daughter were walking to the car that was waiting out front, she noticed that appellant was walking with two people toward her house.

She testified that she knew one person as “Nick” and that the other person was someone she had met through appellant, but she could not recall his name. Appellant did not say anything as he passed, but Goggans recollected that appellant “stare[d] me down before he got into the house.” Goggans watched the three men go through the front door; they did not shut the door all the way. She witnessed appellant’s “shirt go up as if he was going up the stairs.” At this point, as she was walking toward the car, she heard the door shut. Then, she heard “feet like on a basketball court, like when they scuff, squeak a little bit” followed by Taylor “crying in pain.” Shortly after she heard Taylor’s cries, she saw Nick and the other individual run out of the house.

Goggans told Hill that she wanted to go see what was happening, but Hill insisted that Taylor was fine and that they needed to go to his house so that he could get changed and go to a local Wendy’s. As they drove away, she witnessed appellant emerge from the house, stand in front of the door ⁵⁸⁵ and stare at her. She stated that she wanted to go back, but did not because Hill assured her that everything was fine. Goggans and Hill then drove to his mother’s home and remained there for approximately forty-five minutes.

They later drove back to her house and, when she opened the door, she saw Taylor lying on the stairs. Believing that Taylor had just been knocked unconscious, she took her daughter to a neighbor and called 9-1-1. She testified that she made a statement at the scene and later talked to detectives from the Baltimore County Police Department — statements that she admitted were inconsistent, but that were inconsistent, she explained, because she was in shock when she first saw the body. She also identified photographs of “Nick” and appellant.

On the witness stand, Goggans identified appellant from a photograph taken from a Wendy’s surveillance camera earlier in the evening on the date of the murder. Appellant, she recounted, was wearing a hat that was later found next to her sink in her home. Shamar Harris was one of the individuals with appellant at the time of the murder. He testified that he knew appellant and Nicholas Jones, but “not that well.” He had only met them a couple of times.

On the night of the murder, he met appellant and Jones at Barnesley Place, near the scene of the crime, and the three of them went to a local Chinese carry-out restaurant and a Wendy’s restaurant. While they were sitting at Wendy’s, appellant received a cell phone call and, after the call, appellant’s “whole attitude had changed ... He went from being calm to like upset.” After the cell phone call, Harris, Jones and appellant “[w]ent to some female’s house.” There, appellant and Taylor, whom Harris had never met before, began arguing. A fight erupted, during which Harris saw appellant brandish a knife and stab Taylor.

He stated, “[ajfter I saw the stabbing, I was in a state of shock, and I had left the house.” He met Jones at the top of the block and they continued walking when appellant rejoined them. At that point, Harris recalled, appellant discarded a knife in the vicinity of Barnesley Place. Harris admitted that he had ⁵⁸⁶ recognized the knife because it was a knife that he had given appellant a few days before April 11, 2006. He gave the knife to appellant, he said, because, as he was “about to just throw the knife away,” appellant asked him for it.

He insisted that, when he gave the knife to appellant, he did not know what appellant was going to do with it. According to Harris, he did not know what was going to happen when they left Wendy’s Restaurant to go to Goggans’s house that night. Nicholas Jones had also accompanied appellant and Harris on the morning in question. He testified that he had known appellant for several years and he knew Taylor for a month or two before his death, adding, “I didn’t know him [Taylor] that well, but I never got into an argument or anything with him.” Jones was familiar with appellant and Taylor’s relationship, which he described as a “50/50” relationship, meaning that, “at first they just didn’t say nothing to each other, then it escalated.” According to Jones: At first, I mean, he felt as though [Taylor] was stealing [Goggans] from him, and he started getting mad because of that.

Then he started getting madder and madder. Then it escalated to the situation that happened. Jones further testified that, on April 11th, the day of the murder, he met appellant and Harris and they went to “the Chinese spot and ordered some Chinese food, and then went to Wendy’s.” While they were eating at the Wendy’s, someone called appellant’s cell phone and he became upset. Thereafter, the group left the Wendy’s Restaurant and, as they proceeded to Goggans’s house, appellant told Jones that they were going to “tap” Taylor.

Jones stated that, at first, he did not understand what appellant meant, but he had an idea that it meant appellant was going to “beat up,” stab or shoot Taylor. When they arrived at the house, Hill and Goggans were there. According to Jones, first Goggans and appellant began to argue, then Goggans left and appellant and Taylor began to argue. Jones witnessed appellant brandish a knife and, before he ran out of the house, Jones saw appellant stab Taylor three or four times; neither he nor Harris was involved in the fight with Taylor.

Harris and Jones ran to the ⁵⁸⁷ top of the block and, out of breath, waited there. After “about ten seconds,” appellant joined them. The three began to run and, as they were running, appellant discarded a knife somewhere near Barnesley Place. Jones stated that the knife that appellant employed in committing the murder and discarded in the woods was that which Harris had given appellant a couple of days prior to the murder.

Later, Jones took police officers to the scene to recover the knife. Dwayne Meyers, a resident of the neighborhood surrounding Scarborough Circle, testified that he met appellant sometime between March and September 2005. Meyers stated that appellant told him, “ I should have poke [sic] him up,’ ” referring to the initial confrontation appellant had had with Taylor at Goggans’s house. Meyers understood this to mean that appellant wanted to stab Taylor.

Meyers stated that appellant was angry, in part, because Taylor was going to “wife up” Goggans, meaning start a relationship, and this was going to leave appellant without a place to stay. After the murder, Meyers spoke with police officers. In an effort to locate appellant, Meyers, in cooperation with Detective Childs of the Baltimore City Police Department, attempted to call both appellant and Goggans using the direct connect “chirp” function on his Nextel phone, which allowed him to directly connect to another phone, similar to a “walkie-talkie.” Eventually, Meyers was able to reach appellant and they had a brief conversation, while Detective Childs listened via the speaker phone. Meyers sought to engage appellant in a discussion about the murder, to which appellant responded that he thought someone had been “banked, jumped, beat on, that’s it.” Meyers informed appellant that Taylor was the victim and appellant responded, “ ‘oh, for real[?]’ ” Meyers attempted to induce appellant to state where he was, but appellant avoided the question and told Meyers that he would need to talk to him later.

Meyers also assisted Detective Childs in locating Nicholas Jones, who had eluded the police after the murder; once Jones surfaced in the neighborhood, Meyers notified Detective ⁵⁸⁸ Childs. When Meyers and Jones walked to a local gas station, as the officers approached them, Jones slipped Meyers a knife. After the officers arrested Jones, Meyers gave the knife to the police. 3 Meyers stated that there was no blood on the blade at the time. Kenneth Hill testified that he knew appellant for one or two years before Taylor’s murder.

During the weeks before the murder, both he and appellant had spent the night at Goggans’s house. Hill had known Taylor for nearly as long as he had known appellant. During the first altercation between Taylor and appellant at Goggans’s house, there was a pocket knife or a house knife involved in that fight, but that “everything just died on down after we stopped them.” Hill also recalled seeing appellant, Jones and Harris approach Goggans’s house as he, Goggans and her daughter were getting ready to leave. He saw appellant and two other individuals leave “in a hurry” as they drove off.

After he, Goggans and her daughter had left the house to get food, he received a call from appellant in which appellant stated, “ ‘yo, me and your boy, we just got into it, I just now had to fuck you [sic] boy on up.’ ” Hill told appellant that he needed to “chill” and ended the conversation. When Hill returned to Goggans’s apartment, he found Taylor on the stairs, saw blood, checked Taylor’s pulse and then told Goggans to call 9-1-1. Hill admitted that he attempted to leave the scene, explaining that he left because he did not want to be involved. Apartment complex security guards stopped Hill and eventually spoke to the police.

Benjamin Angel, a resident of the neighborhood where the murder occurred, testified that he had met appellant two or three weeks before the murder and, on the night in question, he was out walking his dog when he ran into “Corey,” appellant’s and his mutual friend. While they were talking, Corey made a direct connect cell phone call to appellant, whose voice Angel recognized because he had spoken to appellant on the ⁵⁸⁹ phone previously. He testified that appellant told Corey not to go to Goggans’s house because it was “a bloody mess.” Kelly Franklin, an inmate at the Baltimore County Detention Center who was incarcerated in the same unit as appellant after appellant’s arrest, testified that appellant confided in him that he stabbed a man eleven to thirteen times to help a friend. 4 Detective Gary Childs of the Baltimore County Police Department testified regarding his role in the investigation into Taylor’s murder. In addition to relating the manner in which his investigation proceeded and the ultimate arrest of appellant as a suspect, Detective Childs testified extensively from the cell phone records of two cell phones recovered from appellant at the time of his arrest.

Utilizing the records, Detective Childs (1) demonstrated that appellant was not truthful when he told police that he had not called or spoken to certain individuals, (2) corroborated the testimony of other witnesses regarding cell phone calls that they had with appellant, including the parties to those calls and the timing, and (3) over the objection of appellant, he used the records and cell phone tower sites to approximate appellant’s- location at the times just before, during and after the murder. After the presentation of all of the evidence, each side made their closing statements. On May 15, 2008, after a few hours of deliberation, the jury convicted appellant of first-degree murder. The court ordered a pre-sentence investigation and, on September 10, 2008, sentenced appellant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2008. Additional facts shall be provided infra as warranted by our discussion of the issues. ⁵⁹⁰ LEGAL ANALYSIS I Appellant’s first contention is that the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction on accomplice liability. At trial, appellant’s counsel tried to develop the theory that appellant was not at the scene of the murder, but instead, was the victim of a conspiracy between many of the witnesses who sought to frame appellant for Taylor’s murder. During his cross-examination of most of the witnesses — Jones and Harris in particular — appellant’s counsel questioned those witnesses at length about involvement in the murder, at times suggesting that they committed the murder or hired individuals to commit the murder.

Specifically, appellant’s counsel cross-examined the witnesses in an attempt to prove that Shamar Harris and Nicholas Jones, the two eyewitnesses to the murder, were, in fact, the actual perpetrators of the crime. After the presentation of all of the evidence, appellant’s counsel requested that the court propound Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 3:11B, the “Testimony of an Accomplice” instruction to the jury. 5 The trial court declined to give ⁵⁹¹ the instruction and appellant’s counsel objected after the court instructed the jury. During the ensuing bench conference, he asserted that he would like the instruction read, to which the trial court responded, “Yeah, I did not think the evidence generated that instruction.... In addition to the comments already made, the accomplice [sie] I don’t think the evidence generated [that] either of the two eyewitnesses were accomplices to the murder.” The court ruled, as a matter of law, that appellant did not meet his burden of production and did not generate a genuine jury issue that Jones or Harris could be considered accomplices.

Appellant asserts that, in so holding, the trial court erred because “the record viewed in a light most favorable to [appellant] overwhelmingly paints both Jones and Harris as accomplices.” At the very least, appellant posits, the issue of whether they were accomplices should have been submitted to the jury. Without conceding that he was actually the perpetrator of the crime, appellant asserts that the jury could have found that both [Harris and Jones] accompanied the perpetrator to the scene of the murder; that they were with him during the murder; that they knew he was armed; that the perpetrator would never have brought witnesses to the scene of the murder unless he knew them to be his confederates; that Jones and Harris were with the perpetrator while the stabbing occurred; and they departed the scene in lockstep with him, watched him dispose of the knife, and made no effort to summon police or at least medical aid for Taylor, as a non-accomplice certainly would. The State counters that, “[e]ven assuming arguendo that all [of appellant’s] points were supported by at least some evidence, they were insufficient, without more, to generate an ⁵⁹² issue of accomplice testimony” because “[t]here was no evidence whatever [sic] that Jones or Harris actually participated in, aided or encouraged the murder, nor was there any evidence from which it could be inferred that they harbored any intent to kill or harm” the victim. Moreover, the State counters, to be considered an accomplice, a person must participate in the commission of the crime “with common criminal intent ... or must in some way advocate or encourage the commission of the crime.” Here, there was no evidence that Harris and Jones possessed a common criminal intent with appellant at the time of the murder.

We agree. “ ‘The main purpose of a jury instruction is to aid the jury in clearly understanding the case, to provide guidance for the jury’s deliberations, and to help the jury arrive at a correct verdict.’ ” Cruz v. State, 407 Md. 202, 209 , 963 A.2d 1184 (2009) (quoting Chambers v. State, 337 Md. 44, 48 , 650 A.2d 727 (1994)). Pursuant to Md. Rule 4-325(c), “[t]he court may, and at the request of any party shall, instruct the jury as to the applicable law and the extent to which the instructions are binding.” (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals has interpreted Rule 4-325(c) as requiring the trial court to give a requested instruction when: (1) the requested instruction is a correct statement of the law; (2) the requested instruction is applicable under the facts of the case; and (3) the content of the requested instruction was not fairly covered elsewhere in the jury instruction actually given. Tucker v. State, 407 Md. 368, 379-80 , 965 A.2d 900 (2009) (citing Dickey v. State, 404 Md. 187, 197-98 , 946 A.2d 444 (2008); Thompson v. State, 393 Md. 291, 302-03 , 901 A.2d 208 (2006); Patterson v. State, 356 Md. 677, 683-84 , 741 A.2d 1119 (1999))(emphasis added).

Thus, a criminal defendant “is entitled to have the jury instructed on any theory of the defense that is fairly supported by the evidence” and “[w]hether a particular instruction must be given depends upon whether there is any evidence in the case that supports the instruction; if the requested instruction has not been generated by the ⁵⁹³ evidence, the trial court is not required to give it.” General v. State, 367 Md. 475, 485-87 , 789 A.2d 102 (2002). The determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to generate a jury instruction is a legal determination for the judge to make under the “some evidence” standard. Abbott v. State, 190 Md.App. 595 , 989 A.2d 795 (2010). This standard was set forth by the Court of Appeals in Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206 , 571 A.2d 1251 (1990), where the Court explained: Some evidence is not strictured by the test of a specific standard.

It calls for no more than what it says — “some,” as that word is understood in common, everyday usage. It need not rise to the level of “beyond reasonable doubt” or “clear and convincing” or “preponderance.” The source of the evidence is immaterial; it may emanate solely from the defendant. It is of no matter that the self-defense claim is overwhelmed by evidence to the contrary. If there is any evidence relied on by the defendant which, if believed, would support his claim that he acted in self-defense, the defendant has met his burden.

Then the baton is passed to the State. It must shoulder the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the jury that the defendant did not kill in self-defense. Id. at 216-17 , 571 A.2d 1251 . In evaluating whether competent evidence exists to generate the requested instruction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the accused.

General, 367 Md. at 487 , 789 A.2d 102 . To determine whether a witness could be considered an accomplice, the test commonly applied is to determine if the witness could have been indicted and punished for the offense, either as a principal or as an accessory. In re Anthony W., 388 Md. 251, 274 , 879 A.2d 717 (2005) (citing Harriday v. State, 228 Md. 593, 596 , 182 A.2d 40 (1962)). When the evidence is capable of different determinations or different inferences, then there is an issue that must be submitted to the trier of fact with proper instruction.

Christopher v. State, 9 Md.App. 277, 281 , 263 A.2d 605 (1970). ⁵⁹⁴ In order to warrant the instruction, appellant was required to produce “some evidence” that the witnesses could have been indicted and punished for the offense as a principal or accessory. In re Anthony W., supra, at 274, 879 A.2d 717 . To be sure, the burden of proof to generate “some evidence” that Harris and Jones were accomplices to the murder was indisputably upon appellant. Burroughs v. State, 88 Md.App. 229, 235 , 594 A.2d 625 (1991).

Appellant failed to adduce any evidence that would generate an issue as to whether Jones or Harris actually participated in the murder of Taylor, aided or encouraged appellant in the commission of the murder or that they had the intent to kill or harm Taylor and, thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to submit the issue to the jury. We explain. First, as the State points out, even if the jury were to believe all of the contentions appellant raises in his brief, it still could not find that Harris and Jones were accomplices. These contentions only prove that Harris and Jones were present at the murder and did nothing. “It is a universally accepted rule of law that mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime is not of itself sufficient to prove the guilt of that person, even though it is an important element in determination of the guilt of the accused.” Fleming v. State, 373 Md. 426, 433 , 818 A.2d 1117 (2003) (citations omitted).

Nothing in the evidence cited by appellant or inferences deducible therefrom supported a finding that Jones and/or Harris aided, encouraged or joined in the commission of the murder. More importantly, the testimony of both Harris and Jones, which is the only evidence of their involvement, was consistent and refutes appellant’s assertion that they possessed the requisite criminal intent or that they participated in the murder. Both testified that they only knew the victim casually and that neither had any conflicts with him. Harris testified that, before the night of the murder, he had never met the victim and did not know his name.

He also testified that, when he was walking to the house, he did not know why they were going to the house. Harris admitted giving appellant the ⁵⁹⁵ knife, but stated that this was done days before the murder; he gave it to appellant because he did not have any use for it and, when he gave it to him, he did not know that appellant intended to use it to murder Taylor. Jones testified that he knew Taylor only a “a month or two months” before the murder. When asked to describe his relationship with Taylor, Jones stated, “I didn’t know him that well, but I never got into an argument or anything with him.” Jones said that, walking to the house, he had an idea of what would happen based on appellant’s comments that he was going to “tap” Taylor, but did not know precisely what appellant was going to do.

Jones stated that he did not get involved or try to stop it because he was “not trying to get stabbed in the process.” Significantly, both Jones and Harris corroborated each other’s testimony that the other did not participate in the murder. Appellant’s attempt to introduce “some evidence” that Jones and Harris were accomplices in the murder consisted of questions about their presence at the crime scene, their prior crimes and their inconsistent statements to police. None of this tended to indicate their complicity in the murder of appellant or that they participated, aided or encouraged appellant. Both Jones and Harris were candid in their testimony that they were present during the commission of the murder; however, without more, this is insufficient for them to be accomplices.

Additionally, evidence of other crimes charged against or committed by these individuals was not relevant to show that Harris or Jones committed the murder, or helped another commit the murder. Appellant was unable to refute the evidence presented which indicated that Jones and Harris were not accomplices and, instead, could make only accusations and propound unsupported theories that Harris and Jones were accomplices. “Conclusions by non-witnesses are not evidence; arguments are not evidence; theories of complicity are not evidence. The burden of producing legally sufficient evidence cannot be satisfied by offering non-evidence.” Burroughs, 88 Md.App. at 244 , 594 A.2d 625 . Ac ⁵⁹⁶ cordingly, the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s request for the accomplice liability instruction.

II Appellant’s second contention is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements that he made to police during his April 19, 2006 interrogation. As noted swpra, appellant was interrogated by the police and made statements on two occasions, one on April 12th and a second on April 19th. Between interrogations, the police released appellant from custody. Prior to trial, appellant’s counsel sought to suppress both statements.

Neither party disputed that, during each interrogation, appellant was subjected to custodial interrogation and, therefore, Miranda warnings were required. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The parties also stipulated that the police provided appellant Miranda warnings in both instances. Rather, the issues were whether appellant had invoked his right to counsel under Miranda and whether the police had subsequently violated that right.

Regarding the April 12th interrogation, the court viewed the videotape of the interrogation and the court found that appellant clearly and unambiguously requested an attorney based on two statements made by appellant, one in which he asked “so I could call my lawyer to come up here” and another in which he asked “can my lawyer be present?” So I find that a reasonable police officer in those circumstances would understand this to be a request for an attorney and especially considering the circumstances of this case, that [appellant] was arrested when he was walking into the courthouse accompanied by his lawyer and that he was removed from the courthouse without his lawyer or even given an opportunity to talk to his lawyer or tell the lawyer what had happened. Now, Detective Childs must have heard [appellant’s] statement, that he wanted his cell phone so he could call his ⁵⁹⁷ lawyer to come up here, because Detective Childs responded that, I am going to explain to you what is going on, instead of allowing the defendant to get his lawyer to come up and tell him what is going on. Now, after [appellant’s] request for a lawyer, it is true that Detective Childs read him his Miranda rights, and [appellant] then waived them. However, again, in Billups [v. State, 135 Md.App. 345 , 762 A.2d 609 (2000) ], the Court of Special Appeals said, once a defendant requests a lawyer, subsequent advisement of Constitutional rights followed by acquiescence in police-initiated questioning can not establish a valid waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, and the court also reiterated that law in Costley And again, as I mentioned earlier, at the two times these statements were made, 1346, the interrogation was imminent and, therefore, the right to counsel could be invoked at the time, and at 1349, with Detective Childs, interrogation was beginning.

It was underway. So I am going to order that the motion to suppress the April 12th interview is granted. Regarding the April 19th interrogation, the court viewed the video tape, which demonstrated that the police re-administered Miranda warnings and that appellant thereafter waived his rights and made inculpatory statements. Appellant argued that his prior request for counsel prevented the police from interrogating him a second time without his counsel present; thus, his waiver was invalid.

The court held that his request for counsel was vitiated by the break in custody between interviews where appellant was released from custody and, therefore, his prior request for an attorney did not prevent the subsequent interrogation. The court further found that appellant’s statements in that interview did not amount to a request for counsel: Now, after the April 12th interview, there was a break in custody. [Appellant] was released from custody on April ⁵⁹⁸ 12th. He was not charged, because the police wanted to check out his alibi, and he was arrested again a week later on April the 19th. So according to the law, [appellant’s] question-proof status had ended when he was released from custody on April 12th and when [appellant] was taken back into custody on April 19th.

He can be informed of his Miranda rights and questioned again. And as to the April 19th statements, my finding is different than on April 12th. I find that on April 19th, [appellant] did not invoke his right to counsel. And I find that [appellant] waived his right to counsel on April 19th, knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, and there was no Miranda violation on April 19th.

There was no Miranda violation on April 19th.[ 6 ] Appellant argues that the trial court erred in holding that the break in custody voided his prior request for an attorney. He postulates that, under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), the police could not have conducted the second interview without appellant’s counsel; thus, appellant’s waiver of his right to counsel in the second interview was invalid. As his waiver was invalid, appellant continues, the second statement should have been suppressed. The State aptly recognized that the answer to this question is found in the United States Supreme Court decision in Maryland v. Shatzer, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1213 , — L.Ed.2d - (2010), which was pending before the United States Supreme Court at the time the parties filed their brief in this case.

Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Maryland v. Shatzer, we hold that the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress and in admitting appellant’s April 19th statements into evidence. ⁵⁹⁹ The opinion of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Shatzer v. State, 405 Md. 585 , 954 A.2d 1118 (2008), from which the State of Maryland filed and was granted certiorari in Maryland v. Shatzer, — U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 1213 , — L.Ed.2d -(2010), set forth the relevant facts of that case: In August 2003, Brenda Lohman, a social worker assigned to the Child Advocacy Center in the Criminal Investigation Division of the Hagerstown Police Department, made a referral to the police department regarding a child, Michael Shatzer, Jr. The referral involved allegations that appellant, Michael Blaine Shatzer, Sr., committed sexual child abuse by ordering his three-year old son to perform fellatio on him. On August 7, Detective Shane Blankenship met with Shatzer to interview him about the investigation at the Maryland Correctional Institution — Hagerstown, where Shatzer was incarcerated on an unrelated offense involving sexual child abuse of a different child. Shatzer waived his Miranda rights, but after Detective Blankenship explained what he wanted to discuss, Shatzer invoked his Miranda rights and refused to talk without the presence of an attorney; the interview was terminated. Detective Blankenship’s written report stated that “When I [Blankenship] again attempted to initiate the interview, he [Shatzer] told me that he would not talk about this case without having an attorney present.” The police closed the investigation in 2003.

In February 2006, Brenda Lohman filed a new referral when the child, now older, was able to make more specific allegations. Sergeant Kifer of the Hagerstown Police Department opened a new investigation. Kifer assigned Detective Paul Hoover to the new investigation because Detective Blankenship was on leave at the time the case was assigned. Shatzer was still incarcerated within the general prison population, and was housed at the Roxbury Institute.

Detective Hoover interviewed Shatzer at the Roxbury Institute on March 2, 2006, where Shatzer had been transferred. It is undisputed that Shatzer remained incarcerated in a Maryland Correctional facility during the entire interim period be ⁶⁰⁰ tween the first interrogation in 2003 and the interview by Detective Hoover in 2006. At the March 2, 2006 interview, Shatzer expressed his surprise at the renewed questioning on the matter involving his son because Shatzer thought that the investigation had been closed. Detective Hoover explained that the Hagerstown Police Department had opened a new investigation on the same matter.

Detective Hoover advised Shatzer of his Miranda rights and Shatzer signed the waiver form, waiving his right to an attorney and his right to remain silent. At no time did Shatzer indicate that he wished to talk with an attorney. Shatzer denied the fellatio allegation but did admit to masturbating in front of his son, from a distance of about three feet away. At the end of the half hour interview, Shatzer agreed to undergo a polygraph examination.

On March 7, 2006, Shatzer was again informed of and waived his Miranda rights, and Detective Shawn Schultz administered the polygraph examination. Detective Schultz concluded that Shatzer failed the polygraph test. Detective Hoover then joined Detective Schultz in interviewing Shatzer. Shatzer became emotional, started to cry, and said “I didn’t force him.

I didn’t force him.” At that time, he requested an attorney and the interview stopped. Id. at 589-90, 954 A.2d 1118 (footnote omitted). As a result of his admissions, the State’s Attorney for Washington County charged Shatzer with second-degree sexual offense, sexual child abuse and contributing to conditions rendering a child in need of assistance. Id. at 590 , 954 A.2d 1118 .

He moved to suppress his March 2006 statements to police, relying on Edwards as authority. Id. at 591 , 954 A.2d 1118 . The trial court rejected his contention, stating, id.: “[Tjhere was a break in custody for Miranda purposes because of the length of time that he was incarcerated continuously in the Division of Corrections. And because of that the requirements of Edwards , that is, to not question the defendant without having an attorney present once he asserts those rights, did not apply.” ⁶⁰¹ Shatzer pleaded not guilty and proceeded on an agreed statement of facts, whereupon the court found him guilty of sexual child abuse.

Id. The court sentenced him to a consecutive fifteen year sentence, with all but five years suspended, followed by five years of supervised probation. Id. at 592 , 954 A.2d 1118 . Shatzer appealed to this Court and the Court of Appeals, on its own initiative, granted certiomri.

Id. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case. After conducting a thorough analysis of Supreme Court precedent, the Court of Appeals held “that the passage of time alone is insufficient to expire the protections afforded by Edwards.” Id. at 606-07, 954 A.2d 1118 . The Court explained, id.: To hold otherwise would create a tenuous slippery slope, whereby the protections against the coercive pressures of interrogation expire after an indeterminate time period has passed.

As the District of Columbia court aptly noted in Green: “If five months ... is held sufficient to dispel Edwards’ presumption that any new waiver of rights is involuntary, then why not three months or three weeks?” Green, 592 A.2d at 989. We think that the fact-based analysis such a rule would require would run contrary to the bright-line rule established in Edwards and the purpose of Edwards . Allowing a lapse of time, standing alone, as the sole factor that terminates the protection against reinterrogation without counsel, would undermine the established rule, that an accused “is not subject to further interrogation” unless either counsel has been made available or “unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 , 101 S.Ct. at 1885 . Without further guidance from the Supreme Court, we adhere to the bright-line rule that without either of these two exceptions, Edwards protections continue.

See also Kochutin v. State, 813 P.2d 298, 304 (Alaska Ct.App.1991), vacated on other grounds, 875 P.2d 778 (Ala.App.1994) [ (Alaska App.1994) ] (“we find nothing in Edwards or in subsequent decisions of the Su ⁶⁰² preme Court to indicate that Edwards should be relaxed by the mere passage of time”). Additionally, the Court held that, even assuming that a break-in-custody exception existed, Shatzer’s release into the general prison population was not a break in custody. It reasoned that “a suspect who remains in continuous government custody or incarceration remains in custody for Edwards purposes, particularly where, as here, the second interrogation regards the same underlying crime as the first interrogation involved.” Id. at 607-08 , 954 A.2d 1118 . The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider “whether a break in custody ends the presumption of involuntariness established in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).” Maryland v. Shatzer, — U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 1213,1217 , — L.Ed.2d-(2010). 7 First, the court outlined the benefits of the Edwards decision, explaining that the presumption of involuntariness of a subsequent waiver of a right to counsel, after the right has been invoked articulated in Edwards has the benefits of preserving judicial resources “which would otherwise be expended in making difficult determinations of voluntariness,” preserving “the integrity of an accused’s choice to communicate with police only through counsel,” and preventing “police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.” Id. at 1220 (citations omitted).

The court noted, however, that a blanket extension of the Edwards presumption was unwarranted because, as the rule was extended, the benefits of the presumption would diminish. Id. ⁶⁰³ at 1221. For example, there are instances where a suspect who has invoked his Miranda right to an attorney is released from pre-trial custody and, after returning to his normal life, decides to cooperate without an attorney. Id.

Under these circumstances, the court reasoned, the “[u]ncritical extension of Edwards ... would not significantly increase the number of coerced confessions excluded”; thus, the justification for the rule would decrease in relation to its expansion. Id. Besides yielding diminishing benefits, the Court pointed out that the wholesale extension of Edwards would have associated costs, such as “the in-fact voluntary confessions it excludes from trial, and the voluntary confessions it deters law enforcement officers from even trying to obtain.” Id. at 1222. Accordingly, the Court stated that Edwards must be deemed to have an ending point after the “termination of Miranda custody and any of its lingering affects.” Id.

The issue for the Court then became determining the duration of the break in custody that would eliminate the lingering affects of Miranda custody. Id. at 1222-23. In answering this question, the Court took the unusual step of delineating a precise time limit for which the Edwards protections will apply after a break in custody. The Court deemed it “appropriate to specify a period of time to avoid the consequence that continuation of the Edwards presumption ‘will not reach the correct result most of the time.’ ” Id. at 1223.

(quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 737 , 111 S.Ct. 2546 , 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991)). Thus, the Court held that a break in custody sufficient to eliminate the Edwards presumption is fourteen days. Id. Explaining how the new