Collier v. Nesbitt

FISCHER, Judge. Appellants, Alfred and Catherine Collier, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City seeking recovery for injuries sustained in an automobile accident allegedly caused by the negligence of Eugene Nesbitt, appellee, who operated a tow truck owned by the State Mass Transit Administration (“MTA”), appellee. As the appellants failed to notify the State Treasurer of their claim, a prerequisite under the Maryland Tort Claims Act, the court entered summary judgment in favor of Nesbitt and the MTA. The Colliers now appeal and pose three questions for our review: whether the Tort Claims Act notice requirement applies to cases arising under Md.Trans.Code Ann. § 7-702; whether appellants substantially complied with the Tort Claims notice provision; and whether compliance is neces ⁷³¹ sary in light of the MTA’s independent liability coverage.

Because we answer the first question in the negative, we need not address the other two. Until now, we have not had occasion to determine the applicability of the Tort Claims procedural requirements to § 7-702 of the Transportation Article. To resolve this issue, we begin by examining the relevant statutes. Section 7-702 originally appeared as Article 64B, § 49 until 1977 when it was renumbered and, without substantive change, was enacted as a provision in the newly created Transportation Article. 1977 Md. Laws ch. 13.

Regarding the MTA’s liability for contracts and torts, § 7-702 provides: (a) Administration 1 liable for contracts and torts.— Subject to subsection (b) of this section, the Administration is liable for its contracts and torts and for the torts of its officers, agents and employees in connection with the performance of the duties and functions of the Administration under this title. (b) Exclusive remedy is suit. — The exclusive remedy for a breach of contract or for a tort committed by the Administration, its officers, agents, or employees is a suit against the Administration. No execution may be levied on any property of this State or Administration. When construing this or any other statute, the plain meaning controls.

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intent. In determining that the Court considers the language of an enactment in its natural and ordinary signification. A corollary to this rule is that if there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of a statute, there is usually no need to look ⁷³² elsewhere to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly. Police Commissioner v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 418 , 379 A.2d 1007 (1977) (citations omitted).

See also St Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Insurance Commissioner, 275 Md. 130, 141 , 339 A.2d 291 (1975). By its own terms, § 7-702 is a general waiver of sovereign immunity for the MTA. See Weide v. Mass.

Transit Admin., 628 F.Supp. 247, 250 (D.Md.1985). It unequivocally states that a suit against the Administration is the “exclusive” remedy for a tort committed by MTA employees while performing their duties. To cover any damages assessed against the MTA as a result of these suits, § 7-703 provides in part: (a) Property and liability insurance required. — The Administration shall self insure or purchase and maintain insurance against: (1) Loss or damage to its property; and (2) Liability for injury to persons or property. (c) Form and amount of insurance coverage. — Subject to the requirements of any agreement in connection with the