Collins v. Board of Education

Wilner, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. When, on April 23, 1979, sixteen-year old Oscar Grinnell decided to ride home from school with his friend and fellow student Jimmy Styons rather than take the school bus, he made a tragic mistake. Jimmy was involved in a head-on collision when he attempted, improperly, to pass a school bus, and Oscar was seriously injured in the crash. Oscar’s mother, appellant here, sought recompense for her son’s injuries; but in the judgment of the Circuit Court for Kent County, she has sought it from the wrong person.

She sued the county board of education on a most novel theory. By sustaining the board’s demurrer, however, the court indicated its unwillingness to adopt that theory; and we think its position was a correct one. Appellant’s First Amended Declaration, to which the demurrer in question responded, contained three operative counts, each proposing a different sub-theory of recovery. It was alleged, in an introductory part of the complaint, that (1) Oscar was properly enrolled at the Kent County High School, a "consolidated” school operated by the board; (2) as the school was more than a mile from Oscar’s home, the board had a statutory responsibility (Education article, § 4-119) to transport Oscar to and from the school; (3) school board rules and regulations required Oscar to ride the school bus; (4) Oscar rode the bus to school that morning; (5) appellant rightfully expected that Oscar would be "safely returned to her custody, safety, supervision and control at the place where he boarded said school bus in the morning”; and (6) the board "negligently breach[ed] its numerous duties owed to [appellant] to arrange for safe transportation home for [Oscar]” for the reasons set forth in the three ensuing counts.

Count A complained that the board negligently violated its duty under Education article, § 4-119 when it "knowingly and negligently permitted” Oscar to get into a vehicle with Jimmy Styons without appellant’s permission, knowing that such form of transportation was unauthorized and with "knowledge from which it should have been known ²¹⁵ that the student [Oscar] foreseeably was riding home from school in a vehicle being driven by a student who was one of a number of students that habitually drove home from school in a speedy, reckless, hazardous and unsafe manner or would probably drive home from school in the aforesaid negligent fashion. . . .” Thus, said appellant, the board violated its duty to provide Oscar with safe transportation. Count B repeated everything alleged in Count A, and asserted as a purportedly distinct cause of action, a violation by the board of its duty to enforce its bylaws, rules, regulations, and policies pursuant to § 4-107 of the Education article. The bylaws, etc. allegedly violated were those "relating to permits for student driving and parking privileges,” although the Amended Declaration did not specify what particular bylaw, rule, regulation, or policy was transgressed. Count C also repeated everything alleged in Count A and, in somewhat of an antithesis to Count B, charged that the board had negligently failed to adopt rules, regulations, and policies to assure that students dutifully got on their designated buses, and that they did not ride in private vehicles without their parents’ permission.

Finally, in a concluding statement that, grammatically, seemed to be a part of Count C but perhaps was intended to apply to all three counts, it was alleged that the board, with the exercise of ordinary care, knew or should have foreseen that an accident would occur, and that the injuries resulting to Oscar were the "direct and proximate result” of the board’s negligence. After hearing argument, the court sustained the board’s demurrer to Counts A and C without leave to amend, concluding, respectively, that § 4-119 does not impose the type of duty alleged by appellant and that there was no legal requirement for the board to adopt regulations prohibiting a student from riding home in a private automobile without his parent’s permission. The court also sustained the demurrer to Count B, but offered leave to amend if appellant could properly allege that an agent of the board responsible for regulating student departures had actual knowledge that ²¹⁶ Jimmy Styons was a reckless driver, and could have prevented Oscar from leaving with him. Appellant responded that she was unable to make such an allegation, whereupon the court sustained the demurrer to Count B without further leave to amend.

Appellant does not complain here about the court’s declination of further leave to amend. The question is whether, upon the Amended Declaration as it stands, she has stated a cause of action. As the case reaches us, procedurally, upon the sustaining of a demurrer, we must, in looking at the Amended Declaration, assume the truth of all facts well pleaded. The question before us is not one of fact, however, but one of law.

In short, did the county board of education have a legal responsibility to make certain that Oscar got on his designated school bus; did it have a legal responsibility to prevent him from securing alternate means of transportation, specifically with Jimmy Styons; and is it answerable in damages if it had those responsibilities and did not properly discharge them? We start with Count A and § 4-119. 1 That section provides (1) "[i]f a county board considers it practicable, it shall consolidate schools,” and (2) "[s]ubject to the approval of the State Superintendent [of Schools], each county board shall arrange for the transportation of students to and from consolidated schools.” Section 4-119 ultimately derives from Acts of 1904, ch. 584. At that time, the counties were subdivided into school