Collins v. Collins

Pearce, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal is from two decrees of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, by one of which a conveyance from Michael J. Collins, deceased, to the appellants, of certain leasehold estate in Baltimore City was held to be ineffectual to defeat the dower right therein of his widow, the appellee; and by the other of which, being á supplemental decree, the appellants were required to pay the appellee the sum ot $124.87 being the agreed amount of the one-third part of the net rents of said property from the death of Michael J. Collins to the date of the decree. ⁴⁷⁴ The facts of the case necessary to be stated are these. Sometime in the year 1890, Michael J. Collins, being then a widower with two children, who are the appellants, began to visit the appellee with a view to marriage, and several years later entered into a marriage engagement with her. This engagement continued until April 12th, 1899, when they were married.

On March 22nd, 1899, twenty days before the marriage, Michael J. Collins in consideration of five dollars, and of natural love and affection, secretly conveyed to the appellants, certain leasehold estate, being a dwelling and store house on Harrison street in Baltimore City, subject to a life estate reserved to him by said conveyance, and subject also to an outstanding yearly ground rent of $65.67-100 dollars; and also by deed of the same date, and for the same consideration secretly conveyed to the appellants certain household furniture in said dwelling, and a stock of furniture in said store house, subject to a life estate reserved thereby to said Collins. This was the only property then owned by him and he never acquired any other. All of this property he received under a conveyance from his brother, John W. Collins, sometime in the year 1897, and all of the movable property above mentioned was disposed of by Michael J. Collins in his life time. The stock of furniture was worth from $1,000 to $1,200, and the dwelling and store house at the time the decree was passed rented for $25 per month.

On January 12th, 1900, he executed a will by which he gave, to his wife one-third of all his property, and to his two daughters the residue, and made C. Dodd McFarland his executor, and died January 17th, 1901, leaving said will unrevoked. The bill in this case was filed May 19th, 1901, by the appellee against the appellants and the executor, C. Dodd McFarland, alleging the facts above mentioned, and further alleging that the conveyance to the appellants was kept secret from her and did not come to her knowledge until December, 1899; that the same was fraudulently made on the eve of her marriage to deprive her of her marital rights in the estate of her husband, and was void as against her rights in said ⁴⁷⁵ estate. The prayer of the bill was that the conveyance of said leasehold estate to the appellants be declared null and void. It appeared from the testimony in the case that the appellee knew during her engagement to her husband that he owned the property mentioned, that he told her he owned it absolutely, and that she expected in event of his death to receive a wife’s share therein.

The appellants in their answer, allege that at the time of the conveyance from John W. Collins to their father, he, John W. Collins, was about to submit to an operation from which it was believed death would ensue, and that in this anticipation, this conveyance was made upon the'distinct understanding and agreement between the parties that if John W. Collins should recover, Michael should reconvey the property to him, but if he should die, Michael should convey the property to the appellants; that John died from the effect of the operation and that the conveyance from Michael to them was in pursuance of said understanding and agreement, and that Michael was never at any time the owner of any beneficial interest in said property. We will consider first therefore what interest Michael had in this property. It may be conceded that if Michael accepted the conveyance from his brother upon the verbal understanding above set forth, then the conveyance by him to the appellants would be regarded as made in performance of such agreement? and would be upheld in equity as not affected by the Statute of Frauds. In re Duke of Marlborough, 2 Ch.

Div. 133; Giffen v. Taylor, 139 Inch 573; Larmon v. Knight, 140 Ill. 232 ; Phelps' Jurid. Equity, sec. 210. But such a trust must be clearly established, and the proof in this case falls far short of what is required. Neither of the appellants had any knowledge of the alleged agreement.

Frances knew nothing except what her aunt, Mrs. O’Connor, told her, and admitted that when her father executed and delivered the conveyance to her he said nothing about any such agreement, and only told her he had made the deed. Margaret Collins, the other appellant, knew nothing except what her uncle, Patrick Collins, had told her, and thatw as that their father had conveyed the property to them. ⁴⁷⁶ Mrs. O’Connor, a sister of John and Michael Collins, is the only witness who attempts to prove the alleged agreement. She testified that sometime before the operation was performed, John asked her to let him transfer the property to her for Mike’s children, and she told him to transfer it to the children in the first place, but he said it would leave him in a bad fix if he got over his sickness, as the youngest child would be too young to transfer it back; that she then said transfer it to their father, and he would transfer it back to John if he got well, and if not, to the children; that Mike was there, and he said he certainly would do this and that after John’s death she heard Michael say in the presence of his brother Patrick, that it was John’s wish the property should be transferred to Mike’s children, and that he, Mike, intended to do it. This is the extent cf her knowledge upon this subject.

The record does not contain a copy of the deed from John to Michael, nor was Mr. McFarland called as a witness to state what instructions were given as to its preparation, or what knowledge he had as to John’s wishes, or the understanding between him and Michael, though it appears from the record that he prepared the deed, and the appellant’s counsel states in his brief that the deed was an absolute conveyance. Robert Price testified that he knew all the parties to this case and had known Michael a'nd Patrick Collins for twenty years; that Michael was easily led and he*thought Patrick exercised influence over him. Emma Sudrow, a daughter of the appellee, testified that on the night of the marriage, when Michael Collins and her mother had gone to be married, she was left at his house with the appellants and Patrick Collins who is now dead; that she was in the kitchen and the others in the dining room and she heard Patrick Collins strike the table and say: “By God, I have settled her all right,” and Fannie and Maggie Collins said: “Oh uncle Patrick hush.” The appellee testified that when she first learned in December, 1899, of this conveyance, she asked her husband about it; that he at first denied making it, but afterwards admitted it, and said Patrick was the one ⁴⁷⁷ who made him do it, that he slept with him and bothered him day and night until it was done, and that when her husband died, Patrick told her all she had to do was to take off her apron, put on her hat and walk out; that as she brought nothing she could not take anything. Alexander T. Collins, a brother of Michael Collins, testified in reply to a question as to what he knew of the conveyance in question, that after it was made, Patrick Collins told him that he had fixed this woman, Mrs. Collins.

John W. Silverwood, testified that he had known John W. Collins for twenty years, and that while he was very sick, he told him he wanted to convey his property to Mike, but did not say anything about Mike’s daughters. The testimony thus summarized, not only fails to establish a trust, but is quite convincing that the conveyance in question was made for the purpose of defeating the appellee’s marital rights. We now come to consider whether a Court of equity will relieve a widow against a voluntary conveyance by the husband of all of his estate, pending an engagement of marriage, without any disclosure to the intended wife, or knowledge on her part of his purpose, though without any express misrepresentation on his part, and we do not think there can be any difficulty in reaching a satisfactory conclusion, either upon principle or authority. It has long been settled that equity will protect the marital rights of the husband against a fraudulent conveyance by the wife, pending a treaty of marriage.

In the earlier cases, relief was granted only where some actual fraud, accomplished through misrepresentation or deception was practiced upon the husband ; but in later cases concealment alone was held to be fraud for which a conveyance would be set aside. It was first distinctly so held by Lord Thurlow in Strathmore v. Bowes, 1 Vesey, Jr., 27, although in that case, the decree, upon the facts was adverse to the husband. In subsequent cases, the views of Lord Thurlow in Strathmore v. Bowes, were fully considered, and bare concealment was pronounced to be fraud in itself. Goddard v. Snow, 1 Russ. 485; England v. Downs, 2 Beav. 522; Taylor v. Pugh, 1 Hare, 603. ⁴⁷⁸ In this country, concealment alone has been uniformly held to be fraud per se entitling the husband to relief.

Tucker v. Andrews, 13 Me. 124 ; Logan v. Simmons, 3 Ired. Eq. 487 ; Spencer v. Spencer, 3 Jones Eq. 404 ; Ramsay v. Joyce, 1 McMillan’s Eq. 236; Manes v. Durant, 2 Rich. Eq. 403 ; and other cases to the same effect are collected in White and Tudor's Leading Cases, 317. But- we have still to inquire whether the wife will be afforded the same protection against a conveyance by her intended husband.• Upon principle, it is difficult to perceive any sound and satisfactory reason for discrimination against the wife, since it is the marital right of the husband which is protected against an ante-nuptial conveyance by the wife, and the marital right of the wife, is in itself as perfect as .that of the husband.

It has been well said in Chandler v. Hollingsworth, 3 Del. Ch. 114 : “Whether the wife’s dower, as well as the husband’s interest in her estate, is to be protected against .fraud, depends not at all upon such considerations as the comparative value of the consideration rendered by each, or the value of their respective rights, but solely upon the fact that there exists a marital right, which, in common with all legal rights, is a proper subject of legal protection, whether it be itself of more or less value, or whether it spring from a larger or less consideration rendered. If there could be any ground, in addition to the mere existence of a right defrauded, to evoke a swifter interposition for one sex rather than the other, it would be the consideration that the wife, being of the weaker sex, the more needs legal protection.” There does not appear to be in England any express decision upon the precise question, and the leading text writers upon the subject are not in accord, nor always consistent with themselves. Thus Mr. Roper in his work on Husband and Wife, vol. 1, p. 52, says : “The creation of a trust to have the effect of excluding the widow’s dower; must be a fair transaction, such an one in which a Court of equity would entertain jurisdiction to execute the trust, or the husband will be consid ⁴⁷⁹ ered the legal owner of the estate, which will consequently give to the wife a title to dower;” yet on page 354, he cites Ex parte Bell, 1st Glyn and Jameson, 282, for the doctrine that a voluntary settlement made by the husband, though set aside as fraudulent against creditors, prevents the wife’s right of dower, because the husband was not seised of an estate in possession.

It is pointed out, however, in Chandler v. Hollingsworth, supra, that that case cannot be taken as a decision of the question here, since it does not appear whether the