Collins v. Foster

SMITH, Judge. We shall here hold that the District Court may dismiss a claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The action arose when Charles Foster, an inmate of the Maryland Penitentiary, filed a claim in the District Court ³³⁰ against the warden of that institution alleging a lack of dental treatment. Trial was scheduled for September 23, 1983.

On September 16, 1983, the warden filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the District Court was without jurisdiction because the inmate had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Inmate Grievance Commission statute, Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol., 1983 Cum. Supp.) Art. 41, § 204F. Subsection l specifically provides, “No court shall be required to entertain an inmate’s grievance or complaint within the jurisdiction of the Inmate Grievance Commission unless and until the complainant has exhausted the remedies as provided in this section.” The doctrine that administrative remedies ordinarily must be exhausted before a court will take cognizance of a complaint is well established in our case law. See, e.g., Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83, 91 , 447 A.2d 860, 864-65 (1982); Prince George’s Co. v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 283 , 418 A.2d 1155, 1160 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 , 101 S.Ct. 869 , 66 L.Ed.2d 808 (1981).

The motion specifically noted that Foster had filed a claim with the Commission but this claim had not yet been scheduled for hearing. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss. Foster appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. That court reversed and remanded the proceeding to the District Court for trial.

The circuit court said, in pertinent part: “The defendant’s ‘motion to dismiss’ is in the nature of a motion raising a preliminary objection. The Maryland District Rules and the law make no provision for such a motion. See G.W. Liebmann, Maryland Practice, District Court Law and Procedure, § 263 at p. 324-5 (1976). As pointed out in the pocket supplement, the Court of Appeals rescinded MDR 323, Motion Raising Preliminary Objection, on May 5, 1976. “Except with respect to voluntary dismissal, MDR 541, the only motion to dismiss permitted in the District Court is under MDR 535.

A motion under this rule can only be made after the party against whom it is made has intro ³³¹ duced his evidence at trial. The District Court was without power to dismiss the plaintiff’s statement of claim without first giving him the opportunity to present evidence to support his claim.” We granted the Warden’s petition for a writ of certiorari so that we might address the important public issue here presented. There was indeed a short-lived Maryland District Rule 323 providing for a motion raising preliminary objection in the District Court. It appears to have been included by accident in the 52nd Report of our Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.

Immediately after the publication of the 52nd Report, which recommended the adoption of MDR 323, a letter from a member of the District Court subcommittee called to the attention of the reporter to the committee that the full committee had rejected such a rule. In fact, the chairman of the subcommittee involved had previously advised the reporter that it might well be “that the [then] Maryland District Rule 321 [was] sufficient authority for the filing of a motion of this nature and that there [was] no need for a separate rule on the subject.” The reminder to the