Collins v. State

RAKER, J. This is another case addressing sentence enhancement based on prior offenses. In this appeal, we must interpret Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2001 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, § 293, second or subsequent offenses, and Art. 27, § 291A, possession, ownership, transportation, etc., of a firearm, 1 and decide whether a sentence enhancement for repeat drug offenders may be imposed when a defendant is sentenced for a firearms offense that, by definition, can only be committed by prior drug offenders. 2 We shall hold that the Legislature ⁶⁸⁷ could not have intended to treat a first offense under § 291A as a “second or subsequent offense” under the circumstances presented in this case and, accordingly, we shall vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. I. Appellant Clifton Collins was convicted in the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County of possession of a firearm pursuant to § 291A, and of illegally carrying a handgun on his person pursuant to § 36B(b). On August 5, 2003, on the drug-felon in possession of a firearm count, the court imposed a sentence of ten years.

The court imposed a concurrent three year sentence for carrying a handgun. The court enhanced Collins’s § 291A sentence pursuant to § 293, which permits the imposition of a sentence twice that otherwise authorized. The maximum sentence set out in § 291A is a term of incarceration up to five years; nonetheless, the court determined that Collins’s prior conviction rendered his current crime a “second or subsequent offense” under the enhancement provision of § 293, and therefore subject to twice the stated penalty. Collins noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

Before that court considered the case, we granted certiorari on our own initiative. Collins v. State, 381 Md. 673 , 851 A.2d 593 (2004).

II

Before this Court, Collins argues that when a defendant has been convicted for the first time of the offense of possession of a firearm under Art. 27, § 291A, it is error to enhance a sentence under Art. 27, § 293 by classifying the possession of a firearm offense as a second or subsequent offense. He reasons that if § 293 were applicable to § 291A under those circumstances, then persons convicted under § 291A would always face enhanced penalties. This reading, he suggests, ⁶⁸⁸ would fail to effectuate the intent expressed by the Legislature when it set the maximum sentence under § 291A at five years. Alternatively, he suggests that if the Legislature’s intent is ambiguous as to whether § 293 applies to § 291A, then the rule of lenity bars its application.

The State does not dispute Collins’s premise that, if § 293 applies to § 291A, then all persons convicted under the latter statute are subject to an enhanced penalty, and potentially a ten year sentence. The State argues that this is precisely the intent of the Legislature. The State relies on the plain language of both statutes and concludes that their language makes clear that § 293 applies to § 291A. It also contends that, because § 291A was enacted after § 293, 3 the General Assembly is presumed to have known and intended that § 293 would apply to § 291A.

Because the legislative intent is unambiguous, the State contends, the rule of lenity is inapplicable.

III

We review a trial court’s imposition of sentence on three recognized grounds: “(1) whether the sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or violates other constitutional requirements; (2) whether the sentencing judge was motivated by ill will, prejudice or other impermissible considerations; and (3) whether the sentence is within statutory limits.” Khalifa v. State, 382 Md. 400, 416-17 , 855 A.2d 1175, 1184 (2004) (quoting Triggs v. State, 382 Md. 27, 40 , 852 A.2d 114, 122 (2004)). In the instant case, only the third ground is at issue. Because the interpretation of a statute is a pure question of law, we review the Circuit Court’s decision de novo. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.

See Melton v. State, 379 Md. 471, 476 , 842 A.2d 743, 746 (2004). We begin with the plain language of the statutes. As we have ⁶⁸⁹ frequently stated, if the statutory language is unambiguous when construed according to its ordinary and everyday meaning, then we give effect to the statute as it is written. Id. at 477 , 842 A.2d at 746 .

We have also noted, however, that “[statutes that are clear when viewed separately may well be ambiguous where their application in a given situation, or when they operate together, is not clear.” Gardner v. State, 344 Md. 642, 648 , 689 A.2d 610, 613 (1997). See also Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340 Md. 503, 508 , 667 A.2d 617, 619 (1995) (noting similar result when construing contract terms); Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 74 , 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986) (same).

IV

As we have indicated, appellant was convicted of violating Article 27, § 291A, possession, ownership, transportation of a firearm. Article 27, § 291A provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “(b) Prohibited Acts. — A person may not possess, own, carry, or transport a firearm if the person has been convicted of: (1) A felony under this subheading [Health — Controlled Dangerous Substances]; (2) An offense under the laws of the United States, another state, or the District of Columbia that would be a felony under this subheading if committed in this State; or (3) Conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the offenses listed in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection.” The statutory penalty for a violation of Art. 27, § 291A is a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years or both. Art. 27, § 291A(d). Appellant had been convicted previously of a drug felony under the requisite subheading, and as a result he was not allowed by law to be in possession of a firearm.

Appellant was sentenced to ten years on the possession of a firearm count. He was sentenced as a second or subse ⁶⁹⁰ quent offender under Art. 27, § 293. That section provides as follows: “(a) More severe sentence. — Any person convicted of any offense under this subheading is, if the offense is a second or subsequent offense, punishable by a term of imprisonment twice that otherwise authorized, by twice the fine otherwise authorized, or by both. (b) Second or subsequent offense defined. — For purposes of this section, an offense shall be considered a second or subsequent offense, if, prior to the conviction of the offense, the offender has at anytime been convicted of any offense or offenses under this subheading or under any prior law of this State or any law of the United States or of any other state relating to the other controlled dangerous substances as defined in this subheading.” Collins has correctly identified the logical conundrum into which we are placed when interpreting §§ 293 and 291 A. By its terms, § 293 applies to “any offense under this subheading ..., if the offense is a second or subsequent offense.” Section 291A falls within the Controlled Dangerous Substances subheading.

Thus, when construed in isolation, § 293 would appear to apply to § 291A. By its terms, § 291A carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment “for not more than 5 years.” Yet if § 293 applies to § 291A, every person convicted under § 291A would be subject to an enhanced sentence and the maximum term would be ten years. Any person convicted of “a felony under this subheading” has been convicted of an “offense or offenses under this subheading.” Any person convicted under “the laws of the United States, another state, or the District of Columbia that would be a felony under this subheading if committed in this State” has been convicted under a “law of the United States or of any other state relating to the other controlled dangerous substances as defined in this subheading.” Any person convicted of “[cjonspiracy or attempt to commit any of the offenses listed in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection” has been convicted of an “offense ... under ⁶⁹¹ this subheading or ... any law of the United States or of any other state relating to the other controlled dangerous substances as defined in this subheading” because attempts and conspiracies to commit Controlled Dangerous Substances offenses are proscribed explicitly by Art. 27, § 290. 4 In other words, by definition, every offense under § 291A would be a “second or subsequent offense” within the meaning of § 293. While language such as “imprisonment for not more than 5 years” in a criminal statute impliedly is subject to exceptions created by free-standing enhancement provisions, § 293 cannot be considered an “exception” to § 291A under the State’s reading.

It would be universally applicable, and “imprisonment for not more than 5 years” would never be the maximum penalty for a violation of § 291A. When construing a statute, we recognize that it “should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory.” James v. Butler, 378 Md. 683, 696 , 838 A.2d 1180, 1187 (2003); Benedict v. State, 377 Md. 1, 7 , 831 A.2d 1060, 1063 (2003); Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491 , 632 A.2d 753, 758 (1993). Interpreting the-statutes as the State urges would render the words “five years” nugatory, because those words would never describe the maximum penalty for a violation of § 291A. Our textual analysis has left us with two possible interpretations of the statutes.

When two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of a statute exist, that statute is by definition ambiguous. Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223 , 858 A.2d 484, 487 (2004). Where the language of a statute is ambiguous, we examine its statutory purpose, considering not only the ordinary meaning of words, but also how that lan ⁶⁹² guage relates to the overall meaning, setting, and purpose of the act. Deville at 223 , 858 A.2d at 487 ; Melgar v. State, 355 Md. 339, 347 , 734 A.2d 712, 716 (1999).

Therefore, when interpreting unclear language within a statute, we consider both the particular and broad objectives of the legislation, in addition to the overall purpose of the statutory scheme. See Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 436 , 639 A.2d 675, 678-79 (1994). The purpose of any repeat-offender penalty enhancement is to create a differential in the potential punishments imposed upon first-time and repeat offenders. This differential can serve a number of ends.

Individuals with prior