Combs v. Scharf

Urnerr, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On January 2, 1921, Eliza Combs died, leaving as her heirs at law a son and the four children of a deceased daughter. The son, Henry Combs, is the sole beneficiary of a will of his mother, dated October 29th, 1918, which has been admitted to probate. On June 26, 1917, the testatrix had conveyed by deed to Frank, Adam, and Peter J. Scharf, sons of her deceased daughter, Kosa Scharf, a farm in the suburbs of Baltimore, containing about twenty-four acres, in which the grantor reserved a life estate.

Nearly three years later Mrs. Combs executed a deed for1 the same property to her son Henry and his wife as tenants by the entire-ties. • The bill of complaint in this case was filed by Henry Combs and wife for the purpose of having invalidated, on the ground of mental incapacity and undue influence, the deed of June 26th, 1917, from his mother to her grandsons therein named, and a cross-bill has been filed by the defendants to have the subsequent deed, dated March 5th, 1920, in favor of the plaintiffs, decreed to be ineffective except as a grant of the life estate reserved to the grantor by the first conveyance. This appeal is by the plaintiffs, from a decree dismissing their bill of complaint and granting the relief sought by the erossrbill. The testimony in the record was produced by numerous witnesses and is quite voluminous. It could not be reviewed in detail within the proper limits of this opinion.

But its general effect will be sufficiently stated to indicate the basis of our conclusion that the decree appealed from should be affirmed. There is no evidence as to the circumstances under which the deed of March 5th, 1920, from Eliza Combs to the plaintiffs was executed. But with respect to the preparation and ⁷² execution of her deed of June 26th, 1917, to the defendants, the testimony is full and explicit. It was prepared by a lawyer, who carefully followed her independent and definite instructions.

The ability of the grantor to understand the nature and effect of her deed is conclusively proved. While she was then about eighty-one years of age, she was still personally attending to her various interests. It was testified that she had certain hallucinations towards the close of her life, but the great preponderance of the disinterested testimony justifies the belief that she was mentally capable at the period under inquiry. The deed accomplished her expressed and natural desire to make such a provision for her grandsons, and the proof fails to sustain the charge that it was the product of undue influence.

This charge was directed against her son-in-law, Peter Scharf, father of the grantees. He was associated, as coexecutor, with Mrs. ftambs in the administration of her deceased husband’s estate, and she was a visitor in his home at the period of this transaction, but he does not appear to have had, or to have attempted to exercise, any control over her judgment. He was not present at the execution of the deed, which occurred in the office of a notary and under the supervision of the lawyer by whom it had been prepared. It was read and explained to her and received her unqualified approval.

By her direction it was at once recorded. Hpon the proof we can have no doubt that the deed was the result of her own free and competent volition. On the day of the execution of the deed to her grandsons, Mrs. Combs made a will in which she bequeathed $1,000 to her son Henry, with the accompanying statement that he had received from her more than his share of her estate during her lifetime. It was proved without contradiction that about two years after the date of this will he received from his mother the sum of $2,000.

There is a dispute as to whether or not he obtained from her $2,800 additional. When the will was executed, Mrs. Combs had only a life ⁷³ estate under her husband’s will and the interests she ha,d reserved for life, in the farm conveyed by the deed in controversy, and in a conveyance of another property in 1910