Commissioners of Cambridge v. Eastern Shore Public Service Co.

Markell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On the former appeal in this case we sustained against a demurrer, the bill of complaint for a declaratory decree that defendant is without a franchise to serve the citizens of Cambridge with electricity. Commissioners of Cambridge v. Eastern Shore Public Service Company, 192 Md. 333 , 64 A. 2d 151 . After remand of the case plaintiff filed a petition “that a jury be impanelled as provided in Section 9 of Article 31A of Flack’s 1939 Code for the ⁶⁵⁵ purpose of determining the following issue of fact:1.

Does the defendant hold a franchise to operate its business within the corporate limits of Cambridge?” Section 9 of Article 31 A, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, (which is not uniform as to section 9, since that section is taken, part from the draft act, part from the federal act), provides, “9. (Jury Trial.) When a proceeding under this Article involves the determination of issues of fact, such issues may be submitted to a jury in the form of interrogatories, with proper instructions by the court,'and either a general or special verdict may be taken.” Plaintiff contends that this provision for submission of issues to a jury is not discretionary, but mandatory, even in an equity case, thus overthrowing equity procedure, as settled for centuries in Maryland and in England, (Borssuck v. Pantaleo, 183 Md. 148 , 36 A. 2d 527 , 156 A. L. R. 1140; Chase v. Winans, 59 Md. 475 ; Miller on Equity Procedure, § 232), and also providing means of insuring delay in a special procedure designed to expedite justice. The instant case is an equity case; the nature of the case is equitable, and after declaratory relief the