Comptroller of Maryland v. Miller

HOLLANDER, J. This case arises out of a grievance filed by Janet M. Miller, appellee, against the Comptroller of Maryland (the “Comptroller”), appellant, concerning the Comptroller’s method of computing compensable 1 work time when an employee travels from home directly to a remote work site, rather than to the regularly assigned office. Appellee claimed she was entitled to compensation for all of her travel time, without deducting the time normally spent commuting to the office. The Comptroller was of the view that appellee was not entitled to compensation for the time she would have otherwise spent commuting to work. Appellee pursued her grievance at a contested case hearing conducted by an Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”) at the Office of Administrative Hearings (the “OAH”).

The ALJ concluded that the Comptroller’s policy was arbitrary and unsupported by law. However, the ALJ “denied and dismissed” Ms. Miller’s grievance because she failed to present evidence as to the remedy she sought. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City affirmed the ALJ’s decision rejecting the Comptroller’s policy, but remanded the matter to OAH to determine the specific relief to which Ms. Miller was entitled. On appeal, the Comptroller asks: ³²⁴ Did the circuit court err in affirming the OAH decision that an employee temporarily assigned to a remote work site may properly treat as compensable work time the amount of time involved in her normal commute from home to assigned office?

For the reasons that follow, we shall reverse and remand. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY 2 Ms. Miller began working for the Comptroller in August 2001 as a Financial Compliance Auditor in the Field Audit Section of the Compliance Division. At the time, it was the Comptroller’s policy that an employee who was required to travel directly from home to a remote work site, without a stop at the employee’s assigned office, would be entitled to compensable work time for travel only if the travel time exceeded by at least thirty minutes the employee’s normal commute time. Conversely, if the travel time was less than half an hour beyond the normal commute time, the employee would not be compensated.

Ms. Miller testified at the OAH that, when she submitted her application for employment with the Comptroller, she indicated that she wanted to work within a reasonable commuting distance of her home. She explained, “I didn’t want excessive commute time.” According to Ms. Miller, her normal commute time from her home to her assigned office is “half an hour.” About thirty days after appellee commenced working for the Comptroller, she began going on field audits, which required travel to remote sites. In August 2003, Ms. Miller met with Phillip Deitchman, a labor relations specialist with the Maryland Classified Employee Association. According to Ms. Miller, they discussed the issue of compensation for off-site travel, and Mr. Deitch ³²⁵ man informed her, “They’re supposed to pay you the moment you leave home to when you return.” Accordingly, Ms. Miller submitted a grievance to the Comptroller, dated August 7, 2003, alleging that she was “not compensated properly for travel between her home and temporary work location, which was different from her normal assigned office.” Further, the grievance stated: “Management’s action is arbitrary, capricious, and has no factual basis.” Appellee sought payment “for all time traveled between home and temporary work location.” In connection with the first step of the grievance process, Linda Tanton, the Director of the Compliance Division, issued a decision on September 12, 2003. 3 Ms. Tanton sustained the grievance, in part; she authorized compensation for all travel time in excess of Ms. Miller’s normal commute time, even if the excess travel time did not exceed the normal commute time by thirty minutes.

However, Ms. Tanton limited appellee’s award to the period of thirty days prior to the filing of the grievance. On September 24, 2003, twelve days after the first step decision, the Comptroller formally changed the policy for compensation for travel time. Under the revised policy, an employee is considered to be on work time for any time in excess of the employee’s “normal one-way commute time.” Nevertheless, Ms. Miller appealed the decision because it did not deem as compensable work time the entire period of travel from the employee’s home to a temporary work site. She also challenged the decision to limit the award to the preceding thirty days.

The second step of appellee’s grievance, “Employee Petition Of Grievance Appeal,” led to a “Management Decision” by Deputy Comptroller Stephen M. Cordi, dated November 12, 2003. He affirmed Ms. Tanton’s decision regarding the work ³²⁶ time policy. However, pursuant to Maryland Code (1993, 2004 Repl.Vol., 2005 Supp.), § 12-203(b) of the State Personnel and Pensions Article (“S.P.P.”), Cordi modified the award to limit compensation to the twenty-day period preceding the filing of the grievance on August 7, 2003. Cordi explained: In support of the request for a longer period of award, Ms. Miller’s representative has directed my attention to a case involving two inspectors of the Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation in which the Circuit Court for Baltimore City overruled an Administrative Law Judge’s award of 30 days compensation in a commuting compensation case and award of 5 years.

In an unreported decision, the Court of Special Appeals vacated the circuit court decision and remanded the case to the Administrative Law Judge to put the reason for limiting the award to 30 days on the record. Shortly thereafter, the Administrative Law Judge issued a decision specifying that the award was limited to 30 days because Section 10-206 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article, in effect at the time of the grievances in question, specified that grievances must be filed within 30 days of the act generating the grievance or when the grievant first knew or should have known of the act generating the grievance. After the filing of the grievances in the foregoing case, the General Assembly replaced Section 10-206 with Section 12-203(b) which provides as follows: A grievance procedure must be initiated by an employee within 20 days after: (1) the occurrence of the alleged act that is the basis of the grievance; or (2) the employee first knew of or reasonably should have known of the alleged act that is the basis of the grievance. In light of the foregoing, Ms. Tanton’s award is hereby modified to conform with the 20-day requirement of Section 12-203(b).

As to the substance of the grievance, that is whether Ms. Miller is entitled to compensation for the time for all of her travel to temporary work locations or just the time in excess of normal commute time, Ms. Tanton ruled as follows: ³²⁷ An employee is entitled to compensation during work time. Pursuant to COMAR 17.04.11.02B(l)(j), “work time includes time during which an employee ... [tjravels between home and the work site other than the assigned office, in accordance with the Standard Travel Regulations under COMAR 28.02.01.” I believe that the Department of Budget and Management, in adopting this definition of work time, is equating the determination of what is and is not work time, contrasted with commute time, to the similar determination made by the Board of Public Works in its Standard Travel Regulations. The travel regulations provide that reimbursement for State-owned, State-leased, and privately-owned vehicles is subject to policies issued by the Department of Budget and Management, which has adopted “State Vehicle Fleet Policies and Procedures.” As most recently adopted in June 2002, Section 5 of that document sets forth the policy regarding private mileage reimbursement. Paragraph 5.01.05 states that: “Reimbursement is based on the principle that the employee should be reimbursed for all official business mileage accumulated in a private vehicle which is beyond the normal round trip mileage incurred from the employee’s home to the permanently assigned office/work station and back home again.” Paragraph 5.01.01(1) further provides: “A State employee who leaves home to conduct business without stopping at the assigned office may be reimbursed for all mileage directly connected with the business trip, which is in excess of the commute miles normally traveled, i.e., total official miles driven minus normal daily commute miles.

In this situation, the driver has not driven his normal daily commute and therefore must subtract it from the total official miles driven.” I believe that COMAR 17.04.11.02B(l)(j), incorporating the Standard Travel Regulations, is intending to apply the quoted mileage reimbursement concept in determining whether an employee is on work time or commute time. ³²⁸ Applying that concept to this situation, for those days when Ms. Miller does not travel to her assigned office, she would properly be viewed as being on work time for all time directly connected with the business trip, in excess of her normal commute time. Having reviewed the regulations in question, I have concluded that Ms. Tanton’s analysis is correct and thereby adopt her decision. That decision has the effect of providing parallel treatment for office and field personnel and avoids the necessity of management having to require field employees to report to the office first (and last) whenever the audit site is closer to the office than the employee’s home. The award is modified as set forth above, but the grievance is otherwise denied.

Unhappy with the outcome, Ms. Miller filed a third step appeal to the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (the “DBM”), who delegated the case to the OAH. The ALJ conducted an evidentiary hearing on April 20, 2004, at which Ms. Miller testified. James Loftus, Assistant Director of the Comptroller’s Compliance Division, testified on behalf of the agency. Ms. Miller maintained that, if she was not traveling directly to her assigned office, she was “on the clock” from the moment she got in her vehicle until she arrived at the remote work site.

Moreover, she claimed that the Comptroller’s travel time policies, both before and after the revision of September 24, 2003, violated Code of Maryland Regulations (“COMAR”) 17.04.11.02B(l)(j), which states: “Work time includes time during which an employee ... [t]ravels between home and the work site other than the assigned office, in accordance with the Standard Travel Regulations under CO-MAR 23.02.01.” Nevertheless, Ms. Miller conceded that, under the interpretation she advanced, she would earn compensable time even if assigned to a remote work site that required less travel time than her regular commute to her assigned office. In particular, she maintained that if, as a result of a work assignment to ³²⁹ a remote location, she had only a fifteen minute drive to the remote work site instead of her normal commute of thirty minutes from home to office, she would earn compensable time of thirty minutes for a round trip. Yet, she acknowledged that she earned no compensatory time for the entirety of her normal thirty minute home-to-offiee commute. 4 The following exchange is pertinent: [ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL]: So you would be asserting your right to compensatory time of 30 minutes in this hypothetical when your overall work day from beginning to end was in fact a half an hour shorter than your normal work day, is that correct? [MILLER]: That’s correct. Ms. Miller described how she learned of the Comptroller’s initial policy: I had asked specifically my supervisor what the travel policy was and he handed me that memo, and I said, “Well, I have an audit,” and I said, “If I go on that beltway in the morning, I’ve sat in traffic to go one mile and wait—and sat for 25 minutes.” I said, “I have to meet—my manager’s supposed to be at this tax site at 8:30,” and I now want to leave a quarter after 7:00, which with a half-an-hour commute would give me the extra half and [sic] hour plus 15 minutes.

So I would have gotten under the old policy, the—the memo indicated, 45 minutes compensatory time, and my supervisor said, “Okay.” That Monday I left home at quarter after 7:00 to meet. The beltway was tied up, it was snowing and I got to the taxpayer’s site at 25 of 9:00. I thought my timing was pretty good on doing that. The next day I went into the office and I asked my supervisor how to put the time down on the time card, ³³⁰ because they wouldn’t pay me for when I left home, they were going to discount that first half hour, and he said, “I’ll have to get back to you.” Well, time cards weren’t due until the next week, no big deal as far as I was concerned.

The following Tuesday time cards are due and he says, “Where’s your time card,” and I—I reminded him he was going to get back and tell me what hours to put in and then he told me they weren’t going to pay me, they weren’t approving compensatory time. The Comptroller argued that Ms. Miller’s position could lead to the “absurd” result of an employee who normally commutes thirty minutes at both ends of the day obtaining compensation for fifteen minute trips at each end of the day, and yet “putting in a 30-minute shorter day.” Moreover, the Comptroller claimed that, even if its current policy is inconsistent with law, S.P.P. § 12-203(b) limits to twenty days its liability for back pay or compensation. Appellant advanced the position expressed by Mr. Cordi in his “Management Decision” dated November 12, 2003. The Comptroller conceded that its policy prior to September 24, 2003, was incorrect and inconsistent with the law, but asserted that its revised travel time policy was correct under COMAR 17.04.11.02B(l)(j).

Loftus testified that the Comptroller’s revised work time policy was based upon the mileage reimbursement policy that already applied to State employees. He explained that, under the revised policy, if an employee with a normal commute time of thirty minutes were assigned to a remote work site located fifteen minutes from the employee’s home, that fifteen minute trip “would be all commute time, no work time.” The same result would occur if the employee with a normal commute of thirty minutes was assigned a remote work site thirty minutes from home. However, if the employee with a normal commute time of thirty minutes was assigned to a remote work site forty-five minutes or ninety minutes from home, the employee ³³¹ would be paid for fifteen minutes or one hour, respectively. 5 The Comptroller introduced a letter of February 8, 2000, from Andrea M. Fulton, Executive Director of the Office of Personnel Services and Benefits within DBM, to Mr. J. Alan Baker, Director of the Personal Services Administration of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. It stated, in part: In accordance with Code of Maryland Regulation (COMAR) 17.04.011.02B(l)(j), any time that an employee travels between home and a work site other than the assigned office is considered work time.

When such situations occur, we believe it is appropriate to deduct the employee’s normal commute time from the actual travel time. The amount of the employee’s actual travel time that exceeds the employee’s normal commute time should be considered work time and the employee should be compensated, as appropriate under the personnel regulations concerning overtime, for this time. On June 4, 2004, the ALJ issued his decision, concluding, in part, that the Comptroller’s revised policy “is arbitrary and inconsistent with law and regulations.” He reasoned: No statute directly addresses how executive branch agencies are to define, and compensate employees for, “work time,” “commute time” or “travel time.” [COMAR 17.04.11.02B(j) provides, “Work time includes time during which an employee ... [t]ravels between home and the work site other than the assigned office, in accordance with the Standard Travel Regulations under COMAR 23.02.01.”] The Board of Public Work’s Standard Travel Regulations apply to all executive branch State employees. COMAR 23.02.01.02B(14) provides as follows: (14) “Travel status” means the condition of a State employee while traveling on State business.

An employee is not in travel status while commuting from home to the ³³² employee’s assigned office, regardless of the length of time of that commute. Thus, by promulgated regulation, it is the policy of all executive agencies in the State (unless otherwise exempted) that an employee traveling from home to a field site, and not to the employee’s assigned office, is on “work time” and in “travel status.” An employee is to be paid or compensated for “work time.” See, COMAR 17.04.11.02B(l)(a) through (Z) (list of instances that qualify as compensable work time). When traveling to a field site, an employee is working for the State, “on the clock” so to speak, from the time the employee leaves the residence or the place from which the normal commute to the assigned office would begin. In the instant case, under its revised policy (Joint Ex. #2) the Agency automatically, subtracts out (refuses to compensate for) time equal to an employee’s normal, estimated commute time from home to the employee’s assigned office and back home again when the employee travels to a field site.

The Agency argues that the policy is analogous to the Private Mileage Reimbursement policy contained in the Department of Budget and Management’s Vehicle Fleet policy (Joint Ex. # 3, p. 17-18). That policy is one in which mileage equal to an estimated, average round trip commute to an assigned office is subtracted out of the total miles traveled to and from a field site, for purposes of reimbursing an employee who uses a personal automobile for travel to a field site. With regard to reimbursing travel time, the Agency currently subtracts out the estimated, round trip travel time to the assigned office on those days when an employee does not commute to the employee’s assigned office. .... There is no direct legal authority to allow the Agency to deduct from an employee compensation for the work time while on travel status.

Moreover, if an employee has two or more residences, or two or more places from which an estimated commute to the assigned office begins, the automatic deduction policy becomes unmanageable. The Agen ³³³ cy attempted to argue that if the travel time to a field site were shorter than the estimated commute time to the assigned office, then the employee would somehow be unjustly compensated and therefore that interpretation of the law and regulations would lead to an absurd result. I am not persuaded by the agency’s argument on that point. I conclude that [Ms. Miller] has met her burdens to show that the Agency misapplied the statewide policy in formulating its own travel time policy.

Nevertheless, the ALJ said: In the instant case, [Ms. Miller] offered no credible evidence regarding the calculation of uncompensated work hours that she alleges were wrongly denied by the Agency. She has not offered evidence of the extent, if any, of uncompensated work hours. The ALJ concluded: Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Discussion, I conclude, as a matter of law, that [Ms. Miller] demonstrated that the Agency’s revised travel time policy did not conform to law and regulation. COMAR 17.04.11.02.

I further conclude, however, that [Ms. Miller] did not meet her burdens with regard to demonstrating that she is entitled to compensation for certain, uncompensated work time. Md.Code Ann. State Pers. & Pens. § 12-401(2). Although the ALJ rejected the Comptroller’s arguments on the merits, he “denied and dismissed” the grievance, because Ms. Miller had not presented evidence regarding the remedy she sought. Thereafter, Ms. Miller petitioned for judicial review, and the Comptroller cross-petitioned.

The circuit court agreed with the ALJ that the Comptroller’s revised policy was not supported by law. On the question of remedies, however, the court remanded the case to OAH for further proceedings to determine what, if any, compensation should be awarded Petitioner Miller for travel she undertook to any remote work site. Consistent with all ³³⁴ other aspects of the decision of the Administrative Law Judge, Petitioner Miller’s grievance will be granted. We shall include additional facts in our discussion.

DISCUSSION I. Before discussing the parties’ contentions, it is helpful to review the pertinent statutory and regulatory provisions. Title 17 of COMAR is captioned “Department of Budget and Management.” Subtitle 04 is titled “Personnel Services and Benefits.” Chapter 11 pertains to “Leave.” Section 02 of Chapter 11 is titled ‘Workweek, Overtime and Compensatory Time.” COMAR 17.04.11.02B states: B. Work Time. (1) Work time includes time during which an employee: (a) Is on duty, whether at the employee’s principal job site or at a remote location as part of the State’s telecommuting program; (b) Is on paid leave; (c) Participates in training activities as a job assignment; (d) Is on the employer’s premises and is on call and waiting for work; (e) Is not on the employer’s premises, but is on call and waiting for work, and the employee’s personal activities are substantially restricted; (f) Is changing into and removing program-specified clothing and equipment necessary for the performance of the job; (g) Participates in activities that are job-related immediately before the beginning or immediately after the end of an assigned shift; (h) Travels to and from work after being recalled to work by the appointing authority or the appointing authority’s ³³⁵ designated representative after the employee has completed the standard workday; (i) Travels to and from work after being called to work by the appointing authority or the appointing authority’s designated representative on the employee’s scheduled day off if the employee works fewer than 8 hours as a result of being called on the employee’s scheduled day off; (j) Travels between home and a work site other than the assigned office, in accordance with the Standard Travel Regulations under COMAR 23.02.01; (k) With prior supervisory approval, investigates and processes a disciplinary appeal or grievance, and participates at any conference or hearing relating to a grievance or appeal, in accordance with COMAR 17.04.07.07; or (l) With prior supervisory approval, uses reasonable time to investigate and process a complaint under State Personnel and Pensions Article, Title 5, Annotated Code of Maryland. (2) Work time includes any other time defined as work time under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), if applicable.

(Emphasis added.) Title 23 of COMAR is captioned “Board of Public Works.” Subtitle 02 is titled “Program Administration.” Chapter 01 contains the “Standard Travel Regulations.” COMAR 23.02.01.01 states: .01 Scope. A. Unless otherwise provided by law, these regulations apply to all travel for official business undertaken by officials and employees of units of the Executive Branch of the State government, except elected officials and officials and employees of the University of Maryland System. B. If a contract specifically provides for their application, these regulations may apply to official business travel of persons performing a State contract. C. These regulations do not apply : ³³⁶ (1) When a line item in the annual State budget specifically identifies an item and amount for exemption.

(2) To State-owned, State-leased, or privately owned motor vehicles. Reimbursement to employees or officials who use State-owned, State-leased, or privately owned motor vehicles to conduct official business for the State is within the jurisdiction of the State Fleet Administrator, Department of Budget and Management, and subject to policies issued by the Secretary of Budget and Management. (Emphasis added.) COMAR 23.02.01.02 is also relevant. It provides: .02 Definitions. * * * B. Terms Defined.

(5) Employee. (a) “Employee” means an employee or official of a unit of the Executive Branch of State government. * * * (10) “Routine business travel” means authorized travel on a daily basis or periodic basis to a jobsite other than the employee’s assigned office for official business. (14) “Travel status” means the condition of a State employee while traveling on State business. An employee is not in travel status while commuting from home to the employee’s assigned office, regardless of the length of time of that commute.

(Emphasis added.) Part 5.0 of the State Fleet Administrator’s “State Vehicle Fleet Policies and Procedures” addresses mileage reimbursement. Section 5.01.05, “Reimbursable Mileage,” states: ³³⁷ Reimbursement is based on the principle that the employee should be reimbursed for all official business mileage accumulated in a private vehicle which is beyond the normal round trip mileage incurred from the employee’s home to the permanently assigned office/work station and back home again. Section 5.01.05 further provides: A State employee who leaves home to conduct business without stopping at the assigned office may be reimbursed for all mileage directly connected with the business trip, which is in excess of the commute miles normally traveled i.e. total official miles driven minus normal daily commute miles. In this situation, the driver has not driven his normal daily commute and therefore must subtract it from the total official miles driven.

Title 8 of the S.P.P. Article is captioned “Compensation of Employees Subject to Salary Authority of Secretary of Budget and Management.” Tile 8, Subtitle 3, is captioned “Overtime Compensation.” S.P.P. § 8-302, “Construction and entitlement,” provides: (a) Construction of Subtitle.—This subtitle [Overtime Compensation] shall be interpreted and applied, to the extent applicable, in accordance with the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act; (b) Entitlement.—All employees subject to this subtitle are entitled to the greater of: (1) The benefits that are provided in this subtitle; or (2) To the extent applicable, the benefits required by the federal Fair Labor Standards Act. (Emphasis added.) 6 S.P.P. § 12-203(b) states: (b) Time limitations.—A grievance procedure must be initiated by an employee within 20 days after: ³³⁸ (1) the occurrence of the alleged act that is the basis of the grievance; or (2) the employee first knew of or reasonably should have known of the alleged act that is the basis of the grievance. S.P.P. § 12-402(a), “Remedies available to grievants,” provides: (a) In general.—Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the remedies available to a grievant under this title are limited to the restoration of the rights, pay, status, or benefits that the grievant otherwise would have had if the contested policy, procedure, or regulation had been applied appropriately as determined by the final decision maker....

II

The Comptroller contends that its revised travel policy is valid because it provides for compensation to employees for time actually worked, while denying compensation for the time it ordinarily takes the employee to commute between home and office. Appellant states: This policy equates compensation for persons working at a remote work site with compensation for persons working at an assigned office; equates the State’s work time policy with the State’s travel reimbursement policy; is logical; and is fair. It avoids a windfall to employees assigned to a remote work site located closer to their homes than their assigned office and is consistent with federal law. Appellant notes that COMAR 23.02.01 contains regulations adopted by the Board of Public Works regarding travel for official business, (y.10) According to the Comptroller, “work time,” as defined under COMAR 17.04.11.02B(l)(j), comports “with the Standard Travel Regulations under COMAR 23.02.01.” Therefore, asserts appellant, “by express regulation” DMB “has adopted the criteria for determining what is and is not reimbursable business mileage, as set forth in the State’s Standard Travel Regulations, as the criteria to be used in determining work time.” The Comptroller adds that, “[w]ere this not so, the phrase in COMAR 17.04.11.02B(l)(j) ³³⁹ ‘in accordance with COMAR 23.02.01’ would be mere surplus-age. ...” The Comptroller points out that COMAR 23.02.01.01C(2) provides that the travel regulations do not apply to “State-owned, State-leased, or privately owned motor vehicles [used] to conduct official business for the State.” Rather, “[r]eimbursement to employees or officials who use State-owned, State-leased, or privately owned motor vehicles to conduct official business for the State is within the jurisdiction of the State Fleet Administrator, Department of Budget and Fiscal Planning [now DBM], and subject to policies issued by the Secretary....” Accordingly, appellant contends that “DBM’s incorporation of the Board of Public Works’ travel policy in turn adopts the policies established by the State Fleet Administrator.” Appellant underscores that “[t]he rule for mileage reimbursement, which DBM has adopted for defining work time, is clear: the time it takes to commute from home to the assigned office is personal time and must be subtracted out.” In its view, DMB’s own regulation, COMAR 17.04.11.02B(l)(j), through an incorporation by reference, adopts the State Fleet Policy as the basis for determining work time.

Thus, the Comptroller’s revised policy, based as it is on DBM’s State Fleet Policy, is derived directly from DBM’s own definition of work time. That definition requires that the home to assigned office commute segment of each trip be subtracted from the total travel time to determine compensable “work time.” According to appellant, its interpretation of the work time policy is logical and consistent with the DBM Fleet Policy; both policies recognize that travel time from home to the assigned office “is personal, and not compensable as work-related.” Appellant suggests that, “to hold otherwise would create several anomalies and absurdities of the type that courts regularly caution should be avoided.” In appellant’s view, the revised policy “avoids an unwarranted windfall when ³⁴⁰ an employee is assigned to a remote work site that involves a commute that is shorter than the normal drive to the assigned office.” Appellee’s position, argues the Comptroller, could lead to the “inappropriate” result of “an auditor [having] earned 30 minutes of compensatory time—-for putting in a 30 minute shorter day.” Appellant asserts: “Disparate treatment of similar components of the same trip makes no sense. This is particularly true where, as here, the rule for computing work time is based on the rule for computing business mileage reimbursement.” Moreover, appellant insists that its interpretation “is consistent with the views of DBM.” Referring to the letter of February 8, 2000, from DBM Executive Director Fulton, 7 appellant maintains that “these interpretations, by the official charged with administering the provisions in question,” should receive “ ‘a great deal of deference.’ ” (Citation omitted.) In addition, appellant relies by analogy on 29 U.S.C. § 254 (a), which provides that an employer is not subject to liability or required to pay overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”) for activities that are “preliminary or postliminary” to principal activities. Finally, appellant contends that, under S.P.P. § 12-203(b), the maximum relief to which appellee is entitled is limited to the period of twenty days prior to her filing of the grievance on August 7,2003.

Appellant explains: The filing of a grievance on August 7, 2003, permits at most an award going back 20 days, but no