Condon v. State

MURPHY, Chief Judge. The Maryland Tort Claims Act (MTCA), Maryland Code (1984, 1993 Repl.Vol.), §§ 12-101 through 12-110 of the State Government Article, waives the State’s immunity from tort liability in certain cases, but requires that a claim first be filed ⁴⁸⁶ within a designated time period with the State Treasurer as a prerequisite to initiating a law suit against the State. Specifically, § 12 — 106(b) provides that a claimant may not sue the State under the Act unless: “(1) the claimant submits a written claim to the Treasurer or a designee of the Treasurer within 180 days after the injury to person or property that is the basis of the claim; “(2) the Treasurer or designee denies the claim finally; and “(3) the action is filed within 1 year after the claim is denied finally or 3 years after the cause of action arises, whichever is later.” (Emphasis added.) Section 12-107(d) provides that a claim is “denied finally” by the Treasurer: “(1) if, by certified mail, return receipt requested, under a postmark of the United States Postal Service, the Treasurer or designee sends the claimant, or the legal representative or counsel for the claimant written notice of denial; or “(2) if the Treasurer or designee fails to give notice of a final decision within 6 months after the filing of the claim.” The question before us focuses upon the limitations provisions of § 12 — 106(b)(3) and whether the tort action filed against the State in this case was time-barred under the provisions of this subsection. I On April 7, 1987, appellant Timothy J. Condon (Timothy), a student at the College Park campus of the University of Maryland, a State agency, was a passenger on a motorcycle which was involved in a collision with a University shuttle bus driven by a University employee.

As a result of the collision, Timothy was thrown from the motorcycle and sustained serious injuries. Thereafter, on May 22, 1987, Timothy’s father telephoned the University and notified it of the accident and of his son’s injuries. In a letter dated May 26, 1987, the University ⁴⁸⁷ responded to Timothy’s father, referring him to the provisions of MTCA; informing him of the requirement that a tort claim against the State of Maryland must be submitted in writing to the State Treasurer within 180 days after the injury; and stating that its letter of acknowledgement did not constitute notice to the State Treasurer of Timothy’s claim. On October 5, 1987, within the MTCA’s 180-day filing requirement, Timothy and his parents submitted a detailed written claim to the State Treasurer.

They stated that the amount of their claim was not final because the full extent of Timothy’s physical injuries had not yet been determined. By letter dated October 15, 1987, the State Treasurer’s Office wrote to Timothy and his parents as follows: “This will acknowledge receipt of your claim which was hand delivered to this office on October 5,1987. Your claim will be handled by Edward S. Schaffer, Inc. By carbon copy of this letter to Edward S. Schaffer, Inc., I am forwarding to them all documentation you supplied this office. Upon completion of their investigation, they will submit to me their full report with recommendations as to how this claim should be concluded. “Please note, this letter does not waive any of the State’s rights under the Maryland Tort Claims Act.” Five months later, by letter dated March 17, 1988, Schaffer, Inc. wrote the following letter to Timothy’s parents: “This correspondence is to advise you that I am the authorized claims administrator for the State Treasurer’s Office and the University of Maryland investigating the incident involving your son, Timothy, on 4/8/87. 1 ™ “I have reviewed all of the reports that you had submitted to the State Treasurer’s Office and [am] requesting more complete information with regards to the treatment admin ⁴⁸⁸ istered to your son.

All of the expenses that you have claimed with regards to the accident of 4/8/87 are under consideration and I do not feel that there is any problem with reimbursement for these additional expenses. “I am particularly interested in the medical records from Prince George’s County Hospital as well as the records from the treatment rendered by Dr. Patel. “I also would like additional medical records from Dr. Kothakota. “If I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.” Timothy and his parents never responded to this letter and did not submit additional medical information. More than two years later, in late April or early May of 1990, Timothy’s attorney contacted Schaffer, Inc., regarding Timothy’s claim against the University. After several conversations, Timothy’s attorney was informed that the State would invoke a statute of limitations defense to the claim because more than three years had passed since the injury occurred. Nearly one year thereafter, on March 15, 1991, Timothy filed suit against the University in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.

The University filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that limitations had run on Timothy’s claim because suit was filed more than three years after the cause of action arose. The trial court (Salmon, J.) treated the motion as one for summary judgment and granted it. Timothy appealed to the Court of Special Appeals; that court affirmed the judgment in an unreported opinion. We granted certiorari to consider the issue of public importance raised by the case. 330 Md. 273 , 623 A.2d 655 .

II In arguing for reversal of the judgment below, Timothy asserts that the Court of Special Appeals erred because it applied too narrow a construction of the limitations provision of the MTCA. In addition, he argues that the court was wrong in finding that a person of reasonable intelligence would ⁴⁸⁹ conclude, after reviewing the relevant provisions of the MTCA, that it was necessary to file suit within three years after the date the cause of action arose. And finally, he argues that the intermediate appellate court erred in concluding that agents of the State had not misled him with regard to his claim so as to toll limitations from running against him. The trial court’s decision was based on its finding, as a matter of law, that Timothy failed to comply with the § 12-106(b)(3) deadline to file suit because his complaint was filed more than three years and eleven months after the cause of action arose.

Timothy does not dispute that his claim arose on April 7, 1987, the date of the accident, and that suit was filed more than three years after that date. He claims, however, that the relevant limitations determination involves not the three-year period running from the date of injury, but the alternative one-year period which begins to run on the date of “final denial” of the claim by the Treasurer. As to this one-year period, the State suggests that limitations would bar Timothy’s action because § 12-107(d)(2) provides that if written notice of final denial is not received within six months after the filing of a claim, the claim will be deemed finally denied. Thus, the State maintains that Timothy’s claim would have been considered finally denied on April 5, 1988, six months after the claim was filed, and he would have had to file suit by April 5, 1989.

Timothy, however, argues that this second limitations period has not yet run because the March 17 letter from Schaffer, Inc., constituted either a final decision of acceptance or, at minimum, an open-ended extension of time to submit future medical records and reports while any decision of final denial was still pending; therefore, he argues that his claim could only be denied finally by receipt of a written notice of denial by certified mail from the Treasurer. He maintains, therefore, that final denial of his claim did not occur, pursuant to § 12 — 107(d)(2), six months after filing the claim. Timothy asserts that § 12-107 must be interpreted broadly with reference to the language in § 12-106(b)(3), which pro ⁴⁹⁰ vides that an action must be filed within one year after a claim is denied finally or three years after the cause of action arises, whichever is later. Because § 12-106 appears to recognize that there are situations in which the one-year period from final denial will come after the three-year period, Timothy argues that it is inconsistent with § 12-107(d)(2),' the application of which will always result in a limitations period of under two years from the date of the injury. 2 Thus, he concludes, a reasonable person would not be able to correctly ascertain the requirements of the statute and, therefore, it must be interpreted broadly to avoid violating a claimant’s due process rights.

Timothy’s final argument is that the State “misled, lured, and/or sandbagged” him into believing that his claim had been accepted and that “time was no longer of essence” regarding any statute of limitations provision. He urges that the positive nature of the March 17 letter from Schaffer, Inc. led him to conclude that his claim had been accepted. As to this, Timothy points out that the letter contained no reference to the MTCA and, unlike the previous correspondence regarding his claim, it contained no express reservation of rights under the MTCA. Instead, he says that it contained a suggestion that there would not be a problem with his claim and, based upon that assurance, he commenced extensive medical treatment and testing to determine the extent of his final injuries, believing that he need only present a final submission of medical reports and expenses related to his claim in order to be paid by the State.

We are thus implored to hold that the statute of limitations was tolled by the March 17 letter because the State cannot be allowed to benefit from misleading claimants. A review of the principles of statutory construction as well as an examination of the statutory development of the MTCA ⁴⁹¹ are necessary for a determination of the proper interpretation of the provisions at issue. Therefore, before addressing Timothy’s arguments, we will review these well-established principles, as well as the history of the MTCA, which was enacted in 1981 and thereafter amended several times. Ill A The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry out the true intention of the legislature.

Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 73 , 517 A.2d 730 (1986). In searching for legislative intention, a court looks for the general purpose, aim, or policy behind the statute. Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987).

We first look to the plain meaning of the language of the statute to discern legislative intent. Tucker, supra, 308 Md. at 73 , 517 A.2d 730 . Where the language is clear and unambiguous, a court may not add or delete words to make a statute reflect an intent not evidenced in that language, State v. In Re Patrick A., 312 Md. 482, 487 , 540 A.2d 810 (1988), to avoid a harsh result, Simpson v. Moore, 323 Md. 215, 225 , 592 A.2d 1090 (1991); Cotham and Maldonado v. Board, 260 Md. 556, 565 , 273 A.2d 115 (1971). A clearly worded statute must be construed without “forced or subtle interpretations” that limit or extend its application.

Tucker, supra, 308 Md. at 73 , 517 A.2d 730 ; Wheeler v. State, 281 Md. 593, 596 , 380 A.2d 1052 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 997 , 98 S.Ct. 1650 , 56 L.Ed.2d 86 . The language must be examined in the context in which it was adopted. Motor Vehicle Admin, v. Mohler, 318 Md. 219, 225 , 567 A.2d 929 (1990). All parts of a statute are to be read together to determine intent, and reconciled and harmonized to the extent possible.

Wheeler, supra, 281 Md. at 596 , 380 A.2d 1052 . If reasonably possible, a statute should be read so that no part of it is rendered nugatory or superfluous. Board of Educ., Garrett Co. v. Lendo, 295 Md. 55, 63 , 453 A.2d 1185 (1982). Where a statute may be susceptible of more than one meaning, the court may consider the conse ⁴⁹² quences of each meaning and adopt that construction which avoids a result that is unreasonable, illogical or inconsistent with common sense.

Kaczorowski, supra, 309 Md. at 513 , 525 A.2d 628 . It often is necessary to look at the development of a statute to discern legislative intent that may not be as clear upon initial examination of the current language of the statute. See, e.g., Mohler, supra, 318 Md. at 225-27 , 567 A.2d 929 . B By waiving the State’s tort immunity, the MTCA afforded a remedy for individuals injured by tortious conduct attributable to the State.

Grounded in ancient common law, the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars individuals from bringing actions against the State, thus protecting it from interference with governmental functions and preserving its control over its agencies and funds. Katz v. Washington Sub. San. Comm’n, 284 Md. 503, 507 , 397 A.2d 1027 (1979).

The doctrine is applicable to the State’s agencies and instrumentalities, unless the legislature has explicitly or by implication waived governmental immunity. Godwin v. County Comm’rs, 256 Md. 326, 334 , 260 A.2d 295 (1970). For many years, this Court has held that the State and its agencies could not be sued unless the General Assembly authorized suit and enabled State agencies to obtain funds necessary to satisfy judgments. See, e.g., Board v. John K. Ruff, Inc., 278 Md. 580 , 366 A.2d 360 (1976); University of Maryland v. Maas, 173 Md. 554 , 197 A. 123 (1938).

The General Assembly enacted the MTCA, by Chapter 298 of the Acts of 1981. 3 It established a limited waiver of the State’s immunity in certain tort actions to the extent that the State was covered by a program of insurance established ⁴⁹³ by the State Treasurer. As originally enacted, the MTCA provided certain procedural restrictions on filing suit against the State. 4 The Act specified that suit could be filed only after first presenting a claim in writing to the State Treasurer and waiting until the claim was finally denied; that the claimant could, but was not required to, consider a claim finally denied if the Treasurer did not notify the claimant of final denial by certified mail within six months; and that the filing of a claim tolled the applicable statute of limitations until sixty days following a final denial if the claim was made within the applicable period of limitations. Thus, under the original MTCA, a claimant could file a claim at any time within the three-year limitations period after the cause of action arose. Then, upon receiving a final denial, the claimant had an additional sixty days in which to file suit.

If the claimant did not receive a final denial within six months of filing the claim, the claimant could consider the claim to be finally denied, or could instead wait for written notice of final denial. Therefore, a claimant under the 1981 Act could file suit well beyond three years after a cause of action arose, depending upon when the claim was filed and when final denial was received. ⁴⁹⁴ By Chapter 538 of the Acts of 1985, the General Assembly enacted amendments to the MTCA, which broadened the State’s liability by extending the waiver of immunity to tort actions generally. While broadening the scope of the waiver, however, the legislature narrowed the time in which claimants could file claims or bring actions under the MTCA. The 1985 amendments reduced the time for filing a claim with the State Treasurer from three years to 180 days after the date of the injury.

In addition, the amendments tightened time restrictions on filing suits against the State, requiring that claimants do so within one year after final denial of the claim by the Treasurer or three years after the cause of action arose, whichever is later. And, finally, the legislature deleted the language that allowed claimants the option of when to consider a claim denied. As earlier observed, prior to the 1985 amendments, a claim was finally denied if the Treasurer, by certified mail, so gave written notice of the denial to the claimant, or “at the option of the claimant, if the Treasurer or designee [failed] to give the claimant notice of a final decision within 6 months after the filing of the claim.” (Emphasis added.) As the language “at the option of the claimant” was deleted from § 12-106(d)(2) in the 1985 amendments, it appeared to make absolute the date of final decision in situations where written notice is not received from the Treasurer. Therefore, under the language of the current § 12-106, the limitations period triggered by final denial will always begin to run no later than six months after the filing of the claim.

IV A We turn now to Appellant’s first argument, namely, that § 12-106(b)(3), which provides that a claimant must file an action within one year after a claim is finally denied or three years after a cause of action arose, whichever is later, cannot be reconciled with § 12-107(d)(2); that subsection, as ⁴⁹⁵