Connar v. Leach

Fowler, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The plaintiff, who is a married woman, filed the bill in this case for the purpose of setting aside certain deeds by which several valuable pieces of real estate, located respectively on Sarah Ann and East Baltimore streets, in the city of Baltimore, were conveyed by her husband to one of the defendants, who is claimed to be a daughter by a former wife. The plaintiff and the two defendants, the daughter just alluded to and her husband, who alone among the defendants appear to have any substantial interest in defeating the claims set up in the bill, have all appealed—the plaintiff appealing from an order overruling certain of her exceptions to testimony and sustaining certain of the defendants’ exceptions to testimony, and the defendants from the decree of the Court below by which the deeds in question were set aside and a trustee appointed to convey to the plaintiff the property we have mentioned. The decree below having been in favor of the,plaintiff, we shall con sider only the questions presented by the defendants’ appeal.

The facts disclosed by this record are of such a character that a Court of Equity should hesitate to give its aid in furtherance of the schemes of the defendant William Leach, who, according to his own testimony, has no right to ask it. ⁵⁷³ We forbear to comment upon his and other testimony in the record, which, to say the least, does not commend him to the favorable consideration of a “ Court of conscience.” But in order to get an intelligent comprehension of the grounds of the plaintiffs’ pretensions it will be necessary to recite some of the testimony. It appears that the plaintiff married William Leach in 1863 and that in the year 1865 she became possessed of the leasehold property on Sarah Ann street. On the 2nd March, 1871, she conveyed the leasehold property to her husband “ in consideration of love and affection,” but that being a deed directly from the wife to her husband it is conceded to be void. We find no evidence that she was not the real and bona fide owner of this property, and, therefore, unless she is estopped by having united with her husband in the subsequent conveyance of it to Haller, she is clearly entitled to have it re-conveyed to her, as directed by the decree.

Is she estopped in the manner suggested? We think not. Haller, it is conceded, paid nothing and was used by the defendant, Leach, as a conduit through which he could pass title to the plaintiffs’ property to the defendant, Mrs. Connar, who also took without any valuable consideration. Nor will it do to say, as was suggested, that the plaintiff having jointly with her husband accepted payment for the property, and having entrusted the proceeds to him for investment for her benefit, thereupon became his creditor and relinquished all claim against the property.

If she were claiming as against a bona fide purchaser for value, or against creditors of her husband, this position might be applied, but it must be remembered that the estoppel is relied on, not by creditors or a bona fide purchaser, but by the daughter, who is confessedly neither. And then, too, the payment was no payment at all, but a mere pretence to give the transaction the appearance of reality and honesty. Some reliance was also placed on the defence of laches, based upon the fact that, although the plaintiff dis^covered her husband’s fraud in 1893, she did not proceed ⁵⁷⁴ against him until the filing of this bill in 1895. But considering the relations of the parties and the serious nature of the charges against him in the bill, it was not only natural that she should hesitate, but it is surprising that she should, after taking time to consider, have ever instituted a proceeding reflecting so seriously upon her husband with whom she is still living.

But we will not further discuss this part of the case, and in the absence of testimony to the contrary, we must conclude that the leasehold property on Sarah Ann street belonged to the plaintiff, and that under all the circumstances of the case she ought to be allowed to have it re-conveyed to her as directed by the decree. But the plaintiff’s claims to the property on East Baltimore street rest upon very different grounds, and we will now consider them. She alleges in the bill that in the year 1885 she was possessed of a sum of money amounting to $10,000, which she owned in her own right, and