Consolidated Construction Services, Inc. v. Simpson

CATHELL, Judge. This case arises out of several cases involving the development of a Howard County residential community, “Pleasant Chase.” On January 5, 1996, New Panorama Development Corporation (“New Panorama”), a developer, filed suit against Consolidated Construction Services, Inc. (CCS), a contractor, for various claims, including a claim for damages, involving CCS’s installation of sewers and water lines in the Pleasant Chase development. Soon thereafter, New Panorama also filed suit for damages against several sub-contractors, including Atlas Plumbing and Mechanical, Inc. (Atlas), Maryland Paving and Sealant, Inc. (MPS) and Professional Service Industries, Inc. (PSI). All of these claims were consolidated into one case, hereinafter “New Panorama v. CCS.” The parties involved filed numerous cross-claims, counter-claims and third party claims.

In August 1996, Robert C. Simpson, et. al., respondents, filed suit against New Panorama 1 for defaulting on a mortgage for the purchase of the Pleasant Chase property. On ⁴³⁹ February 20, 1997, respondents obtained a judgment against New Panorama. Respondents then served writs of garnishment on several companies and individuals, including CCS, Atlas, MPS, PSI, Donald J. McCartney and Jeffrey M. Kotz. 2 These entities and persons, together with New Panorama, are petitioners in the case sub judice. On January 7, 1999, petitioners entered the terms of a settlement agreement into the record of the New Panorama v. CCS litigation and later executed that agreement between June and September of 1999.

On May 12, 1999, respondents filed a Motion to Intervene and a Motion to Enforce Garnishments in the New Panorama v. CCS litigation; both motions were denied by order on September 21, 1999. An appeal of that order was stayed pending the outcome of the garnishment issues in the Simpson v. New Panorama litigation. On January 13, 2000, Atlas, CCS, MPS, PSI and Kotz filed a Motion to Terminate Garnishments in the Simpson v. New Panorama litigation. McCartney subsequently filed a Motion to Terminate Garnishment on March 24, 2000.

The Circuit Court held a hearing on April 14, 2000 and entered on order terminating the garnishments on May 1, 2000. Respondents filed a timely appeal. The Court of Special Appeals then consolidated this appeal with respondents’ appeal in the New Panorama v. CCS litigation. On February 6, 2002, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of respondents’ Motion to Intervene in the New Panorama v. CCS litigation.

Simpson v. Consol. Constr. Serv., Inc., 143 Md.App. 606 , 795 A.2d 754 (2002). That court affirmed in part and reversed in part in reference to the trial court’s dismissal of respondents’ garnishments, and ⁴⁴⁰ then remanded the case for further proceedings. 3 On May 1, 2002, petitioners filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this Court.

On May 20, 2002, respondents filed an Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari. On June 20, 2002, we granted the petition. Consolidated v. Simpson, 369 Md. 570 , 801 A.2d 1031 (2002). Petitioners present two questions for our review: “1.

Whether funds generated by a settlement agreement between multiple parties are subject to garnishment by a judgment creditor of one of the parties, where that judgment debtor does not contribute to or receive any funds under the settlement agreement? “2. Whether Section 10-501 of Maryland’s Business Occupations and Professions Article provides an attorney’s lien on funds generated by a pretrial settlement agreement?” We answer in the negative to petitioners’ questions. We hold that respondents’ writs of garnishment are not valid and that McCartney did not have a statutory attorney’s lien on the settlement funds. I. Facts New Panorama is a developer of land for residential homes.

New Panorama generally purchases a parcel of land, prepares a site plan, obtains the necessary development permits, installs lines for water, sewer and storm drainage, builds roads and later sells the finished lots to builders. In 1992, New Panorama purchased land in Howard County from respondents 4 with plans to develop it into a residential community to be known as Pleasant Chase. New Panorama signed a mortgage with respondents, which required an initial down pay ⁴⁴¹ ment and subsequent monthly payments to respondents until the entire balance was paid. After New Panorama failed to make those payments, respondents filed suit in Howard County Circuit Court against New Panorama alleging that New Panorama had defaulted under the mortgage used to purchase Pleasant Chase.

Before its default on its mortgage with respondents, New Panorama entered into a contract with CCS for CCS to dig trenches for water, sewer and storm drainage lines, install the lines and complete other utility work in the Pleasant Chase community. PSI was the engineering firm hired by New Panorama to test the soil, ie., to monitor and test the areas surrounding the community’s utilities to ensure the proper compaction of the backfill prior to the construction of the community’s roads. MPA was hired to pave the roads. Atlas, a sub-contractor hired by Lovell Regency, a residential builder, was hired to connect the individual homes to the water and sewer lines and otherwise complete the plumbing work.

Within a few months, the paved roads within Pleasant Chase began to settle and rupture, thus causing considerable damage rendering the roads in need of extensive repair. New Panorama retained McCartney in reference to possible claims arising out of the damage to the roads. In 1996, after a dispute over who was responsible for the road damage, New Panorama filed separate suits claiming damages against CCS and the sub-contractors. 5 There was a third party claim, 6 ⁴⁴² along with several counter-claims and cross-claims, 7 filed, which led to the suits being consolidated in early 1997. 8 As indicated supra, subsequent to the initiation of the New Panorama v. CCS litigation, respondents obtained a judgment, arising out of a default under the terms of the original mortgage on the property, against New Panorama in the Circuit Court of Howard County in the amount of $791,897.80. Seeking enforcement of that judgment, respondents subsequently served writs of garnishment on CCS, PSI and Atlas to garnish any money that they owed to New Panorama.

In 1999, after three years of litigation and after the writs of garnishment had been served, McCartney and Kotz 9 and the parties to the New Panorama v. CCS litigation, including New Panorama, PSI, CCS, IFIC, MPS and Atlas, devised a settlement agreement, entitled “Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release and Escrow Agreement,” to dispose of all current cross and counter-claims, as well as any future claims arising out of the Pleasant Chase project. The agreement was read into the record on January 7,1999, but was not executed by the parties until between June and September of 1999. The Court of Special Appeals discussed the terms of the settlement agreement as follows: ⁴⁴³ “In the agreement, the parties stated that it was their ‘intention and desire’ to ‘resolve any disputes’ among them relating to the Pleasant Chase development ‘by paying CCS $77,500 plus interest in satisfaction of its counter-claim, third party claim, and indemnity claim,’ although CCS had not yet brought an indemnity claim. They further stated that ‘[f]or purposes of this Settlement Agreement ...

PSI, MPS, and Atlas concede that CCS would have the right to institute a claim against them for indemnity, contribution, and/or negligence ... with respect to damages that could conceivably be awarded in favor of New Panorama against CCS and paid by CCS as a result of the Litigation.’ The agreement also provided that McCartney would be paid ‘$95,000 plus interest in satisfaction of his attorney’s lien,’ stating that McCartney had served ‘written notice of his lien ... established pursuant to § 10-501 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article, Annotated Code of Maryland, and Rule 2-652(b) of the Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure’ upon all parties to the settlement agreement for legal services he had rendered in New Panorama v. CCS. According to the settlement agreement, McCartney’s lien was for ‘fees, expenses, costs and other compensation ... in the amount of one-third of the gross amount of any recovery or actual attorney’s fees, whichever is greater.’ To generate the funds to be paid to CCS and McCartney, the settlement agreement required that, upon execution, Kotz, as escrow agent of the settlement fund, be paid $75,000.00 by PSI, $47,500.00 by the insurance company for CCS, $45,000.00 by the insurance company for MPS, and $5,000.00 by the insurance company for Atlas. The settlement agreement stated that ‘New Panorama [did] not have any legal or equitable interest in the Settlement Funds,’ but did have the right ‘to compel the disbursement [of the funds] by the Escrow Agent in accordance with [the] Settlement Agreement.’ The settlement agreement also declared that it was ‘contingent upon the termination of ... [respondents’] garnishments.’ It specified that Kotz could neither distribute the ⁴⁴⁴ settlement funds nor file a stipulation of dismissal until, among other things, he had received a court order ‘dismissing with prejudice ... [respondents’] garnishments’ and until that order had become final after ‘the conclusion of all appellate review thereof and further, proceedings on remand.’ The settlement agreement also stated that ‘in the event that any court rules that the Settlement Funds or any portion thereof are subject to garnishment by ... [respondents] ... the settlement contemplated herein shall be deemed null and void ab initio, and the parties shall resume théir positions in the Litigation as if [the] Settlement Agreement were never entered into.’ If that occurred, ‘any party who ha[d] deposited funds into the Escrow Account may, at its option, leave said funds in the Escrow Account pending an alternative resolution of the [New Panorama v. CCS case] or demand that the Escrow Agent refund said money.’ ” Simpson, 143 Md.App. at 616-18 , 795 A.2d at 760 (some alterations.added). As a result of that agreement, no money would physically enter the possession of New Panorama, thereby, the parties hoped, avoiding the respondents’ garnishment claims.

Respondents subsequently filed a motion to intervene, 10 a motion to enforce garnishments in the New Panorama v. CCS litigation and served writs of garnishment on MPS, Kotz and McCartney. The Circuit Court denied both motions and dismissed all garnishments. Respondents appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part with reference to the trial court’s dismissal of respondents’ garnishments, and then remanded the case for further proceedings.

The court reversed as to the trial court’s dismissal of the writs of garnishment served on CCS, PSI, Atlas ⁴⁴⁵ and Kotz. The dismissal of the garnishment on McCartney was affirmed and the denial of the garnishment on MPS was remanded lor further factual inquiry, as mentioned supra, in footnote 3. The Court of Special Appeals also determined that McCartney did not have a valid statutory attorney’s lien on the settlement fund and that the settlement fund was the property of New Panorama, thus garnishable with respect to the remaining petitioners. Essentially, the Court of Special Appeals held that: “Although the settlement monies did not go directly to New Panorama, they remained under its control (as it could compel the distribution of funds in accordance with the settlement agreement) and were to be used to satisfy its debts.

Those monies were attachable by garnishment and their transfer to a settlement fund did not, under the circumstances, alter that status.” Id. at 627-28, 795 A.2d at 766 . Petitioner appeals to this Court from that decision.

II

Discussion In the very recent case of Bragunier Masonry Contractors, Inc. v. The Catholic University of America, 368 Md. 608 , 796 A.2d 744 (2002), this Court set out the nature and grounds of garnishment as a remedy: “ ‘[gjarnishment is a remedy created and controlled by statute.’ Bragunier, 139 Md.App. at 293, 775 A.2d at 467. See Mears v. Adreon, 31 Md. 229, 237 (1869) (stating that proceedings under attachment are a special remedy conferred by statute); Chromacolour Labs Inc. v. Snider Bros. Property Management, Inc., 66 Md.App. 320 , 503 A.2d 1365 (1986) (noting that garnishment is a statutory proceeding). In Northwestern National Insurance Co. v. William G. Wetherall, Inc., 267 Md. 378, 384 , 298 A.2d 1, 5 (1972), we stated: ‘An attachment by way of garnishment issued after judgment is a mode of execution and its function is approximately the same as that of a writ of fieri facias.

As attachment proceedings are in derogation of the common ⁴⁴⁶ law, their existence is dependant upon special provisions authorizing them. Authority for courts in this State to entertain attachments after judgment has long been established in our laws.... ’ “Recently, this Court, in Parkville Federal Savings Bank v. Maryland National Bank, 343 Md. 412 , 681 A.2d 521 (1996) discussed the well-established nature and function of a garnishment proceeding. We stated: ‘A writ of garnishment is a means of enforcing a judgment. It allows a judgment creditor to recover property owned by the debtor but held by a third party.... “A garnishment proceeding is, in essence, an action by the judgment debtor for the benefit of the judgment creditor which is brought against a third party, the garnishee, who holds the assets of the judgment debtor.

An attaching judgment creditor is subrogated to the rights of the judgment debtor and can recover only by the same right and to the' same extent that the judgment debtor might recover.” ’ Id. at 418 , 681 A.2d at 524 (citing Fico, Inc. v. Ghingher, 287 Md. 150, 159 , 411 A.2d 430, 436 (1980) (citations omitted)). See Hoffman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Washington County Nat’l Sav. Bank, 297 Md. 691, 696 , 467 A.2d 758, 761 (1983); Northwestern Nat’l Ins. Co., 267 Md. at 384 , 298 A.2d at 5 ; Walsh v. Lewis Swim.

Pool Constr. Co., 256 Md. 608, 610 , 261 A.2d 475, 476 (1970); Peninsula Ins. Co. v. Houser, 248 Md. 714, 717 , 238 A.2d 95, 97 (1968); Messall v. Suburban Trust Co., 244 Md. 502, 506-07 , 224 A.2d 419, 421 (1966); Cole v. Randall Park Holding Co., 201 Md. 616, 623-24 , 95 A.2d 273, 277 (1953). The opinions of this Court have emphasized the principle, growing out of the nature and function of a garnishment proceeding, that the creditor merely steps into the shoes of the debtor and can only recover to the same extent as could the debtor.” Id. at 621-23 , 796 A.2d at 751-52 (some citations omitted).

The test of liability of the garnishee to the judgment creditor is “whether the garnishee has any funds, property or ⁴⁴⁷ credits which belong to the judgment debtor.” Fico, Inc. v. Ghingher, 287 Md. 150, 159 , 411 A.2d 430, 436 (1980) (citing Northwestern Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Wetherall, 267 Md. 378, 384 , 298 A.2d 1, 5 (1972)) (emphasis added). See also Walsh v. Lewis Swim. Pool Constr.

Co., Inc., 256 Md. 608, 610 , 261 A.2d 475, 476 (1970). The burden of proof rests with the garnishing creditor and to recover, that creditor “must present evidence legally sufficient to prove a liability of ... [the garnishee] which existed when the writ was issued or when the case was tried.” Walsh, 256 Md. at 610 , 261 A.2d at 476 (citing Cueva Co. v. Williams & Co., 145 Md. 526, 530 , 125 A. 849 (1924)). Attachment of property in Maryland is governed by two main authorities: Section 3-305 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code and Maryland Rule 2-645. Section 3-305, entitled “Property or credits of debtor subject to attachment,” states that “[a]n attachment may be issued against any property or credit, matured or unmatured, which belong to a debtor.” Md.Code (1973, 1998 Repl.Vol.) § 3-305 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article.

Maryland Rule 2-645(a) states: “(a) Availability. This Rule governs garnishment of any property of the judgment debtor, other than wages subject to Rule 2-646 and a partnership interest subject to a charging order, in the hands of a third person for the purpose of satisfying a money judgment. Property includes any debt owed to the judgment debtor, whether immediately payable, unmatured, or contingent.” The case sub judice presents this Court with the issue of whether monies held in a settlement fund pursuant to certain settlement conditions, created through litigation between a judgment debtor and garnishees, can be the property, for garnishment purposes, of a judgment debtor and thus gamishable by the judgment debtor’s judgment creditor when the judgment debtor does not directly contribute to, nor would it receive directly, any of said funds. We hold these funds represent an attempt to settle contingent obligations and ⁴⁴⁸ interests and, as we shall explain, are not garnishable under Maryland law.

The apparent test under the language of the applicable rule.as to whether the settlement funds are the property of New Panorama and thus garnishable by its judgment creditor, is whether the property is “any debt owed to the judgment debtor, whether immediately payable, unmatured, or contingent.” Md. Rule 2-645. The plain language of this Rule suggests a broad interpretation. Property, as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary 1216 (Henry C. Black ed., 6th ed., West 1998), is “the unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing; the right to dispose of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude everyone else from interfering with it.” This Court, however, has not previously defined property within the context of the facts of the case sub judice. As we have indicated the applicable statute, Maryland Code, Court and Judicial Proceedings Article, Section 3-805, provides for attachments “against any property or credit, matured or unmatured.” The rule this Court adopted during a extensive re-codification of rules in 1982 provides as we have indicated in relevant part, “Property includes any debt owed to the judgment debtor, whether immediately payable, unmatured, or contingent.” u As is readily clear our rule adds the term “contingent.” It is upon this word that Respondents relied and also upon which the Court of Special Appeals relied.

The Respondent proffered, and the lower intermediate court agreed, that the word “contingent” added another class of property that could be subject to attachment by way of garnishment. In doing so the court erred. It added as garnishable objects things that might never be due in the first instance to the debtor. A matured debt is one in which the sum is certain and is due, i.e. matured.

An unmatured debt is one in which the sum is certain and the time for payment of the debt has not yet occurred. Generally, a contingent sum is no more than a possibility that a presently unascertainable sum might possibly be owed to the debtor from the person sought to be ⁴⁴⁹ garnished at some future time. The addition of the term “contingent” was a substantive change by our Rule to the otherwise limiting language of a statutory cause of action. It was improper for us to do so.

We noted in Northwestern National Insurance Company v. William G. Wetherall, Inc., 267 Md. 378, 384 , 298 A.2d 1, 5 (1972), that: “An attachment by way of garnishment issued after a judgment is a mode of execution and its function is approximately the same as that of a writ of fieri facias. As attachment proceedings are in derogation of the common law, their existence is dependent upon special provisions authorizing them.” Those special provisions are now found in Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Section 3-305. Garnishment actions are, as we have said, statutory actions. Our rule making authority is contained in Article IV, Section 18 of the Maryland Constitution.

It provides, as here relevant: “(a) The Court of Appeals from time to time shall adopt rules and regulations concerning the practice and procedure in and the administration of the appellate courts and in the other courts .... ” (emphasis added). Additionally Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides: “That the Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers of Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other; and no person exercising the functions of one of said Departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other.” We noted in Shell Oil Company v. Supervisor of Assessments of Prince George’s County, 276 Md. 36, 46 , 343 A.2d 521, 527 (1975), that: “This Court has consistently stated that Article 8 prohibits the courts from performing nonjudicial functions and prohibits administrative agencies from performing judicial functions.” We also recently again questioned the extent of this Court’s rule making authority. In State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170, 183 , 742 A.2d 508, 515-16 (1999), in respect to the issue of illegal sentences, we overruled Valentine and opined: ⁴⁵⁰ “As pointed out in the dissenting opinion in Valentine, 305 Md. at 123, 501 A.2d at 854, however, ‘A motion to correct an illegal sentence is not a “statutory” remedy. Statutes are enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland....

Nonetheless, the fact that the Maryland Rules have the force of law does not mean that a rule is a statute.’ “Furthermore, the language of the Post Conviction Procedure Act obviously refers to separate common law or statutory causes of action, such as habeas corpus or coram nobis actions which are separate civil actions. It is doubtful that this Court’s rule-making authority would extend to the creation of a separate cause of action.” We noted in Sugarloaf Citizens’ Association v. Department of the Environment, 344 Md. 271, 289-90 , 686 A.2d 605, 614-15 (1996): “Under ... the separation of powers requirement ... it is not the proper function of an administrative official ... to decide whether a plaintiff ... has standing to maintain an action in court.” (footnote omitted). See also Reyes v. Prince George’s County, 281 Md. 279, 295 , 380 A.2d 12, 21 (1977), which states: “The other constitutional limitation which prohibits this Court, or indeed any Maryland court, from rendering such an [advisory] opinion to the legislature or executive flows from Article 8 of our Declaration of Rights, which mandates that the powers of the three departments of government be ‘forever separate and distinct.’ We have many times stated that Article 8 prohibits the courts from performing nonjudicial functions. Moreover, we have said that ‘all judicial authority is only such as is provided for by Article 4 of the Maryland Constitution, and it has been decided that only judicial functions can be exercised which find their authority in that article----’ ” [Citations omitted.] [Alteration added.] See also City of Baltimore v. Comptroller, 292 Md. 293, 297-98 , 439 A.2d 1095, 1096-97 (1982); but cf., Steed Mortgage Co. v. Arthur, 37 Md.App. 592, 603 , 378 A.2d 690, 698 (1977) ⁴⁵¹ (relating to court rules in respect to service of process in attachment cases stating, “As we see it, the rule establishes a preferential order of service....

Reason and common sense indicate that the preferential order ... adopted is no more than procedural.”). As we have indicated the Constitution limits this Court’s rule making power to matters of procedure and practice. It does not confer upon this Court the power to, by rule, add substantive elements to causes of action. The potential problem of the Court’s use of its rule making power to initiate substantive changes to causes of action was more recently pointed out in Judge Eldridge’s dissent to the adoption of Maryland Rules Orders Adopting Rules of Practice and Procedure (2001), relating to constructive civil contempt.

There Judge Eldridge, joined by Judge Bell, noted: “Finally, I question the propriety of this Court utilizing its rule making authority to change the substantive law of civil contempt and abolish an affirmative defense in a large category of civil actions. Article IV, § 18, of the Maryland Constitution authorizes this Court to ‘adopt rules and regulations concerning the practice and procedure in and the administration of the appellate courts and in the other courts of this State____’ This provision has not previously been construed as authorizing the Court, by rule making, to change the substantive nature of civil causes of action. “... In light of this, it is doubtful that changing the substantive law of civil contempt by abolishing an affirmative defense falls within this Court’s rule making authority.” Maryland Rules Orders at 47 (2001). As we have indicated, attachment and garnishment proceedings are creatures of statute.

As such the substance of the statute, so long as constitutional issues are not present, is the province of the Legislature and not the courts. The statute only permits the garnishment of matured and unmatured property or credits belonging to the garnishor’s debtor. When we added contingent property or credits by rule, we ⁴⁵² added a substantive element to a statutory cause of action. In doing so we exceeded our rule making authority. 11 We have not discovered any comment by the Court at the time of the passage of the rules submission of which this rule was a part.

We have, however, been able to examine the minutes of the Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (April 16, 1982) in their deliberations in respect to this matter. It appears that the committee did not completely contemplate the meaning of the word “contingent” in the context of attachment and garnishment proceedings. The minutes of April 16, 1982 in respect to the predecessor rule where the word “contingent” was first proposed, states in relevant part: “Rule 2-668 was accompanied by the following explanatory note: ‘This Rule has been redrafted with the intent of retaining the essence of current garnishment practice for use in the majority of cases and of making special provision for the few cases where controversy between the judgment creditor and garnishee requires the full panoply of a litigated action. The format of this Rule generally correlates with the pres ⁴⁵³ ent procedure for garnishment of wages as provided in Rule F6. [Prior Rule F6 contained no provisions in respect to “contingent” property or credits.] ‘Section (a) [the section where the word “contingent” is added] is new and is consistent with Rule G45a and the case law developed relative to that rule.’ ” Prior Rule G45 provided: “(a) Generally.

Any property, including a credit which has not matured and a debt due upon judgment belonging to the defendant .. . may be attached.” The word “contingent” was not contained in that prior rule. More importantly, the Courts and Judicial Article, Section 3-305, the statute then in effect provided, as the present statute does, that attachments could issue against “property or credit, matured or unmatured, which belong to a debtor.” The word “contingent” was not a part of that prior statute. In any event, the minutes continue and reflect the following: “The Chairman inquired as to the intended coverage accomplished by inclusion of the word ‘contingent’ in section (a). Mr .... commented that a contingent debt is simply one for an ascertainable amount but for which there is no definite due date.” The minutes reflect that another member believed that the word “contingent” did include the situation where a personal injury plaintiff places a garnishment in the hands of a defendant’s insurance company.

Another member commented that the term was broad enough to include trust situations. Later, when the rule was being further considered, the minutes reflect the following: “Judge ... inquired as to the function to be served by the last sentence of section (a). Mr .... responded that the sentence provides a simple definition of an attachable debt; an unmatured debt cannot be accelerated but can be garnished. Mr .... asked if an unmatured debt can be forgiven by the debtor.

Mr .... indicated that the debtor’s right is curtailed by the garnishment of the debt.” It appears clear that the committee was not really recommending that contingent credits be garnishable but that unmatured debts could be. Its use of the word “contingent” was ⁴⁵⁴ not intended to cover the situation that exists in the case sub judice where the obligations of the various contractors, if any, were completely contingent on the ability of the developer to establish that obligations were due it in the first instance. We lacked the power and authority to adopt such a provision. Accordingly, the garnishments laid in the hands of the subcontractors, contractors and the escrow agent were invalid.

The property deposited into the settlement fund of the parties is not, for garnishment purposes, the property of New Panorama and cannot be garnished by its judgment creditors. This Court, prior to the improper rule change discussed above, spoke to whether contingent debts were gamishable under § 3-305 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article of the Md.Code. Our most recent case discussing contingent garnishments in this context is Fico, Inc. v. Ghingher, 287 Md. 150 , 411 A.2d 430 (1980). In Fico, the question presented was: “whether an escrow fund, established under § 6-106(1) and held by a garnishee for the payment of creditors who were listed and given notice or who filed claims as required by § 6-104(1)(a) and § 6-105, may be attached by a judgment creditor who was