Consolidated Waste Industries, Inc. v. Standard Equipment Co.

HARRELL, J. Owner unhappiness with a series of repairs to a John Deere 744J Loader (Waste Hauler) 1 inspired this litigation. Appellant, Consolidated Waste Industries, Inc. (“Consolidated Waste”) purchased the new Waste Hauler from Appellee, Standard Equipment Company (“Standard Equipment”), in June 2005. Twenty months later, the machine experienced hydraulic and operational issues. Standard Equipment was able to “repair” it, after two tries.

Almost seven months later, after the return of the equipment to Consolidated Waste, the Waste Hauler evinced the same or quite similar mechanical issues. Standard Equipment “repaired” it, but two attempts were necessary again. Consolidated Waste filed an action in circuit court, seeking to recoup the cost of this second round of repairs. Although somewhat convoluted factually, at bottom, this case is about whether the circuit court abused its discretion at trial in two specific instances.

Consolidated Waste argues that the trial court erred by (1) excluding evidence of a third ²¹⁴ round of later repairs, made by a company other than Standard Equipment, and (2) using a confusing verdict sheet supplied by Standard Equipment. For reasons to be explained more fully infra, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in either instance. Even had we been convinced that the trial court acted unreasonably, we are unable to declare that the decisions prejudiced actually (i.e., impacted harmfully) the verdict reached by the jury. See Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 91 , 854 A.2d 1180, 1185 (2004).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. I. Facts and Legal Proceedings. Three separate sets of repairs were made to the Waste Hauler purchased by Consolidated Waste from Standard Equipment. Consolidated Waste claims that the first and second set of repairs, performed by Standard Equipment, were made in such a way as to constitute a breach of contract and negligence. 2 Likewise, Consolidated Waste contends that the third round of repairs, performed by a different company (Carter Machinery) over a year after the filing of its complaint, were completed correctly, i.e., the Waste Hauler ceased thereafter to experience the same or similar deficiencies as it had, and illustrate the proper duty of care owed (but not honored) by Standard Equipment.

Consolidated Waste purchased the new Waste Hauler from Standard Equipment on 7 June 2005 for $424,647.00. 3 The Waste Hauler was an integral part of Consolidated Waste’s daily operations as a full service refuse removal company. It ²¹⁵ was used at a transfer facility approximately thirteen hours a day, five-and-a-half days a week. On 16 February 2007, approximately twenty months and 5635 hours of operating time after the original purchase, the Waste Hauler experienced steering problems, slow operation, and difficulties with the “bucket” moving up and down. Consolidated Waste’s president, William Lash, determined that the hydraulic system failed and contacted Standard Equipment about performing repairs.

On or about 16 February 2007, the Waste Hauler was sent to Standard Equipment. Approximately one month later, Standard Equipment informed Consolidated Waste that the repairs were complete. On 9 March 2007, Consolidated Waste paid the invoice for the repairs, in the amount of $17,630.23, but the machine turned out, when tested, to be inoperable completely and required further repair. 4 At this point, Standard Equipment informed Consolidated Waste that the hydraulic system was contaminated with metal debris in the hydraulic fluid. On 25 May 2007, four months after receiving initially the Waste Hauler, Standard Equipment completed the first set of repairs and returned the Waste Hauler to its owner in an operational condition.

Consolidated Waste paid the invoice for the second round of initial repairs, which included only additional parts, in the amount of $2,803.91. The total cost to Consolidated Waste for the first set of repairs was $20,434.14. 5 On or about 6 December 2007, approximately seven months and 2153 additional hours of operating time, Consolidated Waste contacted Standard Equipment again about similar, if not identical, operational problems with the Waste Hauler, i.e., steering problems, slow operation, and difficulties with the “bucket” moving up and down. The Waste Hauler was trans ²¹⁶ ported to Standard Equipment for a second set of repairs and, on or about 16 January 2008, it was returned “repaired” to Consolidated Waste after it paid the invoice for $16,769.81. After less than thirty minutes of operation at the transfer station, the same problems occurred for which the Waste Hauler had been sent for repair.

The Waste Hauler was returned yet again to Standard Equipment for correction, where it remained for approximately four months, from 25 January 2008 through 9 April 2008. Upon completion of this set of repairs, Standard Equipment returned the Waste Hauler to Consolidated Waste, which paid, under protest, the invoice of $16,853.92. Unlike the invoices for the repairs earlier in 2007, the invoice for the latter 2007 and 2008 repairs included itemization for labor and parts. The total cost to Consolidated Waste for the complete second set of repairs was $33,623.73.

On 8 December 2008, Consolidated Waste filed initially in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County a three count complaint alleging breach of contract, negligence, and unjust enrichment 6 —based on Standard Equipment’s alleged failure to perform the second set of repairs in a workmanlike and timely manner. The complaint asked for judgment in the amount of the invoices for the second set of repairs only, $33,623.73. On or about 29 June 2009, the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Charles County following filing of an unopposed motion by Standard Equipment. Over a year after the complaint was filed, and approximately twenty months and 4404 hours of additional operating time of the Waste Hauler after the disputed repairs, on 31 December 2009, the Waste Hauler experienced hydraulic system problems again.

Consolidated Waste took the equipment to Carter Machinery, which discovered metal debris in the hydraulic tank. 7 It performed a complete hydraulic system ²¹⁷ clean-out in slightly less than two months (from 31 December 2009 to 23 February 2010), at a cost to Consolidated Waste in excess of $40,000. On 5 May 2010, the day prior to trial, Standard Equipment filed a “Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony of G.B. Critzer (‘Critzer’)”; a “Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Repairs not in Controversy” 8 ; and a “Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Subsequent Repairs.” 9 The next day, prior to trial commencing, the trial judge denied the motions to exclude completely the testimony of Critzer and to exclude evidence of the “repairs not in controversy.” The trial court granted the motion to exclude evidence of Carter’s subsequent repairs. Trial consumed two days, the 6th and 7th of May 2010. Critzer testified as an expert witness for Consolidated Waste, opining about the proper industry standard to correct metal contamination in a hydraulic system and the role he played generally in supervising such repairs in the past.

Even after examining the invoices of Standard Equipment’s repairs, however, Critzer refused to comment specifically on the details or competency of the work performed by Standard Equipment. In submitting the case to the jury, the trial judge elected to use a verdict sheet proposed by Standard Equipment. Consolidated Wasted objected, contending that (1) Question 5 on the sheet was redundant and might be confusing to the jury in light of Question 4, and (2) Question 6 should not be present because it made inappropriate reference to the defense of contributory negligence. Questions 4, 5, and 6 asked: ²¹⁸ (4) Has Plaintiff Consolidated Waste Industries, Ine. proven by a preponderance of the evidence presented at trial that Defendant Standard Equipment Company was negligent?

Yes_No_ (5) Has Plaintiff Consolidated Waste Industries, Inc. proven by a preponderance of the evidence presented at trial that Defendant Standard Equipment Company’s negligence caused damages to Plaintiff? Yes_No_ If you answered either question four or question five “no” skip (and do not answer) questions six through seven and continue directly to question eight. (6) Was Plaintiff Consolidated Waste Industries, Inc. contributorily negligent? Yes_No_ The jury answered Questions 4 and 5 in the negative and, accordingly, left Question 6 unanswered.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Standard Equipment, and, on 27 May 2010, judgment was entered. On 10 June 2010, Consolidated Waste noted timely an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. On 18 March 2011, on our initiative and before the intermediate appellate court could decide the appeal, a writ of certiorari was issued. Consolidated Waste v. Standard Equipment, 418 Md. 397 , 15 A.3d 298 (2011). 10 We consider here whether the trial court abused its discretion by (1) granting the “Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Subsequent Repairs” and (2) submitting to the jury the verdict sheet offered by Standard Equipment. 11 ²¹⁹ II.

Standard of Review. The nature of the type of evidentiary ruling represented by the grant of the Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Subsequent Repairs is “left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.... ” Malik v. State, 152 Md.App. 305, 324 , 831 A.2d 1101, 1112 (2003) (citing Martin v. State, 364 Md. 692, 705 , 775 A.2d 385, 393 (2001)). When weighing the probative value of proffered evidence against its potentially prejudicial nature, an abuse of discretion in the ruling may be found “where no reasonable person would share the view taken by the trial judge.” Brown v. Daniel Realty Co., 409 Md. 565, 601 , 976 A.2d 300, 321 (2009) (citing In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295, 312 , 701 A.2d 110, 118 (1997)). That is to say, an abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is “well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.” King v. State, 407 Md. 682, 711 , 967 A.2d 790, 807 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Thus, “a ruling reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard will not be reversed simply because the appellate court would not have made the same ruling.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Whether there has been an abuse of discretion depends on the particular circumstances of each individual case.” Pantazes v. State, 376 Md. 661, 681 , 831 A.2d 432, 444 (2003). Even when a trial court is found to have abused its discretion, “it has long been the settled policy of this [C]ourt not to reverse for harmless error.” Brown, 409 Md. at 613 , 976 A.2d at 328 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); See Crane, 382 Md. at 91 , 854 A.2d at 1185 (stating that the burden is on an appellant to show that the trial court error is accompanied by prejudice). Prejudice exists when the ²²⁰ particular error is determined likely to have affected the verdict—“it is not the possibility but the probability of prejudice which is the object of the appellate inquiry.” Crane, 382 Md. at 91 , 854 A.2d at 1185 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Similarly, the decision to use a particular verdict sheet “will not be reversed absent abuse of discretion.” Applied Indus. Techs, v. Ludemann, 148 Md.App. 272, 287 , 811 A.2d. 845, 854 (2002). 12 Moreover, Maryland appellate courts generally will not reverse even an unreasonable decision without evidence of prejudice/harm. See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett, 343 Md. 500, 526 , 682 A.2d 1143, 1155 (1996).

III

Analysis. A. The Grant of Standard Equipment’s Motion in Limine. Maryland Rule 5-403 proclaims that, “[although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed substantially by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury....” Evidence is probative “if it tends to prove the proposition for which it is offered,” Johnson v. State, 332 Md. 456, 474 , 632 A.2d 152, 160 (1993), while “[ejvidence is prejudicial when it tends to have some adverse effect ... beyond tending to prove the fact or issue that justified its admission....” Hannah v. State, 420 Md. 339, 347 , 23 A.3d 192, 196 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The danger associated with the misuse of evidence tends to outweigh substantially any probative value where other evidence, tending to prove the same, may be attained through less prejudicial means.

See Norfolk S. Ry. Corp. v. Henry Tiller, 179 Md.App. 318, 334 , 944 A.2d 1272, 1282 (2008) (quoting Eichel v. New York Cent. R. Co., ²²¹ 375 U.S. 253, 255 , 84 S.Ct. 316, 317 , 11 L.Ed.2d 307, 309 (1963)). Consolidated Waste urges two reasons why evidence of the subsequent repairs by Carter Machinery should have been allowed.

First, the subsequent repairs were probative in that they tended to prove the proper industry standard or duty for performing a complete hydraulic system clean-out of a John Deere 744J Loader. See Johnson, 332 Md. at 474 , 632 A.2d at 160 . As this argument continues, the proffered evidence would have strengthened the credibility of Consolidated Waste’s expert witness, Critzer; it tended to show that Critzer—as an employee of the company who performed the subsequent repairs—understood and oversaw the completion of similar repairs. Second, the fact that subsequent repairs were necessary indicated in and of itself that Standard Equipment’s assertedly deficient workmanship constituted negligence and a breach of contract.

Despite this probity, the trial court determined ultimately that the probative value of the subsequent repairs, in fact, was limited. There was other testimony and evidence