Cook v. Grierson

GREENE, J. In this case we are asked to interpret the Slayer’s Rule so as to allow for the grandchildren of a murdered victim to inherit from him (the victim having died intestate), notwith ⁵⁰⁴ standing the fact that the grandchildren’s father (the victim’s son) was the murderer and is still alive. We recognize, by our previous construction of the rule, that persons who are the natural object of the slayer’s bounty are disqualified from taking directly from the victim’s estate as well as through the slayer’s estate. Because the slayer never acquired a beneficial interest in the victim’s estate, anyone claiming through the slayer, even though innocent of any wrong doing, may not share in the victim’s estate. The overarching policy to prevent the undeserving slayer from controlling the disposition of the victim’s property should not be changed by judicial fiat. 1 If there is to be any change in the laws of intestate succession, the General Assembly should make that change.

I The facts of this case are not in dispute. On January 22, 2002, Frederick Charles Grierson, Jr. (“Frederick”), died as a result of multiple stab wounds inflicted by his son, Charles Grierson (“Charles”). He died intestate, survived by Charles, three grandchildren, and his widow, Deborah Grierson. 2 Charles pled guilty to second degree murder and is serving a thirty-year prison sentence. On May 1, 2002, Deborah Grierson, as personal representative of the estate, filed a notice of disinheritance in the Orphans’ Court for Anne Arundel County contending that, under Maryland’s Slayer’s Rule, Charles Grierson should not share in the estate of his father.

On November 14, 2002, the grandchildren, through their mothers, petitioned the Orphans’ Court to declare their right to inherit from the intestate decedent. The Orphans’ Court denied the grandchildren’s ⁵⁰⁵ right to inherit, and that decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. Appellants noted an appeal. We granted certiorari prior to proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals. 378 Md. 176 , 835 A.2d 1103 (2003).

The issue before this Court is one of first impression. The question is whether the grandchildren of a decedent may inherit from the decedent pursuant to the intestacy laws where the children’s father, who is the decedent’s son, could not inherit because of the Slayer’s Rule. For the reasons set forth below we shall hold that pursuant to the Maryland intestate statute the children have no right to inherit from their grandfather’s estate. Our statute of intestate succession specifically excludes the lineal descendants of a living lineal descendant from taking as issue of the decedent.

II As a threshold matter, we note that the grandchildren have standing to bring this action. See Md.Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 3-403 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (classifying an heir or next of kin or those claiming through them as individuals entitled to a declaration of rights or legal relationship with respect to the estate of a decedent.) The Slayer’s Rule The Slayer’s Rule prevents a murderer, or anyone claiming through or under the murderer as an heir or representative, from sharing in the distribution of the victim’s estate as an heir by way of statutes of descent and distribution, or as a devisee or legatee under the victim’s will. Ford v. Ford, 307 Md. 105, 111 , 512 A.2d 389, 392 (1986). The rule developed from the common law principles that equity would not permit anyone “to profit by his own fraud, to take advantage of his own wrong, to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime.” Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 506 , 165 A. 470, 470 (1933).

Forty-two states have adopted “slayer statutes” that reflect the common law principles and direct the distribution of what would have ⁵⁰⁶ been the slayer’s share of a decedent’s estate. 3 Maryland is not one of those States. 4 The seminal Maryland case in this area is Price v. Hitaffer. In Price the issue was, “Can a murderer, or his heirs and representatives through him, be enriched by taking any portion of the estate of the one murdered?” Price, 164 Md. at 506 , 165 A. at 470 . We answered the question in the negative. ⁵⁰⁷ The Court began its discussion by recognizing that there were two schools of thought on the issue. One line of cases held that “provisions of a will and the statutes of descent and distribution should be interpreted in the light of universally recognized principles of justice and morality” embodied by the equitable principles of the common law.

Id. The other line of cases recognized the public policy of the common law, but held that the policies were “abrogated and denied ... by the [Legislature in the enactment of statutes to direct descents and distribution, or governing the execution and effect of testamentary disposition ].” Id. at 505-07 , 165 A. at 470 . Included in the second group were cases that based their conclusions on “statutory declarations to the effect that conviction of crime shall not work a corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.” Id. Corruption of blood is a common law doctrine providing that “ ‘when any one is attainted of felony or treason, then his blood is said to be corrupt; by means whereof neither his children, nor any of his blood, can be heirs to him, or to any other ancestor, for that they ought to claim by him.

And if he were noble or gentleman before, he and all his children are made thereby ignoble and ungentle....’” Diep v. Rivas, 357 Md. 668, 677 , 745 A.2d 1098, 1103, n. 4 (2000) (quoting Termes de la Ley 125 (1st Am. ed. 1812), as quoted in Black’s Law Dictionary 348 (7th ed.1999)). Article 27 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights prohibits application of the doctrine in Maryland. It provides: “[t]hat no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.” In discussing the prohibition and its effect on our analysis with regard to the Slayer’s Rule, the Court said: In the view that we take of the case, the constitutional and statutory prohibition against corruption of blood and forfeiture of estate by conviction has no application, because by reason of the murderous act the husband never acquired a beneficial interest in any part of his wife’s estate. These provisions apply to the forfeiture of an estate held by the criminal at the time of the commission of the crime, or which he might thereafter become legally or equitably enti- ⁵⁰⁸ tied to.

In other words, it is a constitutional declaration against forfeiture for a general conviction of crime. There can be no forfeiture without first having beneficial use or possession. One cannot forfeit what he never had. The surviving husband in the case before us, never having acquired any interest in his wife’s estate, there is nothing upon which the constitutional or statutory prohibition can operate.

By virtue of his act he is prevented from acquiring property which he would otherwise have acquired, but does not forfeit an estate which he possessed. Price, 164 Md. at 508 , 165 A. at 471 (internal citations omitted). Having concluded that the prohibition of corruption of blood had no application to the Slayer’s Rule as we defined it, the Court held that it is inconceivable “that one be permitted by murder to acquire property through the act, which without the perpetration of the crime he might never come into possession of.” Id. at 514 , 165 A. at 473 . We chose to align Maryland with the opinions that “give expression and adherence to the principles and reasoning” of the common law.

Id. at 517 , 165 A. at 474 . Adherence to these principles has been reaffirmed in subsequent cases. See Diep v. Rivas, 357 Md. 668 , 745 A.2d 1098 (2000) (holding that innocent contingent beneficiaries were not prohibited from collecting pursuant to an insurance policy despite the slayer being their brother); Ford v. Ford, 307 Md. 105 , 512 A.2d 389 (1986) (holding that where the murderer was found not criminally responsible by way of insanity she could inherit pursuant to the deceased’s will); Schifanelli v. Wallace, 271 Md. 177 , 315 A.2d 513 (1974) (holding that where the death of the insured resulted from gross negligence on the part of the designee, the designee may collect pursuant to the policy because the killing was not intentional); Chase v. Jenifer, 219 Md. 564 , 150 A.2d 251 (1959) (holding that where the killing is both felonious and intentional the slayer will be prohibited from receiving benefits as the beneficiary pursuant to a life insurance plan). We summarized the status of the Slayer’s Rule in Maryland in Ford v. Ford, 307 Md. 105, 111-112 , 512 A.2d 389, 392-393 (1986).

We said that in Maryland a person who intentionally ⁵⁰⁹ and feloniously kills another may not share in the distribution of the decedent’s estate as an heir by way of statutes of descent and distribution, or as a devisee or legatee under the decedent’s will, nor may the slayer collect proceeds as a beneficiary under a policy of insurance on the decedent’s life. These principles also apply to anyone claiming through or under the slayer. We discussed the “through or under” language in a case heavily relied upon by the grandchildren, Diep v. Rivas, 357 Md. 668 , 745 A.2d 1098 (2000). Diep involved the contemporaneous murder of Maria Rivas and suicide of her husband and slayer, Xuang Ky Tran.

Rivas’s life was insured through Tran’s employer’s group accidental death and dismemberment policy. Upon Rivas’s death the policy was to pay $150,000 to the surviving person or persons in the following list of preferential classes: the Insured’s 5 (a) spouse; (b) children; (c) parents; (d) brothers and sisters; or (e) estate. The Court was asked to decide who between Tran’s brother and sister or Rivas’s father was entitled to the proceeds. The Court of Special Appeals, Diep v. Rivas, 126 Md.App. 133 , 727 A.2d 448 (1999), extended the Slayer’s Rule to disqualify Tran’s brother and sister and award the money to Rivas’s father.

The court based its decision in part on the “through or under” language used in Price and Ford . We reversed, holding that: Here, the facts do not fall within the “through or under” statement from Ford . The petitioners do not claim in the right of Tran. They claim based on the promise made by [the insurance company] to pay “the surviving person or persons in the first of the following classes of successive preference beneficiaries of which a member survives the Insured.” Their claim is in their own right as contingent beneficiaries under the contract of insurance. ⁵¹⁰ 357 Md. at 680 , 745 A.2d at 1104 .

We said that to preclude Tran’s brother and sister, who were blameless in the murder, from taking under the policy “conjures up the ghosts of corruption of the blood which is prohibited by Article 27 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.” Id. at 677 , 745 A.2d at 1103 . The grandchildren, here, argue that they, like Tran’s brother and sister, are innocent contingent beneficiaries who should be permitted to inherit from their grandfather. Diep, however, is distinguishable from the case at bar in that the brother and sister in Diep had a recognized claim to the insurance proceeds independent of Tran. The policy specifically provided that the benefits were payable to the members of the first of the classes to qualify.

There is no equivalent provision in the case sub judice. Contrary to granting the grandchildren an independent basis for inheriting from Frederick, the intestacy statute specifically excludes them as the lineal descendants of a living lineal descendant. See Md.Code (1972, 2001 Repl.Vol.), § 1-209 of the Estates and Trust Article