Cook v. United Railways & Electric Co.

Stockbridge, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The plaintiff, appellant in this Court, brought suit to recover damages from the United Railways and Electric Company of Baltimore for injury to an auto»-ambulance, occasioned by a collision between his machine while being operated by one of his employees and a street car owned by the defendant and operated by its employees. The ambulance in question was of Cadillac make, weighing something over two tons. On the morning of January 21, 1916, the plaintiff had been notified from the University Hospital that there was some one at Union Station to be brought to that hospital, and at the time of the collision the ambulance was on its way to answer that call.

It was proceeding north on Cathedral street, at a rate variously estimated from fifteen to twenty-five miles per hour, and at the intersection of Cathedral and Biddle streets- came in contact with a oar of the defendant of the Roland Park Line. The morning was wet and the streets slippery, but the ambulance was no-t at the time equipped with chains to prevent sliding or skidding. The driver in charge of the ambulance saw the car proceeding slowly westward, when he was at a distance of from one hundred to one hundred and twenty-five feet south of Biddle street, but contented himself with ringing a large gong upon the ambulance, with ⁵⁵⁵ out "seeking to. check his speed, until he was within twenty-five feet of the car. He: then applied both the foot and the emergency brakes, and attempted to cut across the path of the ear into Brevard street.

The effect, of this action, was to bring him in a lino parallel with the car, and he would probably have avoided the collision had not the machine skidded on the wet and slippery street. Thei condition of the street, the change in direction, of the machine and the sudden application of the brakes acted in combination to produce the result that the rear wheel of the ambulance struck the car about in the center. The ambulance was severely damaged, the repairs to it costing $692.G8. At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case, the defendant offered three prayers; the first to the effect that, there was no evidence in the case legally sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover, and that the verdict of the jury must be for tbe defendant.

The third asked the Court to instruct the jury that from the uncontradicted evidence fix the case the driver of the ambulance was guilty of negligence directly contributing to the happening of the accident, and that the verdict of the jury must he for the defendant. These two prayei’s were granted by the Court, whereupon the defendant withdrew" its, second prayer". The ruling of the trial Court upon these prayers constitute the sole exception in the record. Several questions were raised by counsel a,t the argument, though it will be sufficient for the disposition -of this case to consider only two of them.

The plaintiff urges as an act of negligence on the part of the defendant, a i'ailnro to observe the ordinance * then in force designed to regulate traffic in the streets of Baltimore City, and which gave a right of way at street intersections to north and south bound travel, over that moving east and west. This provision, like all provisions, of municipal regu ⁵⁵⁶ lation, must he given a reasonable construction. To extend ■ it as far as the plaintiff now asks wonld he to place a prohibition upon all east and west bound traffic, a condition which can not he supposed to have been intended by the framers of the ordinance, and it entirely ignored the further provision in the same ordinance, that “nothing contained herein or omitted herefrom shall he construed or held to relieve any person using or traveling, or being upon any street for any purpose whatever, from exercising all .reasonable care to avoid or prevent injury, through collisions with all other persons and vehicles.” It is conceded that the speed of the ambulance was greater than that permitted by tbe ordinance, and that the car was moving slowly. It is also established by the evidence that the chauffeur of the ambulance saw the car when distant one hundred to one hundred and twenty-five feet from it, and had it in such full view that both ends of the car were visible, and that tire ear was proceeding slowly westwardly, within the speed limits prescribed by tbe ordinance.

The plaintiff attempted to show by the chauffeur that the motorman of the car was looking in a different direction, and, therefore, did not see tire approaching machine. This last, however, was a mental deduction of the witness, rather than a statement of fact, and while the prayers which were granted necessarily concede the truth of the