Cooper v. Holmes

McSherry, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. There are what purport to be four bills of exception in this record. The last is the only one which is signed and sealed by the’ Judges of the Circuit Court. The questions intended to be presented by the others are consequently not before this Court.

Each distinct exception which embraces an independent proposition of law, must be signed and sealed by the Court below before it can lie regarded as a valid exception to be considered by this ²⁵ Court. Ellicott vs. Martin, Love & Co., 6 Md., 509 . The facts stated in one exception can not be looked to in disposing of a question raised under another, unless the two are connected by some apt reference. Gist’s Adm’r vs. Cockey & Fendall, 7 H. & J., 134.

We think there is sufficient reference to connect these papers, designated exceptions. Hopkins and Hull vs. Kent, 17 Md., 113 ; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. vs. State, use of Fryer, 30 Md., 54 . But, if this were doubtful, we would have no difficulty in treating the record as containing but one exception, in which all the evidence is set out, and by which the rulings of the Court upon the prayers and the instructions are alone brought up for review. There are no spaces left between these so-called exceptions and no places provided for the signatures and seals of the Judges, and they practically and substantially form one continuous and connected narration of the testimony adduced on the trial.

At the end of what is numbered the fourth exception appear the signatures and seals of the Judges. John Cooper was the owner of a life estate in about three hundred acres of land lying in Prince George's County. This land was assessed to him and in his name. The appellants were the owners of the remainder.

Cooper failing to pay the State and county taxes for several years, the property was sold by the treasurer and collector of the county for the sum of live hundred and fifty dollars — a few dollars more than was needed to pay the taxes in arrear, interest thereon and costs. After Cooper's death the remainder-men instituted an action of ejectment against the appellee, who claims title under the collector’s deed, and this appeal is taken from the judgment rendered against them in that case. All the papers relating to the tax sale have been lost, and there is no record of them. Resort was had at the trial to parol proof to establish their contents. ²⁶ Under the Act of ,1872, ch. 384, as amended and reenacted by the Act of 1874, ch. 483, 0ode, Art.. 81, sec. 52, it has been settled in Guisebert vs. Etchison, 51 Md., 478 , and in Steuart vs. Meyer, et al., 54 Md., 454 , that when a sale has been made by a tax' collector, and has been reported to the proper Court and there finally ratified, ‘ ‘ the order of confirmation operates only to relieve the purchaser of the onus of proof, and to cast the onus of showing the illegality of the proceedings upon the party resisting the sale. ***** Until such proof is offered by the assailing parly, the sale, if ratified and confirmed, stands -good and effective, by operation of the statute. ’ ’ By this legislation, when an order of ratification is produced the burden of proof is changed, and it becomes necessary for the party assailing the jnoceedings to show some defect sufficiently grave to vacate them.

But it is quite apparent that this is not required until such an order is shown. The loss of the order, if properly proved, would authorize the admission of secondary evidence of its contents. It is stated by Mr. Hill, who prepared the collector’s deed to the purchaser, that he procured an order of ratification. The docket-entries in the tax sale case also show that such an order was filed. - This is all the evidence in the record on that subject.

The contents of the order are not given or pretended to be given. The paper is characterized or described as an order of ratification; but whether it is such or not can only be determined when its contents are made to appear. What has just been said with regard to the effect of the order of ratification has relation to sales made under the statutes alluded to. It is claimed, however, that the sale in question here was made under a local law, the Act of 1882, ch. 317, which, it is insisted, does not give to the order of ratification the force and effect accorded it by the Act of 1874, ch. 483.

There is some ²⁷ difference between the two statutes, and wherever they conflict, if they do conflict at all, the local law must prevail. Code, Art. 1, see. 10. The general law declares that if no cause, or an insufficient cause, be shown, the sale shall, by order of the Court, “be ratified and confirmed, and the purchaser shall, on payment of the purchase money, have a good title to the property sold. ” The local law provides for no order nisi, but directs the Court to ratify the sale, if it shall appear that the collector “has complied with the requirements of this Act and the existing laws of the State of Maryland not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, * * * * either party to have the right of appeal to the Court of Appeals; and if not redeemed within the time prescribed by existing law, the treasurer shall convey the same in fee simple to the purchaser thereof. ”. Whilst the general law declares that the purchaser shall have a good title; the local law, omitting those words, uses others of substantially the same import, viz., “the treasurer shall convey the same in fee simple to the purchaser. ” The difference between the Acts consists rather in the form of expressing the same design, than in any substantially repugnant provisions.

We think the object aimed at in both