Coquelet v. Union Hotel Co.

Stockbridge, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In June, 1919, Henriette Coquelet went from Washington to the City of Baltimore with her husband, Lieutenant Henri Coquelet. The trip was one of recreation. The lieutenant had been seriously wounded in the world war, besides having been exposed to shell shock on several occasions.

He was at the time in exceedingly poor health as the result of this experience and, though in some way attached to the French Embassy in Washington, was hardly in a condition to perform any duties involving close application. The afternoon was spent in Baltimore and in the evening Lieutenant and Madame Coquelet visited a moving picture show somewhere apparently in the center of the city. At the conclusion of the show, Lieutenant Coquelet was feeling badly and attributed it to lack of nourishment, and accordingly the couple strolled up the street past the Caswell Hotel, which was operated by the Union Hotel Company, where they dropped into the grill room for supper. Before the supper was over Lieutenant Coquelet found himself feeling worse, and proposed to his wife that they remain in Baltimore over night, to which she assented.

He accordingly left the table, went to the office of the hotel, and registered as Henri Coquelet and wife. Having registered, he inquired the price of rooms, was told the price of the rooms and, according to the testimony of Madame Coquelet, was told, after the clerk had learned that they had no baggage, that they could not be accommodated at the hotel with a room. He returned to the grill room, where he reported the substance of the interview he had just had to his wife, and at the conclusion of their repast both of them entered the office, and Madame Coquelet went to the clerk in charge, F. G, ⁵⁴⁶ Murray, and asked for the reason that they were refused lodging for the night. According to Madame Ooquelet’s own testimony, she was attired in a “fluffy French dress and picture hat and some other things,” and the clerk declined to give any reason for his refusal to give them a room and, upon her insistence for a reason, asked if he thought they were not married.

To this he made no response, but invited them to leave, and by her own testimony she “assumed” that the reason of it was that he had doubt as to their being married. She inquired for the manager of the hotel, and Mr. Busick, the assistant manager of the company, having charge of this particular hotel, coming in about that time, the conversation was continued with him, and he declined to recede from the position which had been taken by Mr. Murray. Thereupon Lieutenant and Madame Coquelet left the Caswell and went to another hotel, and a few days later Madame Coquelet instituted the present action against the hotel company. The testimony on behalf of the hotel company discloses some variations from that given by Madame Coquelet, but hardly of a sufficiently serious character to call for more than this passing comment.

At the trial of the case, eight bills of exceptions were reserved, seven of which related to rulings upon evidence, and the eighth to the ruling of the court upon the prayers. At the time of the filing of the declaration and the amended declaration, demurrers were interposed. The demurrers to the first and second counts were overruled, and that to the third sustained. The burden of the third count of the declaration was that, ffie act of the defendant was malicious, as forming a basis for a finding of punitive damages.

Ordinarily a case stated in the language of thisi third count would have so far justified the finding as to have made the count good, and if there had been any evidence to sustain the theory of the plaintiffs on the question of malice, it would have been necessary to hold that, in sustaining the ⁵⁴⁷ demurrer to this count, the court committed an error. When, however, the evidence is examined, there is nothing in any manner to hear out the allegation of malice, and consequently no reversible error can be predicated upon the action of the trial court in sustaining the demurrer, since it would have presented merely an error without injury. The exceptions upon the questions of evidence are in a very similar position. Thus the question asked of the plaintiff by her counsel upon re-examination, objection to which was sustained by the court, was: “Counsel on the other side asked whether there was any hostility on the part of the clerk after you had engaged him in conversation.

Was there actual hostility, could you tell that hisi remarks were hostile from his tone ?” By this the plaintiff was asked to state whether there was any hostility manifested toward her by the hotel clerk, not in what he said, but in the tone in which he said it. This method of proving malice is very close to the border line^ for, as was said in Beeler v. Jackson, 64 Md. 589 , “The plaintiff is bound to prove the existence of malice as the real motive of the