Corapcioglu v. Roosevelt

DEBORAH S. EYLER, Judge. When Darren Yavuz Corapcioglu was 2lj¿ years old, his father, Mehmet Yavuz Corapcioglu, Ph.D. (“Father”), abducted him and took him to Turkey. At the time, there was a custody case pending over Darren, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, brought by his mother, Sharon Roosevelt, Ph.D.

(“Mother”), with whom Darren always had lived. After more than two years of Hague Convention litigation, the Supreme Court of Turkey ordered Darren returned to Mother’s custody, and they were reunited. At issue in this appeal is a judgment entered on an award by the circuit court to Mother of $252,930 for fees and costs she incurred in securing Darren’s return to the United States. Father challenges that award, raising the following questions for review, which we have reordered and reworded: I. Did the circuit court err by treating Mother’s motion for child support as a motion for counsel fees and costs under Md.Code (1984, 2004 RepLVoL), section 12-103 of the Family Law Article (“FL”)?

II

Is the circuit court’s $252,930 judgment of July 28, 2005 void because the proceedings were subject to the automatic stay in bankruptcy?

III

Did the hearing judge err by not recusing himself?

IV

Did the parties’ custody agreement, as embodied in a Consent Order entered on July 20, 2004, preclude Mother from pursuing counsel fees and costs? V. Did the circuit court’s January 30, 2004 award of $200,000 for “costs” bar Mother from recovering the entire $252,930 in fees and costs she was awarded as a judgment on July 28, 2005? ⁵⁸¹ VI. Did the circuit court improperly calculate Mother’s fees and costs and improperly award her fees and costs that had been paid by her husband with no repayment obligation on her part? Mother has noted a cross-appeal, raising the following question, which we also have reworded: I. Did the circuit court err by classifying its July 28, 2005 judgment for $252,930 as fees and costs, not as child support?

Because we find merit in Father’s fifth issue, we shall vacate the order of the circuit court and remand the case for further proceedings, with directions. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS Darren was born on November 8, 1999, in Houston, Texas. At that time, Mother was in her late 30’s and held a doctoral degree in physics. Father was in his early 50’s and was a tenured full professor of civil engineering at Texas A & M University.

Father is a dual citizen of the United States and Turkey. Mother and Father were not married to each other (and never have been). Mother was working as a research associate for Father. The two commenced an intimate relationship and decided to have a baby.

Mother became pregnant and, when she was at three months gestation, moved into Father’s house. In fact, during all this time, Mother was married to another man — one Eric Benck, Ph.D., a physicist. Mother and Benck had married in 1984. They had made their home in Maryland, where Benck still was living. 1 The couple was childless.

On January 21, 2000, when Darren was 11 weeks old, Mother left Texas with him and returned to Maryland, to her home with Benck. Nevertheless, for another year, until Feb ⁵⁸² ruary 2001, Mother and Father continued in an intimate relationship. Mother represented to people in Maryland that Darren was Benck’s child, however. For the first two years of Darren’s life, Mother allowed Father to have daytime visitation with Darren in Maryland.

On August 27, 2001, Father married a Turkish woman who held the position of Undersecretary to the Prime Minister of Turkey. Thereafter, the relationship between Mother and Father became increasingly strained. On December 20, 2001, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Mother filed a complaint for custody and child support. 2 After Father filed an answer, a scheduling order was entered. 3 The case proceeded through discovery. Mother continued to give Father access to Darren for daytime visitation in Maryland.

The case turned sharply off course on May 5, 2002, when Father and his wife abducted Darren and took him to Turkey. The abduction was well planned. Father had taken a sabbatical from his teaching position in Texas and had lined up a teaching position in Turkey. The day after the abduction, Father called Mother and told her that he was in Turkey, but would not disclose his location there, and that she would never see Darren again.

That same day, Mother sought and was awarded immediate temporary emergency custody of Darren in the pending action. The court ordered Father to return the child to Mother’s custody. Father did not comply. Mother filed an amended complaint seeking immediate custody.

The case went to a merits trial on July 23, 2002. Mother appeared with counsel. Neither father nor his counsel appeared. The court awarded Mother immediate sole legal and physical custody of Darren and child support in an amount to be determined.

The court also awarded Mother ⁵⁸³ $100,000 “as [Father’s] initial contribution towards the fees, costs, and expenses including attorney’s fees incurred by” her in undertaking legal action in Turkey to secure Darren’s return. On August 7, 2002, the court entered an order memorializing the decisions stated above and setting the monthly child support award at $1,040, retroactive to December 20, 2001. The court entered a judgment for the $100,000 in counsel fees and costs and for $7,280 in child support arrears. During Father’s career in academia, he had accumulated substantial retirement benefits through the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund (“TIAA-CREF”).

In late December 2002, the court entered a qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”) that enabled Mother to collect child support from Father’s TIAA-CREF retirement benefits account. From the day Darren was abducted, for over two years, Mother devoted herself to recovering him. She contacted members of Congress, the State Department, the FBI, the Turkish embassy, and the Montgomery County State’s Attorney’s Office, none of whom were able to give her any positive assistance. She traveled to Turkey and took the steps necessary to initiate an international child custody proceeding under the Hague Convention.

(Father refused to do so himself.) She hired a Turkish attorney and an expert on Turkish law and the Hague Convention. She learned that Turkey only had become a party to the Hague Convention two years prior and that the Turkish courts were reluctant to effectuate the return of abducted American children. Indeed, until then, there had not been any case in which an American child abducted to Turkey had been returned to the United States as the result of a Hague Convention proceeding. At some point during the two year period, President Bush discussed the case with the Prime Minister of Turkey, in an effort to persuade the Turkish government to return Darren.

Mother decided that, given the political situation in Turkey, and that Father’s wife was a high ranking government official, ⁵⁸⁴ it was necessary for her to pursue all means — both within and outside the Turkish legal system — in order to obtain Darren’s return. She retained Corporate Training Unlimited, Inc. (“CTU”), a company that specializes in rescuing children who have been kidnapped to foreign countries. CTU put together intelligence and surveillance teams made up of Turkish citizens outside of Ankara (the capital city) to insulate them from political influence and pressure. It took about six weeks for CTU to locate Father and Darren in Turkey.

Six months after the abduction, Mother first saw Darren again. By then, he no longer could speak English and was speaking only Turkish. At the first Hague Convention hearing, the judge granted Mother weekly visitation with Darren from Wednesday at 9:00 a.m. to Thursday at 6:00 p.m. According to Mother, however, for the next two years, Father did not allow her to visit with Darren overnight.

Although not part of the Turkish court’s order, Father supervised all of Mother’s visits with Darren. On August 8, 2003, in the circuit court, Mother filed a motion seeking to have Father held in contempt for failing to return Darren to her custody in accordance with the court’s custody orders. The court issued a show cause order. Through counsel, Father filed an opposition.

A hearing was held on January 16, 2004. 4 Neither Father nor his counsel attended. Counsel for Mother introduced evidence showing that Mother had made 11 trips to Turkey in connection with the Hague Convention proceeding and CTU’s efforts to recapture Darren, and that she had incurred $255,000 in attorney’s fees and expenses in doing so. The court found Father in contempt for failing to return Darren to Mother. The judge stated: ⁵⁸⁵ So I find the defendant to be in contempt of court.

The defendant may purge himself of this contempt finding by submitting himself to the jurisdiction of this court within the next 30 days. I find also that the defendant’s [opposition] ... is one which should not be considered until such time as the defendant returns and submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. So I will strike the [opposition] ... until such time as the defendant returns and submits himself to the jurisdiction of this court. I have before me expenses that have been incurred in this process.

This process totaling $255,000. So I will award costs as requested in the amount of $200,000 on behalf of [Mother]. (Emphasis added.) On January 23, 2004, the court issued an order striking Father’s opposition; finding him to be in contempt; directing Father to pay $200,000 to Mother and that a judgment in that amount be entered; and stating, “[Father] may purge himself of this Contempt Order by submitting himself to the jurisdiction of this court within thirty (30) days[.]” The order was entered on January 30. Father initially prevailed in the Hague Convention case.

Mother took an appeal, however, and ultimately prevailed in the Supreme Court of Turkey. The court determined that the United States was Darren’s “home state,” which meant Father had to return him to Mother’s custody. Apparently, once that ruling was made, discussions ensued between counsel for the parties, resulting in a comprehensive agreement about custody, visitation, and numerous other issues. On July 15, 2004, the parties filed a joint motion for change of custody.

Father returned Darren to the United States the next day. On July 20, 2004, the parties submitted a Consent Order, embodying their agreement, which was approved by the court and entered that day. The Consent Order provided among other things that Mother would have primary physical ⁵⁸⁶ custody and sole legal custody of Darren and Father would have visitation that would be implemented gradually. Six days after entry of the Consent Order, Mother filed an emergency request to have Father’s visitation supervised, citing concerns about reabduetion.

Father opposed the request. The court held a hearing on July 28, 2004, and granted Mother’s request; an order directing that Father’s visitation with Darren be supervised was entered on August 8. About two weeks later, on August 16, Father filed a suggestion of bankruptcy, asserting that on August 11, he had filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in a Texas federal court. On September 3, 2004, Mother filed, inter alia, a response to Father’s suggestion of bankruptcy, in which she asked the court to clarify that the $200,000 judgment entered on January 30, 2004, was an award of child support.

She also filed a motion asking among other things that the Consent Order be set aside and for an award of counsel fees and costs incurred in attempting to enforce the court’s custody order. The court held a hearing on the outstanding motions, on November 5, 2004. Mother made two assertions about the $200,000 judgment. First, she maintained that the judgment was “in the nature of a fine” for “civil and criminal contempt,” which she argued is not dischargeable in bankruptcy.

Second, she asserted that the $200,000 judgment was “in the nature of child support,” which she also argued is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. The court ruled that the $200,000 judgment was a “sanction” it had imposed against Father for violating the court’s custody order commanding him to return Darren to Mother. It also ruled that the $200,000 judgment was not “in the nature of child support.” In addition, the court ruled that the proceedings were not subject to the automatic stay. It denied Mother’s motion to set aside the Consent Order.

It did not address Mother’s request for counsel fees and costs incurred in attempting to enforce the court’s custody order. On November 9, 2004, the court entered orders memorializing its decisions. ⁵⁸⁷ A little over a month later, on December 16, 2004, Mother filed what she entitled a motion for child support, asking that she be awarded a lump-sum amount of child support equal to the sums she had expended in securing Darren’s return from Turkey. Father filed a timely opposition. The motion and others not relevant to this appeal were set in for a hearing, which was postponed several times and ultimately set in for June 23, 2005.

In the meantime, in the Texas bankruptcy case, Mother filed a “Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt under U.S.C. § 523(a),” seeking a ruling that the $200,000 judgment in her favor was not dischargeable in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court held an evidentiary hearing, at which Mother and Father testified, and on May 18, 2005, issued a memorandum opinion and order determining that the judgment was non-dischargeable “for willful and malicious injury by [Father] to [Mother],” under 11 U.S.C. section 523 (a)(6). On May 23, 2005, in the domestic case, Mother filed a “line” attaching the memorandum opinion and order of the Texas bankruptcy court. The evidentiary hearing on Mother’s motion for child support began as scheduled on June 23, 2005, and continued into the next day.

Mother introduced evidence that CTU had been paid $200,000 for the rescue efforts for Darren. The court found that that sum was necessary, fair, and reasonable to enforce its custody orders. Mother also introduced evidence that she had incurred $7,440 for Turkish lessons. The court found that that expense was fair and reasonable, and that the lessons had been necessary because Darren no longer was able to speak or understand English.

Mother also introduced evidence of attorneys’ fees and expenses for transportation, lodging, shipping, health insurance, document translation, telephone bills and other expenses, all supported by receipts, incurred in her efforts to have Darren returned to her custody. The court found that the fees and costs all were reasonable and necessary to enforce its custody orders. ⁵⁸⁸ During the hearing, Father argued that most of the fees and costs Mother was seeking were incurred before the entry of the court’s January 30, 2004 judgment for $200,000, and were for the exact same expenses covered by that judgment. He maintained that Mother could not recover the same expenses twice and asked the court to calculate any award of counsel fees and costs by subtracting the $200,000 judgment. Mother responded that the $200,000 judgment was a contempt sanction, not an award of counsel fees and costs, and therefore should not be subtracted from the court’s award.

Also during the hearing, Mother asked the court to characterize any award of counsel fees and costs she was claiming as an award of child support. The court determined, however, that the counsel fees and costs Mother was claiming were not child support; and therefore any award it might make would not be a child support award. After hearing argument of counsel, the court ruled from the bench. The judge found that, as a result of Father’s having abducted Darren and absconded with him to Turkey, Mother had incurred a total sum of $352,930 in counsel fees and costs to secure custody of Darren.

He further found that Mother had received $100,000 of that sum by collecting her judgment in that amount against Father’s TIAA-CREF retirement pension account. The judge awarded Mother the balance of $252,930. He declined to deduct from that sum the $200,000 judgment of January 30, 2004. (None of the $200,000 has been collected.

As noted above, however, the judgment was ruled nondischargeable in the Texas bankruptcy case.) The court immediately entered an order directing Father to pay the $252,930 to Mother within 30 days. When Father did not do so, the court entered judgment for that amount against him, on July 28, 2005. Mother filed a notice of appeal on August 17, 2005. A week later, Father filed a notice of appeal. 5 ⁵⁸⁹ To the extent necessary, we shall include additional facts in our discussion of the issues.

DISCUSSION I. Did the circuit court err by treating Mother’s motion for child support as a motion for counsel fees and expenses? (Father’s Question I) Did the circuit court err by awarding Mother $252,930 in expenses, rather than in child support? (Mother’s Question I) Father contends that because Mother’s December 16, 2004 filing was entitled a motion for child support, the court erred by sua sponte treating it as a motion for counsel fees and costs, under FL section 12-103, and therefore further erred by granting Mother such an award. 6 ⁵⁹⁰ Mother’s single contention on cross-appeal is a variation on this same theme. She maintains that the costs she incurred in her efforts to secure Darren’s return from Turkey constituted child support, and that the court should have categorized all of her expenditures for securing Darren’s return, except her counsel fees, as child support.

We do not find merit in either of these contentions. To begin, Father is precluded from contending on appeal that the court erred by treating Mother’s motion as one for attorney’s fees and costs because that contention is diametrically opposed to the position he argued below. See Gordon v. Posner, 142 Md.App. 399, 424-26 , 790 A.2d 675 (2002); Billman v. State Deposit Ins. Fund Corp., 86 Md.App. 1, 20-21 , 585 A.2d 238 (1991) (both discussing doctrine of judicial estoppel).

In the circuit court, Father argued that Mother’s motion was not one for child support, and could not be, because child support cannot be modified retroactively; and that the fees and costs that Mother was seeking were not child support under Maryland law. Having taken that position below, Father cannot argue to the contrary on appeal. Even if Father previously had advocated the position he now advances on appeal, we would reject his argument. It is well established in Maryland law that a court is to treat a paper filed by a party according to its substance, and not by its label.

See, e.g., Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane v. Tornillo, 320 Md. 192, 195 , 577 A.2d 34 (1990) (“Ordinarily, ‘magic words’ are not essential to successful pleading in Maryland. Courts and administrative agencies are expected to look at the substance of the allegations before them, not merely at labels or conclusory averments.”); Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 650-51 , 574 A.2d 898 (1990) (treating document labeled as “memorandum” as a motion to revise); Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532 , 535 n. 1, 530 A.2d 724 (1987) (noting that “our concern is with the nature of the issues legitimately raised by the pleadings, and not with the labels given to the pleadings”); Frederick County Bd. of Comm’rs v. Sautter, 123 Md.App. 440, 451-52 , 718 A.2d 685 (1998) (observing that, in court ⁵⁹¹ filings, substance is more important than form); see also Esteps Elec. & Petroleum Co. v. Sager, 67 Md.App. 649, 652 , 508 A.2d 1032 (1986), and Flying “A” Serv. Station v. Jordan, 17 Md.App. 477, 482 , 302 A.2d 650 (1973) (both cases treating motions for reconsideration as motions for rehearing). In substance, Mother’s motion was a request for an award to reimburse her for the counsel fees and costs she had incurred in securing Darren’s return from Turkey; notwithstanding its label, the motion was not a request for child support.

Accordingly, the court did not err in sua sponte treating the motion as one made pursuant to FL section 12-103. There also is no merit to Mother’s argument that the court should have denominated its $252,930 award as child support. Under Maryland law, counsel fees and costs incurred by a parent in a custody case are not child support, even when they are for the benefit of the child. In Goldberg v. Miller, 371 Md. 591, 810 A.2d 947 (2002), the Court of Appeals held that the fees of a lawyer appointed to represent a child in a custody case were not child support.

The Court explained that the trial court, which had ruled that its order directing the parents to pay those fees was “ ‘in the nature of child support,’ ” 371 Md. at 601 , 810 A.2d 947 , lacked authority under Maryland law to do so. The circuit court does not have the authority to “select, at its complete discretion, which of its orders should be deemed child support.” Id. at 603 , 810 A.2d 947 . The Court went on to explain that, whether an award is child support must be determined, instead, by application of Maryland’s statutory child support scheme. When the General Assembly enacted the child support guidelines, and certain other portions of the child support chapter of the Family Law Article, it decided what specific expenses that are not part of the parents’ basic child support obligation nevertheless constitute child support.

Those expenses include actual child care expenses incurred due to either parent’s employment, FL § 12-204(g); extraordinary medical expenses, FL § 12- ⁵⁹² 204(h); special or private school expenses, FL § 12 — 204(i)(l); expenses for transportation of the child between the parents’ homes, FL § 12-204(i)(2); expenses related to medical support, FL § 12-101(d); and a requirement that a parent include the child in that parent’s health insurance coverage, FL § 12-102(b). That is the extent of payments that are child support, or are in the nature of child support, under Maryland law. The Goldberg Court made clear that federal bankruptcy law about what obligations are child support or “in the nature of child support,” for purposes of being excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. section 523 (a)(5), does not bind state courts in deciding what constitutes child support under state law. It also made clear that the federal bankruptcy courts likewise are not bound by state law in deciding what obligations are child support or “in the nature of child support” within the meaning of the federal bankruptcy statute and regulations.

In the case at bar, notwithstanding that the expenses incurred by Mother to return Darren to her custody might have benefited him, the expenses were not child support under Maryland law; rather, they were costs incurred by Mother in prosecuting the child support action by seeking enforcement of the court’s custody order, including by pursuing Hague Convention litigation in Turkey and by retaining experts in foreign abductions to locate Darren and attempt to gain his release. 7 The hearing court did not err by ruling that its award of fees and costs incurred by Mother in rescuing Darren from Turkey was not child support, or in the nature of child support, under Maryland law. The only reason the parties are arguing over whether the court could sua sponte treat Mother’s motion as one for counsel fees and costs, and whether the $252,930 judgment is for child support, is that they believe the answers to those ⁵⁹³ questions will determine the outcome of Father’s second question presented — whether that judgment was entered in violation of the automatic stay in bankruptcy, under 11 U.S.C. section 362 . As we shall explain, that issue is to be decided under federal law, not Maryland law; and federal law about what obligations are child support, or “in the nature of child support,” differs from Maryland law on that subject. Therefore, our answers to these two questions do not have the significance the parties believe they do.

II

Is the circuit court’s July 28, 2005 judgment for $252,930 void because the proceeding on Mother’s motion was subject to the automatic stay in bankruptcy? Father maintains that the automatic stay in bankruptcy applied to the proceedings in this case after he filed his Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, and as a consequence, the circuit court’s July 28, 2005 judgment, entered when the stay was in effect, is void. Without citing any cases or discussing the pertinent statutory language, Father states simply that, even though section 362(b) “provides for exceptions relating to domestic matters for paternity, divorce, collection of alimony and child support ... [t]here is no exception for collection of counsel fees and costs.” Mother responds that, if her December 16, 2004 motion properly was treated by the court as one for counsel fees and expenses, and not for child support, and therefore the $252,930 judgment was for expenses, not child support, then the automatic stay indeed was in effect, and the court’s judgment must be vacated. Neither party’s argument has merit.

Whether the automatic stay was in effect is a question of law that we decide de novo. In re Merry-Go-Round Enters., Inc., 180 F.3d 149, 154 (4th Cir.1999). In addition, even if the parties agree that the automatic stay was in effect, we are not bound by their agreement on a pure question of law. See Crown Oil & Wax Co. of Del., Inc v. Glen Constr. ⁵⁹⁴ Co. of Va., Inc., 320 Md. 546, 567 , 578 A.2d 1184 (1990) (observing that an appellate court is “not bound by stipulations on matters of law”). 8 Section 362(a) of the federal Bankruptcy Code mandates the automatic stay of a broad range of proceedings against a debtor upon the filing of his or her Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, including the commencement or continuation ... of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title[.] The purpose of the automatic stay is to give the debtor a “breathing spell” from his/her creditors, to allow time to formulate a repayment or reorganization plan, and to prevent a chaotic and uncontrolled scramble for the debtor’s assets in a multitude of uncoordinated proceedings in different courts, by ensuring that all claims against the debtor, other than those exempted from the stay, will be brought in a single forum.

Klass v. Klass, 377 Md. 13, 22 , 831 A.2d 1067 (2003). There are exceptions to the automatic stay, however, which are enumerated in subsection (b) of section 362. In November ⁵⁹⁵ 2004, as pertinent to the case at bar, that subsection excepted from the automatic stay “the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding for (i) the establishment of paternity; or (ii) the establishment or modification of an order for alimony, maintenance, or support” or for “the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362 (b)(2)(A) and (B). 9 In Klass v. Mass, supra, 377 Md. 13 , 831 A.2d 1067 , the Court of Appeals considered the scope of the automatic stay exceptions then in effect (in 2003) that pertained to family law proceedings. The husband had filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition while his divorce case was pending in a Maryland state court.

The court granted the parties an absolute divorce, ordered the husband to pay the fees of the children’s attorney, and also ordered him to pay the wife’s attorney’s fees. The court entered judgments for the fee awards. As here, the husband challenged those judgments on appeal on the ground that they were void because they were entered in violation of the automatic stay. The Court of Appeals prefaced its analysis by explaining that a state court has concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to determine whether and how a matter before the state court may be affected by the automatic stay provision in section 362(a).

The state court must apply federal bankruptcy law in making that determination, however. On the merits, the Court held that, notwithstanding that fees awarded to a lawyer for services to a child or children in a divorce, custody, or child support case do not constitute child support under Maryland law, see Goldberg, supra, 371 Md. at 607-08 , 810 A.2d 947 , for purposes of section 362(b), under federal bank ⁵⁹⁶ rwptcy law, those fees do constitute child support. Under federal bankruptcy law, the “judgment entered in favor of the [children’s lawyer] did no more than establish that component of child support; it was not subject to the stay.” Klass, supra, 377 Md. at 27 , 831 A.2d 1067 . Similarly, and noting that “[m]ost States regard attorney fees to a spouse as in the nature of spousal support,” the Court held that the judgment against the husband for the wife’s attorney’s fees was not entered in violation of the automatic stay.

Id. In so concluding, the Court relied upon some federal cases interpreting section 362(b) and others interpreting section 523(a)(5)(A), which makes non-dischargeable a debt designated as alimony, maintenance, or support that is actually “in the nature of’ alimony, maintenance, or support. The Court observed that it is the prevailing view among federal courts and bankruptcy courts that, under section 523, “judgments against a debtor for fees payable to a [lawyer for a minor child] in a divorce, custody, or child support case are in the nature of child support and are therefore not dischargeable[,]” but that the federal caselaw on the issue in the context of the section 362 automatic stay was “scant.” 377 Md. at 25 , 831 A.2d 1067 . The Court reasoned, however, that it makes sense to read the sections coterminously, so that when judgments are not dischargeable under section 523, because they are in the nature of child support, the proceedings that produce the judgments likewise are not precluded by the automatic stay, under section 362. “[T]he provisions in each [section] relating to child support rest on the same stated policy of not allowing debtors to use bankruptcy petitions to avoid legitimate marital and child support obligations.” 377 Md. at 26 , 831 A.2d 1067 .

In addition, the Court observed, the language of section 362 is broader than that in section 523: section 362 covers proceedings for “alimony, maintenance, and support,” while section 523 covers debts designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, so long as they are in fact in the nature of alimony, maintenance, and support. “Thus, if an order that is not ⁵⁹⁷ precisely in the form of direct periodic monetary support for a child is regarded nonetheless as child support for purposes of § 523, there is little reason not to regard it likewise for purposes of § 362(b).” 377 Md. at 26 , 831 A.2d 1067 . In the instant case, whether Mother’s December 16, 2004 motion was subject to the automatic stay in bankruptcy is a question of federal bankruptcy law, not Maryland law. Klass, supra, 377 Md. at 27 , 831 A.2d 1067 . If the expenses for which she was seeking reimbursement were child support or “in the nature of child support” under federal law, the automatic stay did not apply to bar proceedings on the motion.

In the dischargeability context, it is well-established in federal bankruptcy law that debts for actual expenses incurred in enforcing a state court’s custody order are “in the nature of child support,” and hence are non-dischargeable under section 523(a)(5)(A). See In re Ray, 143 B.R. 937 (D.Colo.1992) (holding that attorney’s fee award to father in contempt action against mother for violating custody order was “in the nature of child support” and therefore was a non-dischargeable debt); In re Castro, 74 B.R. 38 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1987) (holding that judgment obtained by a father for expenses incurred to enforce custody order that mother had violated was non-dis-chargeable because expenses were in the nature of child support); In re Sposa, 31 B.R. 307 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1983) (holding that judgment against father for attorney’s fee, commissioner’s fee, and expenses incurred by mother in prosecuting fraudulent conveyance claim against him, in order to place child support hen on property fraudulently conveyed, was for expenses “in the nature of child support,” and hence nondischargeable). We have found two dischargeability cases that have dealt with expenses incurred by a parent in recovering a child abducted by the other parent. In In re Castro, supra, 74 B.R. 38 , a state court awarded custody of one child to the father and custody of the other child to the mother.

The father was to have visitation with the child in the mother’s custody. The mother and her new husband abducted the child for whom the ⁵⁹⁸ father had custody, and refused to allow the father to have contact with either child. The father incurred expenses in his efforts to enforce the court’s custody order, and in a state court suit obtained a judgment against the mother for those expenses. When the mother filed for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court was asked to decide whether the judgment was dischargeable.

The court ruled that it was not, because it was for expenses actually incurred in enforcing a custody order, and therefore was in the nature of child support. In In re Hicks, 65 B.R. 227 (Bankr.D.N.M.1986), a mother and father were divorced, and the mother was granted custody of their child. Sometime soon thereafter, the father abducted the child. The father managed to conceal the child’s whereabouts for two years.

After the mother obtained the child’s return, she moved the state court to order the father to pay the counsel fees and costs she had incurred to regain custody of the child. The court did so, directing the father to reimburse the mother for “ ‘reasonable expenses incurred by [her] for the search of the minor child.’” 65 B.R. at 228-29 . The father then filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The mother filed a complaint in the bankruptcy court to have the father’s debt deemed non-dischargeable, under sections 523(a)(5)(debts for child or spousal support) and (a)(6) (debts for willful and malicious injury) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Explaining that its task was to determine the “true character of the debt,” 65 B.R. at 229 , the bankruptcy court concluded that the award of counsel fees and costs incurred in securing the child’s return was non-dischargeable, as a support obligation under section 523(a)(5). The court took guidance from the holding in In re Sposa, supra, 31 B.R. at 311 , that in deciding dischargeability, the court must determine whether the proceeding that gave rise to the debt was directly related to a primary support obligation, even if the debt was entered as a judgment in an ancillary proceeding. The Hicks court held that “child support,” as used in section 523(a)(5), includes actual costs incurred in enforcing a custody order, and that the judgment for the mother’s counsel fees therefore was nondischargeable. (The court found it unnecessary to address ⁵⁹⁹ whether the debt was non-dischargeable as one for willful and malicious injury under section 528(a)(6).) We also have found one bankruptcy case that granted relief from the automatic stay for a mother to collect, against the