Corby v. McCarthy

HOLLANDER, Judge. This case, which is before us for the second time, has a protracted history rooted in an ongoing dispute regarding parental support for the parties’ adult disabled child. Bonnie Corby, 1 appellant and cross-appellee, and Daniel P. McCarthy, appellee and cross-appellant, are the divorced parents of Kelly McCarthy, who was born in January 1980. Appellee has paid child support for Kelly since the parties’ divorce in 1982.

This appeal involves a “Supplemental Motion To Modify Child Support,” filed by appellant on June 6, 2002, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, seeking an increase with respect to appellee’s monthly support obligation of $702. In response, appellee asked the court to terminate his support obligation or, in the alternative, to reduce it. Following an evidentiary hearing in February 2003, the circuit court concluded that Kelly is a destitute adult child within the meaning of Md.Code (1999 Repl.VoL), § 13-101(b) of the Family Law Article (“F.L.”). In its Modification Order filed February 24, 2003, however, the circuit court reduced appellee’s support obligation to $150 per month, retroactive to August 1, 2002.

That ruling spawned this appeal. Appellant contests the decision of the circuit court reducing appellee’s monthly support obligation to $150. Appellee challenges the circuit court’s finding that Kelly is a destitute adult child. He also asks us to revisit the ruling of this Court in the first appeal, McCarthy v. McCarthy, No. 423, September ⁴⁵⁴ Term 2000 (filed August 28, 2001) (“McCarthy /”), in which the Court (Murphy, C.J.) determined that the Child Support Guidelines (the “Guidelines”), set out in F.L. § 12-202, apply in calculating the child support obligation for a destitute adult child.

Appellant presents the following five questions: I. Did the Trial Court err when it compelled the destitute adult child to relinquish the autonomy and benefits of residing in her own apartment?

II

Did the Trial Court violate the Mother’s Constitutional rights against State ordered involuntary servitude, when it ordered the destitute adult child to live with the disabled Mother?

III

Did the Trial Court err when it Ordered the Mother to provide shelter and support for the destitute adult child contrary to the statutory authority granted pursuant to FL § 13-103 and the statutory requirements of FL § 12-202 and § 12-204?

IV

Did the Trial Court err in disallowing those costs specifically authorized by FL § 13-103(c)(2), when it ruled that it was in the best interest of the destitute child to receive child support at a level significantly below the child support guidelines amount established by FL § 12-204? V. Did the Trial Court err when it found that the destitute adult child’s expense for a car was unreasonable? With respect to the cross-appeal, appellee asks: I. Did the trial court err when it held that Kelly McCarthy is a “destitute adult child” within the meaning of Md.Code Ann., Fam. Law § 13-101(b)?

II

If Kelly McCarthy is a “destitute adult child,” was the trial court required to apply the child support guidelines?

III

If the child support guidelines do not apply to a “destitute adult child,” was the trial court’s award of support for Kelly McCarthy within the Court’s discretion and not clearly erroneous under Presley v. Presley, 65 Md.App. 265 , 500 A.2d 322 (1985)? ⁴⁵⁵ For the reasons that follow, we shall vacate the court’s Modification Order of February 24, 2003, and remand for further proceedings. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY The parties were married in May 1978. Their only child, Kelly, was born on January 28, 1980. Upon the parties’ divorce in August 1982, appellant was awarded sole custody of Kelly. 2 McCarthy has worked almost thirty years for the federal government.

In his current position as a health insurance analyst for the Medicaid and Medicare Administration, he earns $2,861.60 biweekly, or almost $75,000 annually. McCarthy remarried about thirteen years ago, and his wife, Jeanne, earns about $1000 per week, exclusive of a bonus. They adopted their only child in 1997. Ms. Corby does not work.

In 1998, the Social Security Administration determined that she is disabled, and she now receives Social Security disability benefits of $540 per month. There is no suggestion that appellant is able to contribute to the financial support of Kelly. On October 29, 1997, shortly before Kelly turned eighteen, appellant filed a motion in the circuit court to extend McCarthy’s support obligation beyond Kelly’s eighteenth birthday. The master held a two-day evidentiary hearing in February 1998, at which expert testimony was presented with respect to Kelly’s disability.

At the time of the hearing, Kelly was a special education student at Walter Johnson High School. She was also working part-time at the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”), earning $404 bi-weekly while receiving $73 in monthly SSI benefits. In the master’s report of June 9, 1998, the master recommended the extension of parental support for Kelly beyond her eighteenth birthday. As to Kelly’s condition, the master ⁴⁵⁶ found that she is a “mildly mentally retarded woman who functions at a 4th or 5th grade level.” She also has “great difficulty reading at a 4th grade level,” and has “no understanding of the language presented.” Moreover, the master noted that all of the experts who testified “agreed that Kelly does not have the life skills to live on her own....” In addition, the master found that Kelly lacked the capacity to “obtain and maintain continuous long term employment generating sufficient income to cover her reasonable needs.” Further, the master wrote: Dr. Steven Weinstein, a pediatric neurologist, testified that unlike a 4th or 5th grade child, Kelly has no ability to “problem solve” if new information is presented from the previous learning path.

Although some people at Kelly’s level will work full time, they will not be able to live independently, i.e. live unassisted in the world. People such as Kelly need close supervision in their home for such tasks as food preparation, dressing, and paying bills. People such as Kelly need support to go to and from employment and usually live at home with a parent or in a halfway house where assistance with daily living needs is available.... The master determined that Kelly’s needs amounted to about $1,000 a month.

He then imputed annual income to appellant of $20,000, and found that appellee had an annual income of about $60,000. Using the Guidelines, the master recommended that appellee pay child support of $634 per month. As no exceptions were filed, the court issued an Order of June 25, 1998, extending appellee’s support obligation and requiring him to pay $634 per month towards Kelly’s support. A few months later, on November 23, 1998, Corby filed a petition to modify and increase child support, claiming a change in circumstances based on an increase in appellee’s income and a finding by the Social Security Administration on July 25, 1998, that she is disabled.

Thereafter, on June 18, 1999, McCarthy filed a motion to terminate support, claiming that, since the hearing in February 1998, Kelly had obtained ⁴⁵⁷ full-time employment with the VA, and her annual income had increased from $8,700 to $16,600. The master heard the parties’ motions on October 12, 1999. Then, on November 15, 1999, the master issued a Report and Recommendation, finding a material change in circumstances based on “the nature and extent of the child’s employment.” Whereas Kelly had been employed in February 1998 as a temporary and probationary employee with the VA, working twenty hours per week and grossing $299.60 bi-weekly, she was a permanent and full-time VA employee by the time of the 1999 hearing. Her income had increased to gross monthly earnings of $1,382.50, from which she netted $995.40.

On an annual basis, Kelly was earning a gross wage of $16,590. Because of her employment, however, Kelly was no longer receiving $73 in monthly Social Security benefits. Recognizing that, since the last hearing, Corby had been found disabled by the Social Security Administration, the master declined to impute income to appellee. He reasoned that it would be “equal to forcing a person living at a subsistence level, pursuant to a federal welfare program, to pay child support.” Conversely, the master found that appellee’s income had increased to $5,269 per month, or $63,228 per year.

The master concluded that Kelly was a destitute adult child and that the Guidelines apply in calculating parental support. But, he recommended a downward deviation from the guidelines, based on his finding that Kelly could meet most of her reasonable monthly expenses, which included half the rent for the apartment that Kelly was then sharing with appellant. The master reasoned that “[i]t is not in the best interest of this child to provide the full amount of child support which would artificially establish a standard of living beyond Kelly’s means.” Therefore, although appellee’s child support obligation under the Guidelines would have been $681 per month, the master recommended the reduction of appellee’s support obligation to $100 per month. ⁴⁵⁸ Both parties filed exceptions. In a Memorandum Opinion of March 27, 2000, the court concluded that the Guidelines do not apply to a destitute adult child, but it otherwise adopted the master’s recommendations.

The court stated, in part: Plaintiff [i.e., Corby] alleges that the Master erred in departing from the Child Support Guidelines. The Court does not find this to be error for two reasons. Initially, the Court is not cited to any authority that the child support Guidelines apply in cases where an adult destitute child is involved. Family Law 13-107(b) provides that in determining the amount of support, the court shall consider the financial circumstances of the individual.

Kelly is employed earning approximately $16,000 per year. The Child Support Guidelines do not take these matters into account. In addition, she requires and receives other assistance and subsidies. The court believes that the proper method to determine the level of support is to determine the reasonable needs of the adult child and consider the ability of the child to meet those needs.

If the child is unable to meet her reasonable needs then the Court looks to the ability of the parents to contribute to those needs. On the same date, March 27, 2000, the circuit court entered a Modification Order requiring McCarthy to pay child support to Corby in the sum of $100 per month, commencing from November 1, 1999. That ruling culminated in McCarthy I. On appeal, appellant asked: “Did the trial court err in refusing to utilize the child support guidelines in determining child support for an adult disabled child?” This Court expressly held that “the Child Support Guidelines are applicable to adult destitute children.” Therefore, we vacated the circuit court’s decision and remanded the matter to the circuit court to determine “Kelly’s right to parental support by applying the Child Support Guidelines.” In concluding that the Guidelines applied, Chief Judge Murphy wrote for the panel in McCarthy I: ⁴⁵⁹ The record in this case clearly shows that Kelly is very limited and unable to live independently without assistance from her mother.... In 1998, the Master found that Kelly is “mildly mentally retarded,” functioning on a fourth or fifth grade level, and “that this child does not have the mental capacity to seek out, obtain, and maintain continuous long term employment generating sufficient income to cover her reasonable needs.” We are persuaded that the Child Support Guidelines are as applicable to a “destitute adult child” as they are to a minor child.

Any other interpretation would be inconsistent with the well established requirement that “the procedure and remedies for the enforcement of [an incapacitated adult child’s] right [to parental support] must ... be ‘on equal footing’ [with a minor child’s right to parental support.]” Stern v. Stern, 58 Md.App. 280, 295 , 473 A.2d 56 (1984). (omissions in original). ❖ * ;fc In accordance with [Md.Code Ann. Fam. Law § 12-202(a)(2)(iv) ], a circuit court may only depart from the mandatory child support guidelines when it justifies that departure, in writing, and clearly articulates why the departure “selves the best interest of the child.” In re: Joshua W., 94 Md.App. 486, 492 , 617 A.2d 1154 (1993). See also, Dunlap v. Fiorenza, 128 Md.App. 357, 362 , 738 A.2d 312 (1999).

We shall therefore vacate the judgment at issue and remand for further proceedings at which the circuit court shall determine Kelly’s right to parental support by applying the Child Support Guidelines. (Footnotes omitted). Upon remand, the circuit court entered an Order dated February 27, 2002, in which the court set appellee’s monthly child support obligation at $634, through February 29, 2000. ⁴⁶⁰ Commencing as of March 1, 2000, the circuit court ordered McCarthy to pay child support of $702 per month. No appeal was taken from that Order.

A few months later, in June 2002, appellant filed yet another motion to modify child support, prompting appellee to seek termination of his child support obligation. The court held an evidentiary motions hearing in February 2003, at which Kelly, Corby, McCarthy, and Jeanne McCarthy testified. It is this hearing that is directly before us. At the hearing, counsel for appellee stated: “[W]e’re not contesting Kelly’s disability.” The court concluded that Kelly remains a destitute adult child who cannot meet all of her reasonable expenses.

As we noted, however, pursuant to its Modification Order of February 24, 2003, the court reduced appellee’s support obligation from $702 per month to $150 per month (i.e., $5 per day), effective as of August 1, 2002. We turn to review the evidence adduced at the hearing. Kelly testified that she lives by herself but her mother pays her rent and all of her other bills. Kelly did not know the amount of her rent, and she said she had never written a check.

Moreover, in answer to a series of questions, Kelly made clear that her mother helps her in countless ways with all of her daily tasks. Ms. Corby testified: “Kelly has always been in special ed., and even prior to that, when she was bom, she had obvious developmental disabilities with speech and language and neurological problems, and cognitive limitations. Her IQ is 61.” According to appellant, Kelly also has “fine motor skills problems,” including problems doing ordinary tasks such as brushing her hair. As of the hearing, Kelly was employed by the VA as a GS-3 federal worker, earning a net monthly income of $1,337.

While Kelly receives “automatic” pay raises, she had no merit increases in the four years that she had worked full time at the VA. Appellant added that, since the last hearing, Kelly “was cut off’ from appellee’s health insurance and will “have ⁴⁶¹ to pick it up when open season comes.” That cost would be an additional expense for Kelly. Appellant’s only income is her Social Security disability benefits of $540 per month. 3 Moreover, she claimed that, since the last hearing, her “health [had] deteriorated” because of the “extreme stress” she has experienced in caring for Kelly. Of significance here, at the time of the hearing Kelly and appellant were no longer residing together.

Instead, they had separate apartments in the same federally subsidized apartment building for “low income people.” According to appellant, they are both “very, very small apartments.” Appellant had a one bedroom apartment, for which she paid $122 per month in rent, while Kelly had a one bedroom unit with a den, costing $469 per month. 4 Appellant testified that she and Kelly had previously lived together in a three-bedroom apartment, but when Kelly “got her Section 8 voucher,” there were no available “three-bedroom tax credit apartments.... ” She claimed they had “no choice” but to take two separate apartments that were “close together....” Although Kelly had her own apartment, appellant acknowledged that she continued to provide all of Kelly’s care, including preparation of her meals, awakening her in the morning for work, buying her clothes and food, and paying her bills. Moreover, appellant managed Kelly’s money through three bank accounts, which appellant referred to as “family money.” Kelly’s paycheck, appellee’s child support payments, and ap ⁴⁶² pellant’s Social Security benefits were all commingled in these accounts, from which appellant paid all of the expenses for both appellant and Kelly. The extent of appellant’s care for Kelly is reflected in the following testimony: [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Ms. Corby, how does Kelly get home from the Metro? [APPELLANT]: I pick her up, just like I picked her up yesterday. I pick her up every day.

We go to the Giant. We grocery shop together, and then we come home, and I make dinner. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: When you go grocery shopping, who pays for the groceries? [APPELLANT]: Ido. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Out of what account do you pay for the groceries? [APPELLANT]: We have a joint account. I mean, I’m not going to put her in another line for her to pay what she wants. Most of them groceries are Kelly, what she likes, and I usually end up eating whatever I buy for Kelly. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Okay.

So you buy the groceries for the two of you out of the joint account? [APPELLANT]: Yes. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Would Kelly even know how to pay for groceries? [APPELLANT]: No. She’s never written a check, and I don’t think she understands the concept of money, and she has problems with simple [a]rithmetic as well. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Okay. Has she ever gone out with money and not brought back the proper change? [APPELLANT]: Many times. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: When you have dinner, where do you have dinner at? ⁴⁶³ [APPELLANT]: I have dinner every night with Kelly, in Kelly’s apartment. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Who cooks dinner? [APPELLANT]: I make dinner. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Does Kelly ever cook dinner? [APPELLANT]: Kelly has never used the stove or anything like that, nor has she ever made a sandwich, unfortunately. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: What do you do in the morning with Kelly? [APPELLANT]: In the morning, I wake [her] up every morning when she goes to work, and it’s usually a struggle to get her to go to work .... and there’s some days that she refuses to go. I mean, I can’t fight her. I have tried to tell her that she may lose her job if she doesn’t go.

But on the good days when she’s agreeable to go to work, I wake her up. The night before I sort of decide what outfit she’s going to wear. Kelly has a problem in terms of she has no concept of if it’s winter or summer. She would wear — if I didn’t do that, she [would] wear something like a summer dress or something summery without a coat.

So I select her clothes. So she comes down and — she puts on her clothes, comes down, then I put on her makeup, do her hair. First, I wash her face, then I brush her teeth, then I put on her makeup, and make sure her hair looks nicely brushed, and she puts on her jacket.... I make sure that she has her medications, her keys, a $10 bill, her Metro card in her purse.

Then she goes to work. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Now Kelly testified that she buys the Metro card. Does she buy the metro card? [APPELLANT]: No. We usually get it in the Giant, so that’s where we get it. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Who pays for that? How do you pay for that? Out of what account? ⁴⁶⁴ [APPELLANT]: From our joint account through NCT. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Do you ever give her any lunch money? [APPELLANT]: Yes.

I make sure that she has at least 10 to 15 dollars in her purse every day. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Okay. And where do you get that money? [APPELLANT]: That’s our family money that she has. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Is that from the joint account? [APPELLANT]: The joint account. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Okay. Do you buy — does she go and buy her makeup or do you buy it? [APPELLANT]: I buy everything. She wouldn’t know what to buy. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Is there anything that she buys on her own? [APPELLANT]: A soda, a candy bar. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Do you pay for any necessaries? [APPELLANT]: I pay for everything. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: And out of what account do you pay for it? [APPELLANT]: Out of the family account. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Does her paycheck go in there? [APPELLANT]: Yes.

With respect to Kelly’s ability to function independently, the following testimony of appellant is noteworthy: [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Do you believe that Kelly would be able to live on her own if it weren’t for you? [APPELLANT]: Kelly wouldn’t be able to have dinner without me. As a matter of fact, I was in your office last week. I came home, because I was with you, and Kelly was hungry. She tried to make crackers and peanut butter, and ⁴⁶⁵ I came into the kitchen and the peanut butter was all over the place, and the crackers were open.

So that was her attempt at making dinner for herself. So I don’t think she could do a whole day. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Do you think that she would be able to live in an apartment building that’s separate from yours? [APPELLANT]: No. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Do you consider her independent? [APPELLANT]: — I see her as having her own bedroom, or really it’s me having my own bedroom. We’re together in her apartment, and then I can go to my bedroom and go to sleep and start again the next day. Although appellant acknowledged that Kelly does not live entirely “on her own,” appellant explained why she believes it is necessary for Kelly to reside in her own apartment.

She explained: “I’m not going to live forever. I feel as though to give Kelly some type of feeling on independence.... [W]e’re always together ... But I wanted [Kelly] to get some feeling of learning some daily living skills, independently, if I’m not around.” Appellant added that, apart from herself, “Kelly has no one.” Kelly obtained her driver’s license in 1998, but does not drive alone and cannot park the car by herself. Appellant switches seats with Kelly to park the car in the garage of their building.

Mr. McCarthy testified that he was almost 53 years old at the time of hearing. He stated that he earned $2,861.60 biweekly. In an oral decision from the bench, the court determined that Kelly “does have [the] means of subsistence,” despite her “mental infirmity.” But, the question remained, said the court, as to “whether she can be self-supporting.” The court ⁴⁶⁶ stated: “So the fact that she has some means of subsistence doesn’t necessarily mean she can be self-supporting, but it doesn’t necessarily mean she can’t be self-supporting.” In analyzing whether Kelly has the capacity to be self-supporting, the court said it must “determine whether [Kelly’s] income is sufficient to cover” her “reasonable expenses.” Moreover, based on F.L. § 13-107, 5 the court said it was required to consider Kelly’s “financial circumstances.” The court clearly wrestled with the notion of reasonable expenses for a developmentally disabled twenty-three year old woman. It said: “I am having a very difficult time dealing ... with the word, ‘Reasonable expenses,’ because while what is being spent isn’t extravagant, it may not be reasonable under these circumstances.” The court observed: [T]his child ... is a real person, a human being, a person who her mother has testified knows she has infirmity but doesn’t want it to be seen, or disclosed, or people to comment.

So she wants to look good when she goes out. She puts make-up on. She wants her hair done. She wants to be like other people, and her mother testified that she — her mother wants her to have her own independence, her own privacy as much as possible.

Nevertheless, the court determined that Kelly lacks the capacity to function independently. It said: The problem is she is suffering from a mental infirmity, and she can’t be independent, and without her mother, based on this evidence, this child, without her mother’s attention to her and care for her, she would not be able to function in any degree yet her mother has arranged for this child to have her own home and an automobile, an automobile she can’t even park, an automobile she can’t drive ⁴⁶⁷ unless her mother is in the car with her, yet her mother has her own car, and her mother has her own home. Because the court determined that Kelly cannot function independently, it concluded that it was not appropriate for Kelly to live in her own apartment. The court said: “[Kelly] is with her mother all the other time, and I respect the fact that her mother has got her own life perhaps and that she wants to be alone, but that is not what this is all about.” Accordingly, the court expressly found it unreasonable for Kelly to live in her own apartment.

The court explained: They are inconsistent with each other, with all due respect. So on the one hand it is terrific that this child can go to work, make her way down on the subway to get to work, do the job that she is given to do, make her way back home, come into her apartment, see her mother there, and — but at the end of the day it seems to me, based on this testimony, that at the end of the day her mother goes back to her place, and Kelly stays in her place. They turn the lights out and they go to sleep, but when ... the next morning comes, her mother is in her apartment, in Kelly’s apartment, wakes her up, gets her ready, feeds her, helps her get dressed, combs her hair, helps her brush her teeth, sends her on her way. Without her mother’s involvement, she just could not function in that way.

So my view is that what is reasonable isn’t what her mother thinks the child should have but really what is reasonable to expect from an adult destitute child who has the ability to earn money but not spend it without somebody’s assistance. In analyzing Kelly’s expenses, the court recognized that Kelly and her mother “live close to the edge. There is no frills [sic] in their lives.... ” In the court’s view, however, “many of the expenses claimed are duplications,” because appellant and Kelly live in separate apartments. The court added: “[Kelly] has signed leases.

She has got a telephone. ⁴⁶⁸ She is legally responsible for all of those affairs, but she has no practical way to fulfill her legal obligations.” The court was also convinced that Kelly “does not need an automobile. She may want to have one, but she doesn’t need one. She can’t, other than being alone at night when she is asleep, she isn’t alone.” It said: [W]ith all due respect, this is not a two car family. I recognize that ... it might be important or — for this child’s self worth or her own dignity; however, it is also clear she doesn’t have a clue about the world, and how it works, and money, and writing a check, and paying bills.

Characterizing Kelly as the “bread winner,” the court seemed to imply that appellant benefits economically from Kelly’s money. Troubled by the mother’s use of a “family account” containing Kelly’s money, the court asserted that appellant has no “legal relationship” to her daughter. Further, it said: [T]his is a terrible way to say it, but the mother and this child have no actual legal relationship other than being mother/child. She is not her guardian.

She is not her legal custodian. The mother has absolutely no right that I know of — I know of no law that permits the mother to commingle this child’s money with her own and then spend it even though she is spending it for items like food, and clothes, other sundries, there is no law that permits the mother to do that. It is clear, while she testifies she isn’t spending the child support — the direct child support Mr. McCarthy is paying, I mean, that is beside the point, the fact is the mother testified that they have a joint account. She calls it a family account.

She describes her and Kelly has [sic] a family and that they are, no one can quarrel with that, but the money has to be kept apart. You can’t just commingle it and use it like that. ⁴⁶⁹ So whatever monies that this child makes and puts into an account has to be accounted for. You cannot just continue to use the money the way it is being used, even though I am not saying it is used for extravagances, it isn’t. In regard to Kelly’s expenses, the court noted that in 1998 Kelly had expenses of about $1,000 per month, which almost matched her net income at that time.

The court determined that Kelly’s current reasonable expenses amount to about $1,500 a month and, due to an increase in earnings, Kelly now has a gross monthly income of $1,902, from which she nets $1,337 per month. After computing Kelly’s monthly expenses, the court subtracted that sum from her net monthly earnings of $1,337, and arrived at a monthly deficit for Kelly in regard to her expenses. The court explained its calculations of Kelly’s monthly expenses as follows: I have considered her reasonable expenses to be $60.00 for a phone, $450.00 for food, $130.00 for a drugstore, $50.00 for supplies, $145.00 for tuition, cable and internet expense is an expense that would be shared with her mother. They live together — a video expense for $50.00.

They — her—what she spends to go on the Metro, a clothing expense of $100.00 a month, incidentals $58.00, and her hair $100.00 a month, so her expenses on a monthly basis are somewhere — I mean, I determine her reasonable expenses to be somewhere around $1400.00 a month for a child in her circumstances. Noticeably absent from the court’s determination of Kelly’s expenses was any housing allowance. Further, the court found that appellee’s income has increased to between $6,200 and $6,500 a month. It also recognized that appellant is disabled and has almost no income. ⁴⁷⁰ With respect to calculating appellee’s support obligation, the court reiterated that it is unreasonable for Kelly to live in her own apartment.

It said: If I applied the strict guidelines to this case it would be either somewhere between $795.00 and $827.00 a month, depending upon the gross income attributed to Mr. McCarthy of either $6200.00 or something a little over $6500.00 with interest. I have looked at the financial statement submitted on behalf of Kelly, and it isn’t clear from the record, but I know she has a two bedroom place, and her mother — excuse me — has a one bedroom place. Her mother even testified that the mother has taken most of her furniture, furnishings, clothing, cooking utensils, and so forth and put them in Kelly’s place because that is where she — that is where she is when Kelly is around. I have got to deal with the reality, and the reality is, well, here I am saying you can’t have two homes, you can’t live in two different places.

There can only be one home. V Í ^ They still have got a lease to pay and they don’t have any money to pay it with____I am going to find that it is not reasonable for this child to have her own place because she needs her mother to be toith her when she is home except when she is doing a puzzle, or except when she is watching a video, or — and she can do that in her own room in her mother’s place. (Emphasis added). Although the court recognized that the Guidelines apply to an adult destitute child, and that appellee’s child support obligation under the Guidelines would amount to about $800 per month, the court reduced appellee’s support obligation to ⁴⁷¹ $150 per month. 6 In regard to its downward deviation from the Guidelines, the court said: [I]t is in the best interest of this child to be able to accomplish as much in her life as she can possibly accomplish as a human being.

Her mother is doing the best the way she knows how to do that, and to — to one extent, she should be applauded for that .. . ... She can do everything for her child that [she] is unable to do for herself, and I don’t mean that in a disrespectful way, but the fact is this child is the bread winner in that family, she clearly is. A ... destitute adult child is the primary person in that family who supplies income into the family, and that is a fragile existence for both the child and the mother, all of which I think is necessary to compartmentalize as it applies to the child support obligation of ... the other parent, if you will, and that is why I believe it is necessary to deviate from the guidelines because I believe it is reasonable for me to determine what are the reasonable expenses of this child, not what the actual expenses are but what are the reasonable expenses, and I have articulated them, and then when adding them up, it comes out pretty close to what the child’s net income is ... I have determined that her reasonable expenses on a monthly basis are about $1500.00 a month....

I have considered the guidelines and what they would be. I have determined that this order varies from the guidelines I have put into the record the reasons why, and it is in the best interest of this child to receive the support that I have ordered because it is in her best interest to continue her lifestyle the way it is. ⁴⁷² Certainly if she didn’t work her father ... might have to pay more child support, but the fact is it is in her best interest to be self-supporting and have her own dignity, and she is. The problem is she is also supporting some of her mother’s expenses, and her mother is making decisions for her-that are not reasonable under these circumstances, that is the car and having her own place and those related expenses. So having said all that, I am going to order that child support be modified to the amount of $150.00 each month.

Now that modification will take effect retroactive to when Mr. McCarthy filed his request for modification ... on July 10, 2002. So I will make this effective August 1, 2002 at the rate of $150.00 a month. So for the reasons that I have said ... it is not [Kelly’s] fault, it is not her father’s fault, it is not even her mother’s fault. Her mother wants what is best for her.

She is trying to make her get out there and be independent, but it is not reasonable under these circumstances. After the court announced its ruling, appellant’s counsel complained about “the denial of allowing Kelly any living expenses as far as her apartment because now she is going ... to have to move in with her mother ... therefore, the mother is going to have to get a two bedroom.” Appellant’s lawyer continued: “I think some of that cost should be attributed to Kelly instead of making it all attributed to the [mother], and some of the — some of the utilities.” Therefore, the mother’s attorney asked the court to reconsider the calculation of Kelly’s expenses to take into account the cost to appellant of having to rent a two-bedroom apartment in order to house Kelly. The following colloquy ensued: [THE COURT]: I don’t agree — I don’t disagree. I think it is — it is necessary under these circumstances if nothing else changes that this child will be taken care of on a day-to ⁴⁷³ day, minute-by-minute basis by her mother, and they have to live together, and— [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: But what I am saying is that it appeared when you did the calculations that you are not adding anything— [THE COURT]: I don’t know what to add.

I saw her mother’s [apartment] is $122.00. Now, I know that is a one-bedroom— [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Right. [THE COURT]: — but I don’t know if that is based on her income or not. There is no evidence of that. Her income is less, so maybe she pays less.

Kelly’s income is more, maybe she pays more. If they both live together and the lease is under the mother’s name, maybe it is less. I don’t know what the figure would be, but it is a figure. There is going to be a different number, there is no doubt about that.

I hope you all can figure that out. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: ... [B]ut what I am saying is that we have already got an entry for a two-bedroom is 469. So if you are effectively forcing Bonnie to — and Kelly to live together, but then you are saying, well, [appellant] has to incur the entire cost of a two-bedroom without any contribution from the father, there should be some kind of contribution — Kelly has to live somewhere, and there should be some kind of contribution from him toward the apartment— [THE COURT]: The child’s income should be apportioned to her reasonable expenses, and that shouldn’t include any of her mother’s expenses. If her mother makes from Social Security $540.00 a month that is the extent upon which her mother can rely. ⁴⁷⁴ She can’t rely on any of Kelly’s money to contribute to any of her expenses, she cannot. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: I am not asking her to do that, what I am saying is that there is going to be a two-bedroom apartment that Kelly is going to be living in with her mother, and you are effectively — I mean, it is not like we are saying Kelly has to move in with Mr. McCarthy. I mean, Kelly will be living there, and part of that apartment expense is — is technically apportioned to Kelly.

I am not saying for him to pay anything towards Bonnie, but I just think when you are looking at Kelly’s living expenses, I am just asking Your Honor to reconsider and consider putting in a portion for her actual living somewhere. [THE COURT]: How much? [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Half of the 469. [THE COURT]: I don’t know, but shouldn’t it based on what it really is? [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: It is 469. She has a two-bedroom right now at the Grand, that is how much it is. [THE COURT]: Ma'am, I don’t know if it is going to be cut in half or not, maybe it will be less than that. Maybe it will be more than that because there is two people living there. I — I don’t want her to be put out on the street or have some other place to live, I want her to have ... a safe, comfortable place to live. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Would Your Honor take additional testimony on the amount of what it would be for a two bedroom because my client says it will be the same amount if they are living together. [APPELLANT]: When we were living together, it was the same.

We wouldn’t be able to live at the Grand. We wouldn’t be able to get a place together. [THE COURT]: You know, I don’t mean this disrespectful [sic], but you come in here like I am the only person who can deal with these problems. These are real problems in ⁴⁷⁵ these people’s lives and this little baby who can’t take care of himself. This has to — I mean, shouldn’t I have some evidence other than what your client tells me it is going to be? [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Well, you have got the evidence of what a two bedroom is right now, 469. [THE COURT]: Yes. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: Even if you don’t half it, there is still going to be some cost attributed to Kelly, even if it is not half of 469, even if it is a third of 469, there is still some cost that is attributable to Kelly. [THE COURT]: Well, I don’t know that the mother can’t go to the child’s place and sign the lease that the child’s place is — and for less money.

I don’t know how that all works. Somebody has to tell me how that works because it might be because of her disability she qualifies as the primary tenant that the child can live with. I mean, maybe that is how it works. I don’t want to foreclose that, but I just can’t make a guess....

I just can’t guess.... [THE COURT]: — and I am not going to. [APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY]: It is just what you are then effectively saying is that her living expenses are zero to live in an apartment? [THE COURT]: No. I am not saying that, I said it wasn’t reasonable for her to have her own place.... 1 have ruled.... (Boldface and italics added). DISCUSSION I. Appellant complains that appellee “seeks to relitigate exactly the same two points of law” that were resolved by this Court in McCarthy I. Relying on the doctrine of “law of the case” and principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, ⁴⁷⁶ appellant urges this Court to uphold the conclusions announced in McCarthy I, in which this Court recognized that: 1) the support of a destitute adult child is “on equal footing” with the support of a minor child, and 2) the child support guidelines, F.L. § 12-202, apply in calculating support for an adult destitute children. ' Appellee vigorously argues that the law of the case doctrine does not apply here, because the case sub judice does not involve “further proceedings in the same matter.” To the contrary, appellee asserts that the litigation in McCarthy I “concluded when this Court vacated the prior decision” and, upon remand, there was no further appeal from the entry of a final judgment. He argues: “The law of the case doctrine does not apply to this appeal because the decision in McCarthy I was not rendered in the same case.

The present appeal is based on a new factual record and is not simply a continuation of the prior matter.” Even if the law of the case doctrine applies generally, appellee contends that it is not a rigid concept. He asserts: “The doctrine [of law of the case] was not created to prevent an appellate court from reexamining a prior decision in another case when presented with a new record containing different facts.” Claiming that McCarthy I erroneously concluded that the Guidelines apply to a case involving a destitute adult child, appellee also insists that this Court has “the power” to “disregard or correct its former decision.... ” Kline v. Kline, 93 Md.App. 696, 700 , 614 A.2d 984 (1992). For these reasons, appellee urges us “to revisit” our unreported decision in McCarthy I, which “held that application of the child support guidelines is mandatory in determining the amount of child support to be awarded to a destitute adult child.” Preliminarily, we are satisfied that, in the context of this case, the child support modification proceedings at issue constituted a continuation of the previous child support proceedings. Although new evidence was necessarily presented at the modification hearing, we disagree with appellee’s suggestion ⁴⁷⁷ that the case sub judice must be analyzed as if it were entirely distinct from McCarthy I. We explain.

In the circuit court, both parties sought to show a substantial change in circumstances as a basis to support their respective motions to modify the existing support order. Each relied on F.L. § 12-104. Under F.L. § 12-104(a), a court has discretion to modify a child support award, provided that there has been “a ‘material’ change in circumstances, needs, and pecuniary condition of the parties from the time the court last had an opportunity to consider the issue.” Kierein v. Kierein, 115 Md.App. 448, 456 , 693 A.2d 1157 (1997) (citation omitted); see Wills v. Jones, 340 Md. 480, 489 , 667 A.2d 331 (1995); Unkle v. Unkle, 305 Md. 587, 597 , 505 A.2d 849 (1986); Petitto v. Petitto, 147 Md.App. 280, 306 , 808 A.2d 809 (2002). The burden of proving a material change in circumstance is on the person seeking the modification.

See Haught v. Grieashamer, 64 Md.App. 605, 611 , 497 A.2d 1182 (1985). A change is “material” when it meets two requirements. First, it must be “relevant to the level of support a child is actually receiving or entitled to receive.” Wills, 340 Md. at 488 , 667 A.2d 331 . Second, the change must be “of a sufficient magnitude to justify judicial modification of the support order.” Id. at 489 , 667 A.2d 331 (citation omitted); see Wagner v. Wagner, 109 Md.App. 1, 43 , 674 A.2d 1 , cert. denied, 343 Md. 334 , 681 A.2d 69 (1996).

Thus, the court must focus upon “the alleged changes in income or support ” that occurred after the child support award was issued. Wills, 340 Md. at 489 , 667 A.2d 331 (emphasis added). Wills makes clear that “the passage of some event causing the level of support a child actually receives to diminish or increase” is relevant and material. Id. at 488 n. 1, 667 A.2d 331 .

A change “that affects the income pool used to calculate the support obligations upon which a child support award was based” is also relevant. Id. Therefore, to meet the criteria for modification, the court below had to consider the circumstances that were in effect when the challenged support order was issued, as well as any ⁴⁷⁸ new evidence on which the parties relied to justify the modification. In the context of a child support modification proceeding, however, such new evidence does not transform the matter into an entirely new case.

See F.L. § 12-202 (providing that the Guidelines apply in child support modification proceedings); Drummond v. Drummond, 350 Md. 502, 508 , 714 A.2d 163 (1998); Smith v. Freeman, 149 Md.App. 1, 21 , 814 A.2d 65 (2002); Dunlap v. Fiorenza, 128 Md.App. 357, 363 , 738 A.2d 312 (1999), cert. denied, 357 Md. 191 , 742 A.2d 520 (1999). It is also noteworthy that the parties did not file a new case in seeking modification. Rather, their modification motions were filed in an existing case, Equity Case No. 72150, which was opened in 1980 when the divorce litigation commenced. And, as we noted, the trial court’s ruling, which is at issue on appeal, is captioned “Modification Order.” If that order did not pertain to the continuation of an existing matter, there would have been nothing for the court to “modify.” In this light, the current battle is a continuation of the parties’ ongoing war concerning child support.

To conclude otherwise is to ignore the elements of a child support modification proceeding. Because the modification proceeding was a continuation of prior litigation between the parties with respect to child support for Kelly, we next consider the parties’ conflicting claims regarding the law of the case doctrine. In Maryland, “once a decision is established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case it continues to be the law of the case.” Kline v. Kline, 93 Md.App. at 700 , 614 A.2d 984 ; see Hagez v. State, 131 Md. App. 402, 418 , 749 A.2d 206 (2000); People’s Counsel v. Prosser Co., 119 Md.App. 150, 176 , 704 A.2d 483 , cert. denied, 349 Md. 494 , 709 A.2d 139 (1998). In general, the law of the case doctrine “prevents trial courts from dismissing appellate judgment and relitigating matters already resolved by the appellate court.” Stokes v. American Airlines, Inc., 142 Md.App. 440, 446 , 790 A.2d 699 (2002), cert. denied, 369 Md. 179 , ⁴⁷⁹ 798 A.2d 552 (2002).

The doctrine also applies when we revisit a prior decision of this Court involving the same parties and the same claim. Id,.; see also Turner v. Housing Authority, 364 Md. 24, 31-32 , 770 A.2d 671 (2001); Korotki v. Springer, 218 Md. 191, 193-194 , 145 A.2d 767 (1958); Hawes v. Liberty Homes, Inc., 100 Md.App. 222, 230 , 640 A.2d 743 (1994). Therefore, when an appellate court “answered a question of law in a given case, the issue is [usually] settled for all future proceedings.” Stokes, 142 Md.App. at 446 , 790 A.2d 699 . Nevertheless, as appellee correctly observes, the doctrine is not “an inflexible rule of law.” Stokes, 142 Md.App. at 446 , 790 A.2d 699 .

Rather, “it is a judicial creation.... ” Id. The Court of Appeals explained in Goldstein & Baron Chtd. v. Chesley, 375 Md. 244, 253 , 825 A.2d 985 (2003): [T]he “law of the case” doctrine is one of appellate procedure and convenience rather than an inflexible rule of law, such as claim or issue preclusion, and ... although an appellate decision certainly binds lower courts, the appellate court that rendered the decision is not precluded from reconsidering an issue it previously decided, even in the same case, when exceptional circumstances so warrant. The thrust of Hawes [v. Liberty Homes, 100 Md.App. 222 , 640 A.2d 743 , cert. denied, 336 Md. 300 , 648 A.2d 203 (1994) ] was that decisions rendered by a prior appellate panel of the Court of Special Appeals will generally govern in a second