Coryea Dominique Webster v. State

KENNEY, J. Appellant, Coryea Dominique Webster, was charged in the Circuit Court for Frederick County with possession with intent to distribute cocaine, possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, possession of MDMA, possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of a rifle by a person with a disqualifying offense, possession of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense, and allowing a minor access to a firearm. 1 Tried by a jury and convicted on all counts, appellant was sentenced to twenty years for possession with intent to distribute cocaine; a consecutive twenty years, with all but five years suspended, for possession of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense; a consecutive fifteen years, all suspended, for illegal possession of a rifle; a consecutive four years, all suspended for possession of BZP; and, a consecutive one year, all suspended, for possession of marijuana. Appellant timely appealed and presents the following questions for our review: 1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it permitted the State to introduce into evidence a notebook, when its probative value was outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice? 2. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when it permitted an officer to testify that Mr. Webster’s nickname was “Yeah-0” and that “Yeah-O” means cocaine in Spanish? 3.

Did the trial court err when it permitted the State, over objection, to amend Count 5 of the indictment from possession of MDMA to possession of BZP? ¹⁰⁶ 4. Was the sentence imposed for possession of marijuana illegal? 5. Must Mr. Webster’s sentences for possession of a riñe by a person with a disqualifying conviction and possession of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense be merged, where they were based on the possession of a single firearm? For the following reasons, we shall reverse appellant’s conviction for possession of BZP.

We also shall vacate appellant’s sentence for possession of marijuana and remand for resentencing on that count. Otherwise, the judgments shall be affirmed. BACKGROUND At approximately 2:30 p.m. on April 27, 2012, members of the Maryland State Police responded to an address in Frederick as a result of appellant’s failure to appear in court. After knocking on the apartment door and receiving no response, the police obtained a key for the apartment, made entry, and discovered appellant back in the rear bedroom with his two-year-old child.

At no point during the entry did appellant make his presence known to the police. When they made entry into the apartment, police recovered a loaded rifle inside a closet near the front door of the residence. After securing that weapon, the police then obtained a search warrant. Police then recovered ammunition, drugs, and drug paraphernalia throughout the apartment.

Trooper First Class Jason Stevens, of the Maryland State Police, offered further details during trial. The rifle recovered from the closet was a Hi-Point nine millimeter semiautomatic rifle. Recovered from the medicine cabinet in the bathroom were 28 small bags of suspected cocaine, a small amount of marijuana, and a suspected half pill of Ecstasy. A razor blade and a digital scale with suspected cocaine residue were recovered from a dresser in the bedroom.

In the kitchen, police recovered hundreds of baggies that the trooper testified were consistent with packaging materials for con ¹⁰⁷ trolled dangerous substances. Hundreds of rounds of ammunition were recovered from two plastic bags found underneath a television in the apartment. In addition, a Frederick County Detention Center identification card with appellant’s picture was located on a nearby nightstand in the bedroom, as were two notebooks. 2 Trooper Stevens testified, without objection, that one of the notebooks contained a list labeled “fiens,” 3 and that, “[a] fiend is a drug addict and many times people involved in distribution of controlled dangerous substances will use a fiend to drive them around to pick up packages and normally the fiend is paid either through cash, or, um, more commonly in drugs.” As for the items recovered from the medicine cabinet, the parties stipulated that: the tablet was .2 grams of benzylpiperazine (BZP), a schedule one drug; the plant material was .5 grams of marijuana; and, the total gross weight of the 28 bags of cocaine was 9.1 grams. Senior Trooper Austin Fogle, who was accepted as an expert, testified that the cocaine recovered from the apartment was consistent with possession with the intent to distribute.

The parties also stipulated that the rifle was an operable nine-millimeter Luger caliber Hi-Point semiautomatic rifle, and that appellant had two prior convictions of second-degree assault which prohibited him from possessing a rifle. After the State rested, the defense called Kathleen Bedel, who resided at the apartment in question. She confirmed that appellant had stayed with her the week before the arrest, but not the day before. On April 27, 2012, she called appellant early in the morning and asked him to babysit their son.

Bedel was unaware of any cocaine being in her apartment and of the rifle in the closet. She testified that appellant’s older brother sometimes stayed in her apartment. He, however, ¹⁰⁸ had moved out of the apartment about a month prior to this incident. She also testified that the lock to her apartment was broken and, on three prior occasions, she had found evidence indicating that someone had been in her apartment.

According to Bedel, her apartment door could be opened with a credit card and appellant knew he could access her residence in that manner. She confirmed that, at times, appellant slept over with her in the master bedroom and that he kept clothing at the apartment. Appellant testified on his own behalf that he was in the apartment at the time the police arrived, but he claimed that he did not have any knowledge of the contraband recovered from the apartment. He also denied that his nickname was Yeah-0 and that the notebook admitted into evidence belonged to him.

He did agree that boxer shorts found in the master bedroom most likely belonged to him. He kept clothes in the apartment and had been in an “on and off’ relationship with Bedel for three years. He also testified that he had been unemployed for the last year and did not have any fixed address. We shall include additional detail in the following discussion.

DISCUSSION I. Appellant first contends the court erred in admitting a notebook because its probative value was greatly outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. The State responds that the grounds asserted on appeal are different from those that were raised at trial and that the argument is without merit in any event. We agree with the State. Prior to trial, the court granted a motion in limine to preclude any testimony concerning gang-related activity after defense counsel noted that one of the two notebooks recovered mentioned rules for the East Side Bounty Hunters, a subset of the Bloods gang.

Thereafter, when Trooper Stevens was asked about the contents of the notebooks, the court sustained ¹⁰⁹ an objection when the officer replied that there were rules for that gang in one of the notebooks. Subsequently, the State offered to admit the other notebook, identified as State’s Exhibit 9 at trial. Defense counsel objected on the grounds that “[i]t has a lot of gang stuff.” The court reviewed the notebook being proffered and the following ensued: THE COURT: It, it almost looks like rap poems to me. Obviously there’s some pictures and some drawings. [PROSECUTOR]: Mmm-hmm.

There’s testimony— THE COURT: There’s a picture of a gun. [PROSECUTOR]: There’s— THE COURT: Like a drawing of a gun. Some drawings. Face with a — there’s a gun, there’s a face with a tongue sticking out. (Unclear — one word) ...

(unclear — one word), looks like a grocery list. [PROSECUTOR]: Mmm-hmm. THE COURT: Wipes, bottle, milk, (unclear — one word) cups, (unclear — one word) drinks. Katie, emails, another picture of a gun and a face, an address, (unclear — one word), some math, one gram plus one gram. Some more math.

Pictures. Looks like another, phone numbers, another picture of a gun, picture of a shirt, and I don’t know, some pictures of some writing with some flames coming out of it. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And there’s a, there’s a second one and I just, and these are the copies they gave me, but— THE COURT: Well, this is the one, what’s this marked? Has it got a sticker on it— [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Nine— [PROSECUTOR]: This is nine— [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s nine. THE COURT: Are you objecting to nine? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes because I think the books may contain information or, or the witness may speculate that and interpret some of the information as being gang-related, or something like that. ¹¹⁰ [PROSECUTOR]: Actually the purpose of this book is for drug-related activity.

Your Honor pointed out the grams. THE COURT: Yeah. [PROSECUTOR]: The word fiends was also in there— THE COURT: Yes, I did see— [PROSECUTOR]: — which was testified to previously— THE COURT: Yeah. [PROSECUTOR]: The list with the names and the phone numbers. THE COURT: Right. [PROSECUTOR]: This is the evidence of that. I believe this is— THE COURT: Okay, I— [PROSE CUTOR]: — extremely probative.

(Emphasis added). The court then overruled the objection to State’s Exhibit 9 as follows: THE COURT: I, um, I’ve reviewed Exhibit Number 9 and stated for the record some of the things that I was seeing in it. I do believe it is relevant as to drug activity and I don’t see anything that to this Court, this looks like some poems and luminati [sic], some poems and things and rap type poems and pictures, phone numbers, grocery list, emails. Nothing to this Court that is overtly gang-related.

Nevertheless I don’t think the, there’s anything about any prejudicial information in here. There’s fiends under a bunch of phone and then above phone numbers, several, looks like seven— [PROSECUTOR]: Appear to be phone numbers— THE COURT: — phone numbers. So I don’t find that prejudicial value outweighs the probative value. I’m overruling the objection, allow you— [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay, thank you, Your Hon- or— ¹¹¹ THE COURT: — to submit it.

You’re welcome — 4 Maryland Rule 8-131 (a) provides, in pertinent part: Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but the Court may decide such an issue if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal. The purposes of Rule 8-131 are: “(a) to require counsel to bring the position of their client to the attention of the lower court at the trial so that the trial court can pass upon, and possibly correct any errors in the proceedings, and (b) to prevent the trial of cases in a piecemeal fashion, thus accelerating the termination of litigation.” Fitzgerald v. State, 384 Md. 484, 505 , 864 A.2d 1006 (2004) (quoting County Council v. Offen, 334 Md. 499, 509 , 639 A.2d 1070 (1994)); accord Robinson v. State, 404 Md. 208, 216-17 , 946 A.2d 456 (2008). Moreover, “[w]here a party asserts specific grounds for an objection, all other grounds not specified by the party are waived.” Thomas v. State, 183 Md.App. 152, 177 , 960 A.2d 666 (2008) (citing Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 541 , 735 A.2d 1061 (1999)); Ayala v. State, 174 Md.App. 647, 665 , 923 A.2d 952 (2007) (“It is well-settled that when specific grounds are given at trial for an objection, the party objecting will be held to those grounds and ordinarily waives any grounds not specified that are later raised on appeal.”) (quotation and citation omitted); see also Gutierrez v. State, 423 Md. 476, 488 , 32 A.3d 2 (2011) (reiterating that “when an objector sets forth the specific grounds for his objection ... the objector will be bound by those grounds and will ordinarily be deemed to have ¹¹² waived other grounds not specified”) (quotation and citation omitted). Our review of the record in this case persuades us that appellant’s objection was to any “gang-related” evidence that may have been admitted, either through one of the notebooks or the testimony of Trooper Stevens.

It was this concern that informed the trial court’s analysis. We are unable to conclude, as appellant now asks us to do, that defense counsel’s addition, “or something like that,” raised additional, unstated grounds beyond the explicit concern about gang evidence. Therefore, this issue was not properly preserved. But, even if preserved, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the notebook identified as State’s Exhibit 9.

This Court has stated: “A ruling on the admissibility of evidence ordinarily is within the trial court’s discretion. Blair v. State, 130 Md. App. 571, 592 [ 747 A.2d 702 ] (2000). This Court generally reviews such rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v. Simms, 420 Md. 705, 724-25 [ 25 A.3d 144 ] (2011). “An abuse of discretion occurs ‘where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court,’ or when the court acts ‘without reference to any guiding rules or principles.’ ” Brass Metal Prods, v. E-J Enters., 189 Md. App. 310, 364 [ 984 A.2d 361 ] (2009) (quoting King v. State, 407 Md. 682, 697 [ 967 A.2d 790 ] (2009)).

Hajireen v. State, 203 Md.App. 537, 552 , 39 A.3d 105 (2012) (internal parallel citations omitted); see also Gordon v. State, 431 Md. 527, 533 , 66 A.3d 647 (2013) (“[Ordinarily a trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (citing Hopkins v. State, 352 Md. 146, 158 , 721 A.2d 231 (1998))). Maryland Rule 5 — 401 provides that: “Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to ¹¹³ the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Further: “Relevant evidence” is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Md. Rule 5-401; accord Snyder v. State, 361 Md. 580, 591 [ 762 A.2d 125 ] (2000). In addition, evidence, even if relevant, “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Md. Rule 5-403. “[T]he admission of evidence is committed to the considerable discretion of the trial court.” Sifrit v. State, 383 Md. 116, 128 [ 857 A.2d 88 ] (2004) (citing Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 405 [ 697 A.2d 432 ] (1997)). “The discretion necessarily entrusted to the umpire on the field embraces, by definition, a range of rational decisions.

Within that range a trial judge may freely rule in either direction without fear of being overturned.” Tate v. State, 176 Md.App. 365, 408 [ 933 A.2d 447 ] (2007), vacated on other grounds, 405 Md. 106 [ 950 A.2d 100 ] (2008). Allen v. State, 192 Md.App. 625, 651-652 , 995 A.2d 1013 (2010) (internal parallel citations omitted). But, even relevant evidence may be excluded: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Maryland Rule 5-403; see Decker v. State, 408 Md. 631, 640 , 971 A.2d 268 (2009) (“Relevant evidence may be excluded, however, if it is unfairly prejudicial, confusing to the fact finder, or a waste of time.”); see also Tipton v. State, 39 Md.App. 578, 585 , 387 A.2d 628 (1978) (even if relevant, trial judge should weigh factors going to probative value, such as likelihood jury may be aroused by emotion or otherwise ¹¹⁴ distracted; that evidence will consume an undue amount of time; and the danger of unfair surprise).

On appeal, appellant identifies four areas of particular concern from the admission of the notebook: (1) the word “gram” and a heading labeled “fiens;” (2) drawings of guns; (3) rap poems containing violent references and provocative language; and, (4) one passage suggesting prior contact with law enforcement. As for appellant’s concern about the word “fiens,” it appears that was waived because, as set forth in our background discussion, Trooper Stevens testified, without objection, to the meaning of fiends in the context of drug distribution. See Yates v. State, 429 Md. 112, 120-21 , 55 A.3d 25 (2012) (“Where competent evidence of a matter is received, no prejudice is sustained where other objected to evidence of the same matter is also received.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also DeLeon v. State, 407 Md. 16, 30-31 , 962 A.2d 383 (2008) (holding that a defendant waived an objection to what he claimed was not relevant and also highly prejudicial testimony about his purported gang affiliation because “evidence on the same point [was] admitted without objection” elsewhere at trial). As for appellant’s remaining contentions, we are not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion.

Certainly, no objection or argument was raised that the notebook contained inadmissible other crimes evidence, as appellant now asserts on appeal. And, we are not persuaded that the probative value of the drawings of guns, the calculation of grams, and the listing of “fiens” was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice given the relevance of such evidence to the issues before the jury. As to the drawings, it has been often stated, “[t]here can be no serious dispute that there is an intimate relationship between violence and drugs.” Marks v. Criminal Compensation, 196 Md.App. 37, 70 , 7 A.3d 665 (2010); see also Burns v. State, 149 Md.App. 526, 542 , 817 A.2d 885 (2003) (“The intimate connection between guns and narcotics is notorious”); Whiting v. State, 125 Md.App. 404, 417 , 725 A.2d 623 (1999) (“we have acknowledged a nexus between drug distribution and guns”); Banks v. State, 84 ¹¹⁵ Md.App. 582, 591, 581 A.2d 489 (1990) (“[p]ossession and indeed, use, of weapons, most notably, firearms, is commonly associated with the drug culture”). The trial court neither erred nor abused its discretion in admitting the notebook into evidence.

II

Appellant next asserts the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his alleged nickname because that evidence amounted to inadmissible hearsay and improper propensity evidence. The State responds that, to the extent preserved, the trial court properly exercised its discretion. Prior to jury selection, appellant moved in limine to prevent Trooper Stevens from testifying that appellant’s nickname was a slang Spanish word for cocaine. The court denied the motion, noting that it would consider objections to that effect during trial.

Thereafter, during Trooper Stevens’ testimony about the seizure of evidence from appellant’s apartment, the following ensued: There were also two notebooks which were located. The notebooks had information, ah, they, they had the name Yeah-O, which I know to be a nickname for Mr. Webster. Yeah-0 is a slang term for cocaine. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Ob, objection, Your Honor, it’s ... non-responsive. THE COURT: All right.

Sustain. Strike. Ask you to continue. Please strike that.

BY [PROSECUTOR]: Q. So you said you found a book that had the name Yeah-0 in it? Is that correct? A. Yes sir. Two books.

Q. Okay. And you said Yeah-O’s a name you know as who? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. THE COURT: Overrule. ¹¹⁶ THE WITNESS: Um, Coryea Webster’s known as Yeah-0 on the street. BY [PROSECUTOR]: Q. Okay.

And you said you know that word to mean what? A. Cocaine. Appellant’s primary argument is that the evidence that his nickname was “Yeah-O” amounted to inadmissible hearsay. 5 Under the Maryland Rules, hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Md. Rule 5-801(c). A “statement” is “(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.” Md. Rule 5-801(a).

A “declarant” is “a person who makes a statement.” Md. Rule 5-801(b). Further, “[except as otherwise provided by these rules or permitted by applicable constitutional provisions or statutes, hearsay is not admissible.” Md. Rule 5-802. “Thus, a circuit court has no discretion to admit hearsay in the absence of a provision providing for its admissibility. Whether evidence is hearsay is an issue of law reviewed de novo.” Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 8 , 887 A.2d 602 (2005); accord Thomas v. State, 429 Md. 85, 98 , 55 A.3d 10 (2012). Courts generally begin by identifying the proposition that the evidence was offered to prove.

See Bernadyn, 390 Md. at 10 , 887 A.2d 602 (“We therefore begin our inquiry by identifying the proposition that the medical bill was offered to prove.”) (citation omitted); Murphy, Maryland Evidence Handbook § 702, at 305 (4th ed. 2010) (“When an out-of-court statement is offered in evidence, the trial judge must first determine why it is being offered”). ¹¹⁷ In this case, the State sought to establish that the notebook admitted into evidence, State’s Exhibit 9, was circumstantially linked to appellant because the front cover of the notebook lists the name “Ya Yo,” and the testimony of Trooper Stevens was that appellant was known by the similar nickname “Yeah-0.” Appellant contends his nickname qualified as hearsay. Many authorities suggest that is not the case. Professor Wigmore explains: A person’s name is the title by which he himself and others habitually call him. To know a person’s name, therefore, is to have heard him so called by himself and by others.

In strictness, such an utterance is not hearsay, except where it is made as an assertion of fact. But, though it may be hearsay, as a source of information, yet is universally relied upon as a source of knowledge. Courts have commonly accepted the testimony founded upon it. 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 667a, at 928 (Chadbourne rev.1979) (emphasis in original). Further: One virtually always learns a name — even one’s own — by being told what it is.

See United States v. May, 622 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 984 , 101 S.Ct. 402 , 66 L.Ed.2d 247 (1980). Nevertheless, evidence as to names is commonly regarded as either not hearsay because it is not introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, ..., or so imbued with reliability because of the name’s common usage as to make any objection frivolous. U.S. v. Allen, 960 F.2d 1055, 1059 (D.C.Cir.1992) (some internal citations omitted); see also State v. Shields, 619 S.W.2d 937, 940 (Mo.Ct.App.1981) (“Evidence of the name by which a person is known is not within the rule excluding hearsay evidence.”); State v. Barnett, 41 N.C.App. 171 , 254 S.E.2d 199, 201 (1979) (“The name a person is called is a fact, and in this case the witness was testifying to such a fact within his own knowledge”); State v. Johnson, 13 A.3d 1064, 1066 (R.I.2011) (“[A] multitude of courts have held that evidence about a person’s nickname, in this context, does not constitute hearsay ¹¹⁸ because the use of such a name does not rise to the level of an assertion”); State v. Feyereisen, 345 N.W.2d 58, 60 (S.D.1984) (“[T]here is substantial authority that evidence of a name by which a person is known is not within the rule excluding hearsay evidence.”). Under the circumstances in this case, Trooper Stevens’ testimony regarding a notebook with a particular nickname on it that was found in the apartment was not offered as circumstantial evidence of appellant’s involvement in the drug trade.

Neither his on and off again presence in the apartment nor his actual presence when the police arrived was an issue. As to the nickname that tied appellant to the notebook being hearsay, the Ninth Circuit has recognized: We do not think that the name is hearsay. In a sense, it is. We can know a person’s name only by being told, either by the person or someone else, unless, of course, we happen to have christened the person.

But a name, however learned, is not really testimonial. Rather, it is a bit of circumstantial evidence. May, 622 F.2d at 1007 ; see also U.S. v. Weeks, 919 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir.1990) (holding that witness’s testimony about a person’s nickname reported non-assertive oral conduct and was not hearsay); U.S. v. Day, 591 F.2d 861, 884-85 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (concluding that note bearing defendant’s name found on coconspirator is nonhearsay) (collecting similar cases); U.S. v. Snow, 517 F.2d 441, 443-44 (9th Cir.1975) (holding that a name tag bearing defendant’s name affixed to machine gun case treated as circumstantial evidence only and nonhearsay). We recognize that an important part of appellant’s argument is that the State also used Trooper Stevens’ testimony to suggest that appellant’s nickname was slang for “cocaine.” In other words, appellant’s contention is that the State sought to have the evidence admitted for the truth of the matter asserted.

However, appellant’s only objection to that testimony at trial was that the testimony was non-responsive. And, as appellant concedes, he waived any objection to this evidence by not objecting when Trooper Stevens testified a ¹¹⁹ second time that Yeah-0 was slang for cocaine. As the Court of Appeals has reaffirmed, “|o]b,jections are waived if, at another point during the trial, evidence on the same point is admitted "without objection.” DeLeon, 407 Md. at 31 , 962 A.2d 383 (citing Peisner v. State, 236 Md. 137, 145-46 , 202 A.2d 585 (1964)); see also Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 545 , 735 A.2d 1061 (1999) (“This also requires the party opposing the admission of evidence to object each time the evidence is proffered by its proponent”). Thus, the only issue properly before this Court is whether Trooper Stevens’ testimony about the presence of appellant’s alleged nickname on the notebook amounted to hearsay, and we conclude that there was no error when the trial court overruled the objection and admitted the evidence at issue.

Moreover, we are persuaded that if there was any error it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Bellamy v. State, 403 Md. 308, 332 , 941 A.2d 1107 (2008) (“Once it has been determined that error was committed, reversal is required unless the error did not influence the verdict; the error is harmless only if it did not play any role in the jury’s verdict.”) (quotation and citation omitted). As indicated, the State was offering appellant’s nickname and its alleged meaning as circumstantial evidence connecting appellant to other evidence recovered in the apartment. And yet, that evidence, i.e., appellant’s purported nickname on a notebook found there, was cumulative to other evidence establishing appellant’s relationship to the apartment and its contents.

See Dove v. State, 415 Md. 727, 743-44 , 4 A.3d 976 (2010) (“In considering whether an error was harmless, we also consider whether the evidence presented in error was cumulative evidence. Evidence is cumulative when, beyond a reasonable doubt, we are convinced that there was sufficient evidence, independent of the [evidence] complained of, to support the appellant[’s] conviction[ ].”) (quotation and citation omitted). Other evidence tying appellant to the apartment included Trooper Stevens’ testimony that he was familiar with appellant and had spoken with him on prior occasions. He also knew appellant’s address, and that appellant lived at that ¹²⁰ location with his child and the mother of his child.

There was also Bedel’s testimony confirming that appellant had stayed in her apartment, specifically sleeping over in the master bedroom and keeping clothes there, and that she had invited him over on the day in question to babysit their two-year-old son. Moreover, in addition to the direct evidence that appellant was present in the apartment when the police arrived, a Frederick County Detention Center identification card with appellant’s picture was located on the nightstand in the bedroom, and appellant admitted that he stayed there on occasion and kept clothes in the apartment. Accordingly, there was other evidence beyond the notebook that demonstrated a strong connection between appellant and the apartment. And, to the extent that appellant’s defense was that he just