County Board of Education v. Cearfoss

Frner, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In the three cases, argued together, which are now to be determined, a highly important question is presented. It concerns the contractual rights of the appellees as teachers, and the' authority of the administrative boards and officials as affecting such rights, under the laws of Maryland relating to public education. The question is raised in each of the cases by demurrer to the declaration, which, in the first case, alleges, in effect, that the plaintiff was the holder, since July 1st, 1921, of an elementary school teacher’s certificate of the second grade, issued by the State Superintendent of Schools, and that on ¹⁸¹ the (lute mentioned she entered into the employ of the defendant County Board of Education of Washington County for an undetermined number of years, at a salary of $1,050 per annum, under a contract which stipulated that the plaintiff was to be employed to teach in the public schools of the county, “subject to assignment by the County Superintendent or transfer to some other teaching position within the county, provided that if the transfer be made during the school year or after the opening of school for any year, the salary shall not be reduced for the remainder of the year,” the salary to be fixed by the county board of education and to be not less than the minimum salary specified by law.

The alleged contract contained further provisions as follows: “And it is further agreed that the said teacher will not vacate the position to which assigned during any school year, except in case of emergency, of which the County Board of Education shall judge. “And it is further agreed that either of the parties to this contract may terminate it at the end of the first or second school year by giving thirty days’ notice in writing to the other during the month of June or July. . - “And it is further agreed that if the teacher named herein wishes to vacate his or her position after the second year, thirty days’ notice in writing shall be given tlie County Board of Education during the month of June or July, except in case of emergency, of which the County Board of Education shall judge. “If any of the conditions of this contract shall be violated by the teacher named herein, salary already accrued will he forfeited in the discretion of the County Board of Education. “This contract shall continue from year to year, subject to the foregoing conditions, provided that if the teacher, on recommendation of the County Superintendent, is suspended by the County Board of Education in accordance with the provisions of section 86 of article 77 of the Annolated Code of Maryland, said teacher shall have the right to appeal to the State ¹⁸² Superintendent of Schools, if the decision of said Board is not unanimous. “This contract is made in accordance with the provisions of the school law, and is subject to sections 83 and-86 of article 77 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, chapter 506, of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1916, and any amendments thereto, and will be filed among the records of the County Board of Education.” After reciting the contract which we have quoted', the declaration proceeds: “And on the said day the plaintiff entered the employ of the said defendant in the capacity of school teacher and continued in such employ of the said defendant in the capacity aforesaid, and on the terms aforesaid, until on or about the 30th day of June, A. D. 1930. And although the said plaintiff was on the day and year last mentioned, and has always been ready and willing and then and there offered to remain and continue in the employ of the said defendant in the capacity aforesaid, and on the terms aforesaid, for the remainder of said term, to-wit, until the term of her employment was terminated, and the said defendant during the term aforesaid, to-wit, on or about the 30th day of June, A. D. 1930, disregarding the terms and conditions of the contract aforesaid refused to suffer the said plaintiff to continue in its, the said defendant’s, said employ although the plaintiff did not have any notice of any written recommendation of the County Superintendent of Washington County, recommending her suspension or dismissal for immorality, misconduct in office, insubordination, ineompetency, or willful neglect of duty, and that she, the plaintiff, was not given any opportunity to be heard by the said Board of Education upon any charge made against her for immorality, misconduct in office, insubordination, incompetency, or willful neglect of duty. And the plaintiff was not given any opportunity to be heard in her defense to a recommendation of the defendant ¹⁸³ to the State Superintendent of Schools recommending the revocation of the said certificate of the said plaintiff. Nor did the State Superintendent of Schools order any investigation upon any such recommendation hy the' said defendant, nor did the said State Superintendent of Schools approve any such recommendation for the revocation of the said plaintiff’s certificate; nor was the said certificate of the plaintiff revoked hy the said State Superintendent of Schools; the plaintiff became a member of the Maryland Teachers’ Retirement System as of the date on which her teaching service began and did not vacate any position to which she was assigned during any school year.

No notice of the termination of the said contract was given hy either parties thereto to the other at the end of the first or of the second school year in which the plaintiff was employed by the defendant under the terms of the aforesaid contract, nor did the plaintiff give any notice after the second year that she wished to vacate her position as teacher under said contract; and the plaintiff performed all the conditions of said contract on her part; by reason whereof the said plaintiff has lost and been deprived of all the wages, profits and advantages which she otherwise might and would have derived and acquired from continuing in the employ of the said defendant as aforesaid; and which the said defendant has, from time to time, wholly neglected and refused the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has been and is, hy reason of the premises, wholly unemployed.” The contract set forth in the declaration specifically refers to sections 83 and 86 of article 77 of the Code. The first, of those sections relates to the issuance of certificates for teaching and for other service under the educational system. Section 86 provides as follows: “Any county board of education may, on the recommendation of the county superintendent, suspend any teacher, principal, supervisor or assistant superintendent for immorality, dishonesty, intemperance, insubordination, incompetency or willful neglect of duty, ¹⁸⁴ and máy recommend to the state superintendent of schools the revocation of the certificate of such person, stating in writing the grounds for such recommendations, and giving an opportunity, upon not less than ten days’ notice, to be heard in defense, in person or by counsel, and the state superintendent of schools may order such investigations as he may deem necessary. If he approves the recommendation, the teacher’s certificate shall be revoked and the teacher shall be dropped from the service.” By section 11 of article 77 of the Code, it is provided: “The State Board of Education shall, to the best of their ability, cause the provisions of this article to be carried into effect.

They shall determine the educational policies of the State; they shall enact by-laws for the administration of the public school system, which when enacted and published shall have the force of law. For the purpose of enforcing the provisions of this article, and the enacted and published by-laws of the board, the State Board of Education shall, if necessary, institute legal proceedings. The State Board of Education.shall explain the true intent and meaning of the law, and they shall decide, without expense to the parties concerned, all controversies and disputes that arise under it, and their decision shall be final; and the secretary of the State Board of Education shall have authority to administer oaths, in any part of the State, 'to witness in any matter pending before said board.” One of the by-laws adopted by the State Board of Education prescribes the form of contract which has been quoted, with an additional provision, not alleged in two of the declarations, that the contracting teacher should be a member of the Maryland Teachers’ Retirement System. It appears from ihe record in all of the cases that the plaintiffs became members of the retirement system during the periods of teaching service to which the declarations respectively refer.

The averments in the three declarations are substantially similar, except for differences in description of the certificates held by the plaintiffs, the periods of their service, the ¹⁸⁵ amounts of their salaries, and as to the provisions for membership in the retirement system, which one of the contracts included. In support of the demurrers it is argued that the cause of action asserted in each of the declarations involves a question of school administration as to which the county school superintendent has a statutory power of decision, reviewable, on appeal, by the State Board of Education, and that the plaintiffs were restricted to the remedies thus provided, and were consequently precluded from resorting to the courts for redress. This contention relies upon section 136 of article 77 of the Code, which provides, in part: “The County Superintendent of Schools shall explain the true intent and meaning of the school laws, and of the by-laws of the State Board of Education. He shall decide, without expense to the parties concerned, all controversies and disputes involving the rules and regulations of the county board of education and the proper administration of the public school system in the county, and his decision shall be final, except that an appeal may be had to the State Board of Education if taken in writing within thirty days.” In the same connection reference is made to section 139, which makes the following provision: “The county superintendent of schools shall nominate, for appointment by the county board of education, all principals and all assistant teachers, shall assign them to their positions in the schools, transfer them as the needs of the schools require, recommend them for promotion, suspend them for cause and recommend them for dismissal.” It is not permissible to assume, for the purposes of the demurrers, that the plaintiffs were suspended for cause or recommended for dismissal, within the purview of section 139, which must be read in the light of section 86, indicating the various grounds of suspension or dismissal after notice and opportunity for defense.

The primary issue of law to be decided on the demurrers is whether the plaintiffs have no recourse for relief from the denial of their alleged ¹⁸⁶ contractual rights except to the county superintendent and by appeal to the State Board of Education from his action. The “controversies and disputes” which the county superintendent is empowered by the statute to decide are those “involving the rules and regulations of the county board of education and the proper administration of the public school system in the county. * * *”