County Commissioners of Charles County v. ST. CHARLES ASSOCIATES LTD.

CATHELL, Judge. This case concerns a 1989 Settlement Agreement created by and between the County Commissioners of Charles County and St. Charles Associates, LP and the Interstate General Company, resolving various issues of contention between these two parties, as the developer proceeded its build-out of a large planned unit development district established in 1970 and located in Charles County. This 1989 Settlement Agreement ⁴³¹ arose out of proposals to strengthen the planning process and improve the orderly growth of Charles County, and to ensure adequate infrastructure and facilities linked to the substantial development of property in this planned unit development district — all with the aim of ultimately serving the health, safety, and welfare of Charles County residents. In litigation spanning the past decade, the two parties have disputed the obligations set forth under this Settlement Agreement. 1 More recently, on February 18, 1999, the Circuit Court for Charles County issued an order, which led to this appeal now before our court, in which the Circuit Court found that under the disputed 1989 Settlement Agreement the County was required to issue sewer and water connection permits to St. Charles Community, LLC and Dorchester Greens LP for the fee of $2,040 per permit on certain specified properties. 2 Additionally, the Circuit Court ordered that Charles County may not impose a fee in excess of $2,040 per water and sewer connection 3 for all residential lots or properties located in St. Charles Communities planned unit development (“PUD”) until such time as the County obtains a rate report ⁴³² approved by the Circuit Court, which substantiates an increased charge. 4 On December 5, 2000 the Court of Special Appeals in an unreported opinion, County Commissioners of Charles County v. St. Charles Associates Limited Partnership (“St. Charles III”), affirmed the Circuit Court’s February 18, 1999 order.

We granted the County’s petition for writ of certiorari to review that decision. Petitioners present three questions to this Court: 1. Does ... language in a development agreement between a local government and a developer stating that the agreement “runs with the land” conclusively establish that the agreement binds all purchasers of individual lots in the development where the agreement also provides that it may be assigned, in whole or in part, only if certain procedures are satisfied? 2. Is an assignment of contractual rights that do not run with the land effective where the subject matter of the assignment is not described sufficiently in the document ⁴³³ purporting to effect the assignment to make the subject matter capable of being readily identified? 3.

Where a contract provides that an assignment must be made “as a part of’ a transfer of real property, is an assignment effective where it is made 11 months after the transfer of the property and not pursuant to an instrument relating to the transfer of the property? We answer yes to question one because the agreement at issue in this case is unambiguous in its terms and meets the elements of a covenant running with the land. Under the circumstances of this case, we also answer in the affirmative to questions two and three. The deeds conveyed the real property, and, by their terms, implicitly conveyed the rights and privileges of the agreement.

Also, the assignment of contractual rights set forth in the agreement were effectively assigned via the deeds of conveyance. The eleven-month lapse in time did not hinder the effective assignment of contractual rights, and this subsequent assignment document merely was a redundant formalization of the assignment that had already taken place through the actual conveyances by deed. I. Statement of Facts 5 In 1970, the Interstate General Company, predecessor in interest of St. Charles Associates, LP (collectively “St. Charles” or “SCA”), and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) entered into a project agreement, which established a development plan for the planned and orderly development of St. Charles Communities (“SCC”) as a new community under the New Communities Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. section 3901 et. seq. After the project agreement was executed, the Board of County Commissioners of Charles County enacted new zoning ordinances amending its zoning ordinances in a July 12, 1972 order known as the ⁴³⁴ “Docket 90 Order,” creating a planned unit development (“PUD”) zone of SCC. 6 The 7,030 acres comprising SCC are located within the Mattawoman Creek drainage basin, which encompasses roughly eighty square miles in northern Charles County and southern Prince George’s County.

SCC covers approximately twelve square miles and ultimately may be built out to 24,730 units. To date, S.CA and many other builders have constructed homes on lots within the PUD. Due to a substantial increase in commercial and residential development in both Charles County and Prince George’s County, and because the increased development rendered the Mattawoman Creek drainage basin and its soils unable to process the effluent from the area’s individual sewage disposal systems, Charles County decided to construct a modern wastewater treatment plant. The wastewater treatment plant initially had the capacity to process 5.0 million gallons per day (“MGD”), and cost $33.3 million to construct. 7 The construction of the plant was completed in the early to mid 1970s.

In the 1980s, it became necessary to expand the capacity of the Mattawoman treatment plant from 5.0 MGD to 15.0 MGD. The county financed this expansion by adopting Resolution 88-81, which significantly increased the water and sewer connection charges to be paid by users of the Mattawoman plant. This Resolution adopted on October 18, 1988, increased sewer connection charges for the purpose of paying the debt service due to the costs of plant expansion. It is these increased charges brought forth by the adoption of Resolution 88-81, which spurred the issue and resultant case sub judice.

In 1989, a dispute arose between the County and SCA as to certain water and sewer capacity entitlements and connection charges. Specifically, on May 10, 1989, SCA filed a Com ⁴³⁵ plaint, petitioning the Circuit Court for Charles County for an accounting pursuant to the equity jurisdiction of the court, and for declaratory relief pursuant to the Maryland Code section 3-401 et seq., of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. In its complaint, SCA asserted that SCA should not be subject to the increased water and sewer connection charges imposed under the Resolution, because the County was already contractually bound, under a prior settlement agreement, to provide water and sewer treatment capacity for the 24,730 residential units planned to be built in the SCC. 8 SCA contended that the Mattawoman treatment plant and its initial 5.0 MGD capacity was constructed for the benefit of the PUD, a significant portion of the basin. Thus, the PUD had immediate entitlement to this initial capacity.

SCA alleged that the PUD’s federal status as a new community benefitted the County, because it led to the County’s receipt of millions of dollars in federal grants and state matching funds designated specifically for the construction and maintenance of SCC’s community infrastructure. The County disputed SCA’s claim of entitlement to the capacity and maintained that the key reason for the federal and state grants that financed the 5.0 MGD capacity was the health and safety concerns generated by the then failing septic systems in particular areas of the County. On November 29, 1989, SCA and the County settled the original litigation with a settlement agreement (the “1989 Agreement”). 9 This 1989 Agreement addressed the disputed connection charges and a number of other issues related to municipal services affecting the SCC. On March 6, 1990, the 1989 Agreement was incorporated into a Consent Decree by the trial court, and thus became a judgment of the court.

Relevant portions of the “1989 Agreement” provide as follows: ⁴³⁶ “AGREEMENT 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 1.1 Intent of the Parties: The property subject to this Agreement is all of that Real Property located in Charles County, Maryland, described in Exhibit “A,” and any other property acquired by SCA, its successors and assigns that is, pursuant to the proper exercise of County discretion, subsequently rezoned PUD and made subject to Docket 90 and all property previously developed by SCA and/or its predecessor, located in Charles County, Maryland. It is intended and determined that the provisions of this Agreement shall constitute covenants which shall run with said Real Property and the benefits and burdens hereof shall bind and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective assigns and successors in interest. The Recitals are specifically incorporated in and made a part of this Agreement.

It is the further intent of the parties hereto, to provide certainty to SCA and the County regarding the number of residential units to receive water and sewer allocations each year, to ensure that SCA continues to provide balanced growth by developing and selling commercial and industrial property, to ensure that such commercial and industrial development is afforded adequate and timely water and sewer allocations in accordance with paragraph 4.1.4 hereof, and to ensure the provisions of adequate urban infrastructure and public facilities in conformance with the provisions of this Agreement. 1.3 Assignment: The rights and obligations of SCA under this Agreement may be transferred or assigned, in whole or in part, provided such transfer or assignment is made as a part of the transfer, assignment, sale or lease of all or a portion of the property subject to this Agreement and to Docket 90. SCA shall not transfer or assign its rights or obligations under this Agreement to other projects that are not located within St. Charles PUD. ⁴³⁷ 4. PROVISIONS FOR WATER AND SEWAGE SERVICE AND FOR CERTAIN OTHER IMPROVEMENTS 4.1 Sewer and Water Facilities for Real Property Subject to this Agreement: 4.1.3 In recognition of the County’s desire to provide adequate infrastructure and services to the entire County, beginning January 1,1990, SCA agrees to restrict its rate of development as provided herein. The parties agree that SCA is entitled to sufficient water supply and sewer treatment capacity to serve St. Charles PUD’s planned 24,730 residential units.

In accordance with its reserved entitlement to adequate sewer capacity to treat sewage flows from 24,730 dwelling units, the County agrees to expand the Mattawoman Sewage Treatment Plant capacity to ensure that adequate treatment capacity exists at all times to treat the sewage flows from the development of St. Charles PUD in accordance with the rate of development as set forth herein.... 4.1.6 Accounting from October 19, 1988, SCA, its successors and assigns, agrees to pay a water and sewer connection charge in the amount of $2,040.00 for each residential unit. SCA further agrees to pay increased water and sewer connection charges (“increased charges”) to the extent such increased charges are established as reasonable and properly applicable to SCA, in accordance with applicable federal, state and local law and provided the charges are based upon updated and necessary rate studies obtained by the County. The County agrees to obtain such updated and necessary studies on or before December 31, 1990 and to include in such studies the legal and accounting analysis necessary to establish the rational nexus between the charges and the ⁴³⁸ needs created by SCA’s development. Upon completion of the studies obtained by the County and its determination of “increased charges,” if any, SCA agrees to bring any challenges to the studies and determination of increased charges within 90 days of said completion and determination.

SCA agrees to pay such increased charges, if any, to the extent they shall not have theretofore been paid; and the County agrees to refund to SCA any excess of such increased charges theretofore paid by SCA, within 90 days of the final determination (by agreement 'of the parties or by a court of law having jurisdiction) of such excess, together with interest on any such refunds as provided by law accruing from the dates of payment. 4.1.8 SCA agrees to limit and schedule its annual call on its reserved entitlement to sewer capacity as set forth in subparagraph 4.1.3 until St. Charles PUD reaches its planned build-out of 24,730 units only on the condition that the County agrees to provide St. Charles PUD with adequate sewer treatment capacity to serve St. Charles PUD when such capacity is required in accordance with subpara-graphs 4.1.3. and 4.1.4. of this Agreement. SCA may determine the remaining unallocated capacity available from the Mattawoman Sewage Treatment Plant at any time pursuant to the County’s open records policy. The County agrees that it shall not impose on SCA any of the increase in capital costs incurred by the County to expand the Matta-woman Sewage Treatment Plant in order to replace the treatment capacity originally constructed for the benefit of St. Charles PUD, unless the imposition of said increased costs is authorized by the studies referenced in paragraph 4.1.6 hereof.” [Emphasis added.] The 1989 Agreement became the basis of the current controversy between the parties. In 1990 and 1991, pursuant to the 1989 Agreement, the County turned to the public accounting firm of Ernst & Young to prepare a rate study to calculate the appropriate sewer and water connection charges to enable the County to determine whether customers were entitled to ⁴³⁹ refunds and to suggest recommended rates for all new customers thereafter.

On January 2, 1991, SCA filed a motion to enforce the 1989 Agreement and consent decree, debating the procedures followed by the County in coordinating the study conducted by Ernst & Young, and challenging the County’s general lack of compliance with some of the provisions set forth in the 1989 Agreement. On June 22, 1992, the Circuit Court and, on April 19, 1995, the Court of Special Appeals ruled that the Ernst & Young study did not comply with the terms of the 1989 Agreement, because the study did not take into consideration that the initial capacity of the Mattawoman treatment plant was constructed for the benefit of SCC. In accordance with the Circuit Court’s order, the County, on November 15, 1996, secured a second rate study to retrospectively determine the proper connection charges. 10 Upon the completion of this second study, SCA, on February 6, 1997, filed a motion to enforce the court’s June 22, 1992 order, which ordered that the County, in good faith cooperation with St. Charles, conduct the appropriate study as the basis for water and sewer connection fees for St. Charles. On December 11, 1997, the Circuit Court issued an order in which it ruled that the second study also failed to comply with the 1989 Agreement requirements, but nevertheless found that SCA had to pursue its claim for refunds in the Maryland Tax Court.

On December 22, 1997, SCA moved to alter or amend the ruling, requesting that the Circuit Court expand its December 11, 1997 order to prohibit the County from charging more than $2, 040 per water and sewer connection in the PUD until the County submitted a proper rate study justifying a higher charge. On April 29, 1998, the Circuit Court granted St. Charles’ motion and granted an injunction barring the County from charging SCA 11 more than the set $2,040 amount. ⁴⁴⁰ On May 20, 1998, SCA filed a request for clarification of the April 29, 1998 order, asking that the Circuit Court extend the injunction to all residential dwelling units within the PUD. The Circuit Court granted this request on August 4, 1998, and prohibited the County from charging in excess of $2,040 per water and sewer connection for residential properties in the PUD. In the memorandum accompanying the order, the Circuit Court ruled that other builders in the SCC could obtain the benefit of the 1989 Agreement, if the agreement were assigned to them pursuant to section 1.3 of the 1989 Agreement.

The Circuit Court referenced section 1.3 when it stated, “[sjection 1.3 of the Settlement Agreement states that any such transfer or assignment must be made ‘as a part of the transfer, assignment, sale or lease of all or a portion of the property subject to this Agreement and to Docket 90.’ This clarification simply reflects the parties’ contract as set forth in the Settlement Agreement.” The County appealed each of the Circuit Court’s orders issuing the injunction. On October 6, 1999, 12 the Court of Special Appeals filed its opinion in the 1998 appeal, 13 affirming in part and reversing in part the Circuit Court’s orders. The Court of Special Appeals ruled that the County was prohibited under the 1989 Agreement from charging SCA and/or its assigns more than $1,613 in sewer connection fees until such time as the County submitted a study complying with the 1989 Agreement. The Court of Special Appeals, in its opinion, reversed the portion of the Circuit Court’s order that required new rate studies concerning the appropriate water connection fees to be charged to SCA or its assigns, ruling that SCA had not challenged the County’s $1, 950 water charge. ⁴⁴¹ During the course of the litigation, SCA continued to sell residential lots for development.

On September 30, 1996, SCA conveyed a number of lots to its affiliate, Interstate Business Corporation (“IBC”), which subsequently conveyed these lots to Dorchester Green, LP (“Dorchester LP”). The deeds conveying these lots to IBC and Dorchester LP contained similar conveying language. The deed provided that the conveyance was, “SUBJECT to covenants, easements and restrictions of record. TOGETHER with the buildings and improvements thereupon erected, made or being and all and every the rights, alleys, ways, waters, privileges, appurtenances and advantages, to the same belonging or anywise appertaining.” 14 A year later on September 30,1997, as part of a comprehensive corporate reorganization, SCA also conveyed a substantial portion of the land to a related company, St. Charles Community, LLC (“Community LLC”), a Delaware limited liability company.

The deed conveying that land provided that SCA was conveying the land “TOGETHER WITH AND SUBJECT to covenants, easements and restrictions of record. TOGETHER with the buildings and improvements thereupon erected, made or being and all and every the rights, alleys, ways, waters, privileges, appurtenances and advantages, to the same belonging or anywise appertaining.” Almost eleven months later, on August 27, 1998, SCA executed a document entitled “Assignment,” purportedly pursuant to section 1.3 of the 1989 Agreement, again assigning its rights, title, and interest under the 1989 Agreement to Community LLC. 15 In a letter dated August 28, 1998, the County indicated to SCA that it would not issue sewer and connection permits at the rate of $2,040 for lots owned by Dorchester LP or Community LLC, because the trial court’s August 4, 1998 injunction did not apply to these developers. The County alleged that the deeds conveying the land did not assign the ⁴⁴² right to the sewer hook-up rates as required by the 1989 Agreement. On December 2, 1998, while the 1998 appeal was still pending before the Court of Special Appeals, SCA filed a Motion for Further Enforcement of Injunction or, in the Alternative, for Contempt and Other Sanctions, arguing that the County was violating the Circuit Court’s August 4, 1998 order by refusing to issue sewer and water connection permits to Dorchester LP and Community, LLC at a price of $2,040.

On February 18, 1999, the Circuit Court issued an order, granting SCA’s motion to enforce the injunction and requiring the County to issue connection permits to all owners of residential lots in the SCC. The County appealed this order, and on August 27, 1999 the Court of Special Appeals granted the County’s motion to stay the appeal pending the Court of Special Appeals determination of the County’s 1998 appeal. On December 5, 2000, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court’s February 18, 1999 order, barring the County from charging in excess of $2,040 per water and sewer connection for any residential lot or property located in SCC. 16 The Court of Special Appeals discussed the disputed language in sections 1.1 and 1.3 of the 1989 Agreement. The Court stated: “The language of section 1.3 ... states that rights under the Settlement Agreement, ‘may be transferred or assigned.’. ..

By contrast, the language of section 1.1 of the Settlement Agreement uses the term ‘shall’ throughout, stating, ‘the provision of this Agreement shall constitute covenants which shall run with said Real Property and the benefits and burdens hereof shall bind and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective ” ⁴⁴³ The Court of Special Appeals found that the plain language of the 1989 Agreement expressed the intent of the parties that the right to reduced sewer and water connection fees constituted a covenant running with the land in the PUD. Further, “given the totality of the Agreement, provision 1.1 is properly read as providing that the sewer connection rights run with the land, and section 1.3 is properly read as permitting the assignment of the sewer connection rights in limited circumstances.” Accordingly, the right to reduced sewer connection fees runs with the land, and Dorchester LP and Community LLC became entitled to the benefit of the reduced fees automatically upon the conveyance of the land.

II

Discussion We hold that the 1989 Agreement does contain covenants that run with the land, the covenant relating to reduced fees at issue here. We will discuss the proper standard for interpreting such a contract or agreement, look at the language of the agreement itself, consider the role of the intent of the parties, and, generally, the nature of covenants that run with the land. When applied to the facts of this case, we hold that the terms of the agreement are clear, the intention of the parties is best evidenced by this agreement with no information to suggest otherwise and the applicable provisions of the agreement satisfy the elements of covenants running with the land. As to question two, we hold that the deeds conveying the real property at issue here, while lacking express reference to the 1989 Agreement, were valid grants and assignments and by their terms encompassed any rights and obligations running with the land burdening or benefitting the parties as laid out in the recital or provisions of the 1989 Agreement recorded among the Land Records of Charles County.

We arrive at the holding by construing the deeds in their entirety and the facts, circumstances, and intentions of the parties related to these conveyances, despite the fact that the initial deeds may make no express subject matter reference to the 1989 Agreement itself. ⁴⁴⁴ Finally, as to question three, we hold that the “as a part of’ wording in section 1.3 of the 1989 Agreement does not require a contemporaneous assignment, pursuant to the assignment provision of the 1989 Agreement. But that even if this contention were true, our holding as to the previous questions, that the 1989 Agreement includes covenants running with the land, combined with the intention of the parties and the wording of the deeds equals an effective assignment at the time of conveyance. Moreover, under the circumstances of this case, the actual deeds of conveyance were, by their express terms, in fact, assignments. The subsequent assignment document was nothing more than a redundancy, further formalizing what contractual rights had, in reality, been already properly assigned by deed as of the date of the relevant conveyances.

Part 1 a. Standard of Review-Interpretation of Contracts Maryland has long adhered to the law of objective interpretation of contracts. Auction & Estate Representatives v. Ashton, 354 Md. 333, 340 , 731 A.2d 441, 444 (1999); Calomiris v. Woods, 353 Md. 425, 435 , 727 A.2d 358, 363 , (1999); Adloo v. H.T. Brown Real Estate, Inc., 344 Md. 254, 266 , 686 A.2d 298, 304 (1996); State v. Attman/Glazer P.B. Co., 323 Md. 592, 604 , 594 A.2d 138, 144 (1991). The clear and unambiguous language of an agreement will not give way to what a party thought the agreement meant or was intended to mean.

Auction & Estate Representatives, 354 Md. at 341 , 731 A.2d at 445 ; Adloo, 344 Md. at 266 , 686 A.2d at 304 ; GMAC v. Daniels, 303 Md. 254, 261 , 492 A.2d 1306, 1310 (1985); Board of Trustees v. Sherman, 280 Md. 373, 380 , 373 A.2d 626, 629 (1977). Further, “[i]n the interpretation of written contracts it is the duty of courts to ascertain, if possible, the intention of the parties, as manifested by the terms of the instrument. If the intention ... is plainly manifest upon the face of the instrument there is no room for interpretation.... ” Maryland ⁴⁴⁵ Coal Co. v. Cumberland, & Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 41 Md. 343, 352 (1875). If an ambiguity arises, however, the court construing an agreement must “determine from the language of the agreement itself what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have meant at the time it was effectuated.” Daniels, 303 Md. at 261 , 492 A.2d at 1310 .

An ambiguity arises when the language of the contract is susceptible of more than one meaning to a reasonably prudent person. Auction & Estate Representatives, 354 Md. at 340 , 731 A.2d at 444 ; Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 320 Md. 584, 596 , 578 A.2d 1202, 1208 (1990) (citing Truck Ins. Exch. v. Marks Rentals, Inc., 288 Md. 428, 433 , 418 A.2d 1187, 1190 (1980)). “If the contract is ambiguous, the court must consider any extrinsic evidence which sheds light on the intentions of the parties at the time of the execution of the contract.” Heat & Power Corp., 320 Md. at 596-97 , 578 A.2d at 1208 . b. Construction of Real Covenants Prior to 1955, when construing the meaning of covenants a strict construction standard was applicable to promote the free alienability of land.

See Turner v. Brocato, 206 Md. 336, 345-46 , 111 A.2d 855, 860 (1955). 17 This being so, the principle ⁴⁴⁶ “that doubt must be resolved in favor of the alienability of land,” free and unfettered, was modified and does not always control; “[t]his rule of construction bows always to the more fundamental rule that wherever possible effect will be given to an ascertained intention of the parties.” Turner 206 Md. at 352 , 111 A.2d at 864 . In Gnau v. Kinlein, 217 Md. 43, 48 , 141 A.2d 492 , 495 (1958), we addressed restrictive covenants when we stated: “Whether a restrictive covenant is personal to a grantee or a grantor, or to both, or binds their respective successors in title, and so the land by whomever owned from time to time, as well as whether a grantor intended to bind land retained by him, is a question of intention, which may be ascertained from the language of the conveyances alone or from that language together with other evidence of intent.” In Belleview Construction Company v. Rugby Hall Community Assoc., 321 Md. 152, 158 , 582 A.2d 493, 495 (1990), we examined the next step in reviewing restrictive covenants if the intent of the parties is not clear. We said, “If an ambiguity is present, and if that ambiguity is not clearly resolved by resort to extrinsic evidence, the general rule in favor of the unrestricted use of property will prevail and the ambiguity in a restriction will be resolved against the party seeking its enforcement.” Judge Davidson, writing for the Court of Special Appeals, clearly recognized our holdings in the “restriction” case of Metius v. Julio, 27 Md.App. 491, 498 , 342 A.2d 348, 353 (1975), saying: “In construing the meaning of a restriction on the use of land, the court must determine the intent and purpose of the parties at the time the agreement was made, which is a question of fact. In making that determination the court must consider the language of the instrument itself, giving the words their ordinary and generally understood meaning ⁴⁴⁷ unless it plainly appears from the context that the parties intended to use them in a different sense, or that they have acquired a peculiar or special meaning in respect to a particular subject matter.

Where the language used ... is ambiguous, the court must also consider the circumstances and conditions affecting the parties and the property at the time the agreement was made.” [Emphasis added.] [Footnotes omitted.] See Belleview Constr. Co. v. Rugby Hall Community Assoc., 321 Md. at 157-59 , 582 A.2d at 495-96 ; Harbor View Improvement Ass’n, Inc. v. Downey, 270 Md. 365, 371 , 311 A.2d 422, 425 (1973); Yorkway Apts., Inc. v. Dundalk Co., 180 Md. 647, 650 , 26 A.2d 398, 399-400 (1942); Whitmarsh v. Richmond, 179 Md. 523, 527 , 20 A.2d 161, 163 (1941); McKenrick v. Savings Bank of Baltimore, 174 Md. 118, 128 , 197 A. 580, 584-85 (1938); see also Markey v. Wolf, 92 Md.App. 137, 152-53 , 607 A.2d 82, 88, 89-90 (1992). As alluded to, in more recent years, “a ‘reasonableness rule’(termed a modern rule in some foreign jurisdictions) has been engrafted upon the general rule.” Markey, 92 Md.App. at 150 , 607 A.2d at 88 . Currently, Maryland courts no longer apply a pure strict interpretation or construction, but apply rather, a reasonably strict construction when construing covenants.

In Markey , the Court of Special Appeals, interpreting the position of this Court, adhered to the reasonableness rule when it considered the restrictive covenant at issue in that case. That court stated: “In interpreting words used to create restrictions, the court should endeavor to ascertain the real purpose and intention of the parties and to discover the 'purpose from the surrounding circumstances at the time of the creation of the restriction, as well as from the words used. In endeavoring to arrive at the intention, the words used should be taken in their ordinary and popular sense, unless it plainly appears from the context that the parties intended to use them in a different sense, or that they have acquired a peculiar or ⁴⁴⁸ special meaning in respect to the particular subject-matter.” Id. at 153 , 607 A.2d at 90 . c. Covenants Running with the Land We noted in the lease case of Mercantile-Safe Deposit and Trust Company v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 308 Md. 627, 633-637 , 521 A.2d 734, 737-38 (1987), that: “Whether a covenant touches and concerns the land may be considered in terms of the burdens or benefits it imposes.

Thus, the test is met if the performance of the covenant will ‘tend necessarily to enhance [the] value [of the land] ...,’ Whalen .... It will be noted that the ‘benefit’ and ‘burden’ tests are stated in the alternative; if either is met, the covenant may be one running with the land.... The City nevertheless argues that these covenants could not run with the land because they dealt with something not in esse — future restoration of the properties. This contention is based on Spencer’s Case. ...

The Maryland cases, therefore, give critical effect to the presence or absence of language binding successors and assigns. If these words are present, as they are here, the covenant is one running with the land or the functional equivalent thereof. That is, when the performance of the covenant touches and concerns the land within the meaning of the ‘benefit or burden’ standard, it is deemed one running with the land, even when it deals with something not in esse, when the agreement expressly binds successors and assigns. Indeed, this reasoning is entirely consistent with the majority American view that makes no distinction between affir ⁴⁴⁹ mative and restrictive covenants for the purpose of determining whether a covenant runs with the land.... ...

That the covenants are to be performed in the future cannot, alone, defeat their characterization as covenants running with the land.... ” [Alterations in original.] The Court of Special Appeals has also addressed the issue: “One of our leading cases involving real covenants is Gallagher v. Bell, 69 Md.App. 199 -202, 516 A.2d 1028 (1986), cert. denied, 308 Md. 382 , 519 A.2d 1283 (1987), where____ [footnote 9] Judge Wilner, 18 for the court, furnished a perspective from what is sometimes referred to as ‘the Rule in Spencer’s Case,’ 77 Ency. Rept. 72 (QB 1583), up to the time of the Gallagher decision, providing a complete review of the many aspects of covenant law.” Bright v. Lake Linganore Association, 104 Md.App. 394 , 417 n. 9, 656 A.2d 377, 389 (1995). While an in-depth discussion on the background of real covenants is not necessary in the case sub judice, the nature of covenants can be drawn from Mercantile, Gallagher, and Bright and similar case law, which nature aids our interpretation of the agreement at issue in this case. Bright , referring to Gallagher , provides: “[I]nitially, ... in respect to land conveyances, ‘[covenants ... may be regarded as being either personal in nature or as running with the land.’ The difference, we opined, depended on whether burdens and benefits of the promises made ‘can devolve upon’ the promisors’ successors in title. ... [W]e noted that covenants to pay money for the maintenance of services relating to the land clearly, in our view, touched and concerned the land.

We also stressed the importance of the parties’ intent that covenants run with the land and opined that that intent may be determined from the language contained in the agreement or from other ⁴⁵⁰ indicia.” Id. at 418, 656 A.2d 377 (citation omitted) (one alteration in original). Under Maryland law, a covenant can run with the land if: “(1) the covenant ‘touch[es] and concern[s]’ the land; (2) the original covenanting parties intend the covenant to run; and (3) there be some privity of estate and that (4) the covenant be in writing.” Mercantile-Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 308 Md. 627, 632 , 521 A.2d 734, 736 (1987). “Nevertheless, as discussed in Mercantile, even a covenant that, by its very terms, runs with the land may not be enforceable if the parties creating the covenant intend that it not run.” Bright, 104 Md.App. at 421 , 656 A.2d at 391 . Moreover, simply because the settlement agreement states that the covenant is one that runs with the land does not necessarily make it so. Sanitary Facilities II, Inc. v. Blum, 22 Md.App. 90, 102-03 , 322 A.2d 228, 235 (1974) (citing Glenn v. Canby, 24 Md. 127 (1866)); see also Bright, 104 Md.App. at 421 , 656 A.2d at 391 (holding that covenants by their terms that run with the land may not be enforceable if the parties did not intend). d.

Interpretation of the 1989 Agreement and Whether it Created a Covenant that Runs With the Land The petitioners assert that the provisions of the 1989 Agreement placed at issue in the case at bar contradict one another, specifically that the language found in the beginning provision does not conclusively establish, due to the ensuing and different language of the agreement, that the agreement binds all purchasers of individual lots in the PUD. Or alternatively, that the agreement does not constitute a covenant running with the land, as the Court of Special Appeals held in its recent opinion. We disagree with petitioners. In the case sub judice, not only is the language of the agreement plain, there also is no indication that the original covenanting parties intended that the covenants not run with the land.

Indeed, almost all the evidence in the record reflects the contrary. ⁴⁵¹ First, we address the language of the 1989 Agreement. The 1989 Agreement, established by two sophisticated parties, 19 in which the provisions are contained, through its very language dictates that the provisions run with the land. The wording of the 1989 Agreement, an agreement recorded among the Land Records of Charles County, “contain[s] ... expressions indicative of an intent that the covenants run with the land.” Bright, 104 Md.App. at 421 , 656 A.2d at 892 . Specifically, the 1989 Agreement plainly states: “It is intended and determined that the provisions of this Agreement shall constitute covenants which shall run with said Real Property and the benefits and burdens hereof shall bind and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective assigns and successors in interest. ...

The rights and obligations of SCA under this Agreement may be transferred or assigned, in whole or in part, provided such transfer or assignment is made as a part of the transfer, assignment, sale or lease of all or a portion of the property subject to this Agreement and to Docket 90. Accounting from October 19, 1988, SCA, its successors and assigns, agrees to pay a water and sewer connection charge in the amount of $2,040.00 for each residential unit.” [Emphasis added.] When creating this agreement, SCA and Charles County saw fit to include language in this agreement specifically pertaining to the intent of the parties that SCA’s right and obligations could be transferred and assigned, and that the provisions of the 1989 Agreement, including the right to ⁴⁵² reduced connection fees, were covenants that ran with the land to “assigns and successors.” Applying Maryland’s law of the objective interpretation of contracts, we read this agreement plainly and find no contradiction in its language. Here, the parties caused the document to read, on its face, that its applicable provisions “run with the land” and