County Commissioners v. Fairwinds Beach Club, Inc.

⁵⁷¹ Henderson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In this zoning case from Anne Arundel County, the Chancellor reversed the action of the County Commissioners, in granting a rezoning from Agricultural to Heavy and Light Commercial to permit the construction of a small shopping center, on the ground that a debatable question was not presented. The appellants raised a preliminary question as to whether the Chancellor erred in overruling their demurrer on the ground that the Fairwinds Beach Club, Inc., was not a proper party, citing Windsor Hills Imp. Ass’n v. Baltimore, 195 Md. 383 and Glen Burnie Imp.

Ass’n v. Appeal Bd., 213 Md. 407 . See also Bar Ass’n v. District Title Co., 224 Md. 474 , 476 and cases cited. It is not alleged that the club is a taxpayer or property owner although located on Benfield Road, and the appellees appear to concede that it is in the same category as the Associations in the cases cited. They merely contend that the Club should be permitted to remain as an additional party.

We think the claim is untenable, and that the court erred in refusing to strike the Club as a party. This does not affect the merits of the case, however, as there were other individual parties whose standing is not challenged. The appellees contend that since the rezoning was approved by only a majority vote of 5 to 3 the application failed. The argument is based on the fact that Code (1957), Art. 66B, sec. 21 (e) requires a favorable vote of three-fourths of a zoning board where there is a protest from the owners of 20% or more “either of the area of the lots included in such proposed change or of those immediately adjacent in the rear thereof extending 175 feet therefrom, or of those directly opposite thereto extending 175 feet from the street frontage of such opposite lots * * *." The property in question is a corner lot, and there was testimony that it “fronts” on Jumpers Hole Road, and not on Benfield Road.

The property of the protestant, the Board of Education, is adjacent to the property in question on Jumpers Hole Road. The appellants contend that it is neither adjacent in the rear nor directly opposite and hence the statute is inapplicable.