County Commissioners v. Mayor of Frederick

Boyd, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. A bill in equity was filed by the Mayor and Aldermen of Frederick to require the County Commissioners of Frederick County to account for and pay over a proportion of the taxes collected by them under and by virtue of section 201 of Article 81 of the Code of Public General Laws of Maryland, as enacted by chapter 143 of the Acts of the General Assembly passed at the session of 1896. The part of that section which presents ⁶⁵⁶ the question involved in this case is as follows: “ All bonds, certificates of indebtedness or evidence of debt, in whatsoever form, made or issued by any public or private corporation . . . and owned by residents of Maryland, shall be subject to valuation and assessment to the owner thereof in the county or city in which such owners may, respectively, reside, and they shall be assessed at their actual value in the market; . . . and upon such valuation the regular rate of taxation for State purposes shall be paid, and there shall also be paid on such valuation thirty cents (and no more) on ■each one hundred dollars for county, city and municipal taxation in such county or city of the State in which the owner may reside.” A similar provision is made for taxing certain stocks. The appellants levied a tax of thirty cents on the classes of property embraced in that section, including those held by residents of Frederick City, and the appellee claims that it is entitled to a proportion of the tax so levied and collected from the owners thereof, who reside within the taxable limits of Frederick City, whilst the county contends it is entitled to the whole of it.

The jurisdiction of a Court of Equity to grant the relief prayed for is also questioned by the appellants and it will be convenient to discuss the questions involved in the case under the following heads: 1. Is the appellee entitled to any portion of this tax levied and collected by the appellants from securities mentioned in section 201, which were owned by residents of Frederick City? 2. If so, what proportion is it entitled to? 3. Has a Court of Equity jurisdiction to grant the relief sought? 1.

The Act referred to leaves no doubt as to the county, city or municipal purposes on thes’e securities, therein mentioned and that is therefore not involved in this case. Nor can there be any question as to the amount of tax that can be levied in addition to the State tax as the law says, “ there shall also be paid on such valuation thirty cents (and no more) on each one hundred dollars for county, city and municipal taxation.” ⁶⁵⁷ Unless the words “ and no more ” are to be treated as meaningless and omitted in reading the statute, it is impossible to say that the Legislature intended that any sum in addition to the thirty cents should be levied for county, city or municipal purposes on these securities, but on the contrary if plain, unequivocal language is to have its ordinary meaning given it, there is an express prohibition against exacting a greater tax. Courts have nothing to do with the wisdom of such provisions, so long as they do not conflict with the law, but Judges cannot, without keeping themselves in ignorance of questions discussed in the public press and elsewhere, be unmindful of the fact that there are various opinions as to the best method of dealing with such securities in tax laws. There are those who believe that the imposition of a smaller tax on them than is levied on tangible property will in the aggregate realize more than can be otherwise collected, by reason of the fact that it is oftentimes difficult to reach them when the owners seek to evade taxation, and the greater the tax the greater temptation to such persons to conceal their ownership of them, and others are opposed to taxing them at all.

Whatever the reasons that influenced the members of the Legislature of 1896, certain it is that they intended to limit the rate to thirty cents on the one hundred dollars in addition to the State tax, and that they did not intend that any incorporated town or city -within the limits of a county of the State should impose any tax on those securities in addition to the thirty cents. The power of the State through the Legislature to deprive an incorporated city or town of the right to levy taxes upon a particular class or classes of property within its corporate limits need not be discussed by us, as the question presented is not so much what the Legislature had the right to do as what it actually did and intended to do by the passage of this law. Article 81, title “Revenue and Taxes,” of the Code of Public General Laws, was in many respects materially amended by chapters 120, 141, 142, and 143 of the Acts of 1896 — all of which were approved by the Governor on the same day. By those ⁶⁵⁸ Acts a new assessment of property throughout the State was provided for, and various provisions were inserted as to what should be taxed, what exemptions allowed, how the assessments should be made, etc. Section 194 of chapter 120 provided that the securities above named and all certificates of indebtedness issued by any indi- , vidual or firm should be assessed and valued according to the rate of interest stipulated to be paid, but section 201 of chapter 143 repealed it so far as the securities now under consideration are concerned, and made the provision we have already stated.

If the law had remained as provided for in section 194, State, county and Baltimore City taxes would have been levied on those securities as taxes on other property, excepting that the values were fixed according to the rate of interest stipulated to be paid, and the appellee (as well as other incorporated cities similarly situated) would also have been authorized to levy and collect taxes on such of those securities as were owned by those residing within its taxable limits. Its charter expressly authorized and empowered it “to levy and collect all necessary taxes on the real and personal property within the taxable limits of the corporation, as are now assessed and taxed within said limits for county and State purposes,. or upon any assessment hereafter made in pursuance of law, of the real and personal property within the taxable limits of the corporation.” If then this law did not prohibit it, it would seem clear that the appellee had the right to assess and tax such of these securities as are owned by persons residing within its taxable limits, but as the statute does in terms prohibit the collection of more than thirty cents on each one hundred dollars for county, city and municipal taxation, it is equally clear 'that if the county is entitled to the whole of the thirty cents the city is excluded from collecting any tax on such securities. Was such a result within the contemplation of the statute? As the property is of the character that was originally assessable in this State, and was continued to be by chapter 120 of the Acts of 1896, although on a some ⁶⁵⁹ what different basis, and was liable to taxation under the charter of the appellee, it should not be exempted from taxation by the appellee, unless the language of the law clearly requires such a construction.

We can see no valid reason why the city of Frederick, possessing such powers of taxation as the Legislature has conferred upon it, should not be permitted to tax its residents for property within its corporate limits, which the county is permitted to tax for its purposes. It is true that the city is a part of the county and that the property within the limits of the former is liable to taxation for county purposes, but the residents of a city, such as Frederick, probably receive as much, if not more, protection and direct benefits from the city than from the county, and they ought to contribute their proper proportion of taxes necessary for the city government. The same can be said of residents of other cities in the counties of the State, and therefore we are unable to see any substantial reason why the Legislature should thus discriminate against such cities, and are thus strengthened in our opinion that it did not so intend. That the expression “ city and municipal taxation ” is not confined to Baltimore City alone may readily be seen by a careful study of the provisions of Article 81 of the Code and the amendments thereto.

Under the rule of interpretation, as set forth in section n of Art. i of the Code, that “ the word county shall be construed to include the City of Baltimore unless such construction would be unreasonable,” it was not necessary to insert these words to enable the authorities of Baltimore City to impose such tax. But if it had been intended to use language that would in terms confine the tax to the counties and Baltimore City, it could have been easily so expressed by the Legislature, as it is in other places. Section i of Art. 81, as codified in the present and former codes, reads that “ all State and county taxes, and all taxes in the City of Baltimore, shall be levied upon the assessment heretofore made and such further assessments as may hereafter be made agreeably to law unless otherwise directed,” etc. As amended by chapter 120 ⁶⁶⁰ of the Act of 1896, it reads that “ all State and county taxes and all municipal taxes shall be levied upon the assessments made in conformity to the provisions of this article, and in conformity with all laws relating to revenue and taxes, and not embraced in this Article.” It is not likely that the Legislature made this change in the language used without some object in view, but the presumption is that when they repealed the section which referred to State and county taxes, and those in the City of Baltimore and re-enacted it by referring to State and county taxes and all municipal taxes, they meant what they said and did not intend to limit the latter to municipal taxes in Baltimore City, but intended to include municipal taxes of other cities, so far as the Act was applicable to them. These Acts of 1896 provided a general scheme of assessment for State, county and all municipal taxation, except in so far as otherwise provided, and undertook to define what property was liable, what was exempt from taxation, the methods of assessing stocks, bonds, etc. There are many places in them where Baltimore City is named — thus showing that when the Legislature meant it alone, it used the name of Baltimore.

In section 146 A, which provides for a tax of