Cox v. State

³²⁸ BLACKWELL, Judge. The Petitioner Jehu Cox (“Cox”) was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter under a criminal information charging attempted murder. He contends that attempted voluntary manslaughter is not a crime and thus his conviction should be set aside. We disagree and hold that attempted voluntary manslaughter is a crime under the common law of Maryland.

I Facts The significant facts are undisputed. On December 12, 1984, Michael Sewell, Pierre Haile and another friend named “Ronald” were walking along Wheeler Avenue in Baltimore City. Pierre Haile had a handgun in his possession. Cox, who was also carrying a handgun, and his companion approached the three men on the same side of the street.

An argument ensued which culminated in Cox and Haile discharging their guns at each other. The bullet fired by Cox struck Michael Sewell. Cox was charged by criminal information of attempted murder and related offenses, including assault and battery, unlawfully carrying a handgun and the use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. He was tried by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City (Johnson, J.) and was acquitted of attempted murder in the first and second degree, but convicted of attempted manslaughter, assault, carrying a handgun and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence.

The assault and carrying a handgun counts were merged and Cox received a ten year sentence for attempted manslaughter and a consecutive twenty-year sentence for use of a handgun in a crime of violence. An appeal was timely filed to the Court of Special Appeals, and that Court affirmed the convictions. Cox v. ³²⁹ State, 69 Md.App. 396 , 518 A.2d 132 (1986). We granted Cox’s petition for writ of certiorari which presented the following issues: (1) Is the conviction and sentence for attempted voluntary manslaughter invalid because no such crime exists under the common law of Maryland?

(2) Does the conviction for use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence fail for lack of a valid predicate crime of violence? II Attempt The law of attempt exists because “there is just as much need to stop, deter and reform a person who has unsuccessfully attempted or is attempting to commit a crime than one who has already committed such an offense.” Young v. State, 303 Md. 300, 301 , 493 A.2d 352, 353 (1985) (citing W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 59 at 426 (1972) and Stuart, The Actus Reus in Attempts, 1970 Crim.Law.Rev. 505, 511). The idea that an attempt to commit an offense is a crime came relatively late in Anglo-American jurisprudence. The early history of the crime of attempt was traced by the Court of Special Appeals in Gray v. State, 43 Md.App. 238 , 403 A.2d 853 , cert. denied, 286 Md. 747 (1979): “[The crime of attempt] had its origins in the Court of Star Chamber, during Tudor and early Stuart times.

Its crystallization into its present form, however, is generally traced to the case of Rex v. Scofield, Cald. 397, in 1784.... The doctrine was locked into its modern mold by 1801 with the case of Rex v. Higgins, 2 East 5____ In the wake of Scofield and Higgins, it was clear that an attempt to commit any felony or misdemeanor, of common law origin or created by statute, was itself a misdemeanor. ” Id. at 239, 403 A.2d 853 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). We first recognized a criminal attempt as a common law misdemeanor in Mitchell v. State, 82 Md. 527, 534 , 34 A. ³³⁰ 246, 248 (1896), however, a general definition was not set forth until almost 70 years later in Wiley v. State, 237 Md. 560 , 207 A.2d 478 (1965). Maryland does not have a general statute defining the offense of attempt. 1 Rather it has adopted the common law concept that the crime of attempt consists of intent to commit a particular offense coupled with some overt act in furtherance of the intent which goes beyond mere preparation.

Young v. State, supra, 303 Md. at 302 , 493 A.2d at 354 ; Hardy v. State, 301 Md. 124, 138-39 , 482 A.2d 474, 482 (1984); Lightfoot v. State, 278 Md. 231, 232-38 , 360 A.2d 426 (1976). In the literal sense, the word attempt means to try, it implies an effort to bring about a desired result. Hence, an attempt to commit a crime requires a specific intent. See R. Perkins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law 637 (3d ed. 1982).

The crime of attempt is an adjunct crime, it cannot exist by itself, but only in connection with another crime. Hardy v. State, supra, 301 Md. at 139 , 482 A.2d at 482 . Furthermore, it is not an essential element of a criminal attempt that there be a failure to consummate the commission of the crime attempted. Lightfoot v. State, supra, 278 Md. at 231 , 360 A.2d at 426 .

The crime of attempt expands and contracts and is redefined commensurately with the substantive offense. Hardy v. State, supra, 301 Md. at ³³¹ 139, 482 A.2d at 482 . Therefore it is applicable to many crimes, statutory or common law. Id.

The courts have upheld indictments and convictions for attempted murder, Hardy v. State, supra; attempted armed robbery, Young v. State, supra, and Lightfoot v. State, supra; attempt to commit statutory burglary, Tillett v. Warden, 215 Md. 596 , 135 A.2d 629 (1957); attempted rape in the first degree, Walker v. State, 53 Md.App. 171 , 452 A.2d 1234 (1982); attempted second degree rape, Gray v. State, supra, 43 Md.App. 238 , 403 A.2d 863 ; attempted third degree sexual offense, Holt v. State, 50 Md.App. 578 , 438 A.2d 1386 (1982); attempt to commit the statutory offense of escape, Jennings v. State, 8 Md.App. 321 , 259 A.2d 547 (1969), and a substantial number of other crimes of attempt. There is an exception, however, to the general rule that attempt applies to all offenses. Crimes that do not involve intent to do a criminal act generally fall outside the scope of the crime of attempt. If there is no intent to do a wrongful act, then usually there is no crime of attempt.

Ill Attempted Manslaughter Cox contends that voluntary manslaughter does not require proof of intent, and therefore the crime of attempt does not arise. His argument, in effect, is that voluntary and involuntary manslaughter are the same crime. This is incorrect. The distinction can best be shown by examining the elements of voluntary manslaughter not present in involuntary manslaughter.

We define voluntary manslaughter as an intentional homicide, done in a sudden heat of passion, caused by adequate provocation, before there has been a reasonable opportunity for the passion to cool. State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482 , 483 A.2d 759 (1984); State v. Ward, 284 Md. 189 , 396 A.2d 1041 (1978); Connor v. State, 225 Md. 543 , 171 A.2d 699 (1961); Whitehead v. State, 9 Md.App. 7 , 262 A.2d 316 (1970); Lindsay v. State, 8 Md.App. 100 , 258 A.2d 760 (1969); Gray v. State, 6 Md.App. 677 , 253 A.2d 395 (1969). Involuntary manslaughter, on the ³³² other hand, is defined as the unintentional killing done without malice, by doing some unlawful act endangering life, or in negligently doing some act lawful in itself, or by the negligent omission to perform a legal duty. Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341 , 164 A.2d 467 (1960); Carter v. State, 66 Md.App. 567 , 505 A.2d 545 (1986); Mills v. State, 13 Md. App. 196 , 282 A.2d 147 (1971); Rolfes v. State, 10 Md.App. 204 , 268 A.2d 795 (1970); State v. Gibson, 4 Md.App. 236 , 242 A.2d 575 (1968).

It is necessary under the