Coyne v. Supreme Conclave of the Improved Order of Heptasophs

Burke, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This record brings up for review the. propriety of an order of the Circuit Court No. 2, of Baltimore City, by which a demurrer to the bill of complaint in this case was sustained, and the bill dismissed. The facts are that Edfvard Coyne,' the father of Richard M. Coyne, Raymond W. Coyne, and Robert H. Coyne, infants, was a member of the J. F. Wiessner Conclave No. 458 of the Improved Order of Heptasophs; that by reason of his membership in that Conclave, he was entitled to a death benefit certificate in the Supreme Conclave of the ⁵⁵ Improved Order of Heptasophs, which certificate was duly issued to and accepted by him on June 25th, 1900; that the certificate was payable to Annie M. Coyne, his wife, who was designated as beneficiary, and by which certificate the defendant, the Supreme Conclave of the Improved Order of Heptasophs, promised and bound itself to pay out of its benefit fund to Annie M. Coyne, the sum of one thousand dollars within sixty days from the receipt of satisfactory proof of the death of the said Edward Coyne. Annie M. Coyne died in the lifetime of her husband, and he, in accordance of the constitution and by-laws of the Supreme Conclave of the Improved Order of Heptasophs, created a change in the beneficiary under the certificate by surrendering the same, and having a new certificate issued in which the defendant, Margaret Coyne, was named as beneficiary.

Although Margaret Coyne was designated as the beneficiary under the new certificate without any qualification upon the face thereof, it was understood and agreed between Edward Coyne and the said Margaret Coyne, that the death benefit of one thousand dollars, upon its receipt by the said Margaret, should be paid to Henrietta Buck, for the support and maintenance of Richard M. Coyne, Raymond W. Coyne, and Robert H. Coyne; that Margaret Coyne agreed with and promised the said Edward Coyne that she would pay the proceeds of the benefit certificate to Henrietta Buck for the uses and purposes above-mentioned; that Edward Coyne at first desired to "designate the said Henrietta Buck as beneficiary in the certificate, but was informed that under the constitution and by-laws of the Supreme Conclave of the Improved Order of Heptasophs he was not permitted to do, because she was not within the degree of relationship required by its constitution and by-laws. Edward Coyne departed this life on the second of September, 1906, and satisfactory proof of his death has been transmitted to the Supreme Conclave of the Improved Order of Heptasophs, in which proof of death the infant children of said Edward Coyne, whose names have been mentioned, were des ⁵⁶ ignated as claimants, but Margaret Coyne, notwithstanding the agreement between herself and Edward Coyne, hereinbefore stated, now claims the fund in her own right. If these facts be true, it cannot be doubted that the proceeds of the death benefit certificate when paid to Margaret Coyne should be charged with a trust in her hands in favor of the infant children of Edward Coyne. The facts are fully sufficient to raise a'valid trust, which a Court of equity should enforce. “No precise form of words is necessary to create a trust, but the intention must be clear.

The fact that a trust in lands is created must'be not only manifested and proved by a writing properly executed, but it must also be manifested and proved by such a writing what the trust is. The declaration of trust, whether written or oral, must be reasonably certain in its material terms; and this requisite of certainty includes the subject matter or property embraced within the trust, the beneficiaries or persons in whose behalf it is created, the nature and quantity of interest which they are to have, and the manner in which the trust is to be performed. If the language is so vague, general, or equivocal, that any of these necessary elements of the trust' is left in real uncertainty, then the trust must fail. No particular technical words need be used; even the words “trust” or “trustee” are not essential; any other words which unequivocally show an intention that the legal estate was vested in one person, but to be held in some manner, or for some purpose on behalf of another, if certain as to all other requisites, are sufficient.” 2 Pom.

Eq. Juris., sec. 1009. This Court in the Casualty Ins. Company’s case, 82 Md. 560 , said: “In determining whether or not a trust has been created Courts will take into consideration the situation and relations of the parties, the character of the property and the purpose which the settlor had in view in making the declaration.

No technical terms or expressions are needed. ■ It is sufficient if the language used shows that the settlor intended to create a trust, and clearly points out the property, the beneficiary, and the disposition to be made of the property.” The allegations of the bill, which we have in substance ⁵⁷ stated, are sufficiently certain and definite as to the subject matter of the trust, the persons to enjoy it, and the manner of its disposition to gratify the requirement of law as