Creaser v. Owens

Digges, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, we are once again asked to determine the relative rights and responsibilities of motor vehicle operators under the “boulevard rule.” That law, which at the time of the accident involved here was codified in the Maryland Code (1957) as Art. 66!/2, § 233, 1 commands that a driver upon approaching a “through highway” 2 ²⁴⁰ from an unfavored road must stop and yield the right of way to all traffic already in or which may enter the intersection during the entire time the unfavored driver encroaches upon the right of way; this duty continues as long as he is in the intersection and until he becomes a part of the flow of favored travellers or successfully traverses the boulevard. Cornias v. Bradley, 254 Md. 479 , 255 A. 2d 431 (1969). All of the many “boulevard rule” decisions of this Court have rigorously and consistently guarded the favored driver’s right of way at boulevard intersections.

And, although these decisions have at times been criticized as harsh, confusing, or overprotective, 3 the rule has not been judicially undermined or legislatively modified. 4 Despite the consistency of our many opinions construing the “boulevard rule” there have apparently been lingering doubts about the absoluteness of its application and attempts to create new exceptions to it. We hope that this decision, at least until the “boulevard rule” is modified by the Legislature, will finally remove all doubts about the rule’s application and dis ²⁴¹ courage the belief that there are other exceptions not already recognized by our case law. This suit began in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County when Martha Owens filed her declaration 5 against Frank Creaser seeking damages for injuries sustained when the school bus she was operating was struck by an automobile driven by Creaser. At the trial of this case, Judge Pugh, after concluding that Mrs. Owens was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, granted Creaser’s motion for a directed verdict which was made at the close of the plaintiff’s case.

On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, that court, in a 4-3 decision, reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. Owens v. Creaser, 14 Md. App. 593 , 288 A. 2d 394 (1972). The majority concluded that an unfavored driver is not always contributorily negligent as a matter of law when involved in an accident with a favored driver in a boulevard intersection. They held that a jury question was presented when, “due to the physical facts,” reasonable minds could differ as to whether Mrs. Owens proceeded into the boulevard intersection non-negligently.

And, therefore, she was “entitled to have a jury assay the quality of her conduct in light of the duties that were imposed upon her.” The minority protested this result stating the majority was carving out an exception to the “boulevard rule” where, in fact, none exists. We granted Creaser’s petition for certiorari in order to review this interpretation of the “boulevard rule” and its application to the facts here. We conclude that, as harsh as it may seem, no such exception to the “boulevard rule” exists which would permit recovery by Mrs. Owens. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.

The facts of this case and the inferences deducible therefrom, considered in the light most favorable to Mrs. Owens, appellee here (the party against whom the verdict was directed), reveal that on March 9, 1970, she ²⁴² was employed as a Montgomery County school bus driver. On that morning, she left her home shortly before 7:00 a.m. and drove the bus in an easterly direction on Stewartown Road toward its “T” intersection with Goshen Road en route to her first stop to pick up some school children. Vehicles proceeding on Stewartown Road are unfavored at that road’s intersection with Goshen Road as they are controlled by a stop sign. Goshen Road, the favored boulevard, is a two lane blacktopped way, approximately 20 feet wide, runs roughly north and south and has a posted speed limit of 40 miles per hour.

At this intersection, the driver of a vehicle approaching as Mrs. Owens did has a visibility to her left, a northerly direction, of not more than 200 feet as a more expansive line of vision is prevented by a hill and a curve in the road. The stop sign on Stewartown Road is placed about 8 feet west of the intersection and a driver’s vision at this point is further obstructed by a bank, large trees and bushes. Appellee testified that she intended to make a left turn onto Goshen Road. Initially she stopped at the sign, then slowly “creeped out” and stopped again just before entering the boulevard.

There, she once more checked traffic conditions to both sides. Seeing no traffic, but maintaining a vigilance to the north, she began to maneuver the bus through a left turn by placing it in second gear and starting forward at about 5 miles an hour. When the front of the bus had reached the center of Goshen Road, she saw the Cadillac driven by Creaser, appellant, jump over the crest of the hill at a rapid rate of speed, estimated by her to be about 60 miles per hour. In an attempt to avoid what appellee considered an imminent accident, she tried to accelerate her 30 foot bus so as to clear Creaser’s lane, but her efforts were unsuccessful and the collision occurred.

The front of the car struck the left front wheel of the bus and the impact of the crash turned the bus around and propelled appellee out of her “seat belt and seat.” A Montgomery County police officer, Donald Crowley, ²⁴³ investigated the accident and at trial his testimony placed the point of impact 1^-2 feet north of the northernmost edge of Stewartown Road and 5-6 inches into the northbound traffic lane on Goshen Road. He measured 166 feet of skid marks made by Creaser’s vehicle, 145 feet of which were in appellant’s southbound lane of traffic but the last 17 feet before impact and 4 feet after impact had crossed over the dividing line of the highway. Another witness, Charles Frazier, seated in his car which was parked about 400 yards north of the crest of the hill, estimated the speed of Creaser’s vehicle as between 60-65 miles per hour when it passed him and disappeared over the hill. Confronted with this factual pattern, the majority of the seven-judge panel hearing the case in the Court of Special Appeals decided that “it was possible, indeed probable, for a finder of facts rationally to conclude, that due to the physical facts, the unfavored driver was not negligent.” We do not accept this conclusion.

We have reviewed the more than fifty opinions of this Court which have considered the “boulevard rule,” and in none has there been any suggestion that the topography of an area which limits an unfavored driver’s view of travellers on the favored highway would relieve him of the heavy responsibility placed on him by the stringent requirements of this law. We will not undertake the Herculean task of discussing fully all of these prior decisions of this Court, but will just note that they have all jealously guarded and upheld the favored driver’s right of way on the favored boulevard. In fact, Maryland cases seem to go as far as any of our sister states in upholding such rights of travel. Brown v. Ellis, 236 Md. 487, 495 , 204 A. 2d 526 (1964).

The essence of these decisions, when distilled to their purest form, leaves no doubt that the duty of the unfavored driver to yield the right of way extends to traffic on the whole of the favored road and the driver on the favored highway has a right to assume that he will do so. Dunnill v. Bloomberg, 228 Md. 230 , 179 A. 2d 371 ²⁴⁴ (1962) ; Ness v. Males, 201 Md. 235 , 93 A. 2d 541 (1953) ; Baltimore Transit Co. v. O’Donovan, 197 Md. 274 , 78 A. 2d 647 (1951). When the operator of a vehicle enters the favored highway in disregard of these explicit and mandatory rules and collides with another vehicle approaching thereon, the collision must be at least partially attributed to his negligence. Blinder v. Monaghan, 171 Md. 77 , 188 A. 31 (1936).

It is firmly established in this State that when the “boulevard rule” is applicable the unfavored driver is negligent as a matter of law when sued or contributorily negligent as a matter of law when suing. This does not automatically mean that the unfavored driver will be liable for damages in a case he is defending or unable to recover in a case in which he is the plaintiff, but then, in order to prevail, other factors must be present — either he must be able to establish that the favored driver was contributorily negligent or his claim must be rescued by the doctrine of last clear chance. Of course, once the unfavored driver has entered the flow of favored traffic he is entitled to the same rights and subject to the same duties as other drivers on the highway. Grue v. Collins, 237 Md. 150, 157 , 205 A. 2d 260 (1964).

However, until he attains that status, neither excessive speed by the favored driver nor the obstructed vision of the unfavored driver will be heard as an excuse for his failure to yield the right of way. See, e.g., Dunnill v. Bloomberg, 228 Md. 230 , 179 A. 2d 371 (1962) ; Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24 , 169 A. 2d 661 (1961) ; Sun Cab Company, Inc. v. Cusick, 209 Md. 354 , 121 A. 2d 188 (1956). To expand our discussion of this law, we again focus on what was so aptly stated for this Court by Judge Ogle Marbury in Shedlock v. Marshall, 186 Md. 218 , 46 A. 2d 349 (1946), more than twenty-five years ago but which may have been lost sight of in the ensuing period of time: “What the statutes, as interpreted by [all the Maryland] decisions, mean is that a driver ²⁴⁵ who enters, from an unfavored highway, an intersection with a favored boulevard or arterial highway where there are no traffic controls must yield the right of way to all the traffic he finds there during the entire time he is there. If he does not, and a collision results, he is at fault and cannot recover against the other driver unless the doctrine of last clear chance enters the case.

So far as his rights as a plaintiff are concerned, it makes no difference what the other party does in the first instance. He is negligent because he has not yielded the road. Being negligent himself, his action is barred. But when he is made a defendant in an action for damages resulting from the collision, he can always show that the other party was also guilty of negligence contributing to the accident, and if he succeeds in this, no verdict can be obtained against him.

Then both parties are negligent.” (Emphasis added.) In order to make crystal clear our holding here, we emphasize that if an unfavored driver is involved in an accident with a favored vehicle under circumstances where the boulevard law is applicable then in a suit based on that collision the unfavored driver is deemed to be negligent as a matter of law. And, if the unfavored driver is a plaintiff, his suit is defeated unless the doctrine of last clear chance rescues his claim. See, Trionfo v. Hellman, 250 Md. 12 , 241 A. 2d 554 (1968) ; Greenfeld v. Hook, 177 Md. 116 , 8 A. 2d 888 (1939). Whereas, if the unfavored driver is a defendant he is liable except in the rare case when the issue of contributory negligence on the part of the favored driver is properly submitted to a jury, i.e., whether he was guilty of negligence that was a proximate cause of the accident.

See Brown v. Ellis, 236 Md. 487 , 204 A. 2d 526 (1964) ; Dunnill v. Bloomberg, 228 Md. 230 , 179 A. 2d 371 (1962) ; Green v. Zile, 225 Md. 339 , 170 A. 2d 753 (1961) ; Harper v. Higgs,