Crise v. Smith

³²⁴ Parke, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal brings before us for construction a post-nuptial deed of settlement made by a third party to trustees under circumstances which are not fully disclosed by the record, but which are sufficient, with the concessions of fact made in the argument, to justify the inference that the unmarried nominal settlor, Elsie E. Crise, was selected for the purpose of having the real and personal property of Clarence L. Crise, together with the interest therein of his then wife, May F. Crise, conveyed to Elsie E. Crise, in order that this grantee might forthwith grant and convey the real and personal property so acquired to trustees as previously agreed. Accordingly, on the same day that she so acquired her title, Elsie E. Crise granted and conveyed it to Samuel K. Smith and John Watson, Jr., as trustees for the purposes of the settlement. The deed of trust was dated February 11th, 1916, and the trustees united with Elsie E. Crise in its execution for the purpose of signifying their acceptance of the trust.

The deed of trust was recorded and jurisdiction of the trust was assumed in equity on May 31st, 1916, upon the petition of the conventional trustees. After a conveyance of the real and personal property to the trustees, who were given ample and complete power with respect to sale, lease, conveyance, assignment, investment, re-investment and change of investments of the trust estate, and who were required to pay a list of creditors, aggregating $2,302.31, as soon as convenient after October 11th, 1917, the deed of trust directed the trustees to apply the income collected from the estate, first, to the payment of all taxes, fixed charges, including the mortgage obligation, and a commission to the trustees, and, “Second: Beginning with the date hereof and continuing as hereinafter recited, to pay for the support of Clarence L. Crise and May F. Crise, his wife, and their children, so long as said Clarence L. Crise and May F. Crise, and the survivor of them, shall live, the net balance of said income, or so much thereof as said trustees shall deem right ³²⁵ and proper; provided, however (and not otherwise), that .said sums of money payable for the support of said Clarence L. Crise and his wife and his children, may bo paid into the hands of said Clarence L. Crise or May E. Crise, his wife, in proper person, and not into the hands of any other person or corporation whatsoever, whether claiming by, through or under said Clarence L. Crise or May E. Crise, his wife; and provided further (and this deed is made conditioned precedent upon this proviso), that no part of either principal or income of the property hereby intended to be conveyed, or the reinvestment of such principal and income, is or may bo made liable for the debts, contracts or obligations of said Clarence L. Crise and May F. Crise, or either of them, or in any way subject to the control or disposition of them or either of them; * * * “And for the purposes aforesaid or whenever to said trustees or their successors it may appear advantageous, said Elsie R. Crise doth hereby empower said trustees and their ■successors to bargain, sell, convey, lease, transfer, grant, assign and deliver and in any and every other manner1, conditionally and absolutely, to dispose of, all and any of the property and estate then held by said trustees or their successors in the trust, and upon the death of both said Clarence L. Crise and May E. Crise, his wife, and upon the payment to the persons hereinabove recited of the amounts payable to them each as aforesaid, the trust hereby created shall cease, and the title to the property affected by this deed shall vest, free of the trusts hereby created, in those persons who, at that time, under the present laws of Maryland relating to inheritance, would he the heirs at law of said Clarence L. Crise; and for selling or otherwise disposing of any or all ■of said property, and for distributing it to those entitled to receive it at the expiration of the trust hereby created, the trustees hereunder, or their successors, shall receive a sum of money equal to the commissions allowable by the Circuit Court of Baltimore City to trustees doing similar services under its jurisdiction.” ³²⁶ A construction of these provisions of the deed, which in-' elude the provisions of a spendthrift trust, was sought as a result of the termination of the marital status of the life tenants by their subsequent full divorce. On March 10th, 1921, Olarence L. Orise instituted proceedings in the 'Circuit Court of Baltimore City to obtain a divorce a» vinculo matrimonii from his wife, May E. Orise; and on May 23rd, 1921, he obtained a decree for an absolute divorce, but there is nothing in the record to indicate upon which of the several statutory grounds the divorce was secured. The decree awarded to the mother the custody and guardianship of their only child, Dorothy May Orise, and charged the father with this infant’s support and maintenance.

Since the divorce, the mother has married George F. King, Jr., with whom she and the daughter reside in Florida;, and the trustees have continued to pay a portion of the income to the divorced wife. On April 28th, 1925, Olarence L. Orise filed a petition asking that the chancellor direct the trustees to cease paying any part of the income to her, and, on September 23rd Elsie R. Orise filed a similar petition. The basis of relief was alike in each petition, which advanced the theory that the dissolution of the marriage bond between Olarence L. Orise and May F. Orise put an end to all her interest and estate under the deed of trust. The chancellor, however, held that the wife’s status as a beneficiary under the deed of trust was not affected by the absolute divorce granted her husband, and dismissed both petitions.

The position of the appellants is that a divorce a vinculo matrimonii procured by one spouse on any ground is equivalent to the death of the spouse who has afforded the cause for the decree of dissolution. It is true that, as a general rule and independently of" statute, a divorce a vinculo ends all rights of either spouse dependent on marriage, and not actually vested, as curtesy, dower and property rights under statutes of distribution, but as a rule transfers of property and contracts executed before divorce are not affected by the dissolution of the marital tie. Thus, if a tenancy by entirety ³²⁷ exists, a divorce a vinculo matrimonii is not equivalent in law to the natural death of the guilty spouse, but merely effects a destruction of one of the essential unities upon whose continuance the estate depended; and, so, the severance of the unity of husband and wife by a complete divorce operates to make the divorced parties .hold as tenants in common, no matter whose was the marital fault. Reed v. Reed, 109 Md. 690 , 693 ; Masterman v. Masterman. 129 Md. 167 ; Brell v. Brell, 143 Md. 443 ; Stellz v. Shreck, 128 N. Y. 263 .

The decree of dissolution in a divorce a, vinculo is a determination of the marriage contract by a method unknown to the common law (Wright v. Wright, 2 Md. 428, 447, 451 ) ; and lienee it is that all contractual or property rights of either spouse, not arising out of and dependent upon the continuance of tlie marriage status, survive the divorce a, vinculo, and fall within the scope and operation of the rules and principles governing similar contractual or property rights. So, the general rule, deducible from the great weight of authority, is that a marriage settlement, which was valid in its formation and which was not fraudulently induced in contemplation of the subsequent marital misconduct, is not abrogated by the divorce of the parties for marital misconduct arising after the marriage, unless the language of the instrument or contract contains an express provision against the conduct in question. This rule is sound in principle, and finds support in the decisions of this Court in Michael v. Morey, 26 Md. 239 , 262 to 265 ; Kremelberg v. Kremelberg, 52 Md. 553, 563, 565, 573-575 , 581 ; Schnepfe v. Schnepfe, 124 Md. 330, 342-345 , and also in the clear preponderance of authority. See 2 Bishop on Marriage, Divorce and Separation, secs. 1654-1659; 3 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed.), sec. 1110; 29 A. L. R. 198 et seq.; 35 A. L. R. 139 and note ; Blount v. Winter, 3 P. Wms. 276, 24 Eng.

Reprint, 1063 ; Jee v. Thurlow, 2 Barn. & C. 547, 107 Eng. Reprint, 487 ; Fearon v. Aylesford (1884), L. R., 14 Q. B. 792 ; Wasteneys v. Wasteneys (1900) A. C. 446; Fitzgerald v. Chapman, ³²⁸ L. R. 1 Ch. D. 563 (overruling Fussell v. Dowding, L. R., 14 Eq. 423, and Wilkinson v. Gibson, L. R., 4 Eq. 162) ; Burton v. Sturgeon, L. R., 2 Ch. D. 318 ; Codrington v. Codrington, L. R., 7 H. L. 854 ; Evans v. Carrington, 2 De G., F. & J. 481, 45 Eng.

Rep. 707 ; Norris v. Norris, 1 Swab. & Tr. 174, 164 Eng. Rep. 680 ; Charlesworth v. Holt, L. R., 9 Exch. 38 ; Sweet v. Sweet (1895), 1 Q. B. 12 ; Baynon v. Batley, 8 Bing. 256, 131 Eng. Rep. 400 ; Goslin v. Clark, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 681 ; Sidney v. Sidney, 3 P. Wms. 375, 24 Eng.

Rep. 1060 ; Seagrave v. Seagrave, 13 Ves. 443, 33 Eng. Rep. 358 ; Buttlar v. Buttlar, 67 N. J. Eq. 136 ; Galusha v. Galusha, 116. N. Y. 635 ; Babcock v. Smith, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 61 ; Chase v. Phillips, 153 Mass. 17 ; Kinsey v. Kinsey, 115 Mo. 496 ; Dixon v. Dixon, 23 N. J. Eq. 316 ; Warren v. Warren, 88 N. J. Eq. 612 ; Lister v. Lister, 35 N. J. Eq. 49, 37 N. J. Eq. 331 ; Converse v. Converse, 9 Rich.

Eq. (S. C.) 535. It follows that an existing trust, which was not involved in the divorce proceedings, is not abrogated by the divorce, and that the rights of the cestuis que trustent} which were created and became fixed upon the execution and delivery of the deed of trust, can not be impaired by litigation between these