Cromwell v. Ward

CATHELL, Judge. Appellant, David Cromwell, appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County (Daniels, J., presiding) affirming the order of the Board of Appeals granting a height variance for an accessory building already built by appellee, Arthur Thomas Ward, III. Appellant poses the following questions: I. Whether the self-imposed or self-created hardship discussed in the Maryland case law on variances ⁶⁹⁴ requires an intentional act, such as ignoring or flaunting [sic] the zoning regulations.

II

Does the record before the Honorable Lawrence Daniels support a finding that had the accessory building been built in accordance with the height regulations of Baltimore County, the accessory building would necessarily require a different pitch from all other buildings on the property?

III

Can a difference in roof’pitches between an accessory budding and a home constitute a “practical difficulty or unreasonable hardship” within the meaning of § 307 of the Baltimore County Zoning Regulations? While those questions are limited, appellant expands in his arguments supporting the questions and argues that [t]he restrictions of the applicable ordinance, taken in conjunction with the unique circumstances affecting the property, must be the proximate cause of the hardship [Emphasis added.] and Section 307.1 requires that variances only be granted in cases where special circumstances or conditions exist that are peculiar to the land or structure which is the subject of the variance request____ [Emphasis added.] and Mr. Ward’s property is not unique from the others in the Ruxton area. [Emphasis added.] Although somewhat indirectly, appellant has pointed out an important aspect of the nature of the variance process, i.e., it is at least a two-step process. The first step requires a finding that the property whereon structures are to be placed (or uses conducted) is—in and of itself—unique and unusual in a manner different from the nature of surrounding properties such that the uniqueness and peculiarity of the subject property causes the zoning provision to impact disproportionately upon that property. Unless there is a finding that the property is unique, unusual, or different, the process stops here and ⁶⁹⁵ the variance is denied without any consideration of practical difficulty or unreasonable hardship.

If that first step results in a supportable finding of uniqueness or unusualness, then a second step is taken in the process, ie., a determination of whether practical difficulty and/or 1 unreasonable hardship, resulting from the disproportionate impact of the ordinance caused by the property’s uniqueness, exists. Further consideration must then be given to the general purposes of the zoning ordinance. What we have recently observed in Baltimore County, and in other jurisdictions as well, and what occurred in the case at bar, is a reversal of the required process. Instead of first determining whether the subject property is unusual or unique, the zoning authorities are first determining whether a practical difficulty or unreasonable hardship exists.

That determination is then used to create a unique and unusual situation as to the subject property because surrounding properties do not experience the hardship or difficulty. In the case sub judice, appellee’s act of constructing a building of such a height as to produce a roof pitched at the angle he desired caused the roof to extend above the fifteen-foot height limit. This fact alone was found by the Board (and affirmed by the trial court) to make the property’s problems unique. Simply stated, the variance that is desired (and the difficulties that would exist if it is not granted) cannot be the source of the first prong of the variance process—an inherent uniqueness of the subject property not shared by surrounding properties. ⁶⁹⁶ The Facts Appellee’s contractor, Donald S. Huber and Company, Inc. (Huber), prepared plans for a garage, wine cellar, and storage area on appellee’s property.

Using these plans, Huber, on appellee’s behalf, applied for a building permit, noting on the application that it was to construct a two story “garage and wine cellar;” “[second] story to be used as storage, [first] floor for garage and wine testing room. Cellar will be for wine.” The application indicates that some prior height indication was marked over on the application for a permit and a new mark was made indicating the anticipated height of the structure to be fourteen feet. Huber admitted that he had little experience with the zoning requirements for accessory buildings and was unaware of the height limitations. The County’s automated tracking system, in creating its general permit application data on the subject property, noted: “Height: 14’ ” and “Stories: 2+ CELL.” The plans presented to the County included a “Left Side Elevation” but no height is shown on the elevation plan.

Neither, as far as we have been able to find, does the plan contain a scale from which the “Left Side elevation” can be determined. The plans also include a “Front Elevation” from which actual proposed heights are also conspicuously, almost suspiciously, absent given that all other dimensions appear to be included on the plans. We have, however, extrapolated from a horizontal distance indicated on the lower right-hand corner of the “Second Floor Plan” that fourteen feet five and one-half inches equals slightly over three and one-half inches on our ruler. It would appear that the front elevation plan indicates five and one-fourth inches on our ruler or approximately twenty-one and one-half feet in height.

When measured in similar fashion, the left side elevation indicates a similar height. Thus, if the other measurements are correct, a method existed in which, even absent a scale, rough height elevations might have been discernable, though we are at a loss to understand why the ⁶⁹⁷ elevations were not given in feet and why the plans contained no scale. 2 After receiving a building permit, appellee proceeded to construct the building that violated the fifteen foot height requirement. During the building process, inspections were made of footings, foundations, framing, and electrical service. Final occupancy was then given.

Later, the building was discovered to be twenty-one feet in height. 3 Appellee then successfully applied for an after the fact variance. Appellant appealed to the Board of Appeals and it, in a two to one decision, granted the variance that the circuit court ultimately affirmed. The Law The State Zoning Enabling Act was first passed in 1927 by Chapter 705 of the Acts of 1927. It has since been codified as Article 66B of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1957, 1988 Repl.Vol., 1994 Cum.Supp.).

While it was generally believed that local subdivisions did not have to enact zoning regulations (and some did not), if enacted, they normally had to conform to the provisions of Article 66B. Baltimore County, however, is a charter county and is exempt from many of the provisions in Md.Code Art. 66B. See Md.Code Art. 66B § 7.03 which provides “Except as provided in [sections not pertinent here] ... this article does not apply to the chartered counties of Maryland.” Nevertheless, the language of Art. 66B relating to variances is virtually identical to the provisions of the Baltimore County ordinance. ⁶⁹⁸ The Article 66B provision that provides for variance authority in local zoning ordinances is section 1.00(j). As relevant to an area variance, this section defines a variance under Art. 66B as follows: [Modification only of density, bulk, or area requirements in the zoning ordinance ... where owing to conditions peculiar to the property, and not the result of any action taken by the applicant, a literal enforcement ... would result in either, as specified by the local governing body in a zoning ordinance, unnecessary hardship or practical difficulty. [Emphasis added.] The Baltimore County Zoning Ordinance in section 307, “Variances,” provides, in relevant part, that variances from the ordinances provision, i.e., height, may be granted only in cases where special circumstances or conditions exist that are peculiar to the land or structure which is the subject of the variance request and where strict compliance ... would result in practical difficulty or unreasonable hardship. [Emphasis added.] Accordingly, we shall, in our discussion of cases, refer extensively to cases under the provisions relating to Art. 66B as well as cases under the Baltimore County provisions.

The Baltimore County ordinance requires “conditions ... peculiar to the land ... and ... practical difficulty.... ” Both must exist. But the terms “practical difficulty” and “unreasonable hardship” are stated in the ordinance disjunctively. Thus, at least as to variances other than use variances, 4 if the property is found to be unique, the practical difficulty standard would then apply. We address practical difficulty at some length hereafter.

However, as is clear from the language of the Baltimore County ordinance, the initial factor * that must be established before the practical difficulties, if any, are addressed, is the abnormal impact the ordinance has on a specific piece of property because of the peculiarity and ⁶⁹⁹ uniqueness of that piece of property, not the uniqueness or peculiarity of the practical difficulties alleged to exist. It is only when that uniqueness is first established that we then concern ourselves with the practical difficulties (or unnecessary hardships in use variance cases). Because we have discerned that some of the confusion in this and other jurisdictions may have arisen because of a tendency to intermingle the concepts of special exceptions/conditional uses 5 (where normally an applicant has an easier burden) and variances, we shall first discuss the cases (local as well as foreign) and treatises in which the terms are distinguished. We shall then discuss our cases and certain of those elsewhere in which the proper (and, on occasion, improper) applications of variance law have been applied.

The Baltimore County statute will then be restated and applied to the facts and circumstances of the case sub judice. Special Exceptions (and Conditional Uses) and Variance—Distinguished The treatise writers define the concept as: A variance is an authorization for [that] ... which is prohibited by a zoning ordinance.... ... [T]he difference between the two [variances and special exceptions] ... is of practical significance.... “... [T]he variance and exception are designed to meet two entirely different needs. The variance contemplates a departure from the terms of the ordinance in order to preclude confiscation of property, while the exception ⁷⁰⁰ contemplates a permitted use ... [once] the prescribed conditions therefor are met.” ... [A] variance is “authority ... to use his property in a manner forbidden ...,” while an exception “allows him to put his property to a use which the enactment expressly permits.” ... [T]he standards for ... exceptions are usually less stringent than in the case of variances. A Maryland court summarized this difference and the reason for it. “A special exception ... is one which is controlled and ... permissible in a given zone.

It is granted ... upon a finding conditions of the zoning ordinance are satisfied. A variance is authorized ... where the literal enforcement of its terms would result in unnecessary hardships.” 3 Robert M. Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 18.02-03 (2d ed. 1977) (footnotes omitted) (quoting in part Stacy v. Montgomery County, 239 Md. 189, 193 , 210 A.2d 540 (1965)). See also Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1, 11 , 432 A.2d 1319 (1981); People’s Counsel v. Mangione, 85 Md.App. 738, 748 , 584 A.2d 1318 (1991). A distinction commonly is made between [special] exceptions ... and variances____ An “exception” ... is a dispensation permissible where a board ... finds existing those facts ... specified in the ordinance as sufficient---- “...

But zoning ordinances usually provide for another kind of dispensation, ... by which a variance ... may be authorized ... where a literal enforcement ... would result in unnecessary hardship.” 8 Eugene McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.160 (3d ed. rev. 1991) (footnotes omitted). The general rule is that variances and exceptions are to be granted sparingly, only in rare instances and under peculiar and exceptional circumstances.... A variance should be strictly construed.... Id. § 25.162 (footnotes omitted).

See also 5 Norman Williams, Jr. et al., American Land Planning Law § 133.01 (1985 rev.); 3 Arden H. Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning ⁷⁰¹ § 38.01 (4th ed. 1981); 3 E.C. Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice § 21-6 (4th ed. 1979); 3 Robert M. Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 14.55 (1968); Anderson, supra § 18.30 (2d ed.). Maryland courts, and courts elsewhere, have generally made the same distinction. There is a marked distinction between “variance” and “special exception” in Montgomery County. A special exception ... is expressly permissible.... [A zoning board has authority to grant] variances from the strict application of this chapter when by reason of exceptional narrowness, shallowness, or shape of specific parcels of property ... or by reason of exceptional topographical conditions or other extraordinary situations ... of specific parcels of property, the strict application ... would result in ... unusual practical difficulties to, or exceptional or undue hardship....

Stacy, 239 Md. at 193 , 210 A.2d 540 . Judge Hammond for the Court of Appeals noted in Montgomery County v. Merlands Club, Inc., 202 Md. 279, 288-91 , 96 A.2d 261 (1953): It is the common practice to join an application for an exception with an application for a variance, leaving it to the Board to decide on which ground it will grant the application. As a result, many cases discuss exceptions and variances without differentiation, yet the two do differ, and one important distinction is that where a specific use is permitted by the legislative body in a given area ... the application can be granted without a showing of hardship or other conditions which are necessary for the allowance of a variance .... ... There is a distinction between ... the ordinance provisions ... in those cases [Baltimore City cases] and the facts and the ordinance provision in this case....

See also our case of Martin Marietta Aggregates v. Citizens, 41 Md.App. 26, 34-35 , 395 A.2d 179 (1978). ⁷⁰² A conditional use is not a variance. The primary difference between the two is that a conditional use is not an exceptional [6] use. A conditional use is a desirable use which is attended with detrimental effects which require that certain conditions be met.... While a variance is a departure from the terms of an ordinance, a conditional use is a permitted use ... so long as ... conditions are met.

Therefore, conditional use grants cannot be encompassed within the ... statutory authority to grant variances. Eberhart v. Indiana Waste Systems, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 455, 459 (Ind.App. 3 Dist.1983) (citations omitted). In a case affirming the granting of a special exception, the court in Ash v. Rush County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 464 N.E.2d 347, 350 (Ind.App. 1 Dist.1984), opined: A great deal of confusion has been generated ... because of the parties’ failure to distinguish among rezoning amendments, variances, and special exceptions____ A variance involves a deviation ... from the legislated zoning classification .... A special exception involves a use which is permitted ... once certain statutory criteria have been satisfied. [Citations omitted.] See also Lindquist v. Board of Adjustment, 490 So.2d 16, 18 (Ala.Civ.App.1986) (“Thus a special exception is not truly an exception to the zoning regulations at all”) and (“a special exception may not be used as a substitute for a variance in order to avoid the ... burden of proving ... hardship”); Wolfher v. Board of Adjustment, 672 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Mo.

App.1984) (“an exception is legislatively permitted whereas a variance is legislatively prohibited, but may be allowed for special reasons”); Urban Farms, Inc. v. Franklin Lakes, 179 N.J.Super. 203 , 431 A.2d 163, 167 (A.D.), cert. denied, 87 N.J. 428 , 434 A.2d 1099 (1981) (special exception and variance defined—case decided on zoning estoppel basis); A.J. Grosek & Associates v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 69 Pa.Cmwlth. 38 , 450 ⁷⁰³ A.2d 263, 265 (1982); Bell v. City Council, 224 Va. 490 , 297 S.E.2d 810, 813-14 (1982). VARIANCE— The First Step—Uniqueness or Peculiarity of the Subject Property The general rule is that the authority to grant a variance should be exercised sparingly and only under exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., A. Rathkopf, 3 The Law of Zoning and Planning § 38 (1979). Doorack v. Board of Adjustment, 709 S.W.2d 140, 143 (Mo.App.1986).

See also McMorrow v. Board of Adjustment, 765 S.W.2d 700, 701-02 (Mo.App.1989); Taylor v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 738 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Mo.App.1987). The requirement of uniqueness of the subject property, as we have indicated, is specifically set out for noncharter counties in the State enabling legislation, Md.Code Article 66B, and it is also set out in the Baltimore County ordinance applicable here. Additionally, it has been a necessary prerequisite almost since the inclusion of variance practice in zoning laws—and, before that, it was a part of Maryland case law. That case law is in accord generally with the case law elsewhere as we shall later discuss.

Early on, prior to the State specifically empowering local governments to delegate the granting of variances to zoning boards, the Maryland Court of Appeals found that the delegation of power to an administrative board to grant variances from the terms of a zoning “type” ordinance was improper because the board of zoning appeals is in effect given the power to set aside or annul the ordinance ... with no more definite standard or guide than that such action may only be taken when there are “practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships” .... [UJnder our system of written constitutions it is essential that they accomplish those ... objects in conformity with the restrictions, rules, and limitations which the law itself provides and not in disregard of them.... For such ⁷⁰⁴ phrases as “practical difficulties,” “unnecessary hardships,” “substantial justice,” are too general and indefinite to furnish such a guide, or to mark the limits or control the exercise of the power conferred.... Jack Lewis, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 164 Md. 146, 151 , 164 A. 220 , appeal dismissed, 290 U.S. 585 , 54 S.Ct. 56 , 78 L.Ed. 517 (1933) (though it questioned the variance provisions under which the appellant sought a variance to operate a funeral home, it upheld the restriction prohibiting the funeral home in the first instance). In Sugar v. North Baltimore Methodist Protestant Church, 164 Md. 487 , 165 A. 703 (1933), the Court likewise found the board’s powers to grant special exceptions to permit a confectionery store where otherwise prohibited to be invalid for the same reasons.

In moving towards an acceptance of variance procedures, the Court noted that the “increasing need for garages in the cities was one of the main reasons for the rapid spread of zoning in this country.” Heath v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 187 Md. 296, 300 , 49 A.2d 799 (1946). By the time of its decision in Heath, the Court had accepted the inevitable need for formal variance and special exception provisions, noting that “[c]haos would result if [a building engineer] were allowed to make exceptions or variances in his own discretion.” 187 Md. at 301 , 49 A.2d 799 . The Court further pointed to the special exception powers of the Board of Zoning Appeals as a legally acceptable alternative. The Court also observed that, in response to its decisions in Jack Lewis and Sugar , the city had amended the Baltimore City ordinance to incorporate additional standards to guide the Board.

The Court then correctly defined an exception as “a dispensation permissible where the Board ... finds ... those facts ... specified in the ordinance....” Id. 187 Md. at 303 , 49 A.2d 799 . It was then that the court, for the first time that we can discern, combined exceptions and variances when discussing conformity to the rules in' regard to the grant of either. This is the first instance where the two concepts were intermingled with respect to the Baltimore City ordinance. To a certain extent, this intermingling has, from time to time, created some ⁷⁰⁵ confusion in the cases arising out of Baltimore City.

Because of the proportionately larger number of cases arising out of that jurisdiction, that confusion can be seen in subsequent cases arising from other jurisdictions. This intermingling increased over the years and, during this time, Baltimore City amended its ordinance and eventually became subject to an ordinance that does not distinguish between variances and exceptions except as to the title of their respective sections. In other words, Baltimore City, by the terms of its ordinance, applies the same standards to both variances and special exceptions; this standard is the one used elsewhere for variances. Thus, the Baltimore City special exceptions procedure is one only by title.

For all practical purposes, it is also a variance procedure. Caution should always be used therefore when a court is concerned with special exceptions, as reliance on the cases from Baltimore City may well lead one to rely on inapposite zoning concepts and cases. Judge Marbury, for the Court of Appeals, noticed this unusual circumstance in Dampman v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 231 Md. 280, 285 , 189 A.2d 631 (1963) (“In Baltimore City there appears to be no distinction between the two terms.... ”). 7 We also attempted to indicate the problem in North v. St. Mary’s County, 99 Md.App. 502, 510 , 638 A.2d 1175 (1994), in footnote 3: Baltimore City’s zoning code makes no distinction between special exceptions and variances. Its code treats special exceptions as if they were variances.... [I]t is generally inexact to rely on Baltimore City cases when a special exception is at issue in another jurisdiction, but would be appropriate when a variance is at issue.

In any event, as to variances, the Court of Appeals, applying the uniqueness standard, stated: ⁷⁰⁶ [I]t was incumbent upon the Marinos to have shown ... (ii) that the difficulties or hardships were peculiar to the property in question in contrast with those of other property owners in the same district, and (iii) that the hardship was not the result of the applicants’ own actions. Marino v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 215 Md. 206, 218 , 137 A.2d 198 (1957) (emphasis added). Salisbury Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Bounds, 240 Md. 547 , 214 A.2d 810 (1965), also involved the completion of structural improvements in violation of an ordinance and a subsequent request for an after the fact variance.

The Court opined: The only evidence before the Board as to hardship or injustice involving the property was the fact that repairs and alteration work had been substantially completed before an application for either a variance or a building permit had been made and that what had been done could not be undone without financial hardship to appellees---- 240 Md. at 554 , 214 A.2d 810 . The Court first quoted from 2 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, § 48-1, and then noted: “Where property, due to unique circumstances applicable to it, cannot reasonably be adopted to use in conformity with the restrictions ... hardship arises.... The restrictions of the ordinance, taken in conjunction with the unique circumstances affecting the property must be the proximate cause of the hardship____ [T]he hardship, arising as a result of the act of the owner ... will be regarded as having been self-created, barring relief....” The instant case fits squarely within the above general rule____ [I]f the appellees had used proper diligence ... and then made accurate measurements ... [the resultant hardship could have been avoided]. The hardship ... was entirely self-created____ Id. at 554-55, 214 A.2d 810 (emphasis added).

Had Ward’s contractor, Huber, in the case at bar, checked the ordinance’s height limitation, the situation that now exists could easily have been avoided. See also Burns v. Mayor and City ⁷⁰⁷ Council of Baltimore, 251 Md. 554, 559 , 248 A.2d 103 (1968); Pem Constr. Co. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 233 Md. 372, 378 , 196 A.2d 879 (1964) (“[There was] no evidence of any limitation ... by ... size of yards, irregularity of shape of land or buildings, topography, grade or accessibility”....); Mayor and City Council v. Sapero, 230 Md. 291 , 186 A.2d 884 (1962); Frankel v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 223 Md. 97, 104 , 162 A.2d 447 (1960) (“It was incumbent ... to show that the hardship ... affected his particular premises and was not ... common to other property in the neighborhood .... [H]e met the burden.... ”); Park Shopping Center, Inc. v. Lexington Park Theatre Co., Inc., 216 Md. 271, 277-78 , 139 A.2d 843 (1958). Secs. 14(b), 14(d) and 16 ... have been held not to authorize a granting for the mere convenience to the owner but to require a showing of urgent necessity, hardship peculiar to the particular property....

Mayor and City Council v. Polakoff, 233 Md. 1, 9 , 194 A.2d 819 (1963). The Court in Kennerly v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 247 Md. 601, 606-07 , 233 A.2d 800 (1967), dismissed an appeal of the grant of a height variance for lack of standing, but, in doing so, nevertheless opined: Our dismissal of the appeal is not to be taken as showing that if the appeal properly was here we would affirm the Board. To grant a variance the Board must find from the evidence more than that the building allowed would be suitable or desirable or could do no harm or would be convenient for or profitable to its owner. The Board must find there was proof of “urgent necessity, hardship peculiar to the particular property....” ...

Specific reasons, specific bases to support the finding must be revealed by the evidence before the Board. [Emphasis added, citation omitted.] In McLean v. Soley, 270 Md. 208, 210 , 310 A.2d 783 (1973), one of the few reported Maryland appellate cases approving of a variance, the applicant for an area variance in connection ⁷⁰⁸ with an application to build forty units asserted that it was his desire to retain the “present trees and natural growth, terrain, and topography which provides excellent drainage and natural screening and beauty.” There was evidence that, if the applicant destroyed the existing trees, he could have built 330 units without needing a variance. It was established that a number of attractive trees along the western boundary would have to be destroyed absent a variance. The Court noted that “there was considerable evidence to show the natural beauty of these trees and their importance to the ecology.” 270 Md. at 211 , 310 A.2d 783 . The Court, seeming to acknowledge that it was making a detour from Maryland variance law, opined: Given the unique facts of this case, we think those criteria are met by this evidence: That the construction of the buildings in strict compliance with the sideyard requirements would result in the destruction of the trees; that the preservation of trees in the construction of the first section had contributed to full occupancy ... that the benefits of retaining the trees would accrue to the general public; that greater density would result from strict compliance____ Concededly, this is a close case, but it is nevertheless sufficient....

Id. at 215 , 310 A.2d 783 . We would have to agree that it is a close case. The opinion does not make mention that the practical difficulty resulted from the fact that the uniqueness of the property caused the ordinance to have a different impact on it than on adjoining property. Also, there was no evidence that the neighboring properties were in any way different than the subject property.

If the presence of trees on a particular lot was unique, that might have been a basis, but the court did not make that connection. Thus, this case, coupled with Loyola Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Buschman, 227 Md. 243 , 176 A.2d 355 (1961), and Frankel v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 223 Md. 97 , 162 A.2d 447 (1960), is among the affirmances of variances that we perceive to be, at best, extremely close calls and, as we shall indicate, exceedingly rare. ⁷⁰⁹ The Court in the sludge storage case of AD + Soil, Inc. v. County Comm’rs, 307 Md. 307 , 513 A.2d 893 (1986), reiterated the standards applicable to variances when it affirmed a trial court’s affirmance of a zoning agency’s denial of an area and other variances. The variances were necessary to satisfy the requirements for a conditional use permit to operate the sludge storage and distribution operation. The Court of Appeals noted that the trial court, in affirming the agency’s denial of a variance, agreed that “the only hardships facing Ad + Soil were of its own making.” 307 Md. at 317 , 513 A.2d 893 .

After addressing the important preemption issues therein raised, the Court directed its attention to the area variances sought and, referring to the Board’s findings, stated that, in Queen Anne’s County, the Board’s authority to grant variances was limited to a situation where “there are exceptional or extraordinary circumstances or special conditions applying to the property in question ... that do not apply generally to other properties ... in the ... district.” Id. at 340 , 513 A.2d 893 . The Court concluded: The board declined to grant the variances, concluding that Ad + Soil’s “hardship” was self-inflicted, and, in any event, that it was not the result of exceptional or extraordinary characteristics of the land itself and therefore not the kind of hardship cognizable under the Zoning Ordinance.... We think the Board’s decisions ... reflect no error of law. Id. at 340-41 , 513 A.2d 893 (emphasis added).

In Red Roof Inns, Inc. v. People’s Counsel, 96 Md.App. 219, 224 , 624 A.2d 1281 (1993), after noting the standard of review, we said: In reviewing the zoning authority’s decision, the court must consider all of the evidence in the administrative record. The reviewing court’s role, however, is confined to determining the legality of the procedure employed and whether the decision was fairly debatable in light of the evidence adduced before the zoning authority. ⁷¹⁰ The role of this Court “is essentially to repeat the task for the circuit court; that is, to be certain the circuit court did not err in its review.” [Citations omitted.] We then discussed the legal standards to utilize in respect to variances construing the same statute that applies in the case at bar, saying that variances may be granted “where special circumstances or conditions exist that are peculiar to the land ... and where strict compliance ... would result in practical difficulty____” Id. (emphasis added). We noted that, in regards to area variances, we were only concerned that the conditions peculiar to the land in question presented practical difficulties.

In concluding that the Board had not acted wrongly in denying the variance at issue (a sign variance), we noted: “Zoning matters, including sign variance requests, depend upon the unique facts and circumstances of a particular location and must be analyzed individually.” Id. at 227-28 , 624 A.2d 1281 (emphasis added). In North v. St. Mary’s County, 99 Md.App. at 512 , 638 A.2d 1175 , we held that the ordinance there required a finding that “special conditions or circumstances exist that are peculiar to the land____” We there stated that, in the zoning context, the term “unique” has a customized meaning: In the zoning context the “unique” aspect of a variance requirement does not refer to the extent of improvements upon the property, or upon neighboring property. “Uniqueness” of a property for zoning purposes requires that the subject property have an inherent characteristic not shared by other properties in the area, i.e., its shape, topography, subsurface condition, environmental factors, historical significance, access or non-access to navigable waters, practical restrictions imposed by abutting properties (such as obstructions) or other similar restrictions. In respect to structures, it would relate to such characteristics as unusual architectural aspects and bearing or party walls. In some zoning ordinances, the specialness or uniqueness requirement is more explicitly set out.

The Court of Ap ⁷¹¹ peals, in Ad + Soil, Inc. v. County Comm’rs, 307 Md. 307, 339 , 513 A.2d 893 (1986), quoted from the Queen Anne’s County ordinance: Where by reason of the exceptional narrowness, shallowness, or unusual shape of a specific ... property ..., or by reason of exceptional topographic conditions or other extraordinary situation or special condition of ... property ... the literal enforcement ... would make it exceptionally difficult ... to comply ... and would cause unwarranted hardship and injustice.... The general thrust of the meaning of special features or uniqueness of property for variance purposes relates to the type of uniqueness discussed by the Court in Ad + Soil, Inc. Id. at 514-15, 638 A.2d 1175 . One indication of the general rule that