Cromwell v. Willis & Homer

Briscoe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The record in this case contains three appeals from the Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City, but the principal question on each appeal involves a construction of that part of sec. 132, of Art. 75, of the Code which provides “that any person who resides in one county, but carries on any regular business or habitually engages in any avocation or employment in another county, may be sued in either county.” The question arose in this way. On the 7th of January, 1902, Messrs. George R. Willis and Francis T. Homer, of Baltimore City, law partners, doing business under the firm name of Willis & Homer, brought suit in the Court of Common Pleas, against Richard Cromwell,.Jr., Charles Hammond Cromwell, appellants, and Joseph R. Wilson, Jr., and Charles F. Digges, who have refused to unite in this appeal, for professional services rendered to the defendants.

Thereupon a ²⁶⁵ writ of summons was duly issued to the Sheriff of Baltimore City and was returned endorsed “ summoned omnes." On the 14th of January, 1902, the appellant Richard Cromwell, Jr., filed a motion that judgment of non pros be entered against him for the reason, that he was not at the time of the suit a resident of Baltimore City, but was a resident of Baltimore County: that no writ of summons had been sued out against him in that county and returned non est; that he does not carry on any regular business or habitually engage in any avocation or employment in Baltimore City. The case was heard upon the motion for non pros, and certain affidavits filed therewith. There was no other evidence and the record contains but one bill of exception and that embraces the rulings of the Court in overruling the motion and its refusal to enter the judgment of non pros. According to the evidence in this case, as presented by the record, the appellant while a resident of Baltimore County, was engaged and employed as president of the Lafayette Mill and Lumber Company of Baltimore City, a corporation duly incorporated for the purpose of buying and selling millwork ; that this company has its principal office in the Maryland Trust Building, Baltimore City, where the appellant attends for the transaction of its regular business, but receives no salary as such president.

Briefly stated, it is contended upon the part of the appellant under the facts of the case that holding the office of president of a commercial corporation, without receiving a salary, is not carrying on a regular business or engaging in an avocation or employment, within the meaning and intent of sec. 132 of Art. 75 of the Code, so as to render him liable to suit in Baltimore City, and that the Court of Common Pleas was therefore without jurisdiction to hear and determine the case. In other words, as stated by the appellant in his brief, sec. 132 of Art. 75 of the Code, applies only where the business carried on, or the avocation or employment engaged in, is the defendant’s own business, avocation or employment. The obvious answer to this contention is, that the statute ²⁶⁶ does not so limit and restrict its application to the defendant’s own business, but its broad language