Crosby v. State

ROSALYN B. BELL, Judge. Corey A. Crosby, aged 15, was charged as a juvenile with robbery with a deadly weapon and related offenses. In October, 1985, he appeared before the Circuit Court for Baltimore City sitting as a Juvenile Court. At the conclusion of the hearing, that court waived jurisdiction over the juvenile to the circuit court, 1 paving the way for Crosby to be tried as an adult.

On December 9, 1985, Crosby was charged as an adult with the same offenses. Before trial, Crosby moved to transfer jurisdiction back to the juvenile court. The circuit court denied the motion ruling that under the juvenile court waiver provisions codified at Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc.

Code Ann. § 3-804 (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol., 1985 Cum.Supp.) and § 3-817 (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.), and under the circuit court waiver provisions codified at Md. Code Ann. Art. 27, § 594A (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol., 1985 Cum.Supp.), it lacked jurisdiction to transfer the matter back to the juvenile court. That same day, Crosby was tried on a “not guilty — agreed statement of facts” and found guilty of robbery with a deadly weapon. Subsequently, the circuit court struck the original verdict and found Crosby guilty of robbery. Crosby appeals to this Court challenging the circuit court’s denial of his motion to transfer jurisdiction back to juvenile court.

We affirm, but for reasons other than those espoused by the circuit court. Before reaching the merits, however, we will set out the statutory relationship between the juvenile and circuit court in cases involving juveniles. The juvenile courts are created by statute and have limited jurisdiction. With certain exceptions, these courts ⁶⁰ have exclusive original jurisdiction over children alleged to have committed delinquent acts.

Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-804(a). 2 Subsection (e) to § 3-804 sets out those instances in which the juvenile court- does not have exclusive original jurisdiction: “(e) The court does not have jurisdiction over: (1) A child 14 years old or older alleged to have done an act which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, as well as all other charges against the child arising out of the same incident, unless an order removing the proceeding to the court has been filed under Article 27, § 594A; (2) A child 16 years old or older alleged to have done an act in violation of any provision of the Transportation Article or other traffic law or ordinance, except an act that prescribes a penalty of incarceration; (3) A child 16 years old or older alleged to have done an act in violation of any provision of law, rule, or regulation governing the use or operation of a boat, except an act that prescribes a penalty of incarceration; or (4) A child 16 years old or older alleged to have committed the crime of robbery with a dangerous or deadly weapon or attempted robbery with a dangerous or deadly weapon, as well as all other charges against the child arising out of the same incident, unless an order removing the proceeding to the court has been filed under Article 27, § 594A.” 3 Appellant was alleged to have committed robbery with a deadly weapon. Since he was 15 years old at the time of the incident, none of the exceptions to juvenile jurisdiction under subsection (e) were applicable.

Hence, ⁶¹ the juvenile court had exclusive original jurisdiction over appellant’s case. The circuit court, unlike the juvenile court, is not classified as a court of limited jurisdiction. Maryland Cts. & Jud. Proc.

Code Ann. § 1-501 (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.) provides: “The circuit courts are the highest common-law and equity courts of record exercising original jurisdiction within the State. Each has full common-law and equity powers and jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases within its county, and all the additional powers and jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution and by law, except where by law jurisdiction has been limited or conferred exclusively upon another tribunal.” In the case of juvenile offenses, however, since jurisdiction has generally been conferred upon the juvenile court under § 3-804(a), the circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction in a juvenile matter only when the alleged offense falls under one of the statutory exceptions listed under § 3-804(e). Where exclusive original jurisdiction is lodged in the juvenile court, a waiver of that jurisdiction may occur pursuant to § 3-817 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code. Under § 3-817(a), the juvenile court may waive its exclusive original jurisdiction with respect to a petition alleging delinquency by a child who is (1) 15 years old or older or (2) a younger child if the alleged crime is one that if committed by an adult would be punishable by life imprisonment or death.

The juvenile court may not waive its jurisdiction unless after a hearing the State has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the child is “an unfit subject for juvenile rehabilitative measures.” Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-817(c) (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.). An order of waiver terminates the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and vests it in the criminal court having jurisdiction over the criminal offense with which the child is charged.

In re Appeal No. 961, September Term, 1973, 23 Md.App. ⁶² 9, 12, 325 A.2d 112 (1974). In the case sub judice, the juvenile court granted a petition to transfer the case to the circuit court pursuant to § 3-817(a)(l). In like manner, the circuit court having original jurisdiction may transfer a case to the juvenile court under the procedures set out in Art. 27, § 594A. This is termed a reverse waiver.

Section 594A provides: “(a) Transfer to juvenile court. — In any case, except as provided in subsection (b), involving a child who has reached 14 years of age but has not reached 18 years of age at the time of any alleged offense excluded under the provisions of § 3-804[e](l) or [e](4) [4] of the Courts Article, the court exercising jurisdiction may transfer the case to the juvenile court if a waiver is believed to be in the interests of the child or society. (b) Certain causes not transferable. — The court may not transfer a case to the juvenile court under subsection (a) if: (1) The child has previously been waived to juvenile court and adjudicated delinquent; (2) The child was convicted in another unrelated case excluded from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under § 3-804[e](l) or [e](4); [5] or (3) The alleged offense is murder in the first degree and the accused child is 16 or 17 at the time the alleged offense was committed.” The circuit court must engage in the same inquiry as the juvenile court when deciding whether to order a waiver of ⁶³ jurisdiction, although the burden of persuasion is different. In re: Ricky B., 43 Md.App. 645, 648-49 , 406 A.2d 690 (1979). In the juvenile court the burden is on the State to establish that the juvenile system does not offer a viable chance to the juvenile for rehabilitation, whereas at the circuit court level the burden is on the juvenile to demonstrate he or she is suitable for rehabilitation in the juvenile system.

With these statutory mechanisms in mind, we turn to the merits of the issue before us. In the case sub judice, appellant sought a reverse waiver to the juvenile court under § 594A after the juvenile court had waived the matter to the circuit court pursuant to § 3-817(a)(l). Thus, the question presented is whether a circuit court which acquires jurisdiction by way of a waiver has the power to order a reverse waiver. The question must be answered in the negative.

Appellant contends that because the circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction under Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 1-501, the circuit court without exclusive original jurisdiction nevertheless has the power, except as that power is limited by Art. 27, § 594A(b), to transfer what had been a juvenile case back to the juvenile court. Since, as appellant argues, his case is not one of those causes excepted under subsection (b), the circuit court had the authority to transfer jurisdiction.

Appellant not only reads § 1-501 and Art. 27, § 594A in a vacuum, but poses the issue in a jurisdictional context. Although the State and the circuit court viewed the issue as jurisdictional as well, we view it as a question of the power and authority of the circuit court when proceeding under a special statute. Let us explain. In Austin v. Director of Patuxent Institution, 245 Md. 206, 209 , 225 A.2d 466 (1967), the Court of Appeals held that when a court proceeds by way of a special statute rather than under its general common-law authority, that court has only the powers given to it under the special statute.

Accordingly, when a circuit court acquires a matter pursuant to § 3-817(a), that court can only exercise those powers ⁶⁴ given to it under that Code provision. We turn to § 3-817 to determine whether a circuit court can order a reverse waiver. Section 3-817(e) specifies the procedure the adult court is to follow when it acquires jurisdiction over a waived juvenile matter. That provision states in pertinent part: “(e) If the jurisdiction is waived, the court shall order the child held for trial under the regular procedures of the court which would have jurisdiction over the offense if committed by an adult.” Under subsection (e), then, the circuit court is empowered to proceed “under the regular procedures” as if the matter had originated at that level.

The question thus narrows down to whether Art. 27, § 594A, the waiver provision governing the circuit court, empowers that court in this situation to order a reverse waiver of the matter to juvenile court. Article 27, § 594A(a) clearly specifies that, other than the exceptions in subsection (b), the circuit court may transfer a juvenile matter in any case involving a child 14 years or older who it is alleged has committed “any ... offense excluded under the provisions of § 3-804[e](l)or [e] (4)”— the exact provisions that preclude juvenile court jurisdiction. Thus, by the plain language of § 594A, the circuit court’s power to transfer jurisdiction can only be exercised in instances when it has exclusive original jurisdiction over a juvenile matter pursuant to § 3-804(e)(l) or (4). 6 Article 27, § 594A is inapplicable when the circuit court acquires jurisdiction only by waiver. Since appellant’s case came to the circuit court by waiver and not by way of original exclusive jurisdiction— that is, appellant’s case did not fit into one of the statutory exceptions provided in § 3-804(e) — the circuit court properly denied the motion to grant a waiver back to juvenile court. ⁶⁵ Appellant asserts that “[t]o hold that the circuit court must accept the juvenile court’s waiver determination would lead to absurd results.

The circuit court could waive jurisdiction over a child accused of armed robbery if he were 16 years old but could not waive jurisdiction over the same child if he were one year younger.” (Emphasis in original.) Appellant is correct in his