Crow v. Hubard

Stone, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a controversy about a watch which the appellee claims to have been selected from the personal property of John T. Crow, deceased, by virtue of sec. 291 of Art. 95 of the Code. The testatrix of the appellee was the widow of John T. Crow, and as such claimed the right to select from his estate personal property to the amount of $150; • and it is now claimed by her executor, that among the property so selected, was the watch in controversy. The appellant denies as a matter of fact, that Mrs. Susan Crow in her life-time did select the watch, and insists as a .matter of law, that she had no right to select it.

We must first consider the question of fact, whether Mrs. Crow did in her life-time- choose and take the watch by virtue of the aforesaid section of the Code. If she did not, it is an end of this case, and it would be superfluous to decide any of the many legal questions raised and argued. There is some difference between the recollections of the respective attorneys for the widow and daughter, as to some conversations between them as to this watch, and standing alone the evidence of these conversations might not be sufficient to establish the fact sought to be proved by them. But we think there is sufficient testimony in the record, without taking these conversations into any account whatever, to establish the fact that Mrs. Crow did select the watch as a part of her distributive share of her husband’s estate. ⁵⁶³ On the 3rd of June, 1881, the attorneys for Mrs. Crow-delivered to the attorney of Miss Ida Crow, the executrix of her father, a written notice that she, Mrs. Crow, did select the watch as a part of the personal property she would take by virtue of said section of the Code.

This notice was communicated to the executrix, as the attorney thinks, on the 2nd of July following. This was certainly all the widow could do to indicate her selection, and constitutes a valid selection of the watch, provided there be no legal difficulty in the way of her selection, and provided further, that nothing had occurred before said selection, that would render such selection nugatory. The watch was then in the possession of the executrix. It is true, that she had previously sold it at private sale to herself by virtue of an order of the Orphans’ Court, which she supposed authorized such a sale.

But the Orphans’ Court afterwards rescinded the order ratifying the sale of the watch upon the ground, that the authority to sell the watch was not included iu the order they had previously given, which was confined to furniture and household stuff exclusively. Ho title whatever passed by such a sale, and the title remained precisely as if no such sale had taken place, (Code, Art. 93, sec. 214.) There is no' precise time fixed by law for the widow to make her selection, and certainly within two or three months from the date of the letters, and after the appraisement, is a reasonable time. We therefore think that as a matter of fact the selection of the watch was made. The next question to be considered is, whether there are any valid legal objections to its selection ?

It has been urged, and with some force, that the widow’s selection under secs. 291 and 292 of Art. 93 of the Code, is restricted to articles of household and kitchen furniture, or at any rate to such articles as might be of immediate use to herself and her children, to the exclusion of jewelry or other articles of luxury only. But the lan ⁵⁶⁴ guage of the statute does not admit of so narrow a construction. After specifying household and kitchen furniture, it uses the terms “ or other personal property.” These latter words certainly embrace all the personal property of the deceased that is inventoried, and no rule of construction would justify us in restricting it to household or kitchen furniture. The general practice in the State we believe to be in accordance