Cruz v. Silva

MOYLAN, J. The notion of alimony totally disconnected from a divorce, albeit a practice boasting a venerable pedigree, has become at least quaintly anachronistic, if not actually vestigial, in 21st Century Maryland. Just such a self-contained grant of alimony, however, is what we are urged to hold survived the shipwreck of a divorce proceeding in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County on January 9, 2008. Involved is an unusual 800-year-old procedure, the raison d’etre for which did not outlive the Mexican War. The Dramatis Personae The appellant, Guzman Cruz (Husband), and the appellee, Clemencia Solis Silva (Wife), were married on December 19, 1995.

Two children were born of that union: Salvador Cruz, on February 18,1996; and Yesenia Cruz, on January 10, 2000. On January 25, 2007, the Husband filed a Complaint for Limited Divorce on the basis of a one-year voluntary separation. On July 2, 2007, the Wife filed a Counter-Complaint For Absolute Divorce or, In the Alternative, for Limited Divorce, alleging as her grounds: 1) adultery and 2) abandonment. The divorce charges were thus double-barreled, with the Husband seeking a limited divorce and the Wife, an absolute one or, in the alternative, a limited one.

The Wife also requested alimony. ¹⁹⁹ A Legal Shipwreck The primary language of both parties is Spanish, and they, at trial, utilized an interpreter. Both parties, moreover, appeared pro se, although they had earlier been represented by counsel. Proceeding in such a legally untutored fashion, of course, is an invitation to disaster, and in this case the voyage out never cleared the harbor. At the outset of the hearing, the Husband’s very first response foreshadowed trouble dead ahead: COURT: ...

Let me ask another question. Did you bring a witness to corroborate your grounds for divorce? A No. Q Well then, you can’t, then your request for divorce is going to be denied because the Court can’t award a divorce without a corroborating witness. According to the law, we need to have any grant of divorce proved and corroborated.

(Emphasis supplied). To the extent to which the divorce proceeding depended on his making a case, it teetered unsteadily. Within the minute, the Wife delivered the coup de grace: COURT: Did you bring a witness for a limited divorce? A No. Q Okay.

So, what’s going to happen today, so everybody’s clear, is we will go forward on the complaint and on the counter-complaint. Since nobody brought a corroborating witness the Court ivill not be able to award anybody a divorce or a limited divorce. (Emphasis supplied). Not only did neither party prove legally sufficient grounds for divorce, but neither even gave testimony which, if corroborated, might have established grounds for divorce.

At that point, of course, there was still the possibility that corroborating witnesses might arrive in the nick of time to salvage the divorce proceeding, but no such salvage effort was ever made. The whole issue of divorce, or even the setting out of grounds ²⁰⁰ for divorce, was off the table. The trial judge, nonetheless, resolved to soldier on. So, the only issues it seems to me that are before me today are child support and alimony.

When the final curtain rang down on the January 9 performance, moreover, the run was over. There would be neither postponement nor continuance. In announcing the “Findings of the Court,” the trial judge began: THE COURT: Okay. This matter is here, complaint for limited divorce, requesting among other things a limited divorce, custody, use and possession of the home as well as a counter complaint for divorce, alimony, child support, property and use and possession.

Both parties have chosen to proceed pro se although both parties were represented by counsel until this morning. And neither party brought a corroborating witness to proceed on their claim for a divorce or limited divorce. Accordingly, the request for a divorce, limited divorce and the property request will all be denied and dismissed insofar as any matter of property award and use and possession will be contingent upon a divorce, a limited divorce as the case may be. (Emphasis supplied).

As the trial ground to a halt, the judge denied the Husband’s “Complaint for Limited Divorce and [the Wife’s] Counter-complaint for Absolute Divorce.” The divorce case, in both directions, had collapsed before it got started. What, If Anything, Was Salvaged? What about survivors? The judge did award the custody of the two minor children to the Wife and ordered the Husband to pay $764.00 per month in child support.

The judge also ordered the Husband to pay to the Wife the sum of $1,500.00 per month as indefinite alimony. There was no mention in the Order of the Court that the alimony was merely to be pendente lite. Not only has neither party ever suggested that the indefinite alimony in this case was alimony pendente lite, but ²⁰¹ there was no such possibility. There was no litigation that remained pending.

There was no “lite” to be “pendente.” The Court Order directed that “this case be and hereby is closed statistically.” The Order of Court followed on January 23, 2008. Pertinent for possible survival purposes are the orders dealing with 1) indefinite alimony and 2) child support. ORDERED, that Plaintiff be and hereby is directed to pay to Defendant the sum of $1,500.00 per month as indefinite alimony accounting and accruing from January 1, 2008. Said payments are to be made through the Office of Child Support Enforcement by wage lien; and it is further ORDERED, that Plaintiff be and hereby is directed to pay to Defendant the sum of $76^.00 per month as child support for the minor children accounting and accruing from January 1, 2008.

Said payments are to be made through the Office of Child Support Enforcement by wage lien; and it is further[.] (Emphasis supplied). The final two orders left no doubt that both requests for divorce were absolutely denied and that the case was finally closed. ORDERED, that all other requests in Plaintiffs Complaint for Limited Divorce and Defendant’s Counter-complaint for Absolute Divorce be and hereby are DENIED; and it is further, ORDERED, that this case be and hereby is closed statistically. (Emphasis supplied).

The overarching question before us is: With the core issue of divorce excised from the case, what vitality, if any, remains in the extremities of 1) the grant of indefinite alimony and 2) the award of child support? The Contentions The Husband has taken a timely appeal and now contends ²⁰² 1. that the trial court erred in awarding indefinite alimony to the Wife; 2. that the trial judge should, on remand, be required to consider the recoupment by the Husband of the alimony erroneously awarded to the Wife; and 3. that the trial court erred in calculating the child support award. Alimony Standing Alone Contending that the trial court erred by awarding indefinite alimony to the Wife, the Husband mounts a four-pronged attack, asking: Whether the trial court erred in making an award of indefinite alimony when it failed: (A.) to grant a divorce and no evidence was offered to prove grounds for divorce or the cause of the estrangement of the parties; (B.) to make the necessary projection of the point in time when Ms. Silva would reach maximum potential income; (C.) to properly determine whether the parties standards of living would be unconscionably disparate; and (D.) to take into account the Appellant’s monthly expenses. We are persuaded by the first prong.

Because the Wife never established a proper predicate entitling her to alimony, such an award was a nullity ab initio. The latter three issues, dealing only with a determination of the type of alimony and the calculation of the amount of alimony, are self-evidently moot As Judge Deborah Eyler noted in Whittington v. Whittington, 172 Md.App. 317, 342 , 914 A.2d 212 (2007), “Because we are vacating the alimony award, there is no reason for us to comment upon the amount of the now-vacated award.” This case turns on the validity of the first sub-contention. Although the very notion of alimony without divorce may strike the lay ear as an oxymoron, the concept enjoys a long and venerable history, at least in this State. It is, in a sense, an artifact from another time and it behooves us to examine its etiology. ²⁰³ Distant Beginnings Although the power of the courts to grant divorce is exclusively a creature of statute, with “no existence in the absence of statutory enactment,” Outlaw v. Outlaw, 118 Md. 498, 500 , 84 A. 383 (1912), the inherent power of the courts to award alimony is almost as old as the Proprietary Colony of Maryland itself.

In 1689, the Provincial Court held in Galwith v. Galwith, 4 H. & McH. 477, 478 (1689), that the power to grant alimony rested in the Court of Chancery. See also Crane v. Meginnis, 1 Gill and Johnson 463, 475 (1829). The legislative imprimatur was placed on that power by one of the first acts of the newly independent State of Maryland, as Chapter 12 of the Acts of 1777 officially bestowed the power over alimony on the Courts of Equity. The Act expressly provided that: “ The Courts of Equity of this State shall and may hear and determine all causes for alimony in as full and ample manner as such cases could be heard and determined by the laws of England in the Ecclesiastical Courts there.” (Emphasis supplied).

Although the Maryland courts would, after 1777, try to hear and determine alimony cases just as did the Ecclesiastical Courts of England, there was one gaping difference between the two court systems. The English courts invariably resolved the alimony issue along with their granting of limited divorces (divorces a mensa, et thoro), the companion issue that would seem to be alimony’s inevitable concomitant. Maryland, by dramatic contrast, did not. The Maryland courts had no power to take up what would seem to have been the logically complementary issue of limited divorce for the simple reason that they had no jurisdiction over divorce.

This disparity between how England handled the two related issues together and how Maryland either bifurcated them or totally ignored one of them was discussed in Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 589 , 87 A. 1033 (1913), as the Court of Appeals described the linkage between limited divorce and alimony in the English courts. ²⁰⁴ Limited divorces with alimony were in England for years granted by the Ecclesiastical Courts. In this State, there being no Ecclesiastical Courts the Legislature granted divorces; but the Courts of Chancery assumed jurisdiction over alimony. But by the Act of 1777, Ch. 12, the power was given expressly to Courts of Equity to exercise this jurisdiction____ The only kind of alimony known to the Ecclesiastical Courts being that granted in connection with limited divorces. (Emphasis supplied).

What Was Alimony? Alimony originally was an aspect of divorce a mensa et thorn or legal separation. A husband was legally responsible for the proper maintenance of his wife. If he failed to fulfill that obligation, the Ecclesiastical Courts in England and the Equity Courts in Maryland stepped in and ordered him to do so.

What came to be called alimony was simply a fancy name for separate maintenance. If the husband either 1) failed to provide for his wife while they were living together or 2), without justification, forced her to leave the marital abode, the equity court could order him to provide for her maintenance by what it called “alimony.” Wallingsford v. Wallingsford, 6 H. & J. 485, 488 (1825), first defined the meaning of the term: Alimony is a maintenance afforded to the wife, where the husband refuses to give it, or where from his improper conduct compels her to separate from him. It is ... a provision for her support, to continue during their joint lives, or so long as they live separate. Upon the death of either, or upon their mutual consent to live together, it ceases.

(Emphasis supplied). Outlaw v. Outlaw, 118 Md. at 502 , 84 A. 383 , quoted with approval from Chancellor Bland in Helms v. Franciscus, 2 Bland 544 , 565 (Md.Chanc.1830): “If by the cruel or immoral conduct of the husband the wife cannot with safety and in decency consort with him, ²⁰⁵ then she 'may upon the ground of such ill-treatment come into a Court of Equity and have a separate maintenance assigned to her out of her husband’s estate.” (Emphasis supplied). Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. at 590 , 87 A. 1033 , used the Wallingsford definition in 1913 and confirmed its continuing vitality. This is the definition of alimony which has been recognized and followed through all of the Maryland decisions down to the present.

The right was founded on the common law obligation of the husband to give support to his wife. (Emphasis supplied). See also Altman v. Altman, 282 Md. 483, 491 , 386 A.2d 766 (1978) (“The alimony awarded by the Ecclesiastical Courts in such cases constituted a recognition and enforcement of the husband’s duty to support a wife which continued after the judicial separation.”) (Emphasis supplied); Clayton v. Clayton, 231 Md. 74, 77 , 188 A.2d 550 (1963) (“We read ‘alimony ’ not in the technical sense of the word, but as commensurate with ‘support.’ ”) (Emphasis supplied); Courson v. Courson, 213 Md. 183, 186 , 129 A.2d 917 (1957); Foote v. Foote, 190 Md. 171, 180-81 , 57 A.2d 804 (1948); Staub v. Staub, 170 Md. 202, 207-08 , 183 A. 605 (1936); Polley v. Polley, 128 Md. 60, 63 , 97 A. 526 (1916); McCaddin v. McCaddin, 116 Md. 567, 572 , 82 A. 554 (1911); Keerl v. Keerl, 34 Md. 21, 25 (1871). In the common law world generally, the very idea of alimony grew out of the symbiotic relationship between a divorce a mensa et thoro (or legal separation), on the one hand, and the legally mandated provision for the wife’s maintenance (alimony) for the duration of that separation, on the other hand.

Alimony was just an incident of a divorce a mensa. By contrast, there was originally no such thing as alimony in connection with an absolute divorce. Although dramatic revolutionary changes in the law of divorce have buffeted the original concept of alimony, the definition provided by the early caselaw has nonetheless remained essentially in place, as ²⁰⁶ was noted by Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. at 589-90 , 87 A. 1033 : Nowhere in our statutes is there a definition of what alimony is, and our Courts, since the Act of 1841, in granting alimony in connection with a decree of divorce a vinculo, have been awarding it as it was understood and awarded by the Ecclesiastical Courts of England and our Equity Courts, as incidental to divorce a mensa.... The Act [of 1841] makes no distinction whatever between alimony upon a decree a mensa and upon a decree a vinculo.

We think it is clear, then, that the Act providing for alimony upon this decree, new to the Courts, was intended to provide for alimony of the same character and limitations as the alimony the Courts had for so long dealt with. (Emphasis supplied). And see Altman v. Altman, 282 Md. 483, 491-92 , 386 A.2d 766 (1978) (“[T]he Legislature had intended to provide for alimony of the same character and limitations as the alimony the courts had for so long dealt with in the context of the divorce a mensa et thoro.”); Clayton v. Clayton, 231 Md. at 77 , 188 A.2d 550 ; Walker v. Walker, 125 Md. 649, 659 , 94 A. 346 (1915). Why Has Alimony, In Maryland, Frequently Walked Alone?

As the present ease brings to the fore, we are still called upon in Maryland to deal with this unusual procedural phenomenon—a free-standing request for alimony without an accompanying divorce. This practice is well out of the main stream, however, and should not blithely be taken for granted. It deserves further inquiry, but such inquiry in the caselaw has been notoriously skimpy. With respect to permitting a request for alimony to stand alone, the caselaw is full of description of WHAT the practice entails.

It is perplexingly silent, however, about WHY we still have such a practice or about HOW such a perpetuation of the practice came to be. ²⁰⁷ In the Ecclesiastical Courts of England, which our alimony law was directed to emulate, and in most American states, alimony was, as we have just discussed, inextricably linked to the granting of a limited divorce. A request for alimony in Maryland, however, stood alone. When Chapter 12 of the Acts of 1777 conferred jurisdiction over questions of alimony on the equity courts, it directed them to treat alimony just “as such cases could be heard and determined by the laws of England in the Ecclesiastical Courts there.” Ironically, however, the equity courts of Maryland had to turn an immediate blind eye on the most salient feature of the English practice. The English courts dealt with alimony only as an incident of divorce a mensa et thoro.

The two were neatly packaged in a single verdict. In Courson v. Courson, 213 Md. 183, 185 , 129 A.2d 917 (1957), the Court of Appeals described this indivisible tie in the English practice between alimony and an a mensa divorce. The only legal separation recognized was a divorce from bed and board upon a decree of the Ecclesiastical Court. These Courts, as an incident to the decree, granted alimony, temporary or permanent, but only as a part of the decree a mensa et thoro.

Alimony, therefore, under the English law had no independent existence, and no Court, not even the Ecclesiastical, could grant alimony when it was the only relief sought. (Emphasis supplied). See also Clayton v. Clayton, 231 Md. at 76 , 188 A.2d 550 ; Staub v. Staub, 170 Md. 202, 208 , 183 A. 605 (1936); Keerl v. Keerl, 34 Md. 21, 25 (1871). In Thomas v. Thomas, 294 Md. 605, 609-10 , 451 A.2d 1215 (1982), Judge Eldridge noted that in the English practice alimony had no independent life.

In England, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, courts did not grant absolute divorces (divorce a vinculo matrimonii), but the ecclesiastical courts would grant divorces from bed and board (divorce a mensa et thoro). Incidental to the a mensa divorce, the ecclesiastical courts could award alimony to the wife. Nevertheless, for most of this period, alimony had no independent exis ²⁰⁸ tence under English law; it could be awarded only by an ecclesiastical court and only as part of a divorce decree. This English “doctrine was adopted and followed in ... many of the States in this country, but not in Maryland.” (Emphasis supplied).

The Maryland courts failed to follow the English courts in this regard for the simple reason that they were powerless to do so. The obviously logical English practice of joining the related questions of legal separation (divorce a mensa) and separate maintenance (alimony) in a single proceeding was beyond the authority of the Maryland courts to effect. In our Thomas v. Thomas, 48 Md.App. 255, 262 , 426 A.2d 976 (1981), Judge Wilner took note of our divergence from the English practice. [T]he ecclesiastical courts awarded alimony only as part of a decree of divorce a mensa et thoro; there was no separate action permitted just for alimony. Yet it appears that from a very early time the Maryland chancery court presupposed and occasionally exercised the authority to award alimony where no divorce was granted, and indeed where an a mensa divorce was not even sought.

(Emphasis supplied). That opinion also noted that the authority for Maryland’s remedy was at least suspect, although it may now be late in the day to raise such a question. The precise authority for such a practice, at least in Provincial times, was questionable, as it cannot be said to have emanated from the ecclesiastical law or practice. It appears that the authority was simply assumed as part of inherent chancery jurisdiction.

Id. (emphasis supplied). In its Thomas v. Thomas, 294 Md. at 613 , 451 A.2d 1215 , the Court of Appeals also described how Maryland had departed from the English practice of linking alimony with divorce. [T]he relationship between divorce and alimony under the English law was adopted in some areas of this country but ²⁰⁹ not in Maryland. Although under Maryland law divorce and alimony are tied together for certain purposes, alimony has never been viewed as an incident of divorce.

Indeed, the jurisdiction of equity courts to grant alimony, unlike a divorce, was not based upon statute. Instead, the power to grant alimony was deemed to be within the inherent authority of Maryland equity courts. (Emphasis supplied). The self-evident reason why Maryland before 1841 could not follow the English suit was because the legal authority to grant a divorce resided exclusively in the Maryland General Assembly.

Walter v. Walter, 181 Md.App. 273, 289 , 956 A.2d 255 (2008) (“Until 1841, only the General Assembly had the power to grant a divorce.”); Thomas v. Thomas, 48 Md.App. at 261-62 , 426 A.2d 976 (“Until 1841, the granting of an absolute divorce remained exclusively a legislative prerogative and was effected by Act of the General Assembly.”); Outlaw v. Outlaw, 118 Md. at 500-01 , 84 A. 383 (“For a long time after the separation of this State from England, divorces were obtainable, and obtainable only, through an Act of General Assembly, and it was not until 1841 that this power was conferred upon the Courts.”). The division of powers between the legislative branch of government and the judicial branch tracked precisely the wall of separation between divorce and alimony. The wall was impenetrable from either side. The court, able to award alimony, was powerless to grant a divorce.

The Legislature, able to grant a divorce, was constitutionally forbidden to award alimony. See Thomas v. Thomas, 294 Md. at 614 n. 15, 451 A.2d 1215 : Awarding alimony was deemed to be so clearly an inherent judicial function that a legislative award of alimony to a specific individual was held unconstitutional under the separation of powers provision in the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G. & J. 463 , 19 Am. Dec. 237 (1829). ²¹⁰ (Emphasis supplied).

As it had been since 1689, a request for alimony was a procedural orphan on the wrong side of the wall of separation. The Procedural Rapprochement of 1841 In 1841 the wall came tumbling down. Chapter 263 of the Acts of 1841 for the first time authorized equity courts to grant divorces, both limited divorces a mensa et thoro and absolute divorces a vinculo matrimonii, 1 along with the concomitant authority to award alimony in such cases. Initially, the General Assembly reserved to itself a concurrent authority to grant divorce (but no alimony).

Wright v. Wright, 2 Md. 429 (1852). That concurrent authority, however, was short-lived. The Constitution of 1851 forbade the General Assembly to grant divorces. That prohibition was repeated in the Constitution of 1867 and is now set out as § 33 of Article III.

Courson v. Courson, 213 Md. at 186 , 129 A.2d 917 . The Divorce Act of 1841 also made some significant changes in what the equity courts could do by way of awarding alimony. Before 1841 alimony was only separate maintenance in connection with what would have been a divorce a mensa, if the court had possessed the authority to grant such a divorce. The maintenance was an incident of marriage and could continue only so long as the marriage itself continued.

As of 1841, however, the court was for the first time given the authority to award alimony even in a case of divorce a vinculo matrimonii, In Altman v. Altman, 282 Md. at 491 , 386 A.2d 766 , Judge Levine explained the significant change that took place. [E]ven in England early judicial divorces were only a mensa et thoro, from bed and board. It was not until the enactment of chapter 262 of the Laws of 184-1, when divorce jurisdiction was conferred on the equity courts of this state, that the divorce a vinculo matrimonii—and the power to award alimony therein— ²¹¹ gained, recognition. Prior to 18^1, it was only as an incident to the divorce a mensa et thorn that alimony had been awarded, first by the English Ecclesiastical Courts, and in Maryland by the equity courts after 1777. The alimony awarded by the Ecclesiastical Courts in such cases constituted a recognition and enforcement of the husband’s duty to support a wife which continued after the judicial separation.

(Emphasis supplied). In Thomas v. Thomas, 48 Md.App. at 263-64 , 426 A.2d 976 , this Court also noted that it was the Divorce Act of 1841 that first gave the courts of this State the authority to award alimony in cases of absolute divorce. By Acts of 1841, ch. 262, the General Assembly first conferred statutory jurisdiction over divorce actions on the equity courts. The Act set forth the grounds cognizable for a vinculo and a mensa divorces, confirmed the preexisting authority of equity over the latter, and, for the first time, expanded that authority to include the former.

Section 3 provided that “in all cases where a divorce is decreed, the court passing the same shall have full power to award alimony to the wife____” (Emphasis supplied). In any event, as of 1841 the authority of a single court both to grant a divorce and also to award alimony meant that a request for alimony was no longer a procedural orphan doomed to walk alone. It could now travel in tandem with a divorce case. The procedural orphan, however, had been walking alone for 152 years (since 1689) and, through long entrenched habit, did not look with unbounded enthusiasm on the opportunity to reenter the litigational fold.

The question became whether the procedural orphan of an alimony request without seeking a divorce would be permitted to continue to walk alone now that it was no longer required to do so. Why, but for inertia, did an unbalanced, peg-legged procedure that should have expired with William Henry Harrison remain a ²¹² part of our practice? Strangely, that question, was never asked. Bare Requests For Alimony Post-1841 Why not?

What happens to an unusual procedure, bom of necessity, when the necessity that gave rise to it ceases to exist? The continuing propriety of a naked alimony request was basically just taken for granted. The bare request for alimony, unadorned by a grant of divorce or even a request for divorce, had over a trajectory of a century and a half developed a fierce independence and simply continued, essentially without challenge, to do what it had been doing for 15 decades. Familiarity can acquire an inertial power of its own.

In post-1841 Maryland, of course, alimony could be sought, as the Act of 1841 provided, as an incident of a divorce, limited or absolute, that was actually granted. It could also continue to be sought, as it had long and habitually been sought, as a bare request for alimony without more. Judge Eldridge made this point in Thomas v. Thomas, 294 Md. at 614 , 451 A.2d 1215 . [AJfter judicial divorces were authorized, an eligible plaintiff continued to be able to obtain an award of alimony even though no divorce was sought. (Emphasis supplied).

Judge Deborah Eyler recently observed for this Court in Walter v. Walter, 181 Md.App. 273, 291 , 956 A.2d 255 (2008): [AJfter judicial divorces were authorized in 1841, a wife continued to be able to obtain an award of alimony, even though no divorce was being sought. [2] (Emphasis supplied). See also Blumenthal v. Blumenthal, 258 Md. 534, 539 , 266 A.2d 337 (1970) (“Courts of equity have ²¹³ inherent power, independent of authority to grant a divorce, to entertain and grant an application by a wife against her husband for alimony where he is at fault.”); Wathen v. Wathen, 245 Md. 684, 686 , 226 A.2d 350 (1967) (“Equity has jurisdiction to decree the payment of separate maintenance to a wife although she does not ask for a decree of divorce.”); Hull v. Hull, 201 Md. 225, 232 , 93 A.2d 536 (1953) (“There is no divorce here. This is an alimony case.”); Foote v. Foote, 190 Md. 171 , 57 A.2d 804 (1948); Winkel v. Winkel, 176 Md. 167, 169 , 4 A.2d 128 (1939) (“[A] decree for alimony may be passed without the granting of a divorce.”); Hood v. Hood, 138 Md. 355, 361 , 113 A. 895 (1921) (“In this State a wife can sue for alimony, although she does not ask for a divorce.”); Polley v. Polley, 128 Md. 60 , 97 A. 526 (1916); McCaddin v. McCaddin, 116 Md. 567, 568 , 82 A. 554 (1911) (“There is no question in this State about the power of a Court of Chancery to entertain an application by a wife against her husband for alimony, although she does not ask for a decree of divorce.”); Taylor v. Taylor, 108 Md. 129 , 69 A. 632 (1908). The procedural orphan obviously remained in continuing good health after 1841 and did not hesitate to continue living on its own.

The Alimony Act of 1980 By Chapter 575 of the Acts of 1980, the General Assembly of Maryland effected a sweeping restructuring of alimony law. In McAlear v. McAlear, 298 Md. 320, 344-45 , 469 A.2d 1256 (1984), Judge Davidson explained that the 1980 Alimony Act represented a fresh legislative approach to the subject of alimony and was the culmination of a multi-year study by the Governor’s Commission on Domestic Relations Laws. Maryland’s 1980 Alimony Act (1980 Alimony Act), Md. Code (1957, 1981 Repl.Vol.), Art. 16, §§ 1 through 5, constitutes the second phase of a comprehensive revision of Maryland’s domestic relations law. It represents a new legislative approach to the rights and obligations associated with a form of spousal support—alimony.

The 1980 Alimony Act embodies a significant modification of the previous right to alimony for an indefinite period terminable upon ²¹⁴ the death of either spouse or the marriage of the recipient spouse. It allows equity courts to award alimony for a definite period of time after considering, among other things, both the monetary and nonmonetary contribution of the spouses, and any monetary award granted. (Emphasis supplied). The 1980 Alimony Act provided a comprehensive coverage that now embraces the entire field of alimony.

McAlear v. McAlear, 298 Md. at 346 , 469 A.2d 1256 , stated: The 1980 Alimony Act was passed for the purpose “of defining, consolidating and establishing the law with respect to alimony; establishing uniform procedures for enforcing alimony obligations; clarifying language, resolving conflicts and defining certain terms; and relating generally to alimony.” Ch. 575 of the Acts of 1980, effective 1 July 1980. The subtitle of [what is now Title 11 of the Family Law Article] is “Alimony.” (Emphasis supplied). Judge Eyler noted in Walter v. Walter, 181 Md.App. at 281 , 956 A.2d