CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Haischer

SHARER, J. Following a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, a verdict was returned in favor of Francis L. Haischer, appellee, against his employer, CSX Transportation, Inc. (“CSXT”), appellant. In this appeal, CSXT presents the following questions for review: I. Was the evidence presented insufficient as a matter of law to prove a violation of the Boiler Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20701 ? A. Was there legally sufficient evidence that the locomotive parts and appurtenances were not in proper condition? B. Was there legally sufficient evidence that the locomotive, its parts and appurtenances, were unsafe to ¹⁵¹ operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury?

II

Did the trial court err by failing to permit CSXT to introduce evidence regarding the annuity payments Haischer is receiving from the Railroad Retirement Board? More specifically, with respect to the first issue, CSXT suggests (1) that the trial judge erred by not granting its motion for judgment and (2) that the evidence, as to its liability, was insufficient to support the jury verdict. With respect to its second issue, CSXT suggests that the trial court erred by not permitting it to introduce collateral source evidence. We shall answer the first question in the negative.

As to the second, however, we agree with CSXT and shall reverse and remand for a new trial on damages. FACTUAL and PROCEDURAL HISTORY Haischer brought this action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City pursuant to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act 1 (“FELA”) and the Boiler Inspection Act 2 (“BIA”), seeking damages for a personal injury suffered in the course of his employment as a locomotive engineer for CSXT. He dismissed his FELA claim prior to trial and elected to proceed only on the BIA claim. Haischer was injured on March 1, 2000, while working a regular shift as a locomotive engineer.

As he was ascending the stairs from the nose of the locomotive to the cab, he struck his left shoulder on the bottom edge of the cover of the Head Train Device (“HTD”) that had fallen open. The door of the HTD cabinet, which was hinged at the bottom and hence opened downward, should have been secured in a closed position by screws along the top edge. However, the screws ¹⁵² had inexplicably come loose, causing the cabinet door to fall open sometime during Haischer’s duty hours. Following the incident, on March 20, 2000, Haischer sought treatment from an orthopaedic surgeon, who diagnosed an acute exacerbation of a preexisting calcium deposit.

Surgery disclosed a rotator cuff tear in his left shoulder. After March 1, 2000, Haischer did not return to work at CSXT, nor did he secure employment elsewhere. Haischer’s complaint alleged that he was entitled to compensation because his injury resulted from his employer’s violation of the Boiler Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20701 , which provides: A railroad carrier may use or allow to be used a locomotive or tender on its railroad line only when the locomotive or tender and its parts and appurtenances— (1) are in proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury; (2) have been inspected as required under this chapter ... and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation under this chapter ...; and (3) can withstand every test prescribed by the Secretary under this chapter.... A jury trial commenced on September 6, 2001, and continued for five days.

At the close of Haischer’s case, CSXT moved for judgment, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of a violation of the BIA. CSXT renewed the motion at the close of all the evidence. The trial court reserved ruling on both motions until after the jury verdict (thus, the latter motion effectively became a motion for JNOV). On September 12, 2001, the jury returned a verdict for Haischer, and awarded damages in the total of $203,898.

Thereafter, on October 3, 2001, the trial court issued a memorandum and order denying both CSXT motions, stating: While this Court questions whether Congress intended for the BIA to impose strict liability on railroad carriers for every malfunction on any piece of equipment appended to a ¹⁵³ locomotive, this Court has been cited to no legislative history supporting that interpretation. Case law supports a liberal, expansive construction of the BIA in favor of railroad workers. In Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 317 U.S. 481 , 63 S.Ct. 347 , 87 L.Ed. 411 (1943), the U.S. Supreme Court stated, “Negligence is not the basis for liability under the Act. Instead, it ‘imposes upon the carrier an absolute and continuing duty to maintain the locomotive, and all parts and appurtenances thereof, in proper condition, and safe to operate ... without unnecessary peril to life or limb.’ ” Id. at 485 , 63 S.Ct. 347 (citing Southern Ry.

Co. v. Lunsford, 297 U.S. 398, 401 , 56 S.Ct. 504 , 80 L.Ed. 740 (1936)). Whether or not the locomotive is unsafe to operate is an issue for the fact finder. Topping v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 1 F.3d 260, 261 (1993). Railroad carriers are strictly liable for resultant injuries, if it is determined that unsafe conditions exist.

Id. In the present case, a jury has determined that CSXT has violated the BIA by failing to maintain the locomotive in proper condition, safe to operate. Based on the lack of legislative history and the status of case precedent, CXST’s [sic] motions for judgment are denied. Judgment will be entered for [Haischer] in the amount of $203,898.00.

DISCUSSION I. Was the evidence presented insufficient as a matter of law to prove a violation of the Boiler Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20701 ? As we have noted, there is inherent in CSXT’s issues the argument that the evidence adduced by Haischer was insufficient to establish a violation of the BIA, and that the trial court erred by not granting either of its motions. Because the same test is applied to our consideration of both of those contentions, we shall discuss them as one. Essentially, CSXT contends that the evidence presented in Haischer’s case was not legally sufficient to prove a violation ¹⁵⁴ of the BIA, and failed to generate a jury question that the locomotive, its parts and appurtenances, (1) were not in proper condition; and (2) were unsafe to operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury.

The appropriate standard of review was set out in University of Baltimore v. Iz, 123 Md.App. 135 , 716 A.2d 1107 (1998), cert. denied, Iz v. University of Baltimore, 351 Md. 663 , 719 A.2d 1262 (1998): When we review a trial court’s denial of a party’s motion for judgment in a jury trial, we conduct the same analysis as the trial court. We consider all of the evidence, including the inferences reasonably and logically drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. If there is any evidence, no matter how slight, that is legally sufficient to generate a jury question, we may affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion. On the other hand, where the evidence is not such as to generate a jury question, ie., permits but one conclusion, the question is one of law and the motion must be granted.

Likewise, when we review [the] denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we use the same standard as a motion for judgment made during trial. Thus, we assume the truth of all credible evidence and all inferences of fact reasonably deducible from the evidence that supports the non-moving party’s position. Id. at 149 , 716 A.2d 1107 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The elements of the entitlement to recovery under the BIA are proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the locomotive was (1) not in proper condition; and (2) was not safe to operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury. 49 U.S.C. § 20701 .

A review of the evidence presented by Haischer is appropriate. At trial, only two witnesses were called to describe the condition of the locomotive, and the incident that resulted in Haischer’s injury—Haischer himself and Rudy Carroll, the conductor working with him at the time. ¹⁵⁵ Both testified that the pathway between the locomotive and the cab where the HTD cabinet is located is narrow and poorly lighted. Neither observed the HTD cabinet door to be open when they began their shift. Both explained that the HTD cabinet door is supposed to be secured in a closed position with screws and that neither removed the screws and, if the screws had been properly tightened and secured, even brushing against the cabinet door would not have caused it to come open.

Finally, both testified that the HTD cabinet door did come open at some time during the shift and Haischer struck his left shoulder on the lower edge of the open door as he ascended the narrow stairway above which it was located. The cornerstone of liability under the BIA was laid down by the United States Supreme Court in Lilly v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 317 U.S. 481 , 63 S.Ct. 347 , 87 L.Ed. 411 (1943). Lilly had fallen from atop a locomotive tender when a hook that he was pulling gave way, causing him to slip on the icy surface. Among the findings of the jury was the lack of mechanical defect that caused the accumulation of ice.

In reversing the grant of JNOV,'the Court said: Negligence is not the basis for liability under the Act. Instead it “imposes upon the carrier an absolute and continuing duty to maintain the locomotive, and all parts and appurtenances thereof, in proper condition, and safe to operate in active service without unnecessary period to life or limb.” The Act ... is to be liberally construed in the light of its prime purpose, the protection of employees and others by requiring the use of safe equipment. Id. at 485-86 , 63 S.Ct. 347 (citations omitted). In Topping v. CSX Transp., Inc., 1 F.3d 260 (4th Cir.1993), the employee was injured when he fell over a piece of loose metal in a locomotive.

The piece of metal was not where it should have been and was of unknown origin. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, after noting that the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk are ¹⁵⁶ not available to a defendant in a BIA case, stated that the facts of that case presented “... a classic jury question whether the presence of the loose metal object rendered the locomotive cab ‘unsafe to operate.’ ” Id. at 261 . Lilly and Topping are controlling of our consideration of whether the evidence was sufficient to allow a jury to determine whether the locomotive was (or was not) in proper condition, and was (or was not) safe to operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury. Haiseher’s evidence demonstrated that the HTD, an integral part of the operation of the locomotive, had, for some unknown reason, taken on a characteristic that was abnormal to its usual state.

The HTD was ordinarily a benign fixture which became, when the cabinet door inappropriately opened, an obstruction which ultimately caused Haischer’s injury. As we consider that evidence, including inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to Haischer, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to generate a jury question. We find no error, either in the trial judge’s decision to allow the case to go to the jury on evidence presented, or the denial of CSXT’s motions for judgment.

II

Did the trial court err by failing to permit CSXT to introduce evidence regarding the annuity payments Haischer is receiving from the Railroad Retirement Board? CSXT proposed to call Haischer as its witness to elicit testimony from him that he received $2,320 each month from a Railroad Retirement Board annuity. In so doing, CSXT took the position that Haischer’s earlier testimony about his diminished financial condition, taken together with evidence of his failure to seek other employment, and considering the comments made by his counsel in opening statement, created an exception to application of the collateral source rule, and “opened the door” to the annuity evidence. When conducting a trial, a trial judge’s “decision to admit or exclude evidence will not be set aside” absent an ¹⁵⁷ abuse of discretion.

Barnes v. Rosenthal Toyota, Inc., 126 Md.App. 97, 108 , 727 A.2d 431 (1999) (citing CSX Transp., Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 343 Md. 216, 252 , 680 A.2d 1082 (1996)). In North v. North, 102 Md.App. 1 , 648 A.2d 1025 (1994), Chief Judge Wilner fully explicated the broadly deferential nature of the “abuse of discretion” standard: “Abuse of discretion” is one of those very general, amorphous terms that appellate courts use and apply with great frequency but which they have defined in many different ways. It has been said to occur “where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court,” or when the court acts “without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” It has also been said to exist when the ruling under consideration “appears to have been made on untenable grounds,” when the ruling is “clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court,” when the ruling is “clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just result,” when the ruling is “violative of fact and logic,” or when it constitutes an “untenable judicial act that defies reason and works an injustice.” There is a certain commonality in all of these definitions, to the extent that they express the notion that a ruling reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard will not be reversed simply because the appellate court would not have made the same ruling.

The decision under consideration has to be well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable. Id. at 13-14 , 648 A.2d 1025 (internal citations omitted). With that standard in mind, we will review the trial court’s ruling to disallow evidence of Haischer’s annuity benefits. The collateral source rule, excluding evidence of “damages” paid by a source other than a defendant, was laid down by the Court of Appeals in American Paving & Contracting Co. v. Davis, 127 Md. 477, 485 , 96 A. 623 (1916).

However, evidence of collateral payments is “admissible if there is ¹⁵⁸ evidence in the case of malingering or exaggeration of injury ... but is inadmissible if there is no such evidence or if the question is asked for the real purpose of mitigating the liability of the defendant.” Leizear v. Butler, 226 Md. 171, 175 , 172 A.2d 518 (1961) (citations omitted); see also Kelch v. Mass Transit Admin., 42 Md.App. 291, 296 , 400 A.2d 440 (1979). A. The Opening Statement We look first to CSXT’s complaint about Haischer’s counsel’s opening statement which, CSXT maintains, implied to the jury that a recovery in the lawsuit was Haischer’s only means of compensation for his injury, and resulting unemployment. The aspects of the opening statement to which CSXT refers are underlined below. I don’t know if you realize how important your role is in this case.

You are also what is known as the “trier of fact” and, basically, your job is to sit and to listen to all of the evidence, to look at the exhibits, to watch the witnesses on the stand, to listen to everything, and then you decide the conflicts in this case. You are the ones that decide the outcome of this case and so I would not hesitate to say that you all are the most important group of people in this room right now. So I appreciate that. I would ask you to please take this very seriously.

This is an important time for Mr. Haischer. This is Mr. Haischer, who I represent for injuries that he sustained to his left shoulder while he was working as an engineer, a locomotive engineer for CSX Transportation, Incorporated, and this is his only day or few days in court and so I would ask you to remember that, and whatever the outcome is, this is it for him. If his situation changes five years, ten years down the road, he’s not coming back. This is it for him. * * * And let me digress for a minute and just explain to you all that there is going to be a focus on money and figures and damages in this case, and I want to explain to you that ¹⁵⁹ that’s one of the quirks of our legal system.

If someone bought your house and then decided they didn’t want to go through on the contract, you could take them to court and get what is called “specific performance” and force them— have the court force them to buy your house. When you have a situation like this where