Culp v. Commissioners of Chestertown

Digges, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The proceedings in this caso are designed to test the constitutionality of chapter 359 of the Acts of 1927. The general scope of this act is to provide for the construction of roadways, sewers, and sidewalks in Chestertown, Kent County, to issue bonds for the payment of these improvements, and liquidate an existing indebtedness of the town. The appellants, citizens and taxpayers of Chestertown, attacked the legality of this legislation on several grounds.

In our view of the case, it is only necessary to consider three of these contentions, namely, first, that section 7 of the act declares it to be an emergency law necessary for the preservation of the public health and safety, when in fact and reality no emergency existed; second, that section 4 of article 76 of the Code requires that every public local law made to take effect before the first day ⁶²² of June next after the session at which it may be passed shall immediately after its passage be published once in each of three successive weeks in such newspaper or newspapers of the respective counties in which it may operate as the county commissioners of each county may direct, which provision of the Code was not complied with in this case; and, third, that the act is unconstitutional in that it is violative of section 29 of article 3 of the Oonstitution, which requires “that every law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject and that shall be described in its title.” We will consider these objections to the legality of the legislation now before us in the order above stated. Article 16 of the Oonstitution, known as the referendum article, exempts certain classes of legislation from the provisions of that article, and provides the mode of referring, those classes of legislation embraced in the article to a vote of the people for adoption or rejection. It makes no provision for a referendum to the voters of any city of the state other-than Baltimore City, or of any rural section of the state of a less extent than a county. In the cases of Strange v. Levy, 124 Md. 645 , and Richardson v. Blackstone, 135 Md. 531 , this court has definitely determined that article 16 of the Oonstitution does not apply to acts relating to towns and cities other than Baltimore Oity, and that such acts, although not emergency acts, can be made to take effect as of the date of their passage.

As a result of these decisions it is clear that the act here under consideration does not come within the provisions of article 16 of the Constitution, and therefore that portion of section 7 of the- act which declares it to be an emergency law and necessary for the preservation of the public health and safety is surplusage and should be rejected, leaving intact that portion of section 7 of the act which declares that the same shall take effect from the date of its passage. If legislation confined to the municipality of Ohestertown did come under the provisions of article 16 of the Oonstitution, the act would take effect from the date of its passage because of the legislative declaration that it was an emergency law necessary for the preservation ⁶²³ of the public health and safety and passed by the necessary throe-fifths vote of the membership of both houses of the General Assembly. But, as stated, this legislation is not within the purview of article 16 of the Constitution, and is governed by section 31 of article 3 of the Constitution, which provides: “TSTo law passed by the General Assembly shall take effect until the first day of June next after the session at which it may be passed, unless it be otherwise expressly declared therein.” The act here being controlled by section 31 of article 3, and expressly declaring in the act that it shall take effect from the date of its passage, every constitutional requirement to make it effective on and from that date has been complied with. What we have said disposes of the first contention of the appellants, without regard to the contention made in their brief in respect to an act not being an emergency law simply because of the Legislature’s declaration to that effect.

We deem it advisable, however, to say in answer to that argument that, if the class of legislation enacted is not embraced in and covered by the provisions of article 16 of the Constitution, the Legislature has the undoubted right to fix the date of its taking effect, without declaring it an emergency law, and without the necessity of its passage by a vote of three-fifths of the membership of both houses; and if the legislation does come within the provisions of article 16 of the Constitution, in that event the question of whether or not an emergency in fact exists is a question for the Legislature, and its determination is final and not subject to review by the courts. This is made clear by the language of section 2 of article 16, which provides: “Fo law enacted by the General Assembly shall take effect until the first day of June next after the session at which it may he passed, unless it contain a section declaring such law an emergency law and necessary for the immediate preservation of the public health or safety, and passed upon a yea and nay vote supported by three-fifths of all the members elected to each of the two houses of the General Assembly.” The effect of this language is to declare that any act of the legislature, com- ⁶²⁴ pretended and coming •within the provisions of article 16, which contains a section declaring such law to be an emergency law and necessary for the immediate preservation of the public health or safety, and passed upon a yea and nay vote supported by three-fifths of all the members elected to each of the two houses of the General Assembly, may be made to take effect at any time expressed in said act. The second contention of the appellants is that this act is invalid for the reason that the provision of section 4 of article 76 of the Code requires that every public local law made to take- effect before the first day of June next after the session at which it may be passed shall immediately after its passage be published once in each of three successive weeks in such newspaper or newspapers of the respective counties in which it may operate as the county commissioners of each county may direct. It is clear from a reading of this section that its provisions cannot be considered mandatory and a condition precedent to the act’s taking effect.

To interpret this section to be more than directory would postpone the effectiveness of any public local law for at least three weeks after its passage, and this no matter how great the emergency to meet which the act might have been passed. And, again, if compliance with its provisions should be held to be a condition precedent to the act’s taking effect, the county commissioners of any county might, through inadvertence, negligence, refusal, or disagreement as to the papers in which it is to be published, postpone the date at which such legislation would take effect, thereby frustrating the legislative purpose. The Legislature adjourns in the early part of April, and as to those laws that become effective on June first following, the public have sufficient time to be-■informed as to how they will be affected by the new legislation, and it was for the purpose of giving this information by publication as soon as possible after the passage of legislation taking effect before the first of June that the section now under consideration was passed. The third objection urged by the appellants, namely, that the act violates section 29 of article 3 of the Constitution, is ⁶²⁵ sound, and this renders the act fatally defective.

This constitutional provision is that every law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject and shall be described in its title. This language has probably been more productive of litigation than any other section of our State Constitution, much of which has reached this court and been the subject of numerous decisions. We do not propose to review any great number of these decisions, because they have little force as precedents except in so far as they settle principles of constitutional and statutory construction. These rules are succinctly laid down by this court, speaking through Judge Burke, in the case of Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 463 , with the authorities in this court and elsewhere supporting the principles therein stated.

The authorities hold that section 29 of article 3 of the Constitution is mandatory, but that the general disposition of this court has been to give this section a liberal construction so as not to interfere with or impede legislative action; that the title of an act, whilst it must indicate the subject, need not give an abstract of the .act, yet it must not be misleading by what it contains or what it omits. The purpose of this constitutional provision has been declared to be to prevent separate and incongruous subjects from being contained in one act, and thereby preventing “log-rolling” legislation; to give the people general notice of the character of the proposed legislation, so they may not be misled; to give all interested an opportunity to appear before the committees of the Legislature and be heard upon the advisability of the proposed legislation; to advise members of the character of the proposed legislation, and to give each an opportunity to intelligently watch the course of the proposed bill; to guard against fraud in legislation and against false and deceptive titles. Stiefel v. Md. Institute for the Blind, 61 Md. 144 ; State v. Morris, 70 Md. 91 ; Whitman v. State, 80 Md. 410 ; Kafka v. Wilkinson, 99 Md. 238 ; Christmas v. Warfield, 105 Md. 530 ; Somerset County v. Pocomoke Bridge Co., 109 Md. 1 ; Nutwell v. Anne Arundel County, 110 Md. 667 ; Curtis v. Mactier, 115 Md. 383 ; Painter v. Mattfeldt, supra; Weber v. Probey, 125 Md. 544 . ⁶²⁶ The enforcement of this constitutional provision in proper cases is a 'mandate upon the judiciary, and is essential to accomplish the purposes which this court has determined were intended by the framers of the Constitution. The title of the act in question is: “An act to provide for the construction of curbs, gutters, roadways, sewers and sidewalks in Chestertown, Kent County, Maryland, and to liquidate a previous debt, and to issue bonds to pay for the same, and to levy an annual tax for the payment of such bonds and the interest thereon, and submitting same to the qualified voters of Chestertown for their approval or rejection.” Section 1 of the act authorizes and empowers the commissioners of Chestertown to issue bonds in the name of the-commissioners of Chestertown to an amount not exceeding $100,000, to be designated as “Chestertown curb, gutter, roadway, sidewalk, sewer and liquidation of debt bonds,” and provides the denomination, rate of interest and due date.

Section 2 provides for the advertisement and sale of the bonds. Section 3 provides that the commissioners of the town shall annually levy upon the assessable property sums of money necessary to pay the interest on and redeem the bonds as the same may mature from time to time. Section 1 provides how the proceeds of the bonds shall be applied to the improvement of certain designated streets, by construction of curbs, gutters and pavements, and the amount to be expended for each. In said section, under the sub-head “Pavement,” after providing for the expenditure of $8,350 on certain designated streets, it provides: “One-half of $8,350 to be paid by town (adjoining property owners to pay one-half), $1,175.” By section 5, E. Hynson Rogers, Thomas G. Wroth, James H. Sides and L. Bates.

Russell are created and constituted a special commission, with equal authority, to act and cooperate with the commissioners, of Chestertown in the use and expenditure of the fund received from said bond issues, and the