Cumberland Motor Sales v. Hilliker

Henderson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal is from an order of the Circuit Court for Allegany County reversing an order of the State Industrial Accident Commission which disallowed a claim for compensation on the ground that the claim was not filed within the one year period of limitations prescribed by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, Code (1951), Art. 101, sec. 38. The court submitted two issues to a jury: (1) “Was the claim in this case filed within the time prescribed by law?” and (2) “If the answer to the first issue is ‘No’, was the failure to file such claim within the time prescribed by law induced or occasioned by facts and circumstances amounting to an estoppel of the employer and insurer to rely on such failure?” The jury answered “No” to the first issue and “Yes” to the second. The appellants contend that there was no legally sufficient evidence to warrant the submission of either issue to the jury.

There was little conflict in the testimony. The appellee was a laborer with an eighth grade education. He was employed on a used car lot in Cumberland operated by Carl Billmyer, trading as Cumberland Motor Sales. While cleaning out the trunk of a car on January 7, 1952, the lid fell and injured his back.

He testified he had never had a back injury before, although the appellants produced evidence to the contrary. He mentioned the accident to Billmyer’s brother, whom he described as a foreman. He continued working but, because of the pain in his back, he went to see his own physician, Dr. Weisman, on January 10. X-rays were taken on January 12.

On January 29, Dr. Weisman sent him to Dr. Faw, who examined him and prescribed a brace. He testified that that evening he asked his employer, “What will I do about filing a claim to get a brace?” Billmyer said: “Never mind, I will take care of that”; asked “How much is it?” and on being told that the brace would cost $20.00, gave him that amount of ⁷³ money. The appellee then bought the brace. Billmyer admitted giving him the money, but testified that it was deducted from his wages.

This testimony was not denied. The appellee continued to work for Billmyer until November 7, 1952, when he went to the Memorial Hospital for treatment. He left the hospital on November 12, and returned to work. He was not paid by Billmyer for the time spent in the hospital.

The appellee paid the hospital bill of about $100.00 and all of the doctors’ bills without asking for reimbursement from his employer or anyone else. He was “furloughed” in October, 1953, and went to work for the Thompson Buick Garage in Cumberland. He worked there until May 28, 1954, when he left to do lighter work in Constitution Park, because his back hurt. The appellee’s wife testified that in February, 1954, she called Billmyer on the telephone and asked if he had had Workmen’s Compensation insurance at the time of her husband’s injury in January, 1952.

She did not say anything about filing a claim. Billmyer told her that he had carried insurance and gave her the name of his insurance agent. He told her he had filed no claim for her husband. She testified she told her husband of this conversation.

She also testified, but Billmyer denied, that Billmyer told her to send any doctors’ bills to his insurance company. Billmyer testified that Hilliker never made any claim for compensation, never asked him to file any claim, and never inquired about insurance prior to the conversation with the wife. The appellee testified that he did not do anything about filing a claim because “I figured he [Billmyer] had filed it, and I got my same wages all the time and I didn’t ask him.” The appellee filed his claim with the Accident Commission on May 14, 1954. The appellant argues that the court erred in submitting the first issue to the jury, because it is undisputed that the claim was not filed until more than two years and four months had elapsed from the date of the accident.

The appellee argues that the issue was properly submitted, because the statute reads “within one year after the beginning of his disability”, and he was not “disabled”, in the sense of being unable to perform his regular work, until May, 1954. ⁷⁴ “Disability”, within the meaning of the statute, is not synonymous with “accident”, but usually the right to