Cumberland Valley Railroad v. Maugans

Miller, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The plaintiff in this case was a passenger to Grreen Castle, an intermediate station on the defendant’s road, and fell and was injured in leaving the cars at that station. He alleges, and, for the purpose of determining the single ⁶⁰ ■question presented by this appeal,, we shall assume it to be true, that those in charge of the train were negligent in starting it before time had been allowed for passengers to leave in safety. There can he no question as to the ■duty of the defendant in this respect.

A railroad company undertaking the carriage of passengers to an intermediate point on its road is hound to stop its trains there ■a sufficient length of time to enable all passengers, whose destination is that point, to alight in safety. But the undisputed facts are, that the train was in motion, and the plaintiff knew it was moving when he stepped from it, and that he had, at the time, a valise containing ■clothing which weighed from fifteen to twenty pounds, in his right hand, and a basket containing provisions which weighed from eight to twelve pounds on his left arm. It is not shown that he was directed or requested or encouraged thus to step from the car by any agent or employé of the company, or that he would have been in any peril if he had remained on the train, or that he was under any undue excitement or alarm. At the trial, it was contended that by thus voluntarily stepping from the car when he knew it was in motion, and when he had not the free and unrestricted use of hi/3 hands and arms, because of the luggage he was carrying, he was guilty of such negligence as would prevent a recovery, and that the Court should so ■declare, and direct a verdict for the defendant.

The refusal of the Court below thus to take the case from the jury presents the only question that has been argued in this Court. Counsel for" the appellant have presented their side of the question with much ability and force of argument, but we cannot adopt their .views of the case. We agree that while the question of negligence is ordinarily one of fact and not of law, cases do occur (and perhaps the number of such cases is increasing) in which it becomes the duty, of the Court to interpose and withdraw them from the con ⁶¹ sideration of the jury. The case however must he a very clear one to justify a Court in taking upon itself this responsibility; it must present some prominent and decisive act in regard to the effect and character of which no room is left for ordinary minds to differ.

Fitzpatrick’s Case, 35 Md. 46 ; Stansbury’s Case, 54 Md. 655 . Accidents occur, and injuries are inflicted under an almost infinito variety of circumstances, and it is quite impossible for the Courts to fix the standard of duty and conduct by a general and inflexible rule applicable to all cases, so that a departure from it can be pronounced negligence in law. The rule that requires a party before he crosses a railroad track to stop, look and listen for approaching trains, which has been generally adopted by the Courts, is the only one that approaches universality of application in reference to. a particular class of accidents. But there is no' such general accord of judicial opinion and precedent in reference to attempts to leave a car while it is in motion.

The cases cited in the briefs of counsel on both sides show very clearly that the weight of authority is against the proposition that it is always, as matter of law, negligence and want of ordinary care for a person to attempt to get off from a car when it is in motion. This proposition was pressed upon the Court of Appeals of New York in the case of Morrison vs. Erie Railway Co., 56 N. Y., 302 , but Folger, J., in delivering the opinion of the Court in that case, said, “were I disposed to accede to it upon principle, which I am not, I should feel myself precluded by prior decisions of this Court, and influenced to a contrary conclusion by those of other Courts. The rule established, and as