Cunninghame v. Cunninghame

CATHELL, Judge. Elliott Cunninghame, executor for the estate of Elizabeth Cunninghame, 1 petitioner, filed a claim against the estate of Ferguson Cunninghame. The claim was denied by the co-personal representatives. 2 A Petition for Allowance of Claim was filed in the Orphans’ Court for Montgomery County. The Orphans’ Court disallowed the Petition for Allowance of Claim, finding that the claim was barred by the limitation on presentation of claim statute codified in Maryland Code (1974, 2001 RepLVol.), section 8-103 of the Estates and Trusts Article. 3 ²⁶⁹ Petitioner filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

In affirming the judgment of the Orphans’ Court, that court held that petitioner failed to prove his claim before the Orphans’ Court; therefore, petitioner had failed to prove that the Orphans’ Court committed prejudicial error by disallowing petitioner’s claim because it had not been filed within six months. Petitioner has presented two questions for which we granted certiorari: I. Did the Trial Court err by finding that the claim of the Estate of Elizabeth Cunninghame against the Estate of Ferguson Cunninghame was time barred?

II

Did the Court of Special Appeals err in applying the doctrine of harmless error and in not addressing the timeliness/presentment issue? We answer no to question I. We hold that a claim was not presented by Elizabeth Cunninghame or the estate of Elizabeth Cunninghame within the “Limitation on presentation of claim.” period codified at Md.Code (1974, 2001 Repl.Vol.), section 8-103 of the Estates and Trusts Article. We therefore affirm the decision of the Orphans’ Court for Montgomery County. Because we answer question I in the negative, we need not directly resolve question II, although it will be the subject of some discussion.

I. Facts Ferguson Cunninghame (hereinafter Ferguson) died on July 5, 1998. Elizabeth Cunninghame died on August 11, 1998. On September 9,1998, the Last Will and Testament of Ferguson Todd Cunninghame was filed with the Register of Wills for Montgomery County. The will, which was executed on October 28, 1977, nominated and appointed Ferguson’s former wife, Donna Rae Holt Cunninghame (hereinafter Donna) to serve as personal representative of his estate.

If Donna was unable to serve, then the will nominated and appointed Ferguson’s friend, Benjamin Baird, Jr., to serve as personal representative of his estate. When the will was filed on September 9, 1998, a Renunciation and Consent to Appointment of Co-Personal Representatives was also filed. The Renunciation ²⁷⁰ and Consent to Appointment of Co-Personal Representatives stated that Donna and Benjamin Baird, Jr., renounced their right to serve as personal representative of Ferguson’s estate and asked that Ferguson’s surviving children, Christina Gwynne Cunninghame (hereinafter Christina) and Todd Samuel Cunninghame (hereinafter Todd), be appointed co-personal representatives. The estate of Ferguson was opened on the same date.

On or around July 14, 1998, Todd, who at that time was neither a personal representative of the estate of Ferguson, nor named in Ferguson’s will as a personal representative, commented to his aunt, Elizabeth Ferguson (hereinafter Elizabeth), that she send to him “any bills incurred while my father was in the hospital.” Elizabeth sent a letter dated July 24, 1998 (the letter) to Ferguson’s former wife, Donna, and to his son, Todd. The letter stated: Enclosed are the statements that were obligations that Ferg couldn’t handle while he was hospitalized. Also the tally of what obligations I felt that I had to help keep him afloat for the past couple of years — loan repayment and taxes — If you need a more formalized accounting, please let me know. [Emphasis added.] Enclosed with the letter was a second page with a list of check numbers and amounts. No further elaboration was submitted, such as what the checks were for.

The total amount of the checks submitted by Elizabeth was $86,517.00. There was no indication that the letter was being sent to either Todd or Donna as representatives of Ferguson’s estate. At the time of the letter, neither the will, nor the renunciation, had been filed. Neither Todd, nor Donna, responded to Elizabeth’s letter.

As we indicated, on August 11,1998, Elizabeth died. At the time of her death, the estate of Ferguson had not been opened. The persons named in Ferguson’s will as personal representatives had not filed any renunciation of their rights to be appointed, and Todd had not yet been appointed a co-personal representative. At the time of Elizabeth’s death, ²⁷¹ persons, other than Todd, were designated in Ferguson’s will, as personal representatives.

Elliott Cunninghame (hereinafter Elliott), the brother of Elizabeth and Ferguson, apparently was appointed executor of Elizabeth’s estate. 4 On April 7, 1999, Elliott, allegedly as executor for the estate of Elizabeth, filed a claim against Ferguson’s estate for $36,517.00, which was the amount indicated by the list of checks enclosed with the letter dated July 24, 1998. On April 28, 1999, a Notice of Disallowance was received by the Register of Wills for Montgomery County. The Notice disallowed the claim of the estate of Elizabeth for the $36,517.00. On June 29, 1999, a Petition for Allowance of Claim was filed in the Orphans’ Court for Montgomery County. 5 Elliott, as the alleged executor of the estate of Elizabeth, petitioned the Orphans’ Court to allow the claim for $36,517.00.

Elliott alleged that Elizabeth had loaned Ferguson the $36,517.00 and that Ferguson had promised to repay the loan. No mention ²⁷² was made as to whether Elliott had any knowledge of the communications, oral or written, between Todd and Elizabeth. On October 22, 1999, a hearing was held on the Petition for Allowance of Claim before the Orphans’ Court for Montgomery County. At the hearing, Elliott alleged that Elizabeth had loaned Ferguson money over the final years of his life, that there was an agreement for Ferguson to repay the money, and that Elliott was filing a claim against the estate because Ferguson had not repaid the loan.

Elliott stated at the hearing that there was not any written evidence of an agreement to repay the loan. 6 Respondent stated that the claim should be disallowed for several reasons. First, respondent alleged that the claim violated the limitation on presentation of claim statute because it was not filed within six months in violation of Md.Code (1974, 2001 Repl.Vol.), section 8-103 of the Estates and Trusts Article. 7 Second, respondent alleged that even if the claim was not barred by the limitation on presentation of claim ²⁷³ statute, respondent has “some substantive problems with the claim, and do[es] not believe that they are going to be able to prove that in fact the loan was made----” Petitioner responded, as we indicated, supra, to respondent’s claim that petitioner had violated the limitation on presentation of claim statute by stating that even if the claim filed by the estate of Elizabeth was after the six-month “statute of limitations,” the letter sent by Elizabeth to Todd was within the six-month period and was the presentment of a claim to the person who, although not the personal representative when the letter was sent, would eventually become a co-personal representative. Three witnesses were called during the hearing — Todd, Elliott, and Reverend Gordon Kathy. Todd testified that he “requested originally from my aunt any bills incurred while my father was in the hospital to be sent to me.” He further testified that he received a letter 8 from his aunt; however, he was not the co-personal representative of Ferguson’s estate when he received the letter.

Elliott testified that photocopies of various checks that petitioner wanted admitted into evidence were from Elizabeth’s account. 9 The last witness was Reverend Gordon Kathy, 10 who testified that he had discussions with Ferguson about Ferguson’s finances. Reverend ²⁷⁴ Kathy testified that two to three years before Ferguson’s death, Ferguson told him that since Ferguson had been divorced, he was unable to pay his mortgage and that Elizabeth was paying the mortgage for him. He also testified that Ferguson planned on repaying Elizabeth and Ferguson was being pressured to sell his house to repay her. On cross-examination, Reverend Kathy stated that Ferguson never told him an amount that he owed Elizabeth and Reverend Kathy never saw any form of written agreement between Ferguson and Elizabeth requiring Ferguson to repay Elizabeth for any money that she gave to him.

At the end of the testimony before the Orphans’ Court, respondent argued that petitioner had failed to meet his burden by proving the amount of the claim or petitioner’s entitlement to a claim. Respondent also reiterated his claim that petitioner had violated the limitation on presentation of claim statute. Respondent alleged that the letter from Elizabeth to Todd failed to establish that there was a loan between Ferguson and Elizabeth and that the language in the letter was equally consistent with a gift from a sister to a brother as it was to a loan. Respondent also alleged that the letter was not sufficient as a presentment of a claim and therefore the limitation on presentation of claim statute acted as an absolute bar to the claim filed by Elliott on behalf of Elizabeth’s estate.

Petitioner alleged that the letter alone was enough to establish a claim against Ferguson’s estate. The Orphans’ Court held that the “statute of limitations” applied to the claim filed by Elliott and the letter from Elizabeth to Todd was not a sufficient presentment of a claim. The Court found that the claim must be presented to a personal representative or a Register of Wills and because petitioner had not complied with this requirement within the period allowed by the “statute of limitations,” the claim must be barred. Despite the fact that the Orphans’ Court had barred the claim based upon a violation of the “statute of limitations,” the Orphans’ Court went on and decided that if the “statute of limitations” was not applicable, the Court would have found that petitioner had established that there was loan ²⁷⁵ and that the checks listed with the letter were in fact amounts loaned to Ferguson.

The Orphans’ Court stated that: The law is that if the claim was not presented within the 6 month period of time, then it is time barred. It is a statute of limitation. It is a very harsh law. There is lots of reasons for it which I won’t go into, but nonetheless, the Legislature has said what it said, and then it said, “This is how you present it”.

You present your claim to the PR [personal representative] or you present your claim to an appropriate register of wills. Those are the two ways to do it. Then, it goes on to say what the claim needs to include, but I don’t focus on that because in my view, the dispositive issue is presentation. Now, there wasn’t a presentation to the Court in any fashion.

There wasn’t a presentation to the PR because when this note — assuming this note qualifies otherwise— when it was given to the eventual PR, he wasn’t the PR. So, the requirements of presentation have not been met. So, I look at the issue of, well, what about the notion of substantial compliance and can the plaintiff avoid the effects of statute of limitations by saying substantial compliance? Frankly, that is what I struggled over.

The conclusion that I come to is they cannot, that this substantial compliance would deal with the form of the notice in my view, whether the form was, you know, verified or not, or whether it had the other requirements of the form of the notice, I think, is what substantial compliance is about. I think that I have no discretion when the notice was not given to either the Court or the PR and unequivocally, that is the case. I concluded that I have no discretion to extend or modify the presentation requirements that the statute has set forth, even though that sometimes and probably in this case, results in a harsh application of the statute of limitations. ²⁷⁶ But of course, more often than not, whenever the statute of limitations are applied, it is harsh. Therefore, the motion to disallow the claim will be granted, or the notice to disallow, whatever the right word is on that.

But let me go on since there may be some further action in this regard as to my take on the substantive issues presented in this case. I find, and I am going to resolve that in, in favor of the claimant [petitioner]. Although again, I think that is a very, very close call. The letter is ambiguous.

The letter speaks in a way that you could conclude — by the letter, I mean the letter of July 24th — that you could conclude that it was a gift, or that at least that it wasn’t a loan. But then on the other hand, there is a language that suggests that it is a loan, especially the language at the bottom there, which says if you need a more formalized accounting, please let us know. I mean, that certainly is suggestive of a loan as opposed to a gift. Then, of course, I have the testimony of the pastor who indicate a that — well, who said what he said which certainly supports the notion that it is a loan.

I think that the claimant did establish that there was a loan, and that these payments were a loan. The more difficult question is, How much was the loan? Here, all I have is just simply a list of payments, and it is thin. I mean, I think that is really thin evidence of a loan.

I tried to — you know, I struggled with the notion of what is speculative and what is there by a preponderance of the evidence. I resolved that struggle in this case by saying that it is thereby a preponderance of the evidence, and that it is more likely than not that these numbers contained on the second page of the first exhibit are in fact amounts that were loaned to the decedent. So, having said that, if I had reached that issue, that is how I would resolve it. I don’t reach the issue because of the reasons I have already said. ²⁷⁷ I do think the statute of limitations applies, and so therefore, the Court will grant the motion or request to disallow the claim.

Before the Orphans’ Court, petitioner never mentioned the provisions of Maryland Code (1974, 2001 Repl.Vol.), section 6-105 of the Estates and Trusts Article, 11 which provides that when done in good faith, the acts of a person who ultimately becomes a personal representative, might constitute acts of a personal representative. Petitioner relied exclusively on provisions found in Title 8, “Claims of Creditors,” of the Estates and Trusts Article. Thus, the provisions of section 6-105 were not before the Orphans’ Court and were not considered by Judge Donohue, sitting as the Orphans’ Court, in his decision. Assertions under section 6-105 were made for the first time on appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

The majority in that court, for whatever reason, did not consider section 6-105. The dissent, in large part, relies on section 6-105 and on Maryland Code (1974, 2001 Repl.Vol.), section 7-101(a) of the Estates and Trusts Article, 12 also raised for the first time before the Court of Special Appeals. Accordingly, we shall hold that issues relating to section 6-105 (and section 7-101(a) for that matter) have not been preserved for our determinative review, although we shall exercise our discretion under Rule 8-131(a) and, nonetheless, hold, that, under the circumstances of this case, section 6-105 would not afford petitioner any relief were it to be applicable. Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.

In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment; however, the Court affirmed on different grounds. The Court of Special Appeals held that: In this case, we agree with appellees that, even if we assume, arguendo, that the trial judge erred in holding that a claim had not been filed within six months of Ferguson’s death, appellant [petitioner] was not entitled to a judgment ²⁷⁸ anyway because Elizabeth’s estate never proved that the deceased loaned Ferguson money — hence appellant failed to demonstrate prejudicial error. The Court of Special Appeals went on to state that: There simply were no facts presented in this sparse record from which it could be inferred legitimately that Ferguson agreed to repay his sister the $36,517 she had advanced on his behalf. From the evidence, several equal possibilities exist, and there is no way of telling which is more likely.

There are at least four possibilities: (1) Elizabeth and Ferguson agreed that Elizabeth would loan the money to Ferguson, and Ferguson would repay it; (2) Elizabeth advanced the money without any agreement but with the profound hope that Ferguson would repay her, if and when he was able; (3) Ferguson accepted his sister’s charity without comment but secretly hoped to repay her some day; (4) Elizabeth made the payments without any expectation of repayment but, after her brother died, decided to recapture what she had advanced. Under these circumstances, we hold that the trial judge was clearly erroneous in finding that Elizabeth’s estate had proved its claim. Because the estate of Elizabeth failed to prove its claim, appellant also failed to show that the Orphans’ Court committed prejudicial error when it ruled that no claim had been filed within six months of Ferguson’s death. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court.

II

Discussion We hold that, under the circumstances of this case, the limitation on presentation of claim statute bars petitioner from bringing a claim against respondent. As we have indicated, supra, only the limitations issue and the sufficiency of the claim were properly presented below, we will, accordingly, address those issues in determining whether Elizabeth’s claim is barred by the limitation on presentation of claim statute or by the sufficiency issue. 13 The first is whether the letter sent ²⁷⁹ from Elizabeth to Todd is a presentment of a claim within the time provided by statute. The second is whether respondent is estopped from asserting the limitation on presentation of claim statute because of his actions prior to being appointed personal representative. We are first going to examine the nature of filing claims and the duties of a personal representative and if those duties can commence prior to the personal representative being appointed.

We will then resolve whether the letter sent from Elizabeth to Todd was the presentment of a claim and whether respondent is estopped from asserting that the claim filed by Elliott violates the limitation on presentation of claim statute because of Todd’s actions prior to being appointed personal representative. A. Claims In order for a claim to be properly filed against an estate, there are several requirements that it must satisfy. A claim must be filed within the time prescribed by the statute, it must be presented in the statutorily required form, and it must be presented to the statutorily required person or entity, i.e., a personal representative or a Register of Wills, or suit must be filed in respect to the claim. For a claim against an estate to be valid it must be presented in accordance with the time restrictions of Maryland Code (1974, 2001 Repl.Vol.), section 8-103 of the Estates and Trusts Article. 14 Section 8-103 states, in relevant part, that: § 8-103.

Limitation on presentation of claim. (a) General. — Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute with respect to claims of the United States and the State, all claims against an estate of a decedent, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or ²⁸⁰ unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, are forever barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and legatees, unless presented within the earlier of the following dates: (1) 6 months after the date of the decedent’s death; or (2) 2 months after the personal representative mails or otherwise delivers to the creditor a copy of a notice in the form required by § 7-103 of this article or other written notice, notifying the creditor that his claim will be barred unless he presents the claim within 2 months from the mailing or other delivery of the notice. Ferguson died on July 5, 1998. The claim presented by Elliott, as executor of the estate of Elizabeth, was filed on April 7, 1999, over nine months after Ferguson was deceased.

The claim presented by Elliott was clearly in violation of section 8 — 103(a)(1) and was properly barred by the Orphans’ Court unless respondent is estopped from asserting that the claim violates section 8-103 or unless the provisions of section 6-105 are applicable under the circumstances of the case at bar. 15 The manner and form for presentment of a claim is governed by Maryland Rule 6-413 and Maryland Code (1974, 2001 Repl.Vol.), section 8-104 of the Estates and Trusts Article. 16 Maryland Rule 6-413, in relevant part, states: Rule 6-413. Claim against estate — Procedure. (a) Presentation of claim. A claimant may make a claim against the estate, within the time allowed for presenting claims, (1) by serving it on the personal representative, (2) by filing it with the register and serving a copy on the personal representative, or (3) by filing suit.

If the claim is filed prior to the appointment of the personal ²⁸¹ representative, the claimant may file the claim with the register in the county in which the decedent was domiciled or in any county in which the decedent resided on the date of the decedent’s death or in which real property or a leasehold interest in real property of the decedent is located. (b) Content of claim. A claim against the decedent’s estate shall indicate (1) the basis of the claim, (2) the name and address of the claimant, (3) the amount claimed, (4) if the claim is not yet due, the date when it will become due, (5) if the claim is contingent, the nature of the contingency, and (6) if the claim is secured, a description of the security. Unless the claim is made by filing suit, it shall be verified.

Section 8-104 states, in relevant part, that: § 8-104. Manner of presentation of claim; form. (a) Presentation of claims. — Claims against an estate of a decedent may be presented as provided in this section. (b) Delivery to the personal representative. — The claimant may deliver or mail to the personal representative a verified written statement of the claim indicating its basis, the name and address of the claimant, and the amount claimed.

If the claim is not yet due, the date when it will become due shall be stated. If the claim is contingent, the nature of the contingency shall be stated. If the claim is secured, the security shall be described. The failure of the claimant to comply with the provisions of this section or with the reasonable requests of the personal representative for additional information may be a basis for disallowance of a claim in the discretion of the court.

(c) Filing with register. — -The claimant may file a verified written statement of the claim, substantially in the form contained in this subsection. If the claim is filed prior to the appointment of the personal representative, the claimant may file his claim with the register in the county in which the decedent was domiciled or in any county in which he resided on the date of his death or in which real property or a leasehold interest in real property of the decedent is ²⁸² located. If the claim is filed after the appointment of the personal representative, the claimant shall file his claim with the register of the county in which probate proceedings are being conducted and shall deliver or mail a copy of the statement to the personal representative. Petitioner contends that the letter sent by Elizabeth to Todd was the presentment of a claim to a personal representative.

Petitioner contends that the letter was in substantial compliance with the requirements of section 8-104 and Maryland Rule 6 — 413. The Orphans’ Court determined that the letter could not have been a claim since Todd had not been appointed co-personal representative of Ferguson’s estate when he received the letter. Therefore, the Orphans’ Court held that the claim, in violation of section 8-104(b) and Rule 6 — 413(a), was not properly presented to a personal representative. The question is whether section 8-104 and Rule 6-413 would allow a claim to be presented to a person who was not a personal representative but who was eventually appointed a personal representative.

Section 8-104 and Maryland Rule 6-413 allow for claims to be presented to the personal representative, to the register with a copy sent to the personal representative, or to the register prior to the appointment of a personal representative. The section clearly lays out at least the preferred method for presenting a claim prior to the appointment of a personal representative. At the time that Elizabeth sent the letter to Todd, he had not been appointed the co-personal representative for Ferguson’s estate, nor was he named as such in the will. Petitioner contends that even though Todd had not been named the co-personal representative of Ferguson’s estate, he eventually became the co-personal representative.

Therefore, although Elizabeth may not have presented the claim to the personal representative, she did present the claim to the person who would become a co-personal representative, so a co-personal representative had knowledge of the claim. Petitioner, for the first time on appeal, looks to Maryland Code (1974, 2001 Repl.Vol.), section 7-101 of the Estates and Trusts Article to demonstrate that Todd had a duty toward ²⁸³ Elizabeth to act upon her letter that was presented before his appointment, as a claim after his appointment. Section 7-101, in relevant part, states: § 7-101. Duties of personal representative generally.

(a) Fiduciary responsibility. — A personal representative is a fiduciary. He is under a general duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of the will and the estates of decedents law as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the circumstances. He shall use the authority conferred upon him by the estates of decedents law, by the terms of the will, by orders in proceedings to which he is party, and by the equitable principles generally applicable to fiduciaries, fairly considering the interests of all interested persons and creditors. Petitioner contends, for the first time on appeal, that section 7-101 establishes that a personal representative has a fiduciary responsibility, including a responsibility to fairly consider the interests of all creditors.

Petitioner believes that this obligation entrusted Todd with the obligation to consider all interests, not just the interests of the estate. Petitioner contends that once Todd had knowledge of the claim, even if it occurred prior to him being appointed personal representative, he had a fiduciary responsibility to consider and act upon the claim. According to petitioner, Todd’s failure to act would result in his being estopped from asserting the “statute of limitations.” 17 In order for respondent to be estopped, if he can be, from asserting the provisions of the limitation on presentation of claim statute or for Elizabeth’s letter that she sent to Todd to qualify as a claim, petitioner, had it properly preserved the issue, must show that Todd’s actions, prior to being appointed co-personal representative, bind Ferguson’s estate. Petitioner, again for the first time on appeal, looks to Maryland Code (1974, 2001 Repl.Vol.), section 6-105 of the Estates and Trusts ²⁸⁴ Article to show that actions by a person prior to being appointed personal representative can bind the estate.

Section 6-105 states: § 6-105. Time of accrual of duties and powers; ratification. (a) When letters are issued. — The duties and powers of a personal representative commence upon the issuance of his letters, but when done in good faith, his acts occurring prior to appointment have the same effect as those occurring after. (b) Acts of others. — A personal representative may ratify and accept acts done on behalf of the estate by others if the acts would have been proper for a personal representative.

We have held that “[t]he acts of a person prior to appointment as personal representative may act to bind an estate, and the personal representative may ratify actions taken prior to appointment.” Chapman v. Kamara, 356 Md. 426, 441 , 739 A.2d 387, 395 (1999). Petitioner contends that under section 6-105, Todd’s actions prior to being appointed co-personal representative either bind respondent to recognize Elizabeth’s letter as a claim or estop respondent from asserting the provisions of the limitation of presentation of claim statute under section 8-103. B. Presentment of a Claim Petitioner contends that under section 6-105, Todd had the authority to bind Ferguson’s estate prior to his appointment and that he did bind the estate through his actions when he requested from Elizabeth any bills of Ferguson’s that she incurred while Ferguson was in the hospital. Petitioner also contends that when Elizabeth then sent a letter to Todd with a list of checks, that letter was a valid presentment of a claim.

We hold that the letter was not a valid presentment of a claim because the claim was not in substantial compliance with section 8-104(b) and Rule 6-413(a), by not being presented to a personal representative or to the Register of Wills. ²⁸⁵ This Court has never had the opportunity to directly address the questions now presented. The Court of Special Appeals, however, has held that claimants have to be in substantial compliance with sections 8-103 and 8-104. In Lampton v. LaHood, 94 Md.App. 461 , 617 A.2d 1142 (1993), 18 the Court of Special Appeals stated that: The sole authority cited by Lampton in support of her argument is Lowery v. Hairston, supra [ 73 Md.App. 189 , 533 A.2d 922 (1987) ]. There, plaintiffs filed an action against the personal representative of an estate seeking specific performance of a real estate purchase option.

The circuit court dismissed the action, finding that the option constituted a “claim” under § 8-103(a) and that the plaintiffs had failed to file the claim in a timely fashion. We reversed, holding that three letters from the plaintiffs to the personal representative, which were sent and received by him prior to the statutory deadline for claims, and in which were stated the names and addresses of the claimants, the terms of the option, and their intent and ability to exercise it, constituted substantial and timely compliance with the statute. This holding is, as we noted then, entirely consistent with the “use of the word ‘may’ throughout § 8-104,” indicating that the forms of presentment are “permissive and not mandatory in nature.” 73 Md.App. at 197 n. 2, 533 A.2d 922 . The view that substantial, rather than strict compliance, is all that is necessary, has also been adopted by other courts interpreting similar statutes.

See e.g., Peterson v. Marston, 362 N.W.2d 309 (Minn.1985); Quinn v. Quinn, 772 P.2d 979, 981 (Utah App.1989); Strong Bros. Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of Strong, 666 P.2d 1109 (Colo.App.1983). See also Matter of Estate of Phillips, 532 A.2d 654 (D.C.App.1987). To permit substantial compliance with these kinds of statutory requirements, does not, however, sanction the ²⁸⁶ elimination of such requirements altogether.

There must still be compliance with the statute, indeed there must be “substantial compliance” with it. Lampton does not cite any case, from any jurisdiction, in which a court has held that in the absence of some writing — whether it be a formal claim, or a letter, or a memorandum, or a lawsuit — a claimant has been held to have substantially complied with a claims notice statute like § 8-104. In Lowery and all of the out-of-state cases cited above, the claimant timely notified the personal representative of the claim by a writing of some kind. Id. at 469-70, 617 A.2d at 1146 (emphasis added); see Chamberlin v. Carter, 835 F.Supp. 869, 874 (D.Md.1993); Lowery v. Hairston, 73 Md.App. 189, 197 , 533 A.2d 922, 927 (1987).

Considering only section 8-104 and Rule 6-413, 19 we hold that a claimant is not in substantial compliance with section 8-104 and Rule 6-413 when the claimant presents a claim to a person who has not been appointed the personal representative. When Elizabeth sent her letter dated July 24, 1998 to Todd, Ferguson’s will was not yet filed with the Register of Wills. It was not filed until September 9, 1998, nearly seven weeks later and after Elizabeth was dead. At the time that the will was filed, the will named Donna and Benjamin Baird as personal representatives.

At the time that Elizabeth sent her letter to Todd, not only was he not the personal representative, but he was not even named in the will as the personal representative. It was not until September that Todd was appointed co-personal representative, after the personal representatives named in the will renounced their appointment. 20 ²⁸⁷ We note that the language of section 8-104 and Rule 6-413 would indicate that a claim cannot be presented to a person who has not been appointed a personal representative. Section 8-104 and Rule 6-413 both make allowances for the proper procedure a claimant is to follow if a personal representative has not been appointed. If a personal representative has not been appointed, then a claim should be filed with the Register of Wills, or a suit should be filed.

As stated numerous times, supra, in the case sub judice, not only was Todd not yet appointed a co-personal representative when he received the letter from Elizabeth, but he was not even named in the will as the personal representative. Under the facts of the case sub judice, we cannot find that Elizabeth was in substantial compliance with section 8-104(b) and Rule 6^13(a) when she sent a letter to Todd approximately two months before he was appointed personal representative and at a time when he was not named in the will as a personal representative. The record gives no indication of Todd’s stating to Elizabeth that he was or was not going to be the personal representative. There is also no proof that Todd thought, or had any indication that, he was going to be the personal representative when he asked Elizabeth to send him any bills she incurred while his father was in the hospital.

He may well have been considering personally paying such bills. His inaction after receiving the letter from Elizabeth further confirms that he was not acting as a personal representative. We can find no evidence in the record that would indicate that Elizabeth ever thought that Todd was the personal representative and that was