Cure v. State

HARRELL, J. We issued a writ of certiorari in this case to revisit a question we addressed most recently in Brown v. State, 373 Md. 234 , 817 A.2d 241 (2003), namely, whether a defendant, who reveals a prior conviction in his or her direct examination during the defense case-in-chief (knowing that the trial judge ruled in limine that the State will be allowed to impeach him or her with the prior conviction in cross-examination), waives his or her right to appellate review of the trial judge’s in limine ruling. Secondly, this case presents an opportunity to consider the admissibility vel non of a prior arson conviction for impeachment purposes. ³⁰⁵ Deltavia Cure (“Cure” or “Petitioner”) challenges here the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals (affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City), which reasoned in its supporting opinion that, under the plurality opinion in Brown , a defendant who acknowledges, on direct examination in the defense case, the existence of a prior conviction, waives his or her right to appellate review of the trial judge’s prior determination that the conviction may be used by the prosecution for impeachment purposes. Despite holding the issue to be waived, the Court of Special Appeals proceeded to reach the merits of using Cure’s prior conviction for arson as impeachment evidence, explaining that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling in limine that Cure’s prior arson conviction was admissible for impeachment purposes. Before this Court, Cure argues generally that, on the issue of waiver, the plurality opinion for the Court in Brown is not controlling because it represented the views of only three of the seven participating judges.

Moreover, Cure contends that, knowing the State will be allowed to impeach him if he testifies, “drawing the sting out” of a prior conviction is a valid trial tactic that serves to further the policies underlying the Rules of Evidence. 1 Denying a defendant this potential tactical maneuver, by threat of waiver, disadvantages him or her unfairly. Finally, Cure avers that an arson conviction has little impeachment value and, under these facts, fails the balancing test established in Maryland Rule 5-609. We hold, for reasons to be explained more fully infra, that when a defendant elects to testify and, in doing so, testifies affirmatively on direct examination to the existence of a prior conviction in order to “draw the sting out” of that conviction, he or she does not waive necessarily his or her right to appellate review of the merits of the trial judge’s prior in limine determination that the prosecution may use the conviction for impeachment purposes. Upon reaching the merits of ³⁰⁶ Cure’s argument vis á vis the use of his conviction of arson for impeachment purposes, we hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in ruling that Cure’s prior arson conviction could be used.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS On 14 March 2008, Baltimore City Police arrested and charged Cure with two counts of possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance, two counts of conspiracy to distribute a controlled dangerous substance, and two counts of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance. The arrest followed an investigation by Detective Randolph, who testified that he observed Cure engaging in behavior resembling the dealing of drugs in the 800 block of North Bond Street in Baltimore City. According to Detective Randolph, Cure was wearing a black skull cap, a black sweatshirt with a red design on the back, and blue jeans.

Cure testified, however, that at the time of his arrest, he was wearing a white hooded sweatshirt with a black fingernail design and pajama pants. Cure also denied involvement in any drug activity and contended that the police mistook him for someone else. On the first day of his trial, 12 January 2009, Cure moved for a ruling that the prosecution not be allowed to introduce certain of Cure’s prior convictions, should he testify. The following exchange occurred: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Mr. Cure has two prior convictions that could be used to impeach him if he decides to testify.

I mean, we haven’t made that decision yet, obviously and so, I mean we would want a hearing as to whether or not the State would be allowed to use those convictions to impeach him. [COURT]: Well, what are they? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So, I didn’t know—one is—they were both when he was a juvenile, but was charged and ³⁰⁷ convicted as an adult. One is attempted murder and the other was arson. [PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, actually the State doesn’t believe any attempt falls under— [COURT]: Neither do I. [PROSECUTOR]:—falls under, but there was a, let me, let me back up first, again. There was a conviction separately of first degree arson. The State would like to bring that up and then in that, attempted first degree murder case, there was a conviction for the use of a handgun in the commission of a felony. [COURT]: Well, that’s not an impeachable [sic]. [PROSECUTOR]: That leaves us with the first degree arson, Your Honor. [COURT]: Yeah and the same argument that applies to possession with intent to distribute applies to arson.

It’s done secretly, covertly with knowledge that an individual is violating the law. Essentially, it’s the same reasoning. I’d let that in. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor, and certainly we would object and my argument would be obviously that the prejudicial effect of an arson would like so inflame the jury that he couldn’t get a fair trial. [COURT]: That may be prejudicial, but in a legal sense, it’s not. Of course, albeit, did that happen within the last 15 years? [PROSECUTOR]: It did, Your Honor.

I’ll have the exact dates for you in a second. [COURT]: Do you agree it happened within the last 15 years? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor. [PROSECUTOR]: March of 2001, Your Honor. [COURT]: Mm-hmm and all evidence that’s against the defendant is prejudicial. The question is, is it prejudicial in a legal sense and I don’t believe it is. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor. ³⁰⁸ On the second day of the trial, Cure, knowing of the trial judge’s ruling on his earlier motion in limine regarding use of the arson conviction, elected to testify in his own defense. Prior to testifying, Cure’s attorney advised him on the record of his Fifth Amendment rights, as well as reminding him of the court’s ruling that the arson conviction would be admissible for impeachment purposes during any cross-examination by the prosecutor. The following relevant exchange occurred: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Now, do you understand that we’ve already had a hearing on this and [the judge] has ruled that if you testify, the State can ask you about your arson conviction, right, and you understand that the jury can take that into consideration not as to whether you’re guilty of this charge or not.

However, they can take that into consideration as to whether your testimony is believable or not. Do you understand that? [PETITIONER]: Yes. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Now that you know all of that, do you still want to testify? [PETITIONER]: Yes. During direct examination, Cure and his defense counsel attempted to “draw the sting out” 2 of his prior arson conviction by acknowledging it. The revelation unfolded as follows: ³⁰⁹ [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Now, this is not your first brush with the law.

In fact, you have a prior conviction; is that correct? [PETITIONER]: Yes, sir. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And that conviction is for first degree arson; is that correct? [PETITIONER]: Yes, sir. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You’re on probation for that right now; aren’t you? [PETITIONER]: Yes. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And you served time for that; didn’t you? [PETITIONER]: Yes. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: When was that conviction? [PETITIONER]: That was—I actually was convicted March the 7th, 2001. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: 2001. How old were you at the time that this alleged offense took place? [PETITIONER]: I was 16 at the time. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You were 16 years old. [PETITIONER]: Yes, sir. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. So and in fact, you’re on probation to the Violent Offenders Unit— [PETITIONER]: Yeah, it’s the Violence Prevention Unit. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And what does that mean? [PETITIONER]: Well, basically what it is is people who have been convicted from my understanding, what it is is that people have been convicted of a violent crime, they just implemented this as I believe my PO [Parole Officer] had told me— [PROSECUTOR]: Objection. [THE COURT]: Sustained. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And how often do you have to report? [PETITIONER]: Every single week. ³¹⁰ [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Every single week. [PETITIONER]: And call in twice a week. [PROSECUTOR]:Objeetion. Relevance. [THE COURT]: Okay.

Go ahead. During cross-examination, the State did not inquire directly regarding the arson conviction. The only exchange in cross-examination that touched indirectly on the prior arson conviction was in Cure’s response to the prosecution’s questioning about the alleged accomplice (McNeil) in the present case. The exchange was as follows: [PROSECUTOR]: Sir, how long have you known Mr. McNeil? [PETITIONER]: Well, as you brought up my incarceration, I was locked up for seven and a half years.

So I just— The jury returned a guilty verdict as to each count against Cure. The trial judge sentenced Cure to three concurrent ten-year terms of incarceration for the convictions for possession with intent to distribute heroin, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and conspiracy to distribute heroin. Cure appealed timely to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that he could be impeached with his prior arson conviction. The Court of Special Appeals, in a reported opinion, Cure v. State, 195 Md.App. 557, 561 , 7 A.3d 145, 147 (2010), and relying upon Brown , held that by introducing the conviction during direct examination, Cure waived his right to appellate review of the trial court’s in limine decision to allow the State to impeach him with the prior arson conviction.

See Cure, 195 Md.App. at 573 , 7 A.3d at 154 (“As we perceive no reason why the contemporaneous objection rule[ 3 ] should be ‘bent’ in this case, ³¹¹ we hold that the issue presented by Cure is not preserved for our review.”). The intermediate appellate court, finding ambiguity regarding this Court’s position on the waiver issue due to the “unusual disposition” of Brawn, 4 distinguished Brown from Cure’s case. See Cure, 195 Md.App. at 571 , 7 A.3d at 152 . Our appellate colleagues reasoned that, even if they were to hold that Cure’s objection to the in limine ruling that his prior arson conviction would be admissible for impeachment purposes had not been waived through his testimony about it, he failed nonetheless to meet the requirements for an exception to the contemporaneous objection rule under the rationale of the dissent in Brown.

See Cure, 195 Md.App. at 572 , 7 A.3d at 153 (“The record before us, however, does not reflect that the defense renewed its objection to the court’s ruling of the previous day that the State could impeach Cure with the prior arson conviction, or that the trial court affirmed its earlier ruling.” (footnote omitted)). The appellate court found significant: (1) Cure did not renew his objection to the admittance of the conviction on the day of his testimony; (2) the defense elicited more information about the conviction than simply its existence; and (3) the prosecution did not mention the conviction directly during cross-examination of Cure and, therefore, concluded that it was “persuaded that the facts in the present case are sufficiently distinguishable from those in Brown.” Cure, 195 Md.App. at 573 , 7 A.3d at 154 . Even though the Court of Special Appeals held that Cure waived his right to appellate review of the admissibility of his conviction for impeachment purposes, the panel (as appellate courts are wont to do frequently as an exercise in completeness and “belt and suspenders” support of its judgment) addressed the merits of the issue, stating that, “although a prior arson conviction is no longer admissible per se on the grounds that it is an ‘infamous crime,’ the fact that it is an ‘infamous crime’ in and of itself indicates that it is germane to ³¹² a witness’s credibility.” Cure, 195 Md.App. at 581, 7 A.3d at 159 . The Court concluded: “Accordingly, we reject Cure’s contention that ‘the impeachment value of an arson conviction is virtually non-existent.’ Rather, the impeachment value is assumed by virtue of the fact that it is an ‘infamous crime.’ ” Id.

Accordingly, the panel of the intermediate appellate court stated that, waiver aside, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to rule that Cure’s arson conviction would be admissible for impeachment purposes. Cure filed timely a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted, Cure v. State, 418 Md. 190 , 13 A.3d 798 (2011), to consider the following questions: (1) When the trial court ruled prior to jury selection that the State could impeach Mr. Cure with his prior conviction for first-degree arson, did Mr. Cure waive his right to complain on appeal about the Court’s ruling by testifying about the conviction during his direct examination? (2) Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it ruled that the State could impeach Mr. Cure with his prior conviction for first-degree arson? For reasons to be explained more fully infra, we hold that, on this record, Cure did not waive his ability to seek appellate review of the trial judge’s ruling that the prior conviction for arson may be used potentially for impeachment purposes.

On the merits of Cure’s argument regarding the impeachment value of a prior arson conviction, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing use of Cure’s prior arson conviction. DISCUSSION I. Waiver. In Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753 , 120 S.Ct. 1851 , 146 L.Ed.2d 826 (2000), the United States Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant’s “drawing the sting out” of a prior conviction by testifying regarding the conviction on direct examination amounts to waiver of appellate review of the conviction’s admissibility for impeachment purposes. Maria Ohler was charged with the importation of and possession ³¹³ with intent to distribute marijuana.

Ohler, 529 U.S. at 754-55 , 120 S.Ct. at 1852 , 146 L.Ed.2d at 829 . The Government filed pre-trial motions seeking an in limine ruling on whether Ohler’s prior conviction for possession of methamphetamine could be used as either character or impeachment evidence. See Ohler, 529 U.S. at 755 , 120 S.Ct. at 1852 , 146 L.Ed.2d at 829 . Although the federal district court ruled that the conviction would not be allowed as character evidence, it held that the conviction could be used as impeachment evidence.

Id. Upon direct examination during the defense case-in-chief, presumably to “draw the sting out” of the conviction, Ohler testified regarding her prior conviction. See id. Ultimately, she was convicted on both of the marijuana counts.

Id. Ohler appealed on the ground that it was improper for her prior conviction for possession to be used as impeachment evidence. Ohler, 529 U.S. at 755 , 120 S.Ct. at 1852-53 , 146 L.Ed.2d at 829-30 . The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that, by testifying to the conviction under direct examination, Ohler waived the issue for appellate review.

Ohler, 529 U.S. at 755 , 120 S.Ct. at 1853 , 146 L.Ed.2d at 830 . In a five-to-four decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the issue was waived on appeal, reasoning that, “[generally, a party introducing evidence cannot complain on appeal that the evidence was erroneously admitted.” Ohler, 529 U.S. at 755 , 120 S.Ct. at 1853 , 146 L.Ed.2d at 830 . The Court also rejected Ohler’s argument that applying the waiver rule in this situation “compels a defendant to forgo the tactical advantage of pre-emptively introducing the conviction in order to appeal the in limine ruling,” explaining that, ultimately, both sides must make many strategic choices during trial. Ohler, 529 U.S. at 757 , 120 S.Ct. at 1853 , 146 L.Ed.2d at 830-31 ; see Ohler, 529 U.S. at 757 , 120 S.Ct. at 1854 , 146 L.Ed.2d at 831 (“Whatever the merits of these contentions, they tend to obscure the fact that both the Government and the defendant in a criminal trial must make choices as the trial progresses.”).

To highlight this particular tactical crossroads, the Court stated: The defendant must choose whether to introduce the conviction on direct examination and remove the sting or take her ³¹⁴ chances with the prosecutor’s possible elicitation of the conviction on cross-examination. The Government too, in a case such as this, must make a choice. If the defendant testifies, it must choose whether or not to impeach her by use of her prior conviction. Ohler, 529 U.S. at 758 , 120 S.Ct. at 1851 , 146 L.Ed.2d at 831 .

Finally, the Court reasoned that, as held in Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 , 105 S.Ct. 460 , 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984), 5 “[o]nly when the government exercises its option to elicit the testimony is an appellate court confronted with a case where, under the normal rules of trial, the defendant can claim the denial of a substantial right if in fact the district court’s in limine ruling proved to be erroneous.” Ohler, 529 U.S. at 759 , 120 S.Ct. at 1854-55 , 146 L.Ed.2d at 832 . The Court concluded: “For these reasons, we conclude that a defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the admissions of such evidence was error.” Ohler, 529 U.S. at 760 , 120 S.Ct. at 1855 , 146 L.Ed.2d at 832 . Justice Souter’s dissent rejected the Majority’s reliance upon Luce. See Ohler, 529 U.S. at 761 , 120 S.Ct. at 1856 , 146 ³¹⁵ L.Ed.2d at 833 (Souter, J., dissenting). 6 In contrast to the defendant in Luce , Ohler testified in her defense.

Ohler, 529 U.S. at 755 , 120 S.Ct. at 1852 , 146 L.Ed.2d at 829 . Whereas the harm in Luce was purely speculative, in Ohler , because the defendant testified, there was “a factual record on which Ohler’s claim can be reviewed ... and there is no question that the in limine ruling controlled her counsel’s decision to enquire about the earlier conviction.” Ohler, 529 U.S. at 761 , 120 S.Ct. at 1856 , 146 L.Ed.2d at 833 . For this reason, the dissent explained “the case raises none of the practical difficulties on which Luce turned, and Luce does not dictate today’s result.” Id. The main thrust of Justice Souter’s dissent addressed the Majority’s stance that “there is nothing ‘unfair’ ... about putting petitioner to her choice in accordance with the normal rules of trial.” Ohler, 529 U.S. at 763 , 120 S.Ct. at 1857 , 146 L.Ed.2d at 834-35 .

Justice Souter argued that “[a]ny claim of a new rule’s fairness under normal trial conditions will have to stand or fall on how well the rule would serve the objects that trials in general, and the Rules of Evidence in particular, are designed to achieve.” Ohler, 529 U.S. at 763 , 120 S.Ct. at 1857 , 146 L.Ed.2d at 835 . The Rules are structured, Justice Souter averred, to facilitate the pursuit of truth rather than to outline particular trial strategies. See id. (“The question is not which side gains a tactical advantage, but which rule assists in uncovering the truth.”). “Drawing the sting out” of a prior conviction is, therefore, a valid trial tactic because of the prejudicial effect that might result if a defendant was perceived as concealing the full truth.

See Ohler, 529 U.S. at 764 , 120 S.Ct. at 1857 , 146 L.Ed.2d at 835 (“The jury may feel that in testifying without saying anything about the convictions the defendant has meant to conceal them. The jury’s ³¹⁶ assessment of the defendant’s testimony may be affected not only by knowing that she has committed crimes in the past, but by blaming her for not being forthcoming when she seemingly could have been.”). Because “drawing the sting out” avoids this unnecessary prejudice, the dissent explained, “[allowing the defendant to introduce the convictions on direct examination thus tends to promote fairness of trial without depriving the Government of anything to which it is entitled.” Id. According to the Ohler dissent, as the underlying purpose of the Rules are served, a rule that punishes a defendant for utilizing this valid trial tactic with waiver of right to appeal is unnecessary.

Ohler, 529 U.S. at 764 , 120 S.Ct. at 1857-58 , 146 L.Ed.2d at 885 . The majority of state appellate courts to consider the issue, after Ohler , rejected the reasoning of the Ohler Majority. Although Ohler is binding on federal courts, it is not binding on state courts because the waiver issue does not implicate federal constitutional principles that are mandatory upon state courts. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 280 , 128 S.Ct. 1029, 1041 , 169 L.Ed.2d 859, 871 (2008) (“This [federal] interest in uniformity, however, does not outweigh the general principle that States are independent sovereigns with plenary authority to make and enforce their own laws as long as they do not infringe on federal constitutional guarantees.”).

One reason many state appellate courts rejected the Majority’s rationale in Ohler was because the decision ran contrary to preexisting state precedents. See e.g., State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 654 (Minn.2006) (“In light of our prior decisions on these issues, we hold that a defendant who testifies about his convictions on direct examination after denial of a motion in limine to exclude those convictions has not forfeited the opportunity to appeal the admissibility of those prior convictions.” (emphasis added)); State v. Gary M.B., 270 Wis.2d 62 , 676 N.W.2d 475, 482 (2004) (“The Court’s formulation of the strategic waiver rule in Ohler is contrary to the approach Wisconsin courts have utilized. Finally, as the dissent recognized in Ohler, the majority’s holding is against the great weight of academic authority.” (emphasis added)); State v. ³¹⁷ Daly, 623 N.W.2d 799, 801 (Iowa 2001) (“Moreover, the rule of waiver is contrary to established 'precedent in this state.” (emphasis added)); State v. Cross, 2002 WL 234832 , at ², 2002 Wash.App. LEXIS 288, at ⁶ (Wash.Ct.App. 19 February 2002) (“Even if we were inclined to agree with the general holding in Ohler, that rule is contrary to established precedent in this state.” (emphasis added)). Pre-Ohler contrary state precedents aside, other courts that have addressed the Ohler majority’s reasoning have been disinclined to follow its lead, favoring, rather, the reasoning of Justice Souter’s dissent.

See Pineda v. State, 120 Nev. 204 , 88 P.3d 827, 831 (2004) (“States that have rejected Ohler have done so because a trial court is fully aware of the proposed evidence and law when ruling on such evidence in limine, and it is a poor trial tactic for defense attorneys to wait for the prosecution to introduce such evidence on cross-examination.”); Zola v. Kelley, 149 N.H. 648 , 826 A.2d 589, 593 (2003) (“We therefore decline to follow Ohler and conclude that when a trial judge makes a definitive pretrial ruling that evidence of a prior conviction is admissible, a party’s preemptive introduction of that evidence does not automatically waive the issue for appellate review.”); State v. Keiser, 174 Vt. 87 , 807 A.2d 378, 388 (2002) (“Without recounting at length the other reasons and authority cited by the dissent in Ohler for not finding waiver in circumstances such as these, we adopt its reasoning in concluding that defendant did not waive his objection to the admission of his prior DWI’s when he testified to them on direct examination rather than waiting for the State to elicit them.”); State v. Thang, 145 Wash.2d 630 , 41 P.3d 1159, 1168 (2002) (“We agree with Justice Souter’s analysis. A defense lawyer who introduces preemptive testimony only after losing a battle to exclude it cannot be said to introduce the evidence voluntarily.”). 7 ³¹⁸ In Maryland, we spoke to this issue in Brown . Calvin Brown, who was on trial for second degree assault, had been convicted previously of possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute. See Brown, 373 Md. at 235, 817 A.2d at 242 .

At the close of the State’s case, Brown argued to the trial judge that the prior conviction should not be admissible as impeachment evidence, as the risk of unfair prejudice outweighed its probative value. Brown, 373 Md. at 236 , 817 A.2d at 242 . The trial court disagreed. Id.

Following this ruling, Petitioner elected to testify on his own behalf. During his direct examination, petitioner admitted that he had been convicted of the criminal offense of possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance. On cross-examination, in response to the State’s question, petitioner confirmed the conviction. The jury convicted petitioner and the trial court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of eight years.

Id. Brown appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed in an unreported opinion. Id. Before the Court of Appeals, Brown (similar to Cure) argued, that (1) “drawing the sting out” of a prior conviction should not constitute a waiver of appellate review as to the admissibility of that conviction for impeachment purposes, and (2) that his prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute was more prejudicial than it was probative of his character for truthfulness.

See Brown, 373 Md. at 237 , 817 A.2d at 242-43 . The Court fractured on how to decide the case. As Judge Wilner explained in dissent: This is a peculiar setting. Judge Raker’s opinion announces the judgment of the Court.

She would hold that by revealing his prior conviction on direct examination, petitioner waived any right to complain about the trial court’s earlier ruling that evidence of that conviction was admissi ³¹⁹ ble. Only two other judges share that view, however. I disagree with it, as do Chief Judge Bell and Judge Eldridge. Although Judge Harrell agrees that the issue was not waived, he would hold that evidence of the conviction was nonetheless admissible.

I disagree with that as well; so do Chief Judge Bell and Judges Eldridge and Raker. When coupled with Judge Raker’s view that petitioner’s complaint was waived, however, Judge Harrell’s conclusion as to admissibility suffices to create four votes to affirm the judgment. Brown, 373 Md. at 251-52 , 817 A.2d at 251-252 . This “peculiar setting” is what the Court of Special Appeals identified here as creating ambiguity in the ultimate holding of the Court, and merits us revisiting the question of whether a defendant waives his or her right to appellate review of the admissibility of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes when, under direct examination in the defense case, he or she attempts to “draw the sting out” of the conviction by “confessing” to that conviction before the State has the opportunity to confront him or her.

Judge Raker’s opinion (announcing the judgment of the Court) began by relying on the long-settled general proposition in Maryland law that “a party introducing evidence cannot complain on appeal that the evidence was erroneously admitted.” Brown, 373 Md. at 238 , 817 A.2d at 243 (citations omitted). She then discussed Ohler , stating: “Although not binding on this Court, we agree with the majority’s reasoning in Ohler.” Brown, 373 Md. at 239 , 817 A.2d at 244 . The opinion bolstered its stance by citing dicta from Johnson v. State, 9 Md.App. 166, 177 , 263 A.2d 232, 239 (1970), overruled on others grounds by Bailey v. State, 263 Md. 424 , 283 A.2d 360 (1971), where the Court of Special Appeals “observe[d] that if the prior conviction was introduced by the defendant himself rather than by the State, he thereby waives objection.” Brown, 373 Md. at 242 , 817 A.2d at 245 . Finally, Judge Raker explained that, because the defense made no objection during direct examination of the defendant, its position “runs counter to the requirement in Maryland for a contemporaneous objec ³²⁰ tion to the admission of evidence.” Id.

The plurality held ultimately “that petitioner may not now complain that the evidence that he introduced himself in his direct testimony was not admissible. By introducing the evidence of his prior convictions in his direct testimony, he has waived the issue for appellate review.” Brown, 373 Md. at 243 , 817 A.2d at 246 . Judge Wilner’s dissent in Brown rejected both Judge Raker’s views and the Majority’s holding in Ohler . Like the dissent in Ohler , Judge Wilner began by addressing the purpose behind the rules of evidence.

See Brown, 373 Md. at 258 , 817 A.2d at 255 (Wilner, J., dissenting) 8 (“Maryland Rule 5-102, which states the general purpose of the rules of evidence, makes clear that one of the functions of those rules is ‘that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.’ ” (footnote omitted)). Recognizing the particular challenges associated with admitting evidence impeaching a criminal defendant, Judge Wilner noted that “[l]ay people, and, I expect, even lawyers may have considerable difficulty in putting what they regard as logic and common experience aside and treat this powerful experiential evidence as affecting only one’s credibility as a witness.” Brown, 373 Md. at 260 , 817